The Generals Revolt

A Symptom Of U.S. Malaise

By K Gajendra Singh

04/23/06 "ICH" -- -- The retired generals' revolt only highlights the malaise in the US polity which has crept in , specially in recent decades. The disconnect between an arrogant, ill informed Administration and the military executors of its policies in Iraq has opened a Pandora's box which hopefully might become the tipping point for much needed changes in US polity.

Even before the illegal invasion of Iraq and since then , there was dissent from independent analysts , retired generals and diplomats like Ambassador Joseph Wilson who exposed the Administration's false claims that Saddam Hussein tried to obtain yellow cake from Niger. The efforts , almost from the highest level , to frighten him and other potential whistle blowers , by even breaking the laws , having been highlighted by selected leaks and trial of I. Scooter Libby , Vice President Dick Cheney's chief aide , show up the almost total decline of democracy 's sentinel , the US media , now in the hands of a few corporate giants and their lobbies . The cases of the politician Le May and lobbyist Abrahamoff are just a tip of the iceberg, and the system would need some overhauling and cleansing .

Last week at a panel discussion on "Reporting War" at Columbia University in New York, four journalists , Seymour Hersh and Charles Gras of USA , British journalist Robert Fisk, and John Pilger, an Australian journalist, outlined the destruction of journalism in the U.S. by the business culture it is embedded in. The goal of its higher calling "to tell the truth." has been debased in America by the over riding commercial concerns of the employer.

As the U.S. media was unable to tell the truth, the American public did not know what was happening in Iraq. Accurate stories could be found only in some of the British media and elsewhere. It is not that American journalists did not know the truth , but they wrote stories under self censorship or at the behest of their corporate masters. Still it was remarkable that despite the failure of the U.S. media to educate the public about the issues, more than 50 percent of the U.S. population were opposed to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. The Internet offered an alternative for reporters to write the truth and for the public's right to know.

Herse sees the current American crisis as the collapse of all institutions. This included journalism, the Congress, the federal bureaucracy, and the military. "Constitutional government in the U.S. is in trouble," declared Hersh. "There was a need for a constitutional amendment for a Parliamentary government so there could be snap elections," he observed. [ It has not helped in Britain]

Retired generals' opposition to US Administration and Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld began long time ago, even before the US led invasion on Iraq in March, 2003 , when Anglo-American leaders were beating the war drums in 2002. " Leaks from some in the Establishment who favored an "inside-out" plan to "take Baghdad and one or two key command centers and weapons depots first, in hopes of cutting off the country's leadership and causing a quick collapse of the government ," were dismissed by Marine General Anthony Zinni, a former Commander of Central Command and a US Middle East envoy, as a recipe for a "Bay of Goats" disaster, like the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba."

Many generals and independent think tanks , not financed by US neo –cons had waned that "a US attack would dangerously destabilize the region, harm the global economy, and infuriate Arab and Muslim masses." It has all come true. "Former British chief of staff Field Marshal Lord Bramall, had warned in a letter to the Times that an invasion would pour "petrol rather than water" on the flames and provide al-Qaeda with more recruits. He quoted a predecessor who during the 1956 Suez crisis said: "Of course we can get to Cairo, but what I want to know is what the bloody hell we do when we get there?" ( From my article "Bush family's vendetta ",Atimes.com of 27August , 2002 )

Secretary of State Colin Powell, one of a few sane voices in the administration, but reluctant to stand up, was ignored and then eased out .The Post invasion plans from the State department were ignored or dismissed by what his chief aide Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson dubbed a neo-cons Cabal around Dick Cheney , led by his old time buddy and patron Rumsfeld , so that among other things , immediate spoils from the invasion could be looted or shared among cronies and their companies like Halliburton and Bechtel , as various US Audit reports have clearly brought out.

Even the neo-cons blue-eyed boy ,L.Paul Bremer ,the first Consul in Baghdad , complained in his book about shortage of troops for the task in Iraq and culpability at the highest level on other blunders like disbanding of Iraq's armed forces , security and police apparatus , creating a power vacuum and driving half a million trained men into the arms of the Resistance . In the decision to disband the Iraqi army , neither the national security adviser, Condi Rice nor the Joint Chiefs were consulted.

"US chief administrator L Paul Bremer unveiled Iraq's 25-member governing council in Baghdad on Sunday. It now looks like the beginnings of the rule by the British Governor Sir Percy Cox in the 1920s, after the British had carved out three provinces of the Ottoman empire after its collapse in World War I. After a long national resistance, King Feisel II - of a British-appointed dynasty - and his prime minister, Nuri-as Said, were overthrown and killed in a 1958 military takeover. " From my " Iraq's history already written " Atimes ,15 July, 2003.

But the two principal advocates for the war, besides the president, seem assured of their jobs for the time being. Dick Cheney, remains a driving force in the White House, and Bush has stood firmly behind Rumsfeld, despite calls to resign. "I'm the decider, and I decide what is best," Bush said last week. "And what's best is for Don Rumsfeld to remain as the secretary of defence."

In an interview with Al-Arabiya Television, Rumsfeld, contended that he intended to stay in the job as long as Bush wanted him there. The critics were just a few among the ``thousands and thousands of admirals and generals,'' he remarked.

Analysts feel that Bush would be reluctant to make a change now because any Senate confirmation hearing for a successor would inevitably become a high-profile debate on Iraq.

But some analysts believe that political pressure from Republicans who face voters in Congressional elections in November might help push Rumsfeld aside. ``Rumsfeld will have been so weakened by the generals revolt that as the election approaches the White House will signal that his resignation wouldn't be unwelcome, '' said one analyst.

Some 'achievement' in Iraq, such as the formation of a new government, might provide Rumsfeld the face saving opportunity to leave the Pentagon. ``That would be one way out,'' said another analyst.

US polls find the public weary of the Iraq war and wary of those who initiated it. In USA if you are not a winner you are held down . Rumsfeld is now seen more as a latter day Robert McNamara — the similarly talented ( in business management ! ) Vietnam-era Defense secretary" who blinded himself to the realities of the war and guided the nation ever deeper into that misbegotten adventure."

The Generals' RevoIt;

In a short period beginning from 19 March, six retired U.S. Marine and Army generals denounced the Pentagon planning for the Iraq war and asked for the removal of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Pro-War Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, who visits Iraq frequently said that the generals mirror the views of 75 percent of the officers in the field, and probably more.

While America won't be defeated in Iraq militarily Rumsfeld must leave because the administration is losing the war at home and might be " forced into a hasty and chaotic retreat ".Americans have simply stopped believing the administration on Iraq and "Rumsfeld has become a symbol of that credibility gap. He is a spent force ..."

The generals might have spoken out only after secure in retirement, but they bring imposing credentials to their revolt.

Major Gen. Paul Eaton, first to speak out, was in charge of training Iraqi forces until 2004. He blamed Rumsfeld for complicating the U.S. mission by alienating NATO allies. He wrote that: "I have seen a climate of groupthink become dominant and a growing reluctance by experienced military men and civilians to challenge the notions of the senior leadership." Something similar was said when 9/11 and the failure of US intelligence services were investigated .

In an April 10 interview, Gen. Eaton said he received ``a lot of feedback and all of it has been positive'' from active and retired Army personnel, ranging in rank from sergeants to generals.

Marine Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs up to the eve of the war, charged Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith with a "casualness and swagger that are the special province of those who have never had to execute these missions – or bury the results."

Brig. Gen. James Marks, a retired Iraq veteran and military analyst for CNN said, "Clearly the presence of more combat forces on the ground would have been needed." It was his impression that requests for more troops were being denied by Rumsfeld, and he passed up an opportunity for promotion within the Pentagon partly because of how Rumsfeld and his aides had treated Gen. Eric K Shinseki and others.

Maj. Gen. John Batiste, who commanded the Army's 1st Division in Iraq, charged that Rumsfeld did not seek nor did he accept the counsel of field commanders. He was supported by Maj. Gen. John Riggs. Maj. Gen. Charles J. Swannack, former field commander of the 82nd Airborne, believed " we can create a stable government in Iraq", but Rumsfeld mismanaged the war.

Retired Marine General Zinni told CNN recently that Rumsfeld should be held responsible for a series of blunders, starting with "throwing away 10 years worth of planning, plans that had taken into account what we would face in an occupation of Iraq."

There were signs of anger by the spring of 2004 when a group of very senior officers from the Judge Advocate General's Corps, the legal arm of the U.S. armed forces, were so upset about the administration's loosening of rules against torture that they complained in private to Scot Horton, who was then a committee chair at the New York City Bar Association. Horton and the Bar subsequently prepared a groundbreaking report on U.S. interrogation tactics.

The democratic tradition of civilian control of the military has morphed into civilians being out of control.

The Generals' Revolt is a serious crisis for George Bush. If he continues to stand by Rumsfeld, he pits himself against the generals credibility, much higher than his own today. If he dismisses Rumsfeld, the military would have carried out a figurative coup d'etat. " An alumni association of retired generals will have dethroned civilian leadership and forced the commander in chief to fire the architect of a war upon which not only Bush's place in history depends, but the U.S. position in the Middle East and the world. The commander in chief will have been emasculated by retired generals. The stakes could scarcely be higher."

What ever Bush's decision it marks him as a weak if not fatally compromised president. "He will have capitulated to a generals' coup. Will he then have to clear Rumsfeld's successor with them?
Bush will begin to look like Czar Nicholas in 1916."

"If Iraq collapses in chaos and sectarian war, and is perceived as another U.S. defeat, they [the generals] are saying: We are not going to carry the can. The first volley in a "Who Lost Iraq?" war of recriminations has been fired. "

The Pentagon Counter Attacks ;

The Pentagon issued a memorandum to civilian military analysts and former top military commanders to challenge the criticism. "US senior military leaders are involved to an unprecedented degree in every decision-making process," it said, noting that Rumsfeld had held 139 meetings with the joint chiefs of staff since 2005.

Among the top guns fielded before the media, were Gen. Tommy R. Franks of the Army, who commanded U.S. troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and Gen. Richard B. Myers of the Air Force, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff till six months ago. So far, no high-ranking officers from the Air Force have spoken out against Rumsfeld, who promotes "force transformation" and air power , except for retired air force Major-General Don Shepperd, who said the Pentagon had made "some severe mistakes" in Iraq.

Rumsfeld himself went before the cameras to defend himself in what the New York Times derisively referred to as "the Donny show" and "a daily ritual." Almost every day, Bush has found it necessary to repeat his statements of support for Rumsfeld.

Retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Mike DeLong rejected the idea that new leadership was needed at the Pentagon. "Dealing with Secretary Rumsfeld is like dealing with a CEO," he told CNN. "When you walk in to him, you've got to be prepared. You've got to know what you're talking about. If you don't, you're summarily dismissed. But that's the way it is, and he's effective." { In fact that was the criticism against US war in Vietnam .It was a treated as management problem. What you need in war is overall leadership and not the qualities of a CEO e,g, of Enron.]

White House spokesman McClellan said, "We are a nation at war and we are a nation that is going through a military transformation. Those are issues that tend to generate debate and disagreement and we recognize that."

A Pentagon spokesman, Eric Ruff, described the accusations and differences among generals as more evidence that dissent was unwelcome. "That comment reflects the kind of candor and straightforward approach that General Myers followed when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs." On the debate over troop levels, Ruff said combat commanders and the Pentagon's senior uniformed leadership devised the war plan before sending it to Rumsfeld and his civilian aides for approval, disputing the notion that Rumsfeld was making top-down decisions.

Rumsfeld remins enamored of missile defense and precision weapons. He is skeptical of the Army leadership, which he considers old-fashioned, wedded to heavy forces and slow to change. His supporters considered General Myers and his successor, Gen. Peter Pace of the Marine Corps, helpful in overcoming deeply entrenched institutional resistance to transformation

Controversy among Generals;

A major point of controversy concerns the testimony before the Congress in February 2003 by the former Army chief of staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, with experience as Nato Peacekeeping Forces Commander in Bosnia .He said that peacekeeping operations in Iraq could require several hundred thousand troops, because of "the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems." Wolfowitz ,Rumsfeld's deputy, described the estimate "wildly off the mark," and was supported by the latter. Wolfowitz also told the Congress that a smaller force than what General Shinseki estimated would do because the Iraqis would welcome the Americans, and that unlike Bosnia, Iraq had no history of ethnic strife. Gen Shinseki was then retired . Thomas E. White, the Army secretary, who supported Gen Shinseki was fired by Mr. Rumsfeld soon afterBaghdad fell.

General Franks had initially proposed a force of up to 385,000 troops. That number shrank as the war plan morphed from a version called the Generated Start, to the Running Start, to the Hybrid, to Cobra II. Newt Gingrich, the former House speaker who was an adviser to Rumsfeld, described the discussions between General Franks and the defense secretary as one of "constant negotiation."

[In my piece dated 17 February , 2003 in www. Saag .com titled 'Iraqi Mosaic in Pandora's Box' ,I had written " Iraq is a delicate mosaic, which must be handled carefully, but a US led war would shatter and scatter it to bits. Whenever post Saddam Hussein Iraq is discussed in USA and elsewhere, not enough serious thought is given to ethnic, religious and other differences of its constituents and their tortuous history, which go to make Iraq a delicate mosaic."]

An arrogant man ,Wolfowitz ,soon after the speedy fall of Baghdad ( a natural outcome of a war between US with annual defence spend of $ 400 billions and Iraq a few billions respectively ) , visited Ankara and lambasted the Turkish leadership , including the military brass for not joining in the US invasion , when the Turkish Parliament, with over 90% of country's population vociferously opposed to the US attack on a friendly Muslim neighbour , had rejected the government motion to let US troops use Turkish territory in South East to open a second front against Iraq. But Turkish leaders gave him back as good and publicly rebuked Wolfowitz . Relations between Nato allies US and Turkey, a major player in the region , have gone from bad to worse. Rumsfeld had even said UK need not join when there was some confusion , but British Prime Minister Tony Blair would not give up pillion riding for glory and some gains .There apperas little in this misadventure.

But then look at the intemperate language used by US Congress men or the US Ambassador in New Delhi on the question of India's vote on Iran in International Atomic Energy Agency , Vienna or India's energy security needs. Secretary of State Condi Rice goes around the world hectoring every one in sight. Such displays of US arrogance have alienated many friends around the world at time when US is deep in trouble and indebted to the world by over US$ 8 trillions.

Not so civil war of words among US generals;

General Myers, appointed by Rumsfeld in 2001, has been hitting back at the generals critical of Rumsfeld as a breach of military etiquette. Quite obviously Gen Myers does not share the grave concern at the situation in Iraq for which he as the senior most professional adviser is responsible for the planning and the conduct of the war and must share the maximum blame.

On the controversy over peace keeping requirements, General Myers told ABC , "He [Gen. Shinseki ] was inappropriately criticized, I believe, for speaking out," but otherwise supported Rumsfeld .

Gen. Myers added that "General Shinseki was forced to make that comment under pressure, pulled a number out, wasn't wedded to it." He said that General Shinseki did not push for more troops after giving his Congressional testimony.

When asked on ABC whether he thought "it was a mistake not to follow the guidance of General Shinseki," General Myers that he did not.

"The judgment we got from academia, from anybody that wanted to make inputs, to include the National Security Council, was that we had the right number of troops," said General Myers, He also disputed accusations that he was intimidated by Rumsfeld. [But he is certainly trying to intimidate his senior commanders even in retirement]

In the current issue of Newsweek, General Shinseki, said in reply that he should have made a more aggressive case for more troops, adding: "Probably that's fair. Not my style." It sums up the atmosphere at the Pentagon , that in stead of cool arguments and assessment ,aggressive positions like those of Wolfowitz , his boss and Gen Myers guided the final decisions and not the merits of the presentation.

Public rebuking of General Shinseki by the civilian pentagon's leadership still rankles military colleagues , specially as the Pentagon leadership was wrong. And it goes to the heart of the criticism with Rumsfeld and his top aides disregarding calls for more troops before the invasion

Pentagon differences with Military and State Department on Iraqi resistance ;

Lt Gen John R Vines, who led all coalition forces in Iraq from January 2005 to January 2006. told the Washington Institute recently that an analysis done by him in end 2004 concluded that a three-tier insurgency existed, the largest element of which consisted of "Sunnis who rejected the authority of the interim government". These Sunni Arab rejectionists , perhaps numbering in the "millions" believed that "the transitional government could not be expected to protect their interests". While not all Sunnis Arabs , who form 25% of Iraq population were pro-insurgency, "a significant proportion were." Gen Vines said they were a "source of labor for the insurgency - an unlimited supply of blue collar thugs". The other two tiers of the insurgency , a "very small" contingent of foreign jihadis and some 30,000 loosely coordinated "former regime elements" with access to large amounts of cash from "Sunni sympathisers around the world".

Around the same time the Pentagon under Rumsfeld was preparing for a major offensive in Fallujah based on different assumptions about the insurgency. Rumsfeld revealed in an interview to the Washington Post that the objective of the assault was to "dissuade Sunni townspeople from joining, supporting or tolerating the insurrection". It meant that the price of such support to 'insurgency' in terms of destruction and death would be too high for most civilians.

As has been revealed regularly , senior officials in Washington and Baghdad leaked selected bits of information from the Gen. Vines assessment to the media like details about the access of Baathist elements to financial support from abroad, but none about "the extremely broad base of support among Sunnis for the insurgency' the leitmotif of the analysis.

Gen. Vines analysis was yet another skirmish in a battle between the administration and professional analysts over the nature of the insurgency that began in 2003. The key points in the Vines analysis on support for the insurgency were included in October 2003 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq , reissued in June 2004, according to Wayne White, former deputy director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. White, now with the Middle East Institute, recently reiterated " that the NIE had portrayed the insurgency as having an enormous support base among Sunnis, because of a wide range of grievances, including unemployment, the arrest and killing of family members, the destruction of homes, and opposition to foreign occupation."

Only after the arrival of US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad in Baghdad , CENTCOM and the intelligence community analyses to redress legitimate Sunni grievances were noted. But Rumsfeld and Cheney argued that such support was motivated .The Administration's November 30, 2005 "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" defined the "rejectionists" as those Sunni Arabs "who have not embraced the shift from Saddam Hussein's Iraq to a democratically governed state" and who opposed "a new Iraq in which they are no longer the privileged elite".

An active-duty officer Gen. Vines did not directly criticize . "I don't intend to get into the policy arena," he said. "The policy was directed by Washington," adding that the command in Iraq had merely carried it out. He also refused to comment on retired generals' calls for Rumsfeld's resignation.

Even as Rumsfeld was insisting recently that Syria was facilitating the training and entry of "foreign fighters" into Iraq, Central Command chief General John Abizaid told Congress that Damascus was cooperating with US efforts to stop infiltration across the border.

Whenever the Bush Administration blamed CIA for faulty intelligence, the Agency resorted to leaks to guard its reputation and its turf . Now a revolt seems to be brewing there too. There is a "a big swing" in anti-Bush sentiment at Langley. "There are people who fear that indictments and subpoenas could be coming down, and they don't want to get caught up in it." There "seems to be a quiet conspiracy by rational people" at the agency to avoid involvement in some of the particularly nasty tactics being employed by the administration, especially "renditions"—a practice by which the CIA sends terrorist suspects abroad to be tortured in Egypt, Syria, Uzbekistan, and other .There appears to be a split at the CIA: "There's an SS group within the agency that's willing to do anything and there's a Wehrmacht group that is saying, 'I'm not gonna touch this stuff'."

Politicians join in the war of words;

"My view is that the secretary should step aside," New Mexico governor Bill Richardson, a potential Democratic presidential candidate, told CBS. "Besides the fact that the Iraq war has been mismanaged... we should listen to what these generals say". He added, "These are six distinguished military officers….They basically are saying that secretary Rumsfeld, on issues relating to military strategy... didn't listen to them.... This reaches a new level... of not being willing to admit mistakes, not being willing to change a course, policy that is just not working."

"What you're seeing is deep frustration in the military," he said, "deep frustration within our troops who are not getting enough armor. ... It is obvious that Secretary Rumsfeld did not listen to them. ... That's why we're in this morass." "Our presence there is leading to increasing danger to our troops but also to our objectives in the Middle East," said Richardson.

Sen. Christopher Dodd, a Connecticut Democrat, said, "We need a new direction in Iraq. We're looking at some incompetency in addition to the arrogance issues that have been raised. ... Condoleezza Rice talked about a thousand tactical mistakes the other day inIraq . That's not exactly a ringing endorsement."

From across the political divide , Kentucky Republican senator Mitch McConnell told Fox News Sunday that during Rumsfeld's tenure the US had "wiped out a lot of the people who would do us harm". "I think the important thing to remember here is that we haven't been attacked at home since September of 2001," he added. [ But pre-war Anglo- American intelligence analysts had warned that a war in Iraq war would create more terrorists .And it has turned out to be so. The fear of terrorist attacks was manipulated by the Administration to invade Iraq for its oil and to help Republicans win elections . ]

Republican senator George Allen of Virginia said the criticism of Rumsfeld amounted to "scapegoating" and that firing him would not resolve the Iraq situation. "What difference would it make?" he asked. "Would that mean anything to the terrorists? A lot of this focus on an individual is a way of maybe criticising the president."

Brother Gov. Jeb Bush , who is always at hand to help as in counting of votes in Florida in 2000 was also been roped in. After a five day visit to Iraq and Afghanistan along with 3 other Republican politicians , Jeb besides President Bush at the White House repeated the tune ,"It is very important that we stay the course, that we provide support for these incredible people that are doing such a service for liberty around the world and protecting our freedoms here."

"These men and women — whether they're reservists, Guard or enlisted men and women — are doing heroic work," Jeb Bush said. "They're well-trained, they're well-taken care of, their morale is high, they're totally focused on the mission, there is a strategy that they're implementing — it was inspirational," gushed Jeb Bush.

Richard`Holbrooke on the revolt;

Writing in the Washington Post, Richard Holbrooke, a former US ambassador to the United Nations , and a front runner to be the secretary of state if Florida votes had been counted properly , said that the calls by a number of recently retired generals for the resignation of Rumsfeld " have created the most serious public confrontation between the military and an administration since President Harry S. Truman fired Gen. Douglas MacArthur in 1951. In that epic drama, Truman was unquestionably correct - MacArthur, the commanding general in Korea and a towering World War II hero, publicly challenged Truman's authority and had to be removed. Most Americans rightly revere the principle that was at stake: civilian control over the military. But this situation is quite different."

There was of course Gen. George McClellan vs. Lincoln;, Maj. Gen. John Singlaub, who was fired for attacking President Jimmy Carter over Korea policy. But such challenges were rare enough and did not result in a revolt, now with seven already.

The only two people in the government higher than the secretary of defense are the president and vice president who can not be and the unspoken military code normally precludes direct public attacks on the commander in chief when troops are under fire.

Clearly the retired generals surely spoke for many of their former colleagues, friends and subordinates who are still inside." In the tight world of senior active and retired generals, there is constant private dialogue. Recent retirees stay in close touch with old friends, who were often their subordinates; they help each other, they know what is going on and a conventional wisdom is formed." Gen. Newbold," made this clear in an extraordinary, at times emotional piece , when he said he was writing "with the encouragement of some still in positions of military leadership." He went on to "challenge those still in uniform . . . to give voice to those who can't - or don't have the opportunity to - speak."

These generals are not doves or covert Democrats but professional career men, each with over 3 decades of experience, " who swore after Vietnam that, as Colin Powell wrote in his memoirs, "when our turn came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons." Yet, as Gen. Newbold admits, it happened again. In the public comments of the retired generals one can hear a faint sense of guilt that, having been taught as young officers that the Vietnam-era generals failed to stand up to Defense Secretary McNamara and President Lyndon Johnson, they did the same thing."

Holbrooke concluded that firing Rumsfeld is essential simply because for the past mistakes, "someone must be held accountable," although many others deeply involved in the mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan remain in power, and some are in uniform.

" Put simply, the failed strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be fixed as long as Rumsfeld remains at the epicenter of the chain of command. Rumsfeld's famous "long screwdriver," with which he sometimes micromanages policy, now thwarts the top-to-bottom re-examination of strategy that is absolutely essential in both war zones.

Lyndon Johnson understood this in 1968 when he eased another micromanaging secretary of defense, McNamara and replaced him with Clark M. Clifford. Within weeks, Clifford had revisited every aspect of policy and begun the long, painful process of unwinding the commitment. Today, those decisions are still the subject of intense dispute, and there are many differences between the two situations. But one thing was clear then and is clear today: Unless the secretary of defense is replaced, the policy will not and cannot change."

White House support will not end the crisis as "more angry generals emerge - and they will - if some of them are on active duty, as seems probable; if the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan does not turn around (and there is little reason to think it will, alas), then this storm will continue until finally it consumes not only Donald Rumsfeld. The only question is: Will it come so late that there is no longer any hope of salvaging something inIraq and Afghanistan?"

Gen HR McMaster , a general serving in Iraq ,in his 1997 book, Dereliction of Duty, argued that the joint chiefs of staff of the Vietnam era failed in their constitutional responsibility to object strenuously to misguided strategies.

US Digging in;

But US is digging in .Apart from construction of 4 bases in Iraq , a fortress-like new U.S. Embassy the size of Vatican City, 21 buildings on 104 acres ,the largest of its kind in the world, is rising beside the Tigris River with its own defense force, self-contained power and water, at the heart of Iraq's turbulent red Zone . It will cost over $1 billion.

Rumsfeld' Future;

Some of Rumsfeld's decisions have proved disastrously wrong, and he can not reconcile what he thought would happen in Iraq and what actually happened .His state of denial can only compound the problems his decisions created.

Fact remains that not enough troops were sent to prevent the chaos and looting in the power vacuum after the invasion, except for the ministry of oil and oil fields. One glaring example: the military didn't secure Saddam's huge stockpiles of munitions, despite knowing their location, which have been cornered by the Resistance. Rumsfeld underestimated the nature and strength of the resistance , dismissing them as a bunch of "dead-enders" which was mere wishful thinking than analysis based on history , culture or psychology. He can also be rightly accused of bad guidance on the treatment of prisoners resulting in Guantanamo , the Abu Ghraib , rendition of prisoners ,which has severely damaged US reputation every where. His stonewalling and failure to hold anyone of high rank accountable only made it worse.

So far, only one high-ranking officer from the Air Force has spoken out against Rumsfeld, because he promotes air force prominence .This also explains Gen Myers' loyalty and his lack of proper understanding of post invasion scenario on the ground which is the domain of the Army specially the ground troops .This was brought out clearly in different perceptions between him and Gen Shinseki .

I remember during my 1976 stay at the National Defence college , New Delhi , the endless discussions among Air Commodores and Brigadiers and even among the army's various arms ie armoured , artillery and infantry corps of their importance in war , with an infantry officer claiming that finally it is ground troops who hold the ground .

It is clear that Rumsfeld has been permanently damaged even if he survives calls for his resignation. Loren Thompson, an analyst with the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Virginia, said ,``Any time a war goes wrong on a defense secretary's watch, not only does history judge them poorly but their ability to get anything done is gravely damaged.''

The effort to save Rumsfeld's credibility may be too late, said Lawrence J. Korb, a defense official in the Reagan administration, now a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, Washington. ``He's already been weakened by the failures in Iraq,'' said Korb, `He can't possibly make a controversial decision'' without risking an uproar. He demanded and won from Bush the authority to run the U.S. effort to rebuild Iraqi society with 150,000 troops, and failed.

Republican Senator George Allen of Virginia said Bush may be the real target of Rumsfeld's critics. ``A lot of this focus on an individual is a way of, maybe, criticizing the president,'' Allen told .

Forbes commented in support that "The program of military reforms known as "force transformation" has proved most controversial within the Army. Transformation has required it to cut personnel, incorporate controversial new weapons and transport systems, and radically reconfigure its global basing structure--while simultaneously assuming an onerous operational burden in Iraq."

"We cannot escape history," said Abraham Lincoln.

"History? We don't know. We'll all be dead," George Bush remarked in 2003.

But quite clearly USA is not fighting a cold war era conflict with USSR. This war is being fought in Iraq and is not a deterrent exercise in Mutual Assured Destruction. The transformation away from men on the ground to high-tech investment only enriches the military-industry complex .And to defend against whom .Unless it is for premeditated attacks against all including even Russians and the Chinese as some leaks suggest .

It would appear that the 2003 war was planned on the basis of the experience of the 1991 war , which required freeing Kuwait from Iraqi occupation and destruction of its war machine .There was little ground warfare . The Iraqi troops were withdrawing from Kuwait and put up little resistance .Tens of thousands were killed by 'target shooting ' US helicopter pilots when retreating .The 2003 plans did not take into account the fact that Iraqis would fight ferociously occupation of their country even Shias at some stage now , as they did during the British occupation in 1920s .

Naturally 2003 has not turned out to be a computer generated war of 1991 as transmitted by US TV channels to the US public. This is now real guerilla war fare of attrition for Iraqi independence from occupying foreign troops. To imagine that a larger force would have defeated the Iraqi nationalism and will to live free, as none of the generals imply .is but a folly. It would take a longer and bloodier war of independence as in Algeria against the French, in which nearly one million Algerians out of 11 million perished .

Leadership Qualities;

Too many it came as a surprise, when King Hussein of Jordan on his death bed , replaced his intellectual brother Crown Prince Hassan , by his own son, now King Abdullah II ,to succeed him. King Hussein , one of the wisest and 'real rulers' of his time , combined the roles of a modern-day president , hands on commander-in-chief and the wise head of his tribe. He had undergone a crash course at the British Military academy atSandhurst, when suddenly called to the throne when 17 years old. Military training and other qualities enabled him to survive and deepen the foundations of the artificially created Hashemite Kingdom in the sands of Arabia.

A ruler in the region must understand threat perceptions and overall military strategy to survive and to protect his people. To this end he gave Prince Abdullah a military command who spent long time with the troops. An additional factor weighing with King Hussein's decision was that , King Abdullah's mother was British and Crown Prince Hamzah 's mother an American .The West might view more favourably the half British King on throne with half American heir apparent. Whether King Abdullah and his kingdom would survive if the turmoil unleashed by the US misadventure in Iraq spreads in the region is another matter. To begin with hitherto fiercely loyal Cherkesh have been the Palace guards from the very inception of the Kingdom!

In contrast the US top leadership ie President Bush avoided military draft in Vietnam and Vice -President Cheney was too busy with other important matters then the patriotic call to fight in Vietnam, which the two now impress upon American citizens . As Herse pointed out from the days of President Bill Clinton and perhaps since recent decades, the professional American general has been emasculated and replaced by yes-man. The baits dangled are promotions in situ and later employment in military industry complex.

Many major flaws which have entered and are hollowing the American political structural and economic system and cannot be redressed by half measures. Look how the US Congress behaved and conducted itself, on the report on 911, where it has been reported that Pakistan was able to get a whitewash by bribing them . The lobbying system is too deeply entrenched into the entrails of American political structure .Bribing corrupt politicians can bring about policy decisions favouring vested interests.

Sooner or later something has to give in. After the 1962 debacle on India's border war with China, a number of Indian generals were removed. The man responsible for the mess defence minister Krishna Menon had to resign in spite of his being very close to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.

Other examples is in neighbouring Pakistan. After years of wrong policy and misrule, especially in East Pakistan, when the people of that nation stood up for their rights and took to resistance, after the 1971 war with India and its denouement, the generals presiding over the destiny of Pakistan and responsible for the mess in East Bengal had to leave.

The problems facing USA are not new in history. After ruling for a couple of centuries, when the Arab warriors, who fashioned an empire from Morocco to the borders of China, became drowned in the luxuries of the empire's wealth, and gave up the sword. For fighting they hired Turkish nomad slaves as their sword men. Caliph Al-Mu'tasim , whose mother was Turkish was an effective soldier and administrator but his reign marks the introduction into Iraq of an alien Turkish military class, which was to dominate the political life of the country for centuries to come. From then Iraqi Arabs were rarely employed in military positions, though they continued to be influential in the civil administration. The Turks assumed the title of sultan (literally, 'the holder of power'), originally a minor office.

The Arabs had lost 'Furussiya' which comes from the word 'faras' which means horse, in Arabic.(like bushido and chivalry from French 'Cheval'- horse ) which included military skills and martial arts.

The removal of military draft has removed that inbred association with the Armed forces .Like the Abbasid Caliphs , the US elite has become disconnected from strategic realities .Would the decisions have been different if the President and his deputy had gone to Vietnam or the children of top Pentagon decision makers were soldiers . Not many generals reportedly have their sons fighting in Iraq.

In USA, the Blacks and Hispanics who have a higher proportional representation in the Armed Forces, but do not have similar share in the wealth of the country, would sooner or later clamour for a more equitable system. After the Iraq war Black are refusing recruitment as cannon fodder . The Hispanics are already showing strength by protesting in many hundreds of thousands for immigration rights to stop being exploited. It is not coincidence that many US politicians had to refuse an office when it turned out that they had hired illegal immigrant labour to save on social security and other taxes.

A new strategy is emerging ; globalization and privatization of the war effort . Introduction of a new category of highly paid mercenaries , called security consultants to fighti for the United States. These private mercenary contingents are a mixed bag, consisting, for instance, ex-Rhodesian commandos, former British SAS , amnestied Colombian paramilitaries, Gurkhas, dismissed personnel who were in the service of Augusto Pinochet's dictatorial regime in Chile, French Foreign Legion-type irregulars , employed by the apartheid regime in South
Africa , also deployed to annihilate black resistance groups and now engaged from time to time by trans-national corporations to suppress native aspirants of economic freedom in mineral-rich Africa , etc . It is rumoured that
mafia groups from Sicily and other parts of south Italy, desperate to don the mantle of respectability, have also come forward to help the American war effort. It is a motley crowd, with little in common , certainly not patriotism . These trained killers come as a package of subsidies.

In some places they have become a law of into themselves. Some carried out torture interrogations unbound by any law .It is as a result of their activities and reprisals against them that Fallujah was invaded the first time .The second invasion was to teach the Fallujans a lesson and US created a Guernica . Perhaps these mercenaries could be treated like enemy combatants as defined by US authorities. Few conventions and rules of war are likely to survive under this Administration.

The US polity needs a very thorough overhaul.

K Gajendra Singh, served as Indian Ambassador to Turkey and Azerbaijan in1992 -96. Prior to that, he served as ambassador to Jordan (during the1990 - 91Gulf war), Romania and Senegal. He is currently chairman of the Foundation for Indo-Turkic Studies. The views expressed here are his own.- Email-Gajendrak@hotmail.com
 

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