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When Promoting Truth Obscures the Truth:
Iraqi Body
Count and Iraqi Deaths
By Stephen
Soldz
02/07/06
"ICH"
-- -- David
Edwards of
Media Lens has a brilliant critique of the shortcomings of the Iraq
Body Count tally of civilian deaths in Iraq:
Paved With Good Intentions: On Iraq Body Count, Part 1 and Part
2
Edwards
points out the generally recognized fact that IBC’s methodology –
only listing deaths reported by two or more Western sources – likely
results in their tally being a conservative estimate of civilian
deaths. However, Edwards goes further by showing that there is a
systematic source of bias in that Western news agencies are more
likely to report deaths caused by “insurgents” than those caused by
“Coalition” [aka, American] forces. Edwards reports on an
examination of the IBC database for the six-month period from
January through June, 2005. They found that, of 58 incidents
involving at least 10 deaths, only one was attributed to
US/Coalition action. Further, during this period, only 15 civilian
deaths total were “attributed to 'coalition' airstrikes, helicopter
gunfire and tank fire,” a result that is completely implausible to
anyone who has followed news of the repeated massive attacks by US
and allied forces on alleged “insurgent strongholds.”
Very
disturbing was the tone of IBC’s founder John Sloboda’s response to
being emailed a question about this potential bias. He implied that
IBC had no bias in that it recorded all such events reported in the
Western media, while ignoring Edwards’ point that the Western media
may itself have a bias in what it reports. He stated correctly that
“We have always publicly acknowledged that our numbers must
underrepresent the true figure.” He then goes on to state “the
question of by how much is one that exercises us, as it does many
others.” However, he gives no evidence of wrestling with this issue
or of recognizing its overriding importance in evaluating what the
IBC numbers tell us about the extent of Iraqi deaths.
IBC does,
indeed, “acknowledge” the limits to their work. But, like many
academic researchers throwing in a pro forma “limitations of the
study,” this acknowledgment is done in such a way as to give it
little emphasis. For example, in their July, 2005 report
A Dossier of Civilian
Casualties 2003-2005,
on page 24 of 28, in a discussion of why they use their “maximum”
estimates [they cite a range of deaths from a “minimum” to a
“maximum,” but the “maximum” is of reported deaths, not of likely
deaths], they state “even our max figure is likely to
under-represent the full toll, given that not every death is
officially recorded or reported.” Certainly this language gives no
indication that their maximum may, in fact, radically underestimate
the true toll.
Similarly,
on the IBC website, they have a section entitled
Limitations and scope of enquiry, consisting of responses to
question that have been raised about their work. The only one
relevant to the issue of systematic bias is the question: “Won't
your count simply be a compilation of propaganda?” Their reply:
“We
acknowledge that many parties to this conflict will have an interest
in manipulating casualty figures for political ends. There is no
such thing (and will probably never be such a thing) as an 'wholly
accurate' figure, which could [be] accepted as historical truth by
all parties. This is why we will always publish a minimum and
a maximum for each reported incident. Some sources may wish
to over-report casualties. Others may wish to under-report them. Our
methodology is not biased towards 'propaganda' from any particular
protagonist in the conflict. We will faithfully reflect the full
range of reported deaths in our sources. These sources, which are
predominantly Western (including long established press agencies
such as Reuters and Associated Press) are unlikely to suppress
conservative estimates which can act as a corrective to inflated
claims. We rely on the combined, and self-correcting,
professionalism of the world's press to deliver meaningful maxima
and minima for our count.”
This
statement clearly suggests that the true figure is between their
“minimum” and their “maximum,” as these words would imply. Nowhere
in this Limitations section do they acknowledge the problem of
systematic bias due to reporting bias.
Despite the
strength and originality of Edwards’ critique, I believe that it
does not give enough attention to another source of bias that is
minimized by IBC. This is the difficulty in reporting from Iraq and
the absence of Western reporters from most of the country. Iraq
reporting has been dangerous from the beginning of the war, with
several reporters
killed by American forces during the invasion. By the fall of
2003, as
Reuters reported, reporters were also at risk from rebel forces
and, sometimes, the dissatisfied Iraqi population.
The
situation became much worse after the April, 2004 rebellions across
much of the country. Most of Iraq became off-limits to Western
reporters. Since then, the situation has only deteriorated, with a
number of reporters being killed and several kidnapped. To date,
79 reporters and media assistants have been killed and another
two still missing;
37 media workers have been kidnapped, five of whom were
subsequently killed. [Jill
Carroll, currently kidnapped reporter for the Christian
Science Monitor, is a current reminder.] Of course, in
conditions of active rebellion, the safer areas accessible to
Western reporters are likely to be those under US/Coalition control,
where deaths are, in turn, likely to be due to insurgent attacks.
Areas of insurgent control, which are likely to be subject to US and
Iraqi government attack, for example most of Anbar province, are
simply off-limits to these reporters. Thus, the realities of
reporting imply that reporters will be witness to a larger fraction
of deaths due to insurgents and a lesser proportion of deaths due to
US and Iraqi government forces.
In addition
to the danger, Western reporters have left Iraq as the story became
stale. The daily killings of a few here, a few dozen there became
downers, no longer worthy of front-page coverage. Except for
supposed “turning points,” such as elections, few Western media
sources found it worth the high costs of maintaining an active
bureau in the country, only to report on military press conferences
that generated back-page stories that the Western publics didn’t
want to read. These press conferences, of course, highlight
insurgent “atrocities” and routinely minimize and deny deaths due to
American action.
Of course,
some Western sources are able to report stories generated by Iraqi
reporters they hire, as IBC pointed out in their July, 2005 report:
“Current
reporting is increasingly undertaken by Iraqi staff working for
western media outlets, with Iraqi names now appearing more regularly
as authors or coauthors. Western journalists have always relied on
Iraqi assistants (drivers, interpreters, etc.). In a very real
sense, therefore, the IBC database increasingly depends on the
bravery and dedication of Iraqi media workers continuing to risk
life and limb to inform the world about the situation in their
country.”
Given, as
indicated in that report, that ten media outlets provided over half
the IBC reports and three agencies [Associated Press,
Agence France Presse, and Reuters] provided over a third
of the reports, there is simply no reason to believe that even a
large fraction of Iraqi civilian combat-related deaths
are ever
reported in the Western media, much less, have the two independent
reports necessary to be recorded in the IBC database. Do these few
agencies really have enough Iraqi reporters on retainer to cover the
country? Are these reporters really able comprehensively to cover
deaths in insurgent-held parts of Iraq? How likely is it that two
reporters from distinct media outlets are going to be present at a
given site where deaths occur? How many of the thousands of US
bombings have been investigated by any reporter, Western or Iraqi?
Simply to state these questions is to emphasize the fragmentary
nature of the reporting that occurs and thus the of the IBC
database.
If IBC
believes that the vast majority of Iraqi deaths are reported by the
Western media and, thus, recorded in their database, IBC should
provided an argument to that effect. IBC does not provide such an
argument. Neither do they remind readers of these potential
imitations in any way that would attract attention to them and
decrease the ability of others to deliberately misuse the IBC
numbers.
Producing
“conservative,” bottom-line estimates that are known to be
inaccurate can be a useful research technique in some cases. Such
figures help to remind readers that there is a phenomenon – in this
case, Iraqi civilian deaths caused by the conflict – and to thus
focus attention upon it. In the early days of the war and
occupation, IBC’s figures played such a role. They existed as a
floodlight focusing attention upon the fact that the war and
occupation, despite whatever merits they may or may not possess, had
real costs in terms of lives lost that needed to be included in any
moral reckoning of the rights and wrongs of the war.
Conservative estimates lose their value, however, when they serve to
obscure, detracting attention from the true magnitude of the
phenomenon. Thus, as the fighting has intensified and as other
estimates of Iraqi civilian deaths have become available, IBC’s
low-ball estimates have increasingly been used to mask the true
magnitude of the suffering, rather than as a call for better, more
precise estimates. Such misuses of the IBC figures could only be
avoided, or at least reduced, if IBC took every opportunity to
prominently call attention to the fact that their estimates are
nothing but rock bottom figures, almost certainly far below the true
mortality figures. Indeed, a September, 2005 report by the
Humanitarian Practice Network,
Interpreting and using mortality data in humanitarian emergencies: A
primer for non-epidemiologists, lists seven studies from which
estimates of violent civilian deaths in Iraq can be derived. Since
each study covers a different period and length of time, the results
are standardized as “violent deaths per day.” Of the seven studies,
IBC has the lowest estimate, at 17 deaths per day, followed by 22
deaths per day estimated by the Iraqi Ministry of Heath. Two studies
produce estimates of 50 and 56 violent deaths per day. The Lancet
study leads to an estimate of 101 violent deaths per day, while two
other studies generate even higher estimates of 133 and 152 deaths
per day. Thus, as suggested by our analysis, the IBC estimates are
far below those from most other sources and cannot credibly be taken
as being anything but rock-bottom minimums. [Thanks to Les Roberts
for calling my attention to this report.]
Unfortunately, rather than emphasize the extent to which their
estimates are severe underestimates, IBC appears to deliberately
undercut attention to the weaknesses in their tally. Thus, on June
6, 2005, the BBC
quoted IBC’s John Sloboda as saying “Everyone can agree that
there are good reasons why our count can never be complete, but
there is not as much confusion as you think. Since the end of
hostilities was declared, we are confident in the figures.”
Rather than
call deserved attention to its limitations, IBC’s reporting style
exudes an illusory precision. Thus, page four of their
report states “24,865 civilians were killed in the first two
years, almost all by violence. 82% of those killed were adult males
and 9% were adult women.” No use here of those phrases like “were
reported killed by Western media outlets” that would remind the
reader that these numbers are not precise, but are rough estimates,
potentially severe underestimates, of the real numbers. And how can
one interpret a phrase like “24,865 civilians were killed” – rather
than “around 25,000” – except as a precise number, again suggesting
a precision, and a false accuracy, that the data surely don’t
warrant.
This type
of false precision is especially disturbing since the IBC figures
have been used by many in a campaign of disinformation, discussed at
the beginning of Edwards’ IBC critique, to counter attention being
devoted to the epidemiologist Les Roberts and colleagues' October
2004
Lancet study estimating around 100,000 “excess deaths” from all
causes [See my commentary:
100,000 Iraqis Dead: Should We Believe It? as well as the
excellent Wikipedia
discussion]. The IBC estimate also appears to be the basis, as
Edwards suggests, for
President Bush’s recent claim that “30,000 more or less have
died as a result of the initial incursion and the ongoing violence
against Iraqis.
Robert Fisk
has rightly taken the Western press to task for its “hotel
room journalism.” Fisk does not blame the reporters for doing
what it takes to stay alive. [The recent news that ABC News’
Bob Woodruff and cameraman Doug Vogt were critically injured
provides a potent reminder that even famous network anchors are at
risk if they actually try to do any reporting.] What Fisk does blame
Western reporters for is pretending that their dispatches are based
on actual reporting, rather than, as is largely the case, Green Zone
press conferences and related propaganda efforts by the US and Iraqi
governments.
If Western
reporters, competing for scarce public attention, are loath to
accurately portray the extent of their ignorance about what is going
on in enormous chunks of Iraq, IBC has no excuse not to acknowledge,
openly and prominently, the resultant limits to their civilian death
tally. To not proclaim loudly that the IBC count is, by its nature,
likely a severe
undercount of the true number of deaths, is to participate in the
culture of deceit and denial of the costs in civilian lives and
suffering that has plagued this alleged humanitarian intervention
from the beginning. If IBC does not understand this point, then
their efforts at promoting truth have now turned into its opposite
and should cease.
Stephen Soldz is
psychoanalyst, psychologist, public health researcher, and faculty
member at the Institute for the Study of Violence of the
Boston Graduate School of
Psychoanalysis. He is a member of
Roslindale Neighbors for Peace
and Justice and founder of
Psychoanalysts for Peace and
Justice. He maintains the
Iraq Occupation and Resistance
Report web page and the
Psyche, Science, and Society
blog.
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