The US hawks won't want Iraq's concessions on weapons inspections to prevent war. Their ambitions to transform the Middle East don't stop with Baghdad - yet they leave many crucial questions unanswered

Rosemary Hollis
Reprinted from: Sunday September 22, 2002
The Observer

Despite Iraq's sudden invitation to renew UN weapons inspections, American hardliners will keep up the pressure for war. Regime change might be achieved under cover of disarming Baghdad. But without a serious debate on the objectives of force, there will be no opportunity to consider what could go wrong or how to handle the competing interests.

After all, the rationale for launching a war on Iraq ought to determine how it would be waged. If the goal is a change of regime, the options range from sending assassination squads to target key individuals, to amassing a vast invasion force to take over the country. If the idea is to persuade the Iraqi military to perform a coup d'état, the officer corps would have to be persuaded that the only way to save their own skins would be to take out the government themselves. Heavy handed use of air power would be counterproductive if it killed the very people expected to assume power, or turned the public against the invading forces.

There is also the question of what kind of regime change is required. Will a replacement of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his Takriti clan be sufficient if whoever takes over is prepared to relinquish the weapons of mass destruction, or does there have to be a representative government pledged to democratic norms to justify military intervention? In the first case, a timely coup could be sufficient to avert an invasion. But in the latter, a full-scale occupation would probably be necessary to transform the country from a dictatorship to a functioning democracy.

Logistical snags

In any case, unless the United States can garner broad international support for war, its military options will be constrained by logistical difficulties. At a minimum, the cooperation of Turkey is essential, as is the willingness of Kuwait and Qatar to host a build-up of US forces and materiel. Jordan cannot play a major role for fear of inflaming public antipathy to America over its policies on Palestine as well as Iraq. Syria and Iran will no doubt be expected to keep out of the way of a US campaign, but can be ruled out as formal partners in the conflict unless Washington backtracks on its designation of Iran as part of the 'axis of evil' and threats to relegate Syria to the same fate.

What the Saudis can offer will depend on there being UN cover for military action. Strains are evident in the US-Saudi relationship, resulting from the involvement of Saudi nationals in the attacks of September 11 last year, and the realisation that Saudi individuals and charitable funds apparently helped finance the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Anti-American sentiment is running high among Saudis, fuelled by anger at US support for Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians. Consequently, the Saudi government cannot commit the kingdom to support a US war effort but could provide access to its air space and air bases provided the UN officially sanctioned force.

New order

A determined stance in the face of regional criticism of administration policy, whether toward Palestine or Iraq, is intrinsic to the US war agenda. The so-called hawks championing the cause of regime change in Iraq have made it clear that they have more than the government in Baghdad in their sights.

The neo-conservative wing of the Bush administration is looking for a new regional order, where liberal-capitalist, democratic governments aligned with the United States will replace theocratic, dictatorial and otherwise antithetical regimes. It is claimed that forcing such change in Baghdad will send a message to Tehran, Damascus, Riyadh and Cairo that they will face the censure, if not the intervention, of the US unless they fall into line. The outcome, the hawks claim, will not only serve the US national interest but also promote international peace and security more generally.

Proponents of this vision are sceptical, if not dismissive, of the niceties of international law and the qualms of the international community - embodied in the UN - in their quest to confront 'terrorists and tyrants'. It is the contempt for multilateralism and the neo-imperialist agenda of the leading proponents of war on Iraq that make it especially difficult for America's allies in Europe and beyond to join the proposed showdown with Baghdad.

Iraqi disarmament is unfinished business for the UN Security Council and the threat of a US attack has already produced a more conciliatory response from Baghdad. However, in capitalising on that threat, the Council could lay the grounds for war rather than avert it. And if war goes ahead, the UN will not be in the driving seat, the United States will be.

Ready for business

With this prospect in view, it is time to expand the debate about whether or not US plans for war stand up under international law and start to engage the Bush administration in discussion about its aims and strategy.

Even if America has some UN cover for a war in the name of ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction it has failed to reveal or give up under sanctions and inspections, this is not the only objective of the US hawks. They want to replace the regime with a government with a democratic face, allied to the United States, ready to do business with US companies - especially on oil - and prepared to make peace with Israel.

As yet they have not indicated whether they would expect the new government to accept a UN weapons inspection regime. They have also not spelled out what the conditions would be for the lifting of sanctions, another matter in which the Security Council must surely have a voice, since it imposed them and runs the attendant 'oil for food' programme. Perhaps the US administration would settle for a non-democratic military junta, so long as it promised elections.

Wish list

Meanwhile, the French and Russians will no doubt be looking for oil contracts to match the ones they have discussed with the present Iraqi government, and the settlement of outstanding debts. Turkey's cooperation in a war will presumably be influenced by Ankara's desire to see Kurdish aspirations for autonomy in northern Iraq circumscribed within a new Iraqi constitution.

Syria would like a role in the economic development of Iraq, including as a conduit for Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean. Jordan will also want to benefit from reconstruction and be a key trading partner.

Iran will look for an Iraqi government prepared to uphold a border agreement along the ceasefire lines at the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the return of prisoners of war and access for Shia pilgrims to religious shrines in Iraq. Tehran will also want to see the Iraqi Shia opposition movement, which it hosts, reintegrated into Iraqi political life and an end to Iraqi support for the Iranian opposition movement, the Mujahidin-e Khalq Organisation.

Not least, Kuwait will look forward to a guarantee from Iraq to respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity within the border demarcated by the UN after the Gulf war. The Kuwaitis will also want the return of their prisoners of war or an account of their fate.

It remains to be seen whether the British will expect some prize for supporting the US war effort. Rumour has it that a new Iraqi regime will need to exact recompense for the twelve years' suffering of its people under sanctions, and may satisfy this by discriminating against the British in awarding future contracts. According to this theory, Iraq will not be able to boycott US companies, so Britain will serve as the scapegoat.

As is apparent from the range of interests and concerns waiting to be addressed in the aftermath of a US war on Iraq, the fate of that country is a complex issue with regional and international dimensions. The consequences of war for the Iraqis themselves could get pushed very far down the list of priorities of the external players.

The various elements in the Iraqi opposition that have been encouraging the US to execute regime change all aspire to a place in political life. They will have to accommodate those inside the country who have endured the combined effects of war and sanctions over many years, and who will take the brunt of an assault. If members of the Iraqi armed forces and others inside the country decide to turn on their own regime, they will expect to be the principal beneficiaries of its demise.

Avoiding anger

All this presupposes that a US-led attack can bring regime change without becoming bogged down in a long, inconclusive and bloody conflict on the ground, or that there is escalation with Israel involved and chaos engulfing Jordan. In these instances the chances are that anger and anti-American feeling across the region would generate new recruits for terrorist action on the US and its allies. It is this spectre that has led many to caution Washington that targeting Iraq will complicate rather than expedite the 'war' on terror.

Saddam and his regime have few friends and defenders. Presumably most Iraqis would like to see his departure. But whether they, the region, the United States or the rest of the world will end up better off after a war to topple him will depend on how that battle is undertaken. Given the number of players with a stake in the outcome, it will be surprising if the US hawks are able to manage the agenda as they seem to think they can.

Dr Rosemary Hollis is Head of the Middle East Programme at Chatham House.

About The World Today essay

This article, originally titled Regime change or regional change?, will appear in the October 2002 issue of The World Today, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House. An essay from The World Today appears online in Observer Worldview each month.

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