|
Atomic hypocrisy
Neither Bush nor Blair is in a position to take a high moral line on
Iran's nuclear programme
By Tony Benn
11/30/05 "The
Guardian" -- -- Britain has played a leading role in
the negotiations with Iran about its nuclear programme and the risk
that it might lead to the development of an atomic bomb, and may
well seek to take the matter to the UN security council.
Given that the prime minister himself is determined to upgrade
Trident and appears to be committed to a new series of nuclear power
stations, his position as the defender of the non-proliferation
treaty is not very credible, and if we are to understand the depth
of western hypocrisy on this question we should look back at the
history, which has been conveniently forgotten.
Thirty years ago, on January 7 1976, as secretary of state for
energy I went for a long discussion with the Shah in his palace in
Tehran, and much of the time was spent discussing the plans he had
to develop a major nuclear-power programme in Iran.
I had been well briefed on his proposals by Dr Akbar Etemad of the
Iranian Atomic Energy Organisation, who had told me that he intended
to build a 24 megawatt capacity by 1994, which was bigger than the
programme Britain itself had at that time, and he expressed an
interest in the centrifuges that are essential for reprocessing,
while assuring me that he was anxious to avoid nuclear
proliferation. My diary covering my talk to the Shah about the
sources of his nuclear technology reveals that he told me that he
was "getting it from the French and the Germans and might even get
it from the Soviets - and why not?"
It was only a year later that Dr Walter Marshall of the Atomic
Energy Authority, my own adviser, announced that he was also the
Shah's adviser on nuclear policy, and had prepared a scheme under
which the Shah would order the Westinghouse pressurised-water
reactor (PWR) if Britain would do the same, and that Iran was
prepared to put up the money - a plan that I was determined to
fight. It was actually being suggested as part of this deal that
Iran would become a 50% owner of our nuclear industry for the
purpose of building the PWRs.
Marshall had, without any authority from me, apparently suggested
that Britain abandon our advanced gas cooled reactors and order up
to 20 PWRs, and I formed the impression that he took the view, as
many in the nuclear industry did, that proliferation was inevitable
and there was not much you could do about it. Indeed he almost said
as much.
For all these reasons I was totally opposed to this whole idea, and
what was most worrying to me was the virtual certainty that it would
lead to nuclear proliferation and the development of atomic weapons
by Iran. It was never approved. Sir Jack Rampton, my permanent
secretary, who seemed to be as keen as Marshall on the adoption of
the PWR, and who was directly consulted by the prime minister, was
clearly pressing this approach, and Jim Callaghan himself wanted me
to go along with it.
At a cabinet committee meeting held on May 4 1977, Jim, while
expressing his concern about nuclear proliferation, argued that we
should not reject the Iranian approach since he thought that either
the Germans or the French would take it up.
An added complication arose when it turned out that since nuclear
power was, under Euratom, seen by the Foreign Office as being within
the legal competence of the European commission, the British
government might be unable to take its own view.
Most astonishing of all, in the light of the present discussions, is
that the problem of Iran developing such a huge nuclear capacity
caused no problems for the Americans because, at that time, the Shah
was seen as a strong ally, and had indeed been put on the throne
with American help.
There could hardly be a clearer example of double standards than
this, and it fits in with the arming of Saddam to attack Iran after
the Shah had been toppled, and the complete silence over Israel's
huge nuclear armoury, which is itself a breach of the
non-proliferation treaty.
The International Atomic Energy Agency and its chief, Mohamed
ElBaradei, were recently awarded the Nobel peace prize for their
work on non-proliferation, but since that treaty provided that the
nuclear-weapons states should negotiate their own disarmament
agreement, which has not happened, it is clear that for them the NPT
does not matter.
Now there is a proposal to report Iran to the UN and ElBaradei could
find himself in the same position as was Hans Blix, the Iraq arms
inspector who was used by Washington for its own purposes, with the
US seeking a UN resolution to condemn Iran and then, if that fails,
acting unilaterally using force, as in Iraq.
If the problems now being discussed can be dealt with in a practical
way through the IAEA, there is a real chance of an agreed solution,
and that is what we should be demanding since neither Bush nor Blair
is in a position to take a high moral line.
As I am strongly opposed to nuclear weapons and civil nuclear power,
these comments should not be taken as endorsing what Iran is doing;
but Britain's past nuclear links with Iran should encourage us to be
very cautious and oppose those whose arguments could be presented as
justifying a case for war, which cannot be justified.
Tony Benn was the secretary of state for energy from 1975-79 -
tony@tbenn.fsnet.co.uk
© Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
Translate
this page
(In accordance with Title 17
U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed without profit to
those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the
included information for research and educational purposes.
Information Clearing House has no affiliation whatsoever with the
originator of this article nor is Information Clearing House
endorsed or sponsored by the originator.) |
