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The ties that tangle Iraq and Iran
By M K Bhadrakumar
11/28/05 "Asia
Times" -- -- The meeting of the board of governors
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at Vienna last week
on the Iran nuclear issue turned out to be a poker game. The United
States dealt from a weak hand, likely knew it had a weak one, but
thought that with some bravado and luck it could carry the day.
An atmosphere of suspense was created in the run-up to the meeting,
a lot of dust was raised, and under the cloud cover the US gained
another few months until March to put pressure on Iran.
Washington hopes that by March there may be greater clarity
about the shape of things to come in Iraq - and, in turn, how much
regional clout Iran may come to wield that could have a bearing on
its nuclear policy. Iraq is due to stage parliamentary elections in
December.
In the face of Iranian "intransigence" over the IAEA's September 24
resolution, conceivably, Washington should have upped the ante at
Vienna on November 24. But it hasn't. In September, the IAEA's
35-nation board of governors formally accused Iran of non-compliance
with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), paving the way for
referral to the United Nations Security Council and possible
sanctions.
The US apparently allowed itself to be persuaded to give Iran more
time to ponder over a "Russian proposal" that would involve the
construction of an enrichment facility in Russia in which Iran would
have management and financial interest, but not a technical
interest.
The Russians themselves say in some embarrassment that their
"proposal" is nothing new and that it was first put across to Iran a
year ago. Iranians maintain that they want to hear more about the
"Russian proposal". Meanwhile, they, too, came up with a "proposal"
that they were open to foreign participation in any uranium
enrichment activity within Iran.
Immediately before the IAEA meeting began last week, Iranian Foreign
Minister Manoucher Mottaki said in Vienna, that "enrichment [of
uranium] and the fuel cycle are things that the Islamic Republic of
Iran considers to be its natural and legitimate right and within the
framework of the NPT."
A spate of American statements has appeared alongside, claiming that
Russia and China have been "enlisted" by Washington on the Iran
nuclear issue. These statements create an impression that the
international community now onward (comprising the US, the EU-3 -
Germany, Britain and France - Russia and China) will be working in
concert to get Tehran to agree to the "Russian proposal".
American statements claimed that President George W Bush raised the
issue with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, during his
recent Far East tour - and Putin was in "a problem-solving mode" (to
quote US National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley).
Hadley added that the Russians were feeling "frustrated" with the
Iranians. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice claimed separately
that China, too, by abstaining over the September 24 resolution, was
distancing itself from Iran.
Moscow and Beijing, however, seem uncomfortable that Washington is
arbitrarily hijacking their Iran policy. Their foreign ministries
have since crisply restated their consistent position favoring a
solution to the Iran nuclear issue within the IAEA.
There is also ambiguity whether Russia will be a participant or be
an honest broker, or just a facilitator at any future meeting
between the EU-3 and Iran.
What stands out is that Washington resorted to grandstanding in
order to cover up the accelerating collapse of its regional policy
in Iraq, which surely casts a shadow on the US capacity to force its
will on the Iran nuclear issue.
All protagonists - the EU-3, Russia and Iran - seem to realize this
stark reality. The danger now is that Iran may overreach. Moscow and
Beijing have counseled Tehran to be flexible.
But, on the other hand, Russia does seem to be in a "problem-solving
mode" over Iraq. At a meeting in Busan, South Korea, between Bush
and Putin on November 18, Iraq figured in the discussions. Bush, who
faces a nasty domestic crisis over the Iraq war and who might even
be keen to avoid a showdown with Iran, could do with some Russian
help.
According to Hadley, Bush was "anxious to find ways" to get Putin
"to be supportive of what the Iraqis are doing" so that there was
"progress" in Iraq. Bush and Putin discussed "a couple of ways that
might be done". Hadley wouldn't publicly discuss such a sensitive
topic but, essentially, the US was "trying to find ways in which
Russia can contribute to the progress [in Iraq]".
It does not need a second guess to divine that Washington will be
much obliged if Russia can use its traditional influence with
Ba'athist elements in Iraq to settle for a reconciliation. The Iraqi
elections are due in mid-December. The Arab League is working on an
intra-Iraqi conference in February. The success of the conference
hinges on the participation by the Ba'athist faction.
For the Americans, there is a tight calendar ahead. Opposition to
the war is cascading in the US. The three-day Iraqi national
reconciliation conference that ended in Cairo last Monday agreed on
two major points: that there should be a timetable for the
withdrawal of foreign troops from Iraq, and, second, that resistance
to foreign troops was the right of all Iraqis, while terrorism
remained reprehensible.
The influential daily al-Hayat reported that the participants of the
Cairo conference envisaged the withdrawal of foreign forces from
Iraqi cities within six months (say, mid-May) and that the
withdrawal would be completed over a period of two years (by end
2007).
According to al-Hayat, the American ambassador in Iraq, Zalmay
Khalilzad, concurred with this timetable, and, in Cairo, Sunni
insurgent groups met with American functionaries.
Following the Cairo conference, the two Kurdish leaders, President
Jalal Talabani and Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, headed in two
directions - Tehran and Moscow. The Kurds are naturally anxious
about new patterns appearing on the Iraqi political tapestry. They
have maximum stakes in limiting any Ba'athist role in Iraqi
politics.
Following Zebari's "working visit" to Moscow, the potentials of
Russian involvement in Iraq have been clarified. Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov strongly supported the forthcoming
intra-Iraqi conference in February and offered Russia's help in the
Arab League's efforts toward a "deepening" of intra-Iraqi dialogue
so as to "narrow the base for violence".
But Lavrov emphasized that Russia expected Baghdad to honor Russian
oil companies' multi-billion dollar contracts signed with Saddam
Hussein's regime. Zebari's response was ambivalent. "The Iraqi
government recognizes its responsibility for the contracts Russia
signed during Saddam Hussein's rule," Zebari said, but "regulating
Iraq's political and economic ties with Russia would be up to the
next permanent Iraqi government".
So, what about the "next permanent Iraqi government"? That was what
Talabani's visit to Tehran was about. Talabani, who has kept close
contacts with the Iranian regime for the past few decades, was
naturally given a red-carpet welcome.
Talabani's discussions brought out the following. Iran will not
easily countenance an accommodation of Ba'athist elements in Iraq's
power structure - something that suits Talabani, too. Second, the US
attitude toward Iran (over its nuclear program) will impact on
Iran's willingness to cooperate over orderly US troop withdrawal
from Iraq. Third, instead of a pan-Arab identity for Iraq, Tehran
visualized that Iraq "will glitter in the world of Islam in the near
future" (to quote Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei). Fourth, Iran is
determined to play an assertive role in shaping Iraq's political
future.
Thus, on balance, Washington has sought Moscow's help in stabilizing
Iraq and thereby facilitating an early American troop withdrawal.
Moscow on its part is willing to move in tandem with (pro-American)
Arab regimes in the region in persuading alienated Sunni groups to
reconcile. And Iran has reminded all concerned about the influence
it wields in the region.
As things stand, never before have the two strands - the Iraq
problem and the Iran nuclear issue - become so closely intertwined.
M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service for over 29 years, with postings including India's
ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd
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