Somehow, when it
comes to Congress and the mainstream media,
the true strangeness of the Pentagon budget
always is missing in action. Despite
arguments about the small things, just about
everyone accepts that the United States must
have a monstrous, all-powerful military and
a military budget beyond compare (beyond, in
fact, all comprehension). And nothing seems
to truly dent that sensibility. Somehow, the
fact that the Pentagon has been utterly
incapable of winning — yes, actually
winning! — a war that matters (or even half
matters) since World War II never fully
seems to penetrate, not even on the 20th
anniversary of the
, America’s
own Ukraine. (Only former president George
W. Bush, who launched that invasion, gets
it,
The lesson is
all too clear: the more that’s spent on our
military and the more potentially
destructive it gets, the less it’s actually
able to accomplish. Despite all but
obliterating North Korea from the air, it
couldn’t beat that country’s military (aided
by China’s) in the early 1950s; it lost
disastrously to distinctly under-armed
rebels in Vietnam in the 1960s and early
1970s; and did so again more recently to the
half-baked forces of the Taliban in
Afghanistan. The response of Congress to
such disasters in this century: rewarding
the Pentagon with yet more barrels of money.
On March 13th, the Pentagon rolled out
its proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2024.
The results were — or at least should have
been — stunning, even by the standards of a
department that’s used to getting what it
wants when it wants it.
The new Pentagon budget would come in at
$842 billion. That’s the highest level
requested since World War II, except for the
peak moment of the Afghan and Iraq wars,
when the United States had nearly
200,000 troops deployed in those two
countries.
$1 Trillion for the Pentagon?
It’s important to note that the $842
billion proposed price tag for the Pentagon
next year will only be the beginning of what
taxpayers will be asked to shell out in the
name of “defense.” If you add in nuclear
weapons work at the Department of Energy and
small amounts of military spending spread
across other agencies, you’re already at a
total military budget of
$886 billion. And if last year is any
guide, Congress will add tens of billions of
dollars extra to that sum, while yet more
billions will go for emergency aid to
Ukraine to help it fend off Russia’s brutal
invasion. In short, we’re talking about
possible total spending of well over $950
billion on war and preparations for more of
it — within striking distance, in other
words, of the $1 trillion mark that hawkish
officials and pundits could only dream about
a few short years ago.
The ultimate driver of that enormous
spending spree is a seldom-commented-upon
strategy of global military overreach,
including
750 U.S. military bases scattered on
every continent except Antarctica,
170,000 troops stationed overseas, and
counterterror operations in at least
85 — no, that is not a typo — countries
(a count offered by Brown University’s Costs
of War Project). Worse yet, the Biden
administration only seems to be preparing
for more of the same. Its
National Defense Strategy, released late
last year, manages to find the potential for
conflict virtually everywhere on the planet
and calls for preparations to win a war with
Russia and/or China, fight Iran and North
Korea, and continue to wage a global war on
terror, which, in recent times, has been
redubbed “countering violent extremism.”
Think of such a strategic view of the world
as the exact opposite of the “diplomacy
first” approach touted by President Joe
Biden and his team during his early months
in office. Worse yet, it’s more likely to
serve as a recipe for conflict than a
blueprint for peace and security.
In an ideal world, Congress would
carefully scrutinize that Pentagon budget
request and rein in the department’s overly
ambitious, counterproductive plans. But the
past two years suggest that, at least in the
short term, exactly the opposite approach
lies ahead. After all, lawmakers added
$25 billion and
$45 billion, respectively, to the
Pentagon’s budget requests for 2022 and
2023, mostly for special-interest projects
based in the states or districts of key
members of Congress. And count on it, hawks
on Capitol Hill will push for similar
increases this year, too.
How the Arms Industry Captures
Congress
The $45 billion by which Congress
increased the Pentagon’s budget request last
year was among the highest levels on record.
Add-ons
included five extra F-35 jet fighters
and a $4.7 billion boost to the shipbuilding
budget. Other congressional
additions included 10 HH-60W
helicopters, four EC-37 aircraft, and 16
additional C-130J aircraft (at a cost of
$1.7 billion). There were also provisions
that
prevented the Pentagon from retiring a
wide array of older aircraft and ships —
including B-1 bombers, F-22 and F-15 combat
aircraft, aerial refueling planes, C-130 and
C-40 transport aircraft, E-3 electronic
warfare planes, HH-60W helicopters, and the
relatively new but
disastrous Littoral Combat Ships (LCS),
referred to by detractors as “little
crappy ships.”
The lobbying effort to prevent the Navy
from retiring those problem-plagued ships is
a
case study of all that’s wrong with the
Pentagon budget process as it works its way
through Congress. As the New York Times
noted in a
detailed analysis of the checkered
history of the LCS, it was originally
imagined as a multi-mission vessel capable
of detecting submarines, destroying
anti-ship mines, and doing battle with the
kinds of small craft used by countries like
Iran. Once produced, however, it proved
inept at every one of those tasks, while
experiencing repeated engine problems that
made it hard even to deploy. Add to that the
Navy’s view that the LCS would be useless in
a potential naval clash with China and it
was decided to
retire nine of them, even though some
had only served four to six years of a
potential 25-year lifetime.
Contractors and public officials with a
stake in the LCS, however, quickly mobilized
to block the Navy from shelving the ships
and ultimately saved five of the nine slated
for retirement. Major players included a
trade association representing companies
that had received contracts worth
$3 billion to repair and maintain those
vessels at a shipyard in Jacksonville,
Florida, as well as other sites in the U.S.
and overseas.
The key congressional players in saving
the ship were Representative John Rutherford
(R-FL), whose district includes that
Jacksonville shipyard, and Representative
Rob Wittman (R-VA), whose district includes
a major naval facility at Hampton Roads
where maintenance and repair work on the LCS
is also done. I’m sure you won’t be
surprised to learn that, in 2022, Wittman
received
hundreds of thousands of dollars in
arms-industry campaign contributions,
including substantial
donations from companies like Lockheed
Martin, Raytheon, and General Dynamics with
a role in the LCS program. When asked if the
lobbying campaign for the LCS influenced his
actions, he
said bluntly enough, “I can’t tell you
it was the predominant factor… but I can
tell you it was a factor.”
Former Representative Jackie Speier
(D-CA), who tried to make the decision to
retire the ships stick, had a
harsh view of the campaign to save them:
“If the LCS was a car sold in America
today, they would be deemed lemons, and
the automakers would be sued into
oblivion… The only winners have been the
contractors on which the Navy relies for
sustaining these ships.”
Not all members of Congress are wedded to
the idea of endlessly increasing Pentagon
spending. On the progressive side,
Representatives Barbara Lee (D-CA) and Mark
Pocan (D-WI) have introduced a
bill that would cut $100 billion a year
from the department’s budget. That figure
aligns with a 2021 Congressional Budget
Office
report outlining three paths toward
Pentagon budget reductions that would leave
the U.S. with a significantly more than
adequate defense system.
Meanwhile, members of the right-wing
Freedom Caucus and their allies have
promised to push for a
freeze on federal discretionary spending
at Fiscal Year 2022 levels. If implemented
across the board, that would mean a
$75 to $100 billion cut in Pentagon
spending. But proponents of the freeze have
been unclear about the degree to which such
cuts (if any) would affect the Department of
Defense.
A number of Republican House members,
including Speaker Kevin McCarthy, have
indeed
said that the Pentagon will be “on the
table” in any discussion of future budget
cuts, but the only specific items mentioned
have involved curbing the Pentagon’s “woke
agenda” — that is,
defunding things like alternative fuel
research — along with initiatives aimed at
closing unnecessary military bases or
reducing the size of the officer corps.
Such moves could indeed save a few billion
dollars, while leaving the vast bulk of the
Pentagon’s budget intact. No matter where
they stand on the political spectrum,
proponents of trimming the military budget
will have to face a congressional majority
of Pentagon boosters and the arms industry’s
daunting influence machine.
Greasing the Wheels: Lobbying,
Campaign Contributions, and the Job Card
As with the LCS, major arms contractors
have routinely greased the wheels of access
and influence in Congress with campaign
contributions to the tune of
$83 million over the past two election
cycles. Such donations go mainly to the
members with the most power to help the
major weapons producers. And the arms
industry is fast on the draw. Typically, for
instance, those corporations have already
expanded their collaboration with the
Republicans who, since the 2022 election,
now head the House Armed Services Committee
and the House Appropriations Committee’s
defense subcommittee.
The latest figures from OpenSecrets, an
organization that closely tracks campaign
and lobbying expenditures, show that new
House Armed Services Committee chief Mike
Rogers (R-AL)
received more than $511,000 from weapons
makers in the most recent election cycle,
while Ken Calvert (R-CA), the new head of
the defense appropriations subcommittee,
followed close behind at $445,000. Rogers
has been one of the most aggressive members
of Congress when it comes to
pushing for higher Pentagon spending.
He’s a longstanding booster of the
Department of Defense and has more than
ample incentives to advocate for its agenda,
given not just his own beliefs but the
presence of major defense contractors
like Boeing and Lockheed Martin in his
state.
Contractors and members of Congress with
arms plants or military bases in their
jurisdictions routinely use the jobs
argument as a tool of last resort in pushing
the funding of relevant facilities and
weapons systems. It matters little that the
actual economic impact of Pentagon spending
has been greatly exaggerated and more
efficient sources of job creation could,
with the right funding, be developed.
At the national level, direct employment
in the weapons sector has dropped
dramatically in the past four decades, from
3.2 million Americans in the mid-1980s to
one million today, according to
figures compiled by the National Defense
Industrial Association, the arms industry’s
largest trade group. And those one million
jobs in the defense sector represent just
six-tenths of one percent of the U.S.
civilian labor force of more than
160 million people. In short, weapons
spending is a distinct niche sector in the
larger economy rather than an essential
driver of overall economic activity.
Arms-related employment will certainly
rise as Pentagon budgets do and as ongoing
expenditures aimed at arming Ukraine
continue to do so as well. Still, total
employment in the defense sector will remain
at modest levels relative to those during
the Cold War, even though the current
military budget is
far higher than spending in the peak
years of that era.
Reductions in defense-related employment
are masked by the tendency of major
contractors like Lockheed Martin to
exaggerate the number of jobs associated
with their most significant weapons-making
programs. For example, Lockheed Martin
claims that the F-35 program creates
298,000 jobs in 48 states, though the real
figure is closer to half that number (based
on
average annual expenditures on the
program and estimates by the Costs of War
Project that military spending creates about
11,200 jobs per billion dollars spent).
It’s true, however, that the jobs that do
exist generate considerable political clout
because they tend to be in the states and
districts of the members of Congress with
the most sway over spending on weapons
research, development, and production.
Addressing that problem would require a new
investment strategy aimed at easing the
transition of defense-dependent communities
and workers to other jobs (as outlined in
Miriam Pemberton’s
new book Six Stops on the National
Security Tour: Rethinking Warfare Economies).
Unfortunately, the major contractors are
ever better positioned to shape future
debates on Pentagon spending and strategy.
For example, a newly formed congressional
commission charged with evaluating the
Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy mostly
consists of experts and ex-government
officials with
close ties to those weapons makers. They
are either executives, consultants, board
members, or staffers at think tanks with
substantial industry funding.
And sadly, this should shock no one. The
last time Congress created a commission on
strategy, its membership was also heavily
slanted towards individuals with
defense-industry ties and it recommended a
3% to 5% annual increase in Pentagon
spending, adjusted for inflation, for years
to come. That was well more than what the
department was then projected to spend. The
figure that the commission recommended
immediately became a rallying cry for
Pentagon boosters like Mike Rogers and
former ranking member of the Senate Armed
Services Committee James Inhofe (R-OK) in
their efforts to push spending even higher.
Inhofe typically treated that document as
gospel, at one point
waving a copy of it at a congressional
hearing on the Pentagon budget.
“An Alert and Knowledgeable
Citizenry”
The power and influence of the arms
industry are daunting obstacles to a change
in national priorities. But there is
historical precedent for a different
approach. After all, given enough public
pressure, Pentagon spending
did drop in the wake of the Vietnam War,
again at the end of the Cold War, and even
during the deficit reduction debates of the
early 2010s. It could happen again.
As President Dwight D. Eisenhower noted
in his famous
farewell address in 1961, the only
counterbalance to the power of the
military-industrial complex is an “alert and
knowledgeable citizenry.” Fortunately, a
number of individuals and groups are working
hard to sound the alarm and mobilize
opposition to massive overspending on war
and preparations for more of it. Coalitions
like
People Over Pentagon and organizations
like the
Poor People’s Campaign continue to
educate the public and work to increase the
number of congressional representatives in
favor of reining in the Pentagon’s bloated
budget and shifting funds to areas of urgent
national need.
As of now, the Pentagon consumes
more than half of the federal
government’s discretionary budget. That, in
turn, means the funds needed to prevent
pandemics, address climate change, and
reduce poverty and inequality have taken a
back seat. Those problems aren’t going away
and are likely to pose greater threats to
American lives and livelihoods than
traditional military challenges. As that
reality becomes clearer to ever more
Americans, the Pentagon’s days of virtually
unlimited funding may indeed come to an end.
It’s not the work of a day or a year, but it
certainly is essential to the safety and
security of this country and the world.
This article originally appeared at
TomDispatch.com. To receive TomDispatch
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Copyright 2023 William D. Hartung