| Letter #3 CONFIDENTIAL
FM TASHKENT
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 63
OF 220939 JULY 04
INFO IMMEDIATE DFID, ISLAMIC POSTS, MOD, OSCE
POSTS UKDEL EBRD LONDON, UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS MEW
YORK
SUBJECT: RECEIPT OF INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED UNDER
TORTURE
SUMMARY
1. We receive intelligence obtained under torture
from the Uzbek intelligence services, via the US. We
should stop. It is bad information anyway. Tortured
dupes are forced to sign up to confessions showing
what the Uzbek government wants the US and UK to
believe, that they and we are fighting the same war
against terror.
2. I gather a recent London interdepartmental
meeting considered the question and decided to
continue to receive the material. This is morally,
legally and practically wrong. It exposes as
hypocritical our post Abu Ghraib pronouncements and
fatally undermines our moral standing. It obviates
my efforts to get the Uzbek government to stop
torture they are fully aware our intelligence
community laps up the results.
3. We should cease all co-operation with the
Uzbek Security Services they are beyond the pale. We
indeed need to establish an SIS presence here, but
not as in a friendly state.
DETAIL
4. In the period December 2002 to March 2003 I
raised several times the issue of intelligence
material from the Uzbek security services which was
obtained under torture and passed to us via the CIA.
I queried the legality, efficacy and morality of the
practice.
5. I was summoned to the UK for a meeting on 8
March 2003. Michael Wood gave his legal opinion that
it was not illegal to obtain and to use intelligence
acquired by torture. He said the only legal
limitation on its use was that it could not be used
in legal proceedings, under Article 15 of the UN
Convention on Torture.
6. On behalf of the intelligence services,
Matthew Kydd said that they found some of the
material very useful indeed with a direct bearing on
the war on terror. Linda Duffield said that she had
been asked to assure me that my qualms of conscience
were respected and understood.
7. Sir Michael Jay's circular of 26 May stated
that there was a reporting obligation on us to
report torture by allies (and I have been instructed
to refer to Uzbekistan as such in the context of the
war on terror). You, Sir, have made a number of
striking, and I believe heartfelt, condemnations of
torture in the last few weeks. I had in the light of
this decided to return to this question and to
highlight an apparent contradiction in our policy. I
had intimated as much to the Head of Eastern
Department.
8. I was therefore somewhat surprised to hear
that without informing me of the meeting, or since
informing me of the result of the meeting, a meeting
was convened in the FCO at the level of Heads of
Department and above, precisely to consider the
question of the receipt of Uzbek intelligence
material obtained under torture. As the office knew,
I was in London at the time and perfectly able to
attend the meeting. I still have only gleaned that
it happened.
9. I understand that the meeting decided to
continue to obtain the Uzbek torture material. I
understand that the principal argument deployed was
that the intelligence material disguises the precise
source, ie it does not ordinarily reveal the name of
the individual who is tortured. Indeed this is true
– the material is marked with a euphemism such as
"From detainee debriefing." The argument runs that
if the individual is not named, we cannot prove that
he was tortured.
10. I will not attempt to hide my utter contempt
for such casuistry, nor my shame that I work in and
organisation where colleagues would resort to it to
justify torture. I have dealt with hundreds of
individual cases of political or religious prisoners
in Uzbekistan, and I have met with very few where
torture, as defined in the UN convention, was not
employed. When my then DHM raised the question with
the CIA head of station 15 months ago, he readily
acknowledged torture was deployed in obtaining
intelligence. I do not think there is any doubt as
to the fact
11. The torture record of the Uzbek security
services could hardly be more widely known. Plainly
there are, at the very least, reasonable grounds for
believing the material is obtained under torture.
There is helpful guidance at Article 3 of the UN
Convention;
"The competent authorities shall take into account
all relevant considerations including, where
applicable, the existence in the state concerned of
a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights." While this article
forbids extradition or deportation to Uzbekistan, it
is the right test for the present question also.
12. On the usefulness of the material obtained,
this is irrelevant. Article 2 of the Convention, to
which we are a party, could not be plainer:
"No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether
a state of war or a threat of war, internal
political instability or any other public emergency,
may be invoked as a justification of torture."
13. Nonetheless, I repeat that this material is
useless – we are selling our souls for dross. It is
in fact positively harmful. It is designed to give
the message the Uzbeks want the West to hear. It
exaggerates the role, size, organisation and
activity of the IMU and its links with Al Qaida. The
aim is to convince the West that the Uzbeks are a
vital cog against a common foe, that they should
keep the assistance, especially military assistance,
coming, and that they should mute the international
criticism on human rights and economic reform.
14. I was taken aback when Matthew Kydd said this
stuff was valuable. Sixteen months ago it was
difficult to argue with SIS in the area of
intelligence assessment. But post Butler we know,
not only that they can get it wrong on even the most
vital and high profile issues, but that they have a
particular yen for highly coloured material which
exaggerates the threat. That is precisely what the
Uzbeks give them. Furthermore MI6 have no operative
within a thousand miles of me and certainly no
expertise that can come close to my own in making
this assessment.
15. At the Khuderbegainov trial I met an old man
from Andizhan. Two of his children had been tortured
in front of him until he signed a confession on the
family's links with Bin Laden. Tears were streaming
down his face. I have no doubt they had as much
connection with Bin Laden as I do. This is the
standard of the Uzbek intelligence services.
16. I have been considering Michael Wood's legal
view, which he kindly gave in writing. I cannot
understand why Michael concentrated only on Article
15 of the Convention. This certainly bans the use of
material obtained under torture as evidence in
proceedings, but it does not state that this is the
sole exclusion of the use of such material.
17. The relevant article seems to me Article 4,
which talks of complicity in torture. Knowingly to
receive its results appears to be at least arguable
as complicity. It does not appear that being in a
different country to the actual torture would
preclude complicity. I talked this over in a
hypothetical sense with my old friend Prof Francois
Hampson, I believe an acknowledged World authority
on the Convention, who said that the complicity
argument and the spirit of the Convention would be
likely to be winning points. I should be grateful to
hear Michael's views on this.
18. It seems to me that there are degrees of
complicity and guilt, but being at one or two
removes does not make us blameless. There are other
factors. Plainly it was a breach of Article 3 of the
Convention for the coalition to deport detainees
back here from Baghram, but it has been done. That
seems plainly complicit.
19. This is a difficult and dangerous part of the
World. Dire and increasing poverty and harsh
repression are undoubtedly turning young people here
towards radical Islam. The Uzbek government are thus
creating this threat, and perceived US support for
Karimov strengthens anti-Western feeling. SIS ought
to establish a presence here, but not as partners of
the Uzbek Security Services, whose sheer brutality
puts them beyond the pale.
MURRAY
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