A New York Times story pinning an assassination
on Ukraine was a blockbuster, but why was it
made public? How news in the "Information
Warfare" age has become incomprehensible
By Matt Taibbi
October 07, 2022:
Information Clearing House-- "Stubstack"
- On Wednesday, October 5, the
New York Times published a blockbuster
story, “U.S.
Believes Ukrainians Were Behind an Assassination
in Russia.” Citing “American officials” in
claiming “United States intelligence agencies”
now believe “parts of the Ukrainian government”
were responsible for the car-bomb assassination
of Russian nationalist Daria Dugina* on August
19th, the paper wrote:
The United States took no part in
the attack, either by providing
intelligence or other assistance, officials
said. American officials also said they were
not aware of the operation ahead of time and
would have opposed the killing had they been
consulted. Afterward, American officials
admonished Ukrainian officials over the
assassination, they said.
The article is a Rubik’s cube whose stickers
have been switched all over, leaving no possible
solution. Turn it over as much as you like, you
won’t figure out what you’re reading.
The key news is clearly the fact the article
was even published. Someone in the U.S.
government took an extraordinary step of outing
our intelligence agencies’ supposed belief that
Ukraine was involved in the bombing. Writers
Julian E. Barnes, Adam Goldman, Adam Entous and
Michael Schwirtz do at one point address this,
saying “Countries traditionally do not discuss
other nations’ covert actions,” but in this
case, “some American officials believe it is
crucial” to “curb what they see as dangerous
adventurism, particularly political
assassinations.”
All this info was ascribed to a “closely held
assessment of Ukrainian complicity,” also
referred to throughout as an “American
intelligence assessment,” which was “shared
within the U.S. government last week.” Who wrote
the assessment? What office? The piece doesn’t
say, but does add toward the bottom that
“officials from the State Department, National
Security Council, Pentagon and C.I.A. declined
to comment on the intelligence assessment.”
Reading the news since the invasion has
become a kaleidoscopic guessing game. There are
just too many factors warping the informational
landscape now to make sense of anything.
Aggressive content moderation and
self-censorship mean you won’t see a skeptical
point of view in many if not most news reports.
The blurring of lines between private press and
officialdom — more on that in a moment — means
you almost never know if you’re reading
something leaked intentionally, or accidentally.
Finally, the U.S. has been
boasting for seven months now about its use
of media as a war weapon, deploying special
“tiger teams” of National Security Officials who
leak intelligence for strategic reasons. In
those cases, leaders in Russia or China or Syria
or wherever rather than the ostensible
readership might be a newspaper’s real target
audience.
“It’s what we used to call, when the Russians
did it, information warfare,” former CIA officer
John Sipher
clucked proudly in The Guardian
before the invasion.
In the extant New York Times piece,
you don’t know if you’re reading a piece of news
leaked by someone in the White House in defiance
of the intelligence officials who wrote the
assessment, or if it was leaked by someone in
the intelligence services in defiance of the
White House. It also could be a unified front of
officials who brought the story to the Times
to send a message to Ukraine, Russia, or
both. It could be the U.S. government expressing
general displeasure, both with whichever of the
“competing power centers within the Ukrainian
government” was responsible for the
assassination, and with whatever “parts of the
Ukrainian government…may not have been aware of
the plot.”
Along with the strings of phrases about how
that the U.S. wasn’t happy about “Ukraine’s
aggressive covert operations” (“took no part,”
“would have opposed… had they been consulted,”
“admonished,” etc) came a passage promising that
despite this, there have been no “known changes”
in the “provision of intelligence, military and
diplomatic support to Mr. Zelensky’s
government.” Taken altogether, you can read this
as a thinly veiled hint, as in: “Hey, stop
whacking people outside Ukraine, or we’ll cut
off all the Javelins.”
That makes some sense, but then you’re right
back to the first and most glaring fact of the
article. You can threaten Zelensky with the
yanking of weapons shipments all you want, in
private. Why do so publicly, while also
announcing to the world that Ukraine engaged in
cross-border assassination? The State Department
just last year
sanctioned Russia for its “operation to
assassinate or surveil” Alexey Navalny. We also
expelled 60 Russian diplomats in 2018 after
an ostensible poisoning involving ex-spy Sergei
Skripal in England. Obviously this is not the
same situation, but you’re exposing Ukraine to a
variety of accusations by declaring them guilty
of the Dugina blast.
Is the point here to let the Russians know
that anyone can be reached? I’m pretty sure they
already know that — I guarantee the top Kremlin
military brass have all seen Godfather Part
II along with all the important hood movies
— but are we just making double-sure they got
the message? Is this one of those stories that
is, as Sipher put it, “meant for one consumer:
Vladimir Putin”? It sounds like it, here:
Since the beginning of the war, Ukraine’s
security services have demonstrated their
ability to reach into Russia to conduct
sabotage operations. The killing of Ms.
Dugina, however, would be one of the
boldest operations to date —
showing Ukraine can get very close to
prominent Russians.
A million years ago, when working part-time
for a newspaper in New Bedford, Massachusetts, I
covered an abandoned house fire. As I watched
flames lick up the side of the house, three
teenagers walked up. They told me they heard
that “three hoodlums” set the fire, and they
were “real bold, too” because the fire was
started in broad daylight. They went into
deadpan detail about the “rumors” of how the
crime was committed before walking off. I
thought of them with a laugh when I read the
“one of the boldest operations to date” line
above. Is that what this is about? Credit? On
the life-imitating-art front, have we really
reached the Wag the Dog stage?
On a more serious note, how are we to
interpret passages like this?
The United States has tried
carefully to avoid unnecessary escalation with
Moscow throughout the conflict — in part by
telling Kyiv not to use American equipment or
intelligence to conduct attacks inside of
Russia…
You can see the last traces of editorial
discretion on the part of the New York Times
in the use of the word “unnecessary.” Not
even the most hardcore Ukrainian-flag-emoji-bearing
reader could have swallowed a line that the U.S.
has “tried to avoid escalation” with Russia,
with near-weekly reports of new
billions in arms shipments and places like
The Intercept telling us that the U.S.
now has a “much
larger presence of both CIA and U.S. special
operations personnel and resources” in
theater (I fear the godlike
wrath of the Brookings Institute too much to
bring up the Nord Stream blasts). “Unnecessary
escalation” must be a phrase both the paper and
the paper’s sources can live with, but it’s
frustrating that so many passages in so many
stories now exist in gray areas between official
statement and editorial comment.
Not long ago, a newspaper would have wrapped
the whole of the above pull quote in a clear
attribution, as in, “The officials the Times
spoke with insist the U.S. has tried to
avoid unnecessary escalation…” The biggest gift
you can give an official source is to put his or
her statement in the newspaper’s own “objective”
voice, which once carried the imprimatur of
apolitical fact. This is why companies paid
premiums for “native
advertising,” i.e. ads disguised as
newspaper articles (or other typical content).
It’s why the Internet
melted down in 2013 when The Atlantic
ran an “article” that was actually a
Church of Scientology ad, and why the
Columbia Journalism Review once
wrote, “Editorial will forever be the cat,
and native advertising,
Pepe Le Pew.” Smart newspapers eschewed
native advertising because it killed the
proverbial cat.
No knock against the four writers in this
piece, but it’s become almost impossible for
ordinary readers to discern what’s cat and
what’s skunk in a lot of news copy, particularly
national security coverage, and particularly war
coverage. Former CIA chief Michael Hayden in
Playing to the Edge boasted about calling
the Times and the Washington Post
to “scotch” certain stories, saying he “did
talk a lot to the Times’s Washington
bureau chief, Phil Taubman,” whom he
complimented for being able to balance “the
needs of transparency and security.” The
Times even then was known for killing or
delaying certain stories at the request of
government, and the phenomenon seems to have
accelerated a great deal since, with stories
involving Trump, Russia, and Ukraine in
particular giving off whiffs of intense
press-government cooperation.
Lastly, there’s this passage:
The American officials who
spoke about the intelligence did not disclose
which elements of the Ukrainian government were
believed to have authorized the mission… United
States officials briefed on the Ukrainian action
and the American response spoke on the condition
of anonymity, in order to discuss secret
information and matters of sensitive diplomacy.
How are we to make sense of this fretting
over secrecy and tradecraft, in the context of a
front page New York Times story? Though
possible, it doesn’t feel believable that these
sources fear internal retribution for leaking.
The story more has the character of an official,
approved enterprise, making the Times
ululations about sensitivity feel not quite
believable. If this info is so sensitive, why
are sources handing it to a gang of reporters?
From an intelligence official’s perspective,
that’s like giving a monkey a hand grenade,
unless of course you control the monkey (I
realize we’ve had a surfeit of animal metaphors
by now). There are just too many blurred lines,
and newspapers have given up trying to un-blur
them for us, even though they used to consider
it a primary responsibility. They have more
important clients now.
Is this story ass-covering ahead of a
revelation of U.S. involvement in the Dugina
affair, even just on the level of providing
intelligence? Is it the White House pissed at
the Pentagon that it happened, the Pentagon
pissed at the White House that it happened, both
pissed at Ukraine, neither? Who the hell knows?
Maybe they’re just “sowing discord,” not even
between groups, but within our own heads? One of
the few former intelligence sources I know
chuckled over the story. “The CIA used to do
this kind of thing to influence foreign public
opinion,” he said. “Now they do it to misinform,
distract, and confuse the American public.”
That’s just great, isn’t it?
*I did not know Daria Dugina, and am pretty
sure I never met her father, who was a friend of
former eXile columnist Eduard Limonov.
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