Been there, done that
Talk of a U.S. strike on Iran is eerily reminiscent of the
run-up to the Iraq war.
By Zbigniew Brzezinski
04/24/06 "Los
Angeles Times" -- -- IRAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT that it
has enriched a minute amount of uranium has unleashed urgent
calls for a preventive U.S. airstrike from the same sources that
earlier urged war on Iraq. If there is another terrorist attack
in the United States, you can bet your bottom dollar that there
also will be immediate charges that Iran was responsible in
order to generate public hysteria in favor of military action.
But there are four compelling reasons against a preventive air
attack on Iranian nuclear facilities:
First, in the absence of an imminent threat (and the Iranians
are at least several years away from having a nuclear arsenal),
the attack would be a unilateral act of war. If undertaken
without a formal congressional declaration of war, an attack
would be unconstitutional and merit the impeachment of the
president. Similarly, if undertaken without the sanction of the
United Nations Security Council, either alone by the United
States or in complicity with Israel, it would stamp the
perpetrator(s) as an international outlaw(s).
Second, likely Iranian reactions would significantly compound
ongoing U.S. difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, perhaps
precipitate new violence by Hezbollah in Lebanon and possibly
elsewhere, and in all probability bog down the United States in
regional violence for a decade or more. Iran is a country of
about 70 million people, and a conflict with it would make the
misadventure in Iraq look trivial.
Third, oil prices would climb steeply, especially if the
Iranians were to cut their production or seek to disrupt the
flow of oil from the nearby Saudi oil fields. The world economy
would be severely affected, and the United States would be
blamed for it. Note that oil prices have already shot above $70
per barrel, in part because of fears of a U.S.-Iran clash.
Finally, the United States, in the wake of the attack, would
become an even more likely target of terrorism while reinforcing
global suspicions that U.S. support for Israel is in itself a
major cause of the rise of Islamic terrorism. The United States
would become more isolated and thus more vulnerable while
prospects for an eventual regional accommodation between Israel
and its neighbors would be ever more remote.
In short, an attack on Iran would be an act of political folly,
setting in motion a progressive upheaval in world affairs. With
the U.S. increasingly the object of widespread hostility, the
era of American preponderance could even come to a premature
end. Although the United States is clearly dominant in the world
at the moment, it has neither the power nor the domestic
inclination to impose and then to sustain its will in the face
of protracted and costly resistance. That certainly is the
lesson taught by its experiences in Vietnam and Iraq.
Even if the United States is not planning an imminent military
strike on Iran, persistent hints by official spokesmen that "the
military option is on the table" impede the kind of negotiations
that could make that option unnecessary. Such threats are likely
to unite Iranian nationalists and Shiite fundamentalists because
most Iranians are proud of their nuclear program.
Military threats also reinforce growing international suspicions
that the U.S. might be deliberately encouraging greater Iranian
intransigence. Sadly, one has to wonder whether, in fact, such
suspicions may not be partly justified. How else to explain the
current U.S. "negotiating" stance: refusing to participate in
the ongoing negotiations with Iran and insisting on dealing only
through proxies. (That stands in sharp contrast with the
simultaneous U.S. negotiations with North Korea.)
The U.S. is already allocating funds for the destabilization of
the Iranian regime and reportedly sending Special Forces teams
into Iran to stir up non-Iranian ethnic minorities in order to
fragment the Iranian state (in the name of democratization!).
And there are clearly people in the Bush administration who do
not wish for any negotiated solution, abetted by outside
drum-beaters for military action and egged on by full-page ads
hyping the Iranian threat.
There is unintended irony in a situation in which the outrageous
language of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (whose powers
are much more limited than his title implies) helps to justify
threats by administration figures, which in turn help
Ahmadinejad to exploit his intransigence further, gaining more
fervent domestic support for himself as well as for the Iranian
nuclear program.
It is therefore high time for the administration to sober up and
think strategically, with a historic perspective and the U.S.
national interest primarily in mind. It's time to cool the
rhetoric. The United States should not be guided by emotions or
a sense of a religiously inspired mission. Nor should it lose
sight of the fact that deterrence has worked in U.S.-Soviet
relations, in U.S.-Chinese relations and in Indo-Pakistani
relations.
Moreover, the notion floated by some who favor military action
that Tehran might someday just hand over the bomb to some
terrorist conveniently ignores the fact that doing so would be
tantamount to suicide for all of Iran because it would be a
prime suspect, and nuclear forensics would make it difficult to
disguise the point of origin.
It is true, however, that an eventual Iranian acquisition of
nuclear weapons would heighten tensions in the region and
perhaps prompt imitation by such countries as Saudi Arabia or
Egypt. Israel, despite its large nuclear arsenal, would feel
less secure. Preventing Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons
is, therefore, justified, but in seeking that goal, the U.S.
must bear in mind longer-run prospects for Iran's political and
social development.
Iran has the objective preconditions in terms of education, the
place of women in social affairs, and in social aspirations
(especially of the youth) to emulate in the foreseeable future
the evolution of Turkey. The mullahs are Iran's past, not its
future; it is not in our interest to engage in acts that help to
reverse that sequence.
Serious negotiations require not only a patient engagement but
also a constructive atmosphere. Artificial deadlines, propounded
most often by those who do not wish the U.S. to negotiate in
earnest, are counterproductive. Name-calling and saber rattling,
as well as a refusal to even consider the other side's security
concerns, can be useful tactics only if the goal is to derail
the negotiating process.
The United States should join Britain, France and Germany, as
well as perhaps Russia and China (both veto-casting U.N.
Security Council members), in direct negotiations with Iran,
using the model of the concurrent multilateral talks with North
Korea. As it does with North Korea, the U.S. also should
simultaneously engage in bilateral talks with Iran about
security and financial issues of mutual concern.
It follows that the U.S. should be a signatory party to any quid
pro quo arrangements in the event of a satisfactory resolution
of the Iranian nuclear program and of regional security issues.
At some point, such talks could lead to a regional agreement for
a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East — especially
after the conclusion of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement —
endorsed also by all the Arab states of the region. At this
stage, however, it would be premature to inject that complicated
issue into the negotiating process with Iran.
For now, our choice is either to be stampeded into a reckless
adventure profoundly damaging to long-term U.S. national
interests or to become serious about giving negotiations with
Iran a genuine chance. The mullahs were on the skids several
years ago but were given a new burst of life by the intensifying
confrontation with the United States. Our strategic goal,
pursued by real negotiations and not by posturing, should be to
separate Iranian nationalism from religious fundamentalism.
Treating Iran with respect and within a historical perspective
would help to advance that objective. American policy should not
be swayed by the current contrived atmosphere of urgency
ominously reminiscent of what preceded the misguided
intervention in Iraq.
Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security advisor to President
Carter from 1977 to 1981.
Copyright 2006 Los Angeles Times |
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