The Destabilization Game
By Tom Engelhardt
07/05/06 "TomDispatch"
-- -- One of these days, some scholar will do a
little history of the odd moments when microphones
or recording systems were turned on or left on,
whether on purpose or not, and so gave us a bit of
history in the raw. We have plenty of American
examples of this phenomenon, ranging from the secret
White House recordings of President John F.
Kennedy's meetings with his advisers during the
Cuban Missile Crisis (so voluminous as to become
multi-volume publications) and Richard Nixon's
secret tapes (minus those infamous 18˝ minutes),
voluminous enough so that you could spend the next
84 days nonstop listening to what's been
made publicly available, to the moment in 1984
when a campaigning
President Ronald_Reagan quipped on the radio
during a microphone check (supposedly unaware that
it was on): "My fellow Americans, I'm pleased to
tell you today that I've signed legislation that
will outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in five
minutes."
Just last week, a lovely little example of this
sort of thing came our way and, twenty-two years
after Ronald Reagan threatened to atomize the "evil
empire," Russia was still the subject. Last
Thursday, at a private lunch of G-8 foreign
ministers in Moscow, an audio link to the media was
left on, allowing reporters to listen in on a
running series of arguments (or
as the Washington Post's Glenn Kessler put it,
"several long and testy exchanges") between U.S.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov over a collective
document no one would remember thenceforth
The whole event was a grim, if minor, comedy of
the absurd. According to the Post account,
"Reporters traveling with Rice transcribed the tape
of the private luncheon but did not tell Rice aides
about it until after a senior State Department
official, briefing reporters on condition of
anonymity as usual, assured them that ‘there was
absolutely no friction whatsoever' between the two
senior diplomats." (What better reminder do we need
that so much anonymous sourcing granted by
newspapers turns out to be a mix of unreliable spin
and outright lies readers would be better off
without?) In, as Kessler wrote, "a time of rising
tension in U.S.-Russian relations," the recording
even caught "the clinking of ice in glasses and the
scratch of cutlery on plates," not to speak of the
intense irritation of both parties.
"Sometimes the tone smacked of the playground" is
the way a
British report summed the encounter up, but
decide for yourself. Here's a sample of what "lunch"
sounded like -- the context of the discussion was
Iraq (especially outrage over the kidnapping and
murder of four employees of the Russian embassy in
Baghdad):
"Rice said she worried [Lavrov] was suggesting
greater international involvement in Iraq's
affairs.
"'I did not suggest this,' Lavrov said. ‘What
I did say was not involvement in the political
process but the involvement of the international
community in support of the political process.'
"'What does that mean?' Rice asked.
"There was a long pause. ‘I think you
understand,' he said.
"'No, I don't,' Rice said.
"Lavrov tried to explain, but Rice said she
was disappointed. ‘I just want to register that
I think it's a pity that we can't endorse
something that's been endorsed by the Iraqis and
the U.N.,' she said, adding tartly: ‘But if
that's how Russia sees it, that's fine.'"
Behind Rice's irritation certainly lay a bad few
Russia weeks for the administration. Not only had
the Russians been flexing their energy muscles of
late,
consorting with the Chinese and various of the
Soviet Union's former Soviet Socialist Republics in
Central Asia, which the Bush administration covets
for their energy resources; but, as the ministers
were meeting, Russian President Vladimir Putin --
you remember, another one of those world leaders
George Bush
"looked in the eyes" and found to be
"trustworthy" (but that was
so long ago) -- made it frustratingly clear that
he
would not back U.S. moves against neighboring
Iran and its putative nuclear program at the UN.
"'We do not intend to join any sort of ultimatum,
which only pushes the situation into a dead end,
striking a blow against the authority of the UN
Security Council,' Putin told Russian diplomats in
Moscow in the presence of journalists. ‘I am
convinced that dialogue and not isolation of one or
another state is what leads to resolution of
crises.'"
Destabilizing Russia
There is, however, a larger, far more perilous
context within which to view the "testy"
relationship between the two former Cold War
superpowers and, for once, someone has managed to
lay it out brilliantly, connecting the dots for the
rest of us. In
The New American Cold War, the cover story of
the most recent Nation magazine, Russia
specialist Stephen F. Cohen finally catches the
essence of that ever degrading relationship. What
Cohen points out is that, after the USSR unraveled,
the Cold War never actually ended, not on the
American side anyway, and today it not only
continues at nearly full blast, but the Russians
have finally reentered the game.
To offer a little context: In the early years of
the Cold War, when the A-bomb and then the H-bomb
were briefly American monopolies, there were, among
American hardliners, those who, in the phrase of the
time, wanted to "rollback" the Soviet Union in
whatever fashion necessary. At an extreme, as early
as 1950, the Strategic Air Command's Gen. Curtis
LeMay urged the implementation of SAC Emergency War
Plan I-49, which involved delivering a first strike
of "the entire stockpile of atomic bombs… in a
single massive attack," some 133 A-bombs on 70
Soviet cities in 30 days. However, it was another
policy, "containment" (first suggested by diplomat
George Kennan in his famous "long telegram" from
Moscow and then in his 1947 essay, "The Sources of
Soviet Conduct," written under the pseudonym "Mr. X"
in Foreign Affairs magazine), that took hold.
Increasingly, as the years went by, as superpower
nuclear arsenals came ever closer to parity, the
U.S. and the USSR settled into the equivalent of
family life together, bickering (at the cost of
untold numbers of dead) only on the borderlands of
their respective empires. In the later 1960s,
containment became détente.
When Ronald Reagan won the presidency in 1980 and
relaunched the Cold War against the "evil empire,"
matters threatened to change, but in the end --
despite a massive rearmament campaign (that began in
the Carter years) and the launching of Reagan's
Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars"), meant to
militarize space, détente hung in there; finally, to
the surprise of all American strategists, the Berlin
Wall came down and the Soviet Empire in Eastern
Europe quickly unraveled without opposition from the
remarkable Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev (a rare
instance of the head of an imperial order not
turning to force as it was dismantled). After a
moment's hesitation, America's cold warriors,
including the massively funded intelligence
community which had never so much as suspected the
weakened state of the Soviet Union, declared global
victory. Much of the rest of the story (the lack of
a "peace dividend," the rise of the U.S. as the
globe's supposed sole "hyperpower," the way the
neoconservatives and others
fell in love with American military might and
its potential ability to alter the world in
directions they passionately desired is now
reasonably well known – except for the very large
piece of the puzzle Cohen contributed last week.
In his essay, Cohen points out that Russia,
despite recent gains, is still in "an unprecedented
state of peacetime demodernization and
depopulation," suffering "wartime death and birth
rates" in a time of relative peace; while its
unstable political system rests on the popularity of
one man, Vladimir Putin. What was left of the USSR
having almost imploded in the 1990s, he writes, even
today we cannot be sure what the collapse of a power
armed with every imaginable weapon of mass
destruction might "mean for the rest of the world."
How, he asks, has every U.S. administration
reacted to this globally perilous situation?
"Since the early 1990s Washington has
simultaneously conducted, under Democrats and
Republicans, two fundamentally different
policies toward post-Soviet Russia -- one
decorative and outwardly reassuring, the other
real and exceedingly reckless. The decorative
policy, which has been taken at face value in
the United States, at least until recently,
professes to have replaced America's previous
cold war intentions with a generous relationship
of ‘strategic partnership and friendship'… The
real US policy has been very different -- a
relentless, winner-take-all exploitation of
Russia's post-1991 weakness. Accompanied by
broken American promises, condescending lectures
and demands for unilateral concessions, it has
been even more aggressive and uncompromising
than was Washington's approach to Soviet
Communist Russia… [This policy includes a]
growing military encirclement of Russia, on and
near its borders, by US and NATO bases, which
are already ensconced or being planned in at
least half the fourteen other former Soviet
republics, from the Baltics and Ukraine to
Georgia, Azerbaijan and the new states of
Central Asia. The result is a US-built reverse
iron curtain and the remilitarization of
American-Russian relations."
Destabilizing Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and the
United States
This is the new, American-driven cold war -- a
striking feature of our landscape, almost utterly
ignored by the mainstream media -- that Cohen lays
out at length and in compelling detail. Since 2000,
these new cold war policies have only taken a turn
for the disastrous. From its first moments in
office, the Bush administration, made up almost
solely of rabid former cold warriors, has been
focused with an unprecedented passion and intensity
on what can only be called a "rollback" policy.
Defined a little more precisely, what they have
pursued, as Cohen makes clear, is a policy of
Russian "destabilization" with every means at their
command -- and, until recently, with some success.
Their view was simple enough. In the wake of the
collapse of the Soviet empire, the United States was
the sole military power of significance left
standing. It had, as they saw it, enough excess
power to ensure a Pax Americana into the
distant future, in part by ensuring that no future
or resurgent superpower or bloc of powers would, in
any foreseeable future, arise to challenge the
United States. As the President put it in
an address at West Point in 2002, "America has,
and intends to keep, military strengths beyond
challenge." The administration's new National
Security Strategy of that year seconded the point,
adding that the country must be "strong enough to
dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a
military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or
equaling, the power of the United States."
This was to be accomplished by:
*ensuring that the former challenging superpower,
once rolled back to something like its pre-imperial
boundaries, would never arise in any significant new
form from the rubble of its failed empire.
*ensuring that no new superpower would arise in
economically resurgent Asia; in this regard, the
Chinese would be essentially hemmed in, if not
encircled, by American (and Japanese) power; a
potentially independent Taiwan supported; and the
Japanese and Chinese set at each others throats.
*ensuring that the oil heartlands of the planet
in what was by then being called an "arc of
instability" running from the Central Asian
borderlands of Russia and China through the Middle
East, North Africa (later, much of the rest of
Africa), all the way to Latin America would be
dotted with American military bases, anchored in the
Middle East by an emboldened Israel and new more
pro-American and subservient regimes in formerly
enemy states like Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and that
the planet's oil flows (hence the fate of the
industrialized and industrializing parts of the
planet) would remain under American control.
The administration's destabilization strategy, as
convincingly laid out by Cohen, was not, however,
limited to Russia. The ambitions of top
administration officials and their supporters, after
all, were world-spanning. (It wasn't for nothing
that the neocons and allied pundits began talking
about us as the planet's New Rome back in 2002,
while we were tearing up treaties, setting up secret
prisons, and preparing to launch our first
"preventive" war.) In retrospect, it seems clear
that destabilization was their modus operandi.
Despite what some have argued in relation to Iraq
(and elsewhere in the Middle East), they were
undoubtedly not voting for chaos per se. What they
were eager to do was put the strategically most
significant and contested regions of the planet "in
play," using the destabilization card, always
assuming in every destabilization situation that the
chips would fall on their side of the gaming table,
and that, if worse came to worse, even chaos would
turn out to be to their benefit.
In that spirit, they began working to destabilize
Russia, hoping that even if "regime change" weren't
possible, all sorts of energy resources and other
political and economic fruits would fall their way
from the rotting tree of the former Soviet Union. As
we know, they didn't hesitate to do the same in
Afghanistan, claiming that they were simply taking
out al-Qaeda and its Taliban hosts (with whom they
had, not so long before, been
in pipeline negotiations). What they actually
did, however, was settle in to that country for the
long haul, setting up their normal run of bases and
prisons, and in the process not fretting enormously
about what destabilization was actually doing there
-- creating a narco-warlord-Taliban failed state
that now, of course, befuddles them.
Then, as we all know, they invaded Iraq, claiming
they were pursuing Saddam Hussein's nonexistent WMD
program via "decapitation" shock-and-awe attacks on
his regime, the disbanding of his military, the
dissolution of the Baath Party, the disbarment of
many of its former members from office or jobs, and
the dismantling of the state-organized and run
economy --
a program of destabilization so sweeping as to
take one's breath away and meant to launch a far
more sweeping destabilization (and hence remaking)
of the Middle East. The results of this project,
still in progress, are by now well known --
including the fostering of a complex, bloodthirsty,
sectarian bloodletting in Iraq which now threatens
to spill across borders into neighboring lands
(along with terrorism and oil sabotage).
Their most recent target is Iran -- or rather,
ostensibly, Iran's nuclear energy program. In his
latest report on the administration's Iranian
policy, New Yorker journalist Seymour Hersh
quotes a "high-ranking general" this way: "[T]he
military's experience in Iraq, where intelligence on
weapons of mass destruction was deeply flawed, has
affected its approach to Iran. ‘We built this big
monster with Iraq, and there was nothing there. This
is son of Iraq.'" In fact,
as Hersh has previously reported, administration
strategists have long been trying to destabilize
Iran in a variety of ways, while threatening future
military assaults on that country's nuclear
establishment. If, at some future point, they were
to follow through on this, the results for the
global economy would undoubtedly prove both
staggering and destabilizing in ways it's quite
possible no one could handle.
In the meantime, they have been willing to
destabilize the world by essentially growing terror
in the pursuit of other ends. Despite the centrality
of the "global war on terror" to their plans, it's
obvious that the taking out of hostile terrorist
groups has not been the only, or even perhaps the
primary item on their agenda -- after all, they
curtailed the hunt for Osama bin Laden in order to
whack Iraq. Rhetoric aside, they seem, in fact, to
be quite willing to live with the global phenomenon
of ever proliferating, ever more homegrown terrorist
organizations.
Though it's been little noted, their program in
the United States has been hardly less based on
playing the destabilization card. As their minions
in occupied Iraq were intent on radically
"privatizing" -- that is, destabilizing -- the Iraqi
government and economy, so they have been intent on
radically privatizing (and destabilizing) the
American government and economy. Recently, Frank
Rich of the New York Times wrote a striking
column,
The Road from K Street to Yusufiya, on exactly
this, pointing out that "nearly 40 cents of every
dollar in federal discretionary spending now goes to
private companies." It hardly mattered to them that
they were essentially emptying civil government of
its can-do powers; that they were replacing those
hated bureaucrats in Washington with even less
competent bureaucrats linked to private, crony
corporations of their choice. As Rich put the
matter:
"[T]he Bush brand of competitive sourcing, with
its get-rich-quick schemes and do-little jobs
for administration pals, spread like a cancer
throughout the executive branch. It explains why
tens of thousands of displaced victims of
Katrina are still living in trailer shantytowns
all these months later. It explains why New York
City and Washington just lost 40 percent of
their counterterrorism funds. It helps explain
why American troops are more likely to be
slaughtered than greeted with flowers more than
three years after the American invasion of Iraq.
"The Department of Homeland Security, in
keeping with the Bush administration's original
opposition to it, isn't really a government
agency at all so much as an empty shell, a
networking boot camp for future private
contractors dreaming of big paydays…"
Caesar's Palace
The top officials of this administration are
remarkable gamblers and optimists. They have also
proven remarkably single-minded in playing the
destabilization game. If they are in the
Roman-Empire business, don't think Augustus,
think Caesar's Palace. Like so many gambling
addicts, they've never run across a situation in
which they're unwilling to roll the dice, no matter
the odds. They just give those dice that special
little rub and offer a prayer for good luck, always
knowing that this just has to be their day.
Medicare, roll the dice. Social security, roll
the dice. Tax the poor and middle class by untaxing
the rich, no problem. Wipe out what's left of the
checks and balances of the American system in favor
of
a theory of an all-encompassing
"commander-in-chief" government, roll those dice.
Launch endless, Swift-Boat-style, bare-knuckle
campaigns of fear, lies, and fantasy (accompanied by
gerrymandering and vote-suppression schemes) meant
to install Republicans in power for decades to come,
no matter the cost to the political system -- don't
wait, toss ‘em now!
This is, essentially, a full-scale a program for
the destabilization (as well as plundering) of this
country, one that fits snugly with their operations
potentially destabilizing the planet. And through it
all, like the good cold warriors they are, they've
never let up on that rollback campaign against
Russia. Perhaps, as in the previous century, if all
that needed to be compared was the relative powers
of two superpowers, their acts, however fierce or
cruel, might not have seemed so strategically
wrongheaded. Having taken advantage of the
weaknesses of their opposite number, administration
officials might now be standing tall; while the
Russians, crimped, impoverished, embittered, might
indeed have been licking their wounds, while
complaining angrily but impotently.
Such is not the case. The twenty-first century is
already turning out to be far more than a
hyperpower, or even a two superpower, world. Before
the eyes of much of humanity, between November 2001
and March 2003, the Bush administration decided to
demonstrate its singular strength by playing its
destabilization trump card and setting in motion the
vaunted military power of the United States. To the
amazement of almost all, that military, destructive
as it proved to be, was stopped in its tracks by two
of the less militarily impressive "powers" on this
planet -- Afghanistan and Iraq.
Before all eyes, including those of George, Dick,
Don, Paul, Stephen, Condi, and their comrades, we
visibly grew weaker. While the Bush administration
was coveting what the Russians called
their "near abroad" -- all those former SSRs
around its rim -- and were eagerly peeling them away
with "orange," "rose," and "tulip" revolutions, its
own "near abroad" (what we used to like to call our
Latin "backyard") was peeling away of its own
accord, without the aid of a hostile superpower.
This would once have been inconceivable, as would
another reality -- up-and-coming economic powers
like China and India traveling to that same
"backyard" looking for energy deals. And yet a
destabilized planet invariably means a planet of
opportunity for someone.
In fact, Iraq proved such a black hole, so
destabilizing for the Bush administration itself
that its officials managed to look the other way
while China emerged as an organizing power and
economic magnet in Asia (a process from which the
U.S. was increasingly excluded) and Russian energy
reserves gave Putin and pals a new lease on life.
Now, administration officials find themselves
stunned by the results, which are not likely to be
ameliorated by floating a bunch of
aircraft-carrier task forces menacingly in the
western Pacific.
In one of his recent commentaries, historian
Immanuel Wallerstein pointed out that the
"American Century," proclaimed by Time and
Life Magazine owner Henry Luce in 1943, lasted
far less than the expected hundred years. Now, the
question -- and except for a few "declinist"
scholars like Wallerstein, it would have been an
unimaginable one as recently as 2003 -- is: "Whose
century is the twenty-first century?" His grim
answer: It will be the century of "multi-polar
anarchy and wild economic fluctuations."
If you think about it, the single greatest
destabilizing gamble this administration has taken
has also been the least commented upon. A couple of
years back "global warming" was largely a back-page
story about tribal peoples having their habitats
melted in the far north or finding their islands in
danger of flooding somewhere in the distant Pacific.
It was all ice all the time and if you didn't live
near a glacier or somewhere in the tundra, it didn't
have much to do with you -- and certainly nothing
whatsoever to do with
those nasty hurricanes that seemed to be
increasing in strength in the Atlantic as were
typhoons in the Pacific.
Now, global warming is front-page stuff and you
don't have to go far to find it. Alaska isn't just
melting any more, we are. Lately, a plethora of
major stories and prime-time TV news reports have
regularly talked not about the north, but about the
planet "running
a slight fever from greenhouse gases," or
undergoing
unexpectedly "abrupt" climate change, or of the
U.S. itself having its warmest years in its history
-- something reflected even in local headlines (For
N. Texas, it's warmest year on record). And yet
in our media the Bush administration still largely
gets a free pass on the subject. No major cover
stories are yet taking on the ultimate
destabilization gamble of this administration, the
fact that they are playing not just with the fate of
this or that superpower or set of minor powers, but
with that of the human race itself.
The willingness of the President and his
officials to bet the store on the possibility that
global warming doesn't exist, or won't hit as
ferociously as expected, or soon enough to affect
them, or will be solved by some future quick-fix
still isn't thought of as real front-page news. In
other words, their maddest gamble of all, next to
which the destabilization of Iran or Russia dwindles
to nothing, receives little attention. And yet,
based on their track record, we know just what they
are going to do -- throw those dice again.
For George W. Bush and his top officials, taking
the long-term heat on this probably isn't really an
issue. They have the mentality not just of gamblers
but of looters and in a couple of years, if worse
comes to worse, they can head for Crawford or
Wyoming or estates and ranches elsewhere to hunt
fowl and drink mai tais. It's the rest of us, and
especially our children and grandchildren, who will
still be here on this destabilized, energy-hungry
planet without an air conditioner in sight.
Tom Engelhardt, who runs the Nation
Institute's Tomdispatch.com ("a regular antidote to
the mainstream media"), is the co-founder of
the
American Empire Project and the author of
The End of Victory Culture, a history of
American triumphalism in the Cold War. His novel,
The Last Days of Publishing, is now out in
paperback.
Copyright 2006 Tom Engelhardt |
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