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Blair-Bush deal before Iraq war revealed in secret memo
PM promised to be 'solidly behind' US invasion with or without
UN backing
By Richard Norton-Taylor
02/03/0-6 "The
Guardian" -- -- Tony Blair told President George
Bush that he was "solidly" behind US plans to invade Iraq before
he sought advice about the invasion's legality and despite the
absence of a second UN resolution, according to a new account of
the build-up to the war published today.
A memo of a two-hour meeting between the two leaders at the
White House on January 31 2003 - nearly two months before the
invasion - reveals that Mr Bush made it clear the US intended to
invade whether or not there was a second UN resolution and even
if UN inspectors found no evidence of a banned Iraqi weapons
programme.
"The diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military
planning", the president told Mr Blair. The prime minister is
said to have raised no objection. He is quoted as saying he was
"solidly with the president and ready to do whatever it took to
disarm Saddam".
The disclosures come in a new edition of Lawless World, by
Phillipe Sands, a QC and professor of international law at
University College, London. Professor Sands last year exposed
the doubts shared by Foreign Office lawyers about the legality
of the invasion in disclosures which eventually forced the prime
minister to publish the full legal advice given to him by the
attorney general, Lord Goldsmith.
The memo seen by Prof Sands reveals:
· Mr Bush told Mr Blair that the US was so worried about the
failure to find hard evidence against Saddam that it thought of
"flying U2 reconnaissance aircraft planes with fighter cover
over Iraq, painted in UN colours". Mr Bush added: "If Saddam
fired on them, he would be in breach [of UN resolutions]".
· Mr Bush even expressed the hope that a defector would be
extracted from Iraq and give a "public presentation about
Saddam's WMD". He is also said to have referred Mr Blair to a
"small possibility" that Saddam would be "assassinated".
· Mr Blair told the US president that a second UN resolution
would be an "insurance policy", providing "international cover,
including with the Arabs" if anything went wrong with the
military campaign, or if Saddam increased the stakes by burning
oil wells, killing children, or fomenting internal divisions
within Iraq.
· Mr Bush told the prime minister that he "thought it unlikely
that there would be internecine warfare between the different
religious and ethnic groups". Mr Blair did not demur, according
to the book.
The revelation that Mr Blair had supported the US president's
plans to go to war with Iraq even in the absence of a second UN
resolution contrasts with the assurances the prime minister gave
parliament shortly after. On February 25 2003 - three weeks
after his trip to Washington - Mr Blair told the Commons that
the government was giving "Saddam one further, final chance to
disarm voluntarily".
He added: "Even now, today, we are offering Saddam the prospect
of voluntary disarmament through the UN. I detest his regime - I
hope most people do - but even now, he could save it by
complying with the UN's demand. Even now, we are prepared to go
the extra step to achieve disarmament peacefully."
On March 18, before the crucial vote on the war, he told MPs:
"The UN should be the focus both of diplomacy and of action...
[and that not to take military action] would do more damage in
the long term to the UN than any other single course that we
could pursue."
The meeting between Mr Bush and Mr Blair, attended by six close
aides, came at a time of growing concern about the failure of
any hard intelligence to back up claims that Saddam was
producing weapons of mass destruction in breach of UN
disarmament obligations. It took place a few days before the
then US secretary Colin Powell made claims - since discredited -
in a dramatic presentation at the UN about Iraq's weapons
programme.
Earlier in January 2003, Jack Straw, the foreign secretary,
expressed his private concerns about the absence of a smoking
gun in a private note to Mr Blair, according to the book. He
said he hoped that the UN's chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix,
would come up with enough evidence to report a breach by Iraq of
is its UN obligations.
Downing Street did not deny the existence of the memo last
night, but said: "The prime minister only committed UK forces to
Iraq after securing the approval of the House of Commons in a
vote on March 18, 2003." It added the decision to resort to
military action to ensure Iraq fulfilled its obligations imposed
by successive security council resolutions was taken only after
attempts to disarm Iraq had failed. "Of course during this time
there were frequent discussions between the UK and US
governments about Iraq. We do not comment on the prime
minister's conversations with other leaders."
Sir Menzies Campbell, the Liberal Democrat acting leader, said
last night: "The fact that consideration was apparently given to
using American military aircraft in UN colours in the hope of
provoking Saddam Hussein is a graphic illustration of the rush
to war. It would also appear to be the case that the diplomatic
efforts in New York after the meeting of January 31 were simply
going through the motions.
"The prime minister's offer of February 25 to Saddam Hussein was
about as empty as it could get. He has a lot of explaining to
do."
Prof Sands says Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain's UN ambassador
at the time, told a foreign colleague he was "clearly
uncomfortable" about the failure to get a second resolution.
Foreign Office lawyers consistently warned that an invasion
would be regarded as unlawful. The book reveals that Elizabeth
Wilmshurst, the FO's deputy chief legal adviser who resigned
over the war, told the Butler inquiry into the use of
intelligence during the run-up to the war, of her belief that
Lord Goldsmith, the attorney general, shared the FO view.
According to private evidence to the Butler inquiry, Lord
Goldsmith told FO lawyers in early 2003: "The prime minister has
told me that I cannot give advice, but you know what my views
are".
On March 7 2003 he advised the prime minister that the Bush
administration believed that a case could be made for an
invasion without a second UN resolution. But he warned that
Britain could be challenged in the international criminal court.
Ten days later, he said a second resolution was not necessary
© Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
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