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The Real Choice in Iraq
"Bring 'em on." -- President Bush on Iraqi insurgents, summer 2003
"The insurgency is "in its last throes." -- Vice President Cheney,
summer 2005
" . . . there are only two options before our country: victory or
defeat." -- President Bush, Christmas 2005
By Zbigniew Brzezinski
01/08/06 "Washington
Post" -- -- The administration's rhetorical
devolution speaks for itself. Yet, with some luck and with a more
open decision-making process in the White House, greater political
courage on the part of Democratic leaders and even some
encouragement from authentic Iraqi leaders, the U.S. war in Iraq
could (and should) come to an end within a year.
"Victory or defeat" is, in fact, a false strategic choice. In using
this formulation, the president would have the American people
believe that their only options are either "hang in and win" or
"quit and lose." But the real, practical choice is this: "persist
but not win" or "desist but not lose."
Victory, as defined by the administration and its supporters --
i.e., a stable and secular democracy in a unified Iraqi state, with
the insurgency crushed by the American military assisted by a
disciplined, U.S.-trained Iraqi national army -- is unlikely. The
U.S. force required to achieve it would have to be significantly
larger than the present one, and the Iraqi support for a U.S.-led
counterinsurgency would have to be more motivated. The current U.S.
forces (soon to be reduced) are not large enough to crush the
anti-American insurgency or stop the sectarian Sunni-Shiite strife.
Both problems continue to percolate under an inconclusive but
increasingly hated foreign occupation.
Moreover, neither the Shiites nor the Kurds are likely to
subordinate their specific interests to a unified Iraq with a
genuine, single national army. As the haggling over the new
government has already shown, the two dominant forces in Iraq -- the
religious Shiite alliance and the separatist Kurds -- share a common
interest in preventing a restoration of Sunni domination, with each
determined to retain a separate military capacity for asserting its
own specific interests, largely at the cost of the Sunnis. A truly
national army in that context is a delusion. Continuing doggedly to
seek "a victory" in that fashion dooms America to rising costs in
blood and money, not to mention the intensifying Muslim hostility
and massive erosion of America's international legitimacy,
credibility and moral reputation.
The administration's definition of "defeat" is similarly misleading.
Official and unofficial spokesmen often speak in terms that recall
the apocalyptic predictions made earlier regarding the consequences
of American failure to win in Vietnam: dominoes falling, the region
exploding and U.S. power discredited. An added touch is the notion
that the Iraqi insurgents will then navigate the Atlantic and wage
terrorism on the American homeland.
The real choice that needs to be faced is between:
An acceptance of the complex post-Hussein Iraqi realities through a
relatively prompt military disengagement -- which would include a
period of transitional and initially even intensified political
strife as the dust settled and as authentic Iraqi majorities
fashioned their own political arrangements.
An inconclusive but prolonged military occupation lasting for years
while an elusive goal is pursued.
It is doubtful, to say the least, that America's domestic political
support for such a futile effort could long be sustained by slogans
about Iraq's being "the central front in the global war on
terrorism."
In contrast, a military disengagement by the end of 2006, derived
from a more realistic definition of an adequate outcome, could
ensure that desisting is not tantamount to losing. In an Iraq
dominated by the Shiites and the Kurds -- who together account for
close to 75 percent of the population -- the two peoples would share
a common interest in Iraq's independence as a state. The Kurds, with
their autonomy already amounting in effect to quasi-sovereignty,
would otherwise be threatened by the Turks. And the Iraqi Shiites
are first of all Arabs; they have no desire to be Iran's satellites.
Some Sunnis, once they were aware that the U.S. occupation was
drawing to a close and that soon they would be facing an
overwhelming Shiite-Kurdish coalition, would be more inclined to
accommodate the new political realities, especially when deprived of
the rallying cry of resistance to a foreign occupier.
In addition, it is likely that both Kuwait and the Kurdish regions
of Iraq would be amenable to some residual U.S. military presence as
a guarantee against a sudden upheaval. Once the United States
terminated its military occupation, some form of participation by
Muslim states in peacekeeping in Iraq would be easier to contrive,
and their involvement could also help to cool anti-American passions
in the region.
In any case, as Iraqi politics gradually become more competitive, it
is almost certain that the more authentic Iraqi leaders (not
handpicked by the United States) -- to legitimate their claim to
power -- will begin to demand publicly a firm date for U.S.
withdrawal. That is all to the good. In fact, they should be quietly
encouraged to do so, because that would increase their popular
support while allowing the United States to claim a soberly
redefined "Mission Accomplished."
The requisite first step to that end is for the president to break
out of his political cocoon. His policymaking and his speeches are
the products of the true believers around him who are largely
responsible for the mess in Iraq. They have a special stake in their
definition of victory, and they reinforce his convictions instead of
refining his judgments. The president badly needs to widen his
circle of advisers. Why not consult some esteemed Republicans and
Democrats not seeking public office -- say, Warren Rudman or Colin
Powell or Lee Hamilton or George Mitchell -- regarding the
definition of an attainable yet tolerable outcome in Iraq?
Finally, Democratic leaders should stop equivocating while carping.
Those who want to lead in 2008 are particularly unwilling to state
clearly that ending the war soon is both desirable and feasible.
They fear being labeled as unpatriotic. Yet defining a practical
alternative would provide a politically effective rebuttal to those
who mindlessly seek an unattainable "victory." America needs a real
choice regarding its tragic misadventure in Iraq.
The writer was national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter.
© 2006 The Washington Post Company
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