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I n his State of the Union address Tuesday, President Bush will
undoubtedly boast about his administration's achievements during
the last two years. But, try as he may to put the best spin on a
number of major foreign policy issues, he will be hard-pressed to
explain the government's many blunders.
Although Bush's commitment to do the right thing and safeguard
our national interests has shaped his foreign policy initiatives,
these policies have been at best counterproductive, at worst
potentially disastrous.
Bush and his advisors came to the White House with an aversion
to any major foreign policy objective or initiative supported by
President Clinton. Their personal distaste for the former
president has blinded them from seeing the merit in some of
Clinton's soundest policies.
To name only three of these instances: The administration has
insisted that Clinton invested too much of his political capital
on the failed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, did not stand up
to the North Koreans when it became known that they had an active
nuclear program underway and allowed Saddam Hussein to amass
weapons of mass destruction.
Bent on correcting what it saw as grave mistakes, the Bush
administration shaped different strategies to deal with these and
other issues. The result is that two years later the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict has intensified to the brink of
disaster, the prospects of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula
are very real, and the United States is about to initiate a war
against Iraq.
No objective observer can suggest that the Clinton policies
were perfect. Yet they provided the basis on which a new
administration could build. Regardless of how faulty were
Clinton's mediating efforts at Camp David in 2000, he succeeded in
bringing Israelis and Palestinians closer to an agreement than
ever before. Instead of appointing a presidential envoy to bring
all necessary pressure to bear on the two sides to make the final
concessions for peace, the Bush administration totally rejected
Clinton's peace formula, virtually leaving both sides to their own
devices. Another choice would have prevented the disastrous
escalation in hostilities and, in this respect, helped the war
against terrorism by removing one of its major causes.
As for Bush's fixation on Hussein, it remains inexplicable.
Yes, Hussein is a ruthless leader with an unsatiated appetite for
weapons of mass destruction who must be disarmed. But with U.N.
Resolution 1441 enforcing a much tougher inspection regime, we
need to be clear and more patient about how we wish to achieve our
objective, with war being a last resort.
If Iraq's declaration about its weapons program is incomplete
or inaccurate, we must show evidence of this before we accuse it
of noncompliance substantial enough to justify war. If the U.N.
inspectors uncover no smoking gun, the administration must share
its intelligence with them on the whereabouts of Iraq's forbidden
weaponry.
In the end, we may have to go to war with Iraq because we've
painted ourselves into a corner. But as opposition to war grows
inside and outside the U.S., we can exert sustained political and
military pressure on Iraq that could by itself eventually bring
about a change in regime.
Turning to North Korea, the situation has now boiled over into
a crisis. However much North Korea misbehaved by flagrantly
violating its 1994 agreement with us, Bush's bellicose remarks
have underscored our incredible immaturity in dealing with rogue
states that operate according to values, historical perspectives
and views of their place in the international community that are
far different from our own.
At the outset, the administration basically severed all contact
with this isolated nation. North Korea responded by raising the
stakes: It secretly resumed the production of uranium in violation
of the 1994 agreement; it evicted the inspectors with the
International Atomic Energy Agency; and it withdrew from the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and announced that it would soon
resume missile testing. The North Koreans see these measures as
deterrence against a preemptive attack by the United States. They
are not entirely paranoid.
Why wouldn't the North Koreans assume that after we settle our
score with Iraq, we will turn our guided bombs and missiles
against them? Nothing can justify North Korea's reckless behavior.
But refusing to negotiate because we do not want to appease or be
blackmailed by Pyongyang deprives us of the leverage that
negotiations offer. In any negotiation with North Korea, the U.S.
must make its position and expectations consistently clear: North
Korea must disassemble its nuclear program.
If we have no ill intentions toward North Korea, we should
state this in face-to-face talks. Why is it OK to communicate
through New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, a Democrat (with the
acquiescence of Secretary of State Colin Powell) but refuse to
enter into substantive and direct talks that could defuse the
crisis?
Pyongyang wants our attention; it despairs of receiving it,
including any significant aid. It needs to see that a prospect for
serious relief exists for its people. It is in our best interests,
and those of our allies, especially South Korea and Japan, to
neutralize the crisis and develop a cohesive strategy to deal with
North Korea on a permanent basis. How Bush and his national
security team end the crises in the Middle East and the Korean
peninsula will have a tremendous effect on our moral leadership in
the ever-changing global geopolitical landscape.
Alon Ben-Meir teaches international relations at the New
School University, New York, and is the Middle East project
director at the World Policy Institute in New York.
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