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The Ambassador Versus the Ayatollah
Khalilzad to Iraq: No Shiite Control of Interior, Defense
Sistani Contradicts Him
By Juan Cole
02/21/06 "ICH"
-- -- On Monday, the stage was set for an epic struggle
between the two forces behind the scenes in Iraqi politics, US
Ambassadro in Baghdad Zalmay Khalilzad and Grand Ayatollah Ali
Sistani of Najaf, the spiritual leader of Iraq's majority
Shiites. In every previous such contest, Sistani has handily won
against his American opponent.
Nancy Youssef of Knight Ridder reports on the press conference
in Baghdad on Monday in which Khalilzad publicly threatened to
cut off funding for the training of Iraqi troops if the
ministries of defense and the interior are under "sectarian"
control.
In plain English, Khalilzad was saying that the Supreme Council
for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) may not retain control of
Interior (which in Iraq is a security organization) and continue
to pack it with members of the paramilitary Badr Corps, most of
them trained originally by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
Sunni Arabs have charged that Interior Ministry police commandos
have functioned as death squads, conducting reprisal killings
against Sunnis.
It is in fact important for the recovery of social peace in Iraq
that SCIRI and Badr be gotten away from Interior. The problem is
that the Shiite religious parties have 132 MPs who will vote
with them in a parliament of 275. Barring an unforeseen and
substantial defection from among their ranks, they will almost
certainly form the government. SCIRI has made it clear that it
wants Interior, i.e. federal domestic policing and surveillance,
under its control.
So Khalilzad does not have a lot of options. He appears to be
attempting to undermine the Shiite government by encouraging the
Kurds to ally with the Sunni Arabs. Some theorize that a
Kurdish-Sunni alliance could outmaneuver the Shiite United Iraqi
Alliance. They argue that the two main Kurdistan parties have 53
seats, the two main Sunni Arab coalitions have 55, and Iyad
Allawi's National Iraqi List has 25, for a total of 133. If they
could get the 5 Kurdish Islamists to join them, they would have
138, or 51 percent. There are also 3 Sunni Arab seats of the
list of Mishaan Juburi, who had to flee the country in fear of
being prosecuted as a Baathist agent; I'm not sure what will
happen to his three seats, though.
The Kurdish-Sunni alliance scenario, however, makes no sense.
First, it cannot provide the 184 seats needed to select a
president, who appoints the prime minister. Only a Shiite
alliance with Kurds or Sunnis could accomplish that. And,
whoever selects the president will set things up to be sure that
the president will ask them to form a government. So the Shiite
MPs could strike and refuse to allow a president to be seated
unless they were allowed to form the government.
Second, the Kurds want loose federalism. The Sunni Arabs are
die-hard opposed to it. Both have their own plans for oil-rich
Kirkuk. The 11 neo-Baathists around Salih Mutlak would be
absolutely despised by most Kurds. Mutlak praised the Baath as
the best party Iraq could have! The Kurds don't have fond
memories of Baathism. A government coalition between Kurds and
Sunni Arab Islamists and neo-Baathists wouldn't last longer than
the first cabinet meeting.
Third, the Constitution absolutely requires the president to
offer the prime minister post to the party that has the largest
number of seats in parliament. It would would be
unconstitutional to ask the Kurdistan Alliance with 53 seats to
form a minority government with support from other parties,
unless the largest party had already tried and failed to form a
government.
It should also be remembered that the leading party in
parliament controls Iraq's petroleum profits, of some $17
billion a year, and that this money becomes political patronage
for members of the government. That's a big incentive to any
group to stay with a sure thing rather than pulling out in favor
of possible role in another, unstable, coalition.
Like it or not, it is the Shiite religious parties that have the
cohesion to form a relatively stable government. They would only
need to be joined by the Yazidi MP and the 5 Kurdish Islamists
to have a majority. (It is also not impossible that some Shiite
members of the Allawi list could jump ship and join with the
religious Shiites). If Khalilzad goes too far in undermining
them, he risks throwing Iraq into complete political instability
and hot civil war.
Although there has been talk of the Fadhila or Virtue Party of
the United Iraqi Alliance breaking off and going its own way,
there has also been talk of Virtue getting one of the
vice-presidencies so as to keep it in.
There is another thing. Al-Zaman/ AFP reports that Grand
Ayatollah Ali Sistani has called for all due speed in the
formation of a new Iraqi government. A source close to Sistani
said after the visit to him Monday of Prime Minister Ibrahim
Jaafari said that the new government should not only be formed
quickly but should "ensure the provision of services to the
people. It should be a government based on competence,
spotlessness and transparency." He added, "Sistani also affirmed
during the visit the necessity to hew to the perogatives
explicitly stated in the constitution with regard to powerful
cabinet positions."
Jaafari said, "My visit to Sistani was so as to get his opinion
insofar as he is the shepherd of the political process in Iraq."
He added, "I came to listen to his views, and he affirms the
necessity of haste in forming a government that is competent,
spotless and transparent, and which acts in accordance with the
constitution and the law, and takes an interest in the people
and their demands." Jaafari said he hoped it would not take the
three months to form a government that it took the last time. He
said Kurdistan would be handled as specified in the constitution
(i.e. there will be a popular referendum there in 2007 to decide
if it will join the Kurdistan Regional Confederacy of Dahuk,
Irbil and Sulaymaniyah).
Sistani, it should be remembered, has resources and authority
that might be useful in keeping the Virtue Party from leaving
the Shiite coalition. Most Shiites in Basra would not like to be
denounced personally by the Grand Ayatollah.
Sistani appears to believe that since the leading party in
parliament gets to choose the prime minister, and since the
prime minister gets to choose the cabinet members, that it would
be wrong for the United Iraqi Alliance to give away its right to
powerful cabinet posts such as Defense and Interior, under
American pressue.
There is one way for Khalilzad to avoid a debilitating and
destructive contest with Sistani on this issue. It is for
Khalilzad to identify a member of the United Iraqi Alliance in
parliament who is not tied to the militias and who could be
minister of the interior. That is, Sistani isn't demanding that
the post go to SCIRI and Badr. He is demanding that it go to the
UIA if the UIA wants it. Not all the parliamentarians in the UIA
are tied to militias!
------
Appendix:
Provisions of the Iraqi Constitution on the Formation of a
Cabinet:
' Article 73:
First: The President of the Republic shall name the nominee of
the Council of Representatives bloc with the largest number to
form the Cabinet within fifteen days from the date of the
election of the president of the republic.
Second: The Prime Minister-designate shall undertake the naming
of the members of his Cabinet within a period not to exceed
thirty days from the date of his designation.
Third: In case the Prime Minister-designate fails to form the
cabinet during the period specified in clause "Second," the
President of the Republic shall name a new nominee for the post
of Prime Minister within fifteen days.
Fourth: The Prime Minister-designate shall present the names of
his Cabinet members and the ministerial program to the Council
of Representatives. He is deemed to have gained its confidence
upon the approval, by an absolute majority of the Council of
Representatives, of the individual Ministers and the ministerial
program.
Fifth: The President of the Republic shall name another nominee
to form the cabinet within fifteen days in case the Cabinet did
not gain the confidence.
Juan Cole is Professor of History at the University of
Michigan. Visit his website
www.juancole.com
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