Biden nominees hype China
threat on Capitol Hill
Rahm Emanuel and Nicholas Burns had an
opportunity to rein in Congress’s thirst for
conflict with Beijing, but they took the
bait instead.
By Michael D. Swaine
October 24, 2021 -- "Information
Clearing House -
"Responsible
Statecraft "-
As has now become commonplace for
serving and prospective U.S. officials when
appearing before the Congress,
ambassador-designees Rahm Emanuel (for
Japan) and Nicholas Burns (for China)
focused their testimonies on Capitol Hill
this week primarily on the threats China
poses to the United States, offering no more
than a vague nod in the direction of
cooperation.
Their prepared testimony and responses to
questions were almost all about zero-sum
competition and rivalry with Beijing,
building stronger anti-China blocs (centered
on the U.S.-Japan alliance), and dealing
from a position of strength.
There was no mention of the obvious
workings of an interactive, negative dynamic
between Washington and Beijing involving
ever-greater levels of worst case
assessments on both sides. And there was
little or no hint of policy priorities and
an overall strategy for the region, beyond
countering China and strengthening alliances
for that purpose.
No Advertising - No
Government Grants - This Is Independent Media
Get Our Free
Newsletter
On Taiwan, Burns stated that the United
States “cannot trust China on Taiwan,” but
neglected to mention that the same holds
true for China with regard to the United
States. Both sides are focusing on what each
regard as resolute deterrence actions, with
little in the way of credible reassurances.
This just leads to more deterrence efforts
and drives us toward confrontation and
possible conflict.
Burns’ call to deepen security
cooperation and expand arms provisions to
Taiwan might bring smiles to the faces of
many lawmakers, but it will not stabilize
Taiwan. Deterrence is certainly needed, but
so too are genuinely credible actions in
support of the One China policy.
To his credit, Burns did not make China
out to be a behemoth bent on destroying
everything, as many in Congress insist. But
his correct analysis on this point was still
leveraged toward encouraging competition;
Burns implied that China’s
less-than-gargantuan size would make it
easier to defeat Beijing in great power
competition.
Unfortunately Emanuel towed the
congressional line on China even more than
Burns did, defining the U.S.-Japan
relationship as almost entirely for the
purpose of countering China. He mistakenly
suggested that Asian states want Washington
to weigh in more heavily in opposing
Beijing. In reality they want the United
States to play a more active role by both
balancing against China where needed while
increasing common incentives in support of
an inclusive, more cooperative regional
order that includes China. That’s why few
Asian countries have gotten behind the Quad
concept:
they do not necessarily want to join an
anti-China bloc.
While it is understandable that
administration nominees seeking
congressional approval want to avoid
alienating many members of Congress in their
thirst to “get China,” it is distressing
nonetheless to see two key Asia nominees
pandering to the worst congressional
instincts while offering little in the way
of balanced strategic assessments.