How bad is he?
Bush ran as a moderate, tacked right and governed ineffectually
-- before 9/11. Since then he's become the most radical American
president in history -- and arguably the worst.
By Sidney Blumenthal
09/12/06 "Salon" -- -- No one predicted just how radical a
president George W. Bush would be. Neither his opponents, nor
the reporters covering him, nor his closest campaign aides
suggested that he would be the most willfully radical president
in American history.
In his 2000 campaign, Bush permitted himself few hints of
radicalism. On the contrary he made ready promises of
moderation, judiciously offering himself as a "compassionate
conservative," an identity carefully crafted to contrast with
the discredited Republican radicals of the House of
Representatives. After capturing the Congress in 1994 and
proclaiming a "revolution," they had twice shut down the
government over the budget and staged an impeachment trial that
resulted in the acquittal of President Clinton. Seeking to
distance himself from the congressional Republicans, Bush
declared that he was not hostile to government. He would, he
said, "change the tone in Washington." He would be more
reasonable than the House Republicans and more moral than
Clinton. Governor Bush went out of his way to point to his
record of bipartisan cooperation with Democrats in Texas,
stressing that he would be "a uniter, not a divider."
Trying to remove the suspicion that falls on conservative
Republicans, he pledged that he would protect the solvency of
Social Security. On foreign policy, he said he would be
"humble": "If we're an arrogant nation, they'll view us that
way, but if we're a humble nation, they'll respect us." Here he
was criticizing Clinton's peacemaking and nation-building
efforts in the Balkans and suggesting he would be far more
restrained. The sharpest criticism he made of Clinton's foreign
policy was that he would be more mindful of the civil liberties
of Arabs accused of terrorism: "Arab-Americans are racially
profiled in what's called secret evidence. People are stopped,
and we got to do something about that." This statement was not
an off-the-cuff remark, but carefully crafted and presented in
one of the debates with Vice President Al Gore. Bush's intent
was to win an endorsement from the American Muslim Council,
which was cued to back him after he delivered his debating
point, and it was instrumental in his winning an overwhelming
share of Muslims' votes, about 90,000 of which were in Florida.
So Bush deliberately offered himself as an alternative to the
divisive congressional Republicans, his father's son (at last)
in political temperament, but also experienced as an executive
who had learned the art of compromise with the other party, and
differing from the incumbent Democratic president only in
personality and degree. Bush wanted the press to report and
discuss that he would reform and discipline his party, which had
gone too far to the right. He encouraged commentary that he
represented a "Fourth Way," a variation on the theme of
Clinton's "Third Way."
In his second term, Clinton had the highest sustained popularity
of any president since World War II, prosperity was in its
longest recorded cycle, and the nation's international prestige
high. Bush's tack as moderate was adroit, shrewd and necessary.
His political imperative was to create the public perception
there were no major issues dividing the candidates and that the
current halcyon days would continue as well under his aegis.
Only through his positioning did Bush manage to close to within
just short of a half-million votes of Gore and achieve an
apparent tie in Florida, creating an Electoral College deadlock
and forcing the election toward an extraordinary resolution.
Few political commentators at the time thought that the ruthless
tactics used by the Bush camp in the Florida contest presaged
his presidency. The battle there was seen as unique, a
self-contained episode of high political drama that could and
would not be replicated. Tactics such as setting loose a mob
comprised mostly of Republican staff members from the House and
Senate flown down from Washington to intimidate physically the
Miami-Dade County Board of Supervisors from counting the votes
there, and manipulating the Florida state government through the
office of the governor, Jeb Bush, the candidate's brother, to
forestall vote-voting were justified as simply hardball
politics.
The Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore, by a five to four
margin, perversely sanctioned not counting thousands of votes
(mostly African-American) as somehow upholding the equal
protection clause of the 15th Amendment (enacted after the Civil
War to guarantee the rights of newly enfranchised slaves, the
ancestors of those disenfranchised by Bush v. Gore). In the
majority opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that counting
votes would cast a shadow on the "legitimacy" of Bush's claim to
the presidency. The Court concluded that the ruling was to have
applicability only this one time. By its very nature, it was
declared to be unprecedented. Never before had the Supreme Court
decided who would be president, much less according to tortuous
argument, and by a one vote margin that underlined and extended
political polarization.
The constitutional system had ruptured, but it was widely
believed by the political class in Washington, including most of
the press corps, that Bush, who had benefited, would rush to
repair the breach. The brutality enabling him to become
president, while losing the popular majority, and following a
decade of partisan polarization, must spur him to make good on
his campaign rhetoric of moderation, seek common ground and
enact centrist policies. Old family retainers, James Baker (the
former Secretary of State who had been summoned to command the
legal and political teams in Florida) and Brent Scowcroft (elder
Bush's former national security adviser), were especially
unprepared for what was to come, and they came to oppose Bush's
radicalism, mounting a sub rosa opposition. In its brazen,
cold-blooded and single-minded partisanship, the Florida contest
turned out in retrospect to be an augury not an aberration. It
was Bush's first opening, and having charged through it,
grabbing the presidency, he continued widening the breach.
The precedents for a president who gained office without winning
the popular vote were uniformly grim. John Quincy Adams, the
first president elected without a plurality, never escaped the
accusation of having made a "corrupt bargain" to secure the
necessary Electoral College votes. After one term he was turned
out of office with an overwhelming vote for his rival, Andrew
Jackson. Rutherford B. Hayes and Benjamin Harrison, also having
won the White House but not the popular vote, declined to run
again. Like these three predecessors Bush lacked a mandate, but
unlike them he proceeded as though he had won by a landslide.
The Republicans had control of both houses of the Congress and
the presidency for the first time since Dwight Eisenhower was
elected. But Eisenhower had gained the White House with a
resounding majority. He spent his early years in office trying
to isolate his right wing in the Congress, quietly if belatedly
encouraging efforts to censure Senator Joseph McCarthy.
Eisenhower greeted the Democratic recovery of the Congress in
1954 with relief and smoothly governed for the rest of his
tenure in tandem with Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson. The
outrageous behavior of the Republicans during the brief period
in which they had held congressional power and unleashed
McCarthy was a direct cause of their minority status for 40
subsequent years. But the Republicans who gained control of the
Congress in 1994 had not learned from their past.
The Republican radicals in charge of the House of
Representatives remained unabashed by their smashing failures of
the 1990s. They were willing to sacrifice two speakers of the
House to scandals of their own in order to pursue an
unconstitutional coup d'état to remove President Clinton. (It
was unconstitutional, strictly speaking, because they had
rejected any standards whatsoever for impeachment in the House
Judiciary Committee in contradistinction to the committee's
exacting standards enacted in the impeachment proceedings of
President Nixon.) Now these Republicans welcomed the Bush
ascension as deus ex machina, rescuing them from their
exhaustion, disrepute and dead end. They became Bush's
indispensable partners.
Immediately upon assuming office, Bush launched upon a series of
initiatives that began to undo the bipartisan traditions of
internationalism, environmentalism, fiscal discipline, and
scientific progress. His first nine months in office were a
quick march to the right. The reasons were manifold, ranging
from Cheney and Rumsfeld's extraordinary influence, Rove's
strategies, the neoconservatives' inordinate sway, and Bush's
Southern conservatism. These deeper patterns were initially
obscured by the surprising rapidity of Bush's determined tack.
Bush withdrew from the diplomacy with North Korea to control its
development and production of nuclear weapons. Secretary of
State Colin Powell, after briefing the press that the diplomatic
track would continue, was sent out again to repudiate himself
and announce the administration's reversal of almost a decade of
negotiation. Powell did not realize that this would be the first
of many times his credibility would be abused in a ritual of
humiliation. Swiftly, Bush rejected the Kyoto treaty to reduce
greenhouse gases and global warming, and presented a "voluntary"
plan that was supported by no other nation. He also withdrew the
U.S. from its historic role as negotiator among Israelis,
Palestinians and Arabs, a process to which his father had been
particularly committed.
In short order, Bush also reversed his campaign promise to
reduce carbon dioxide emissions from power plants and canceled
the federal regulation reducing cancer causing arsenic levels in
water. He joked at a dinner: "As you know, we're studying safe
levels for arsenic in drinking water. To base our decision on
sound science, the scientists told us we needed to test the
water glasses of about 3,000 people. Thank you for
participating." He appointed scores of former lobbyists and
industry executives to oversee policies regulating the
industries they previously represented.
As his top priority Bush pushed for passage of a large tax cut
that would redistribute income to the wealthy, drain the surplus
that the Clinton administration had accumulated, and reverse
fiscal discipline embraced by both the Clinton and prior Bush
administrations. The tax cut became Bush's chief instrument of
social policy. By wiping out the surplus, budget pressure was
exerted on domestic social programs. Under the Reagan
administration, a tax cut had produced the largest deficit to
that time, bigger than the combined deficits accumulated by all
previous presidents. But Reagan had stumbled onto this method of
crushing social programs through the inadvertent though
predictable failure of his fantasy of supply-side economics in
which slashing taxes would magically create increased federal
revenues. Bush confronted alternatives in the recent Republican
past, the Reagan example or his father's responsible
counter-example of raising taxes to cut the deficit; once again,
he rejected his father's path. But unlike Reagan, his decision
to foster a deficit was completely deliberate and with full
awareness of its consequences.
Domestic policy adviser John DiIulio, a political scientist from
the University of Pennsylvania, who had accepted his position in
the White House on the assumption that he would be working to
give substance to the president's rhetoric of "compassionate
conservatism," resigned in a state of shock. "There is no
precedent in any modern White House for what is going on in this
one: a complete lack of a policy apparatus," DiIulio told
Esquire magazine. "What you've got is everything -- and I mean
everything -- being run by the political arm. It's the reign of
the Mayberry Machiavellis ... Besides the tax cut ... the
administration has not done much, either in absolute terms or in
comparison to previous administrations at this stage, on
domestic policy. There is a virtual absence as yet of any policy
accomplishments that might, to a fair-minded non-partisan, count
as the flesh on the bones of so-called compassionate
conservatism."
After just four months into the Bush presidency, the Republicans
lost control of the Senate. Senator Jim Jeffords of Vermont, who
had served for 26 years as a moderate Republican in the House
and the Senate, left his party in response to Bush's radicalism.
"In the past, without the presidency, the various wings of the
Republican Party in Congress have had some freedom to argue and
influence and ultimately to shape the party's agenda. The
election of President Bush changed that dramatically," Jeffords
said on May 24, 2001. Overnight, the majority in the upper
chamber shifted to the Democrats.
Bush spent the entire month of August on vacation at his ranch
in Crawford, Texas. His main public event was a speech declaring
federal limits on scientific research involving stem cells that
might lead to cures for many diseases. Bush's tortuous position
was a sop to the religious right. On August 6, three days before
his nationally televised address on stem cells, he was presented
with a Presidential Daily Brief from the CIA entitled "Bin Laden
Determined to Strike Inside U.S." CIA director George Tenet
later told the 9/11 Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the
United States "the system was blinking red." The Commission
reported: "The President told us the August 6 report was
historical in nature ... We have found no indication of any
further discussion before September 11 among the President and
his top advisers of the possibility of a threat of an al Qaeda
attack in the United States."
By September 10, Bush held the lowest job approval rating of any
president to that early point in his tenure. He appeared to be
falling into the pattern of presidents who arrived without a
popular mandate and lasted only one term. The deadliest foreign
attack on American soil transformed his foundering presidency.
The events of September 11 lent Bush the aura of legitimacy that
Bush v. Gore had not granted. Catastrophe infused him with the
charisma of a "war president," as he proclaimed himself. At
once, his radicalism had an unobstructed path.
Bush's political rhetoric reached Manichaean and apocalyptic
heights. He divided the world into "good" and "evil." "You're
either with the terrorists or with us," he said. He stood at the
ramparts of Fortress America, defending it from evildoers
without and within. His fervent messianism guided what he called
his "crusade" in the Muslim realm. "Bring them on!" he exclaimed
about Iraqi insurgents. Asked if he ever sought advice from his
father, Bush replied, "There's a higher Father I appeal to."
After September 11, the American people were virtually united in
sentiment. Support for the Afghanistan war was almost unanimous.
"The nation is united and there is a resolve and a spirit that
is just so fantastic to feel," said Bush. But two weeks after he
made this statement, in January 2002, his chief political aide,
whom he called "The Architect," Karl Rove, spoke before a
meeting of the Republican National Committee, laying out the
strategy for exploiting fear of terror for partisan advantage.
"We can go to the country on this issue because they trust the
Republican Party to do a better job of protecting and
strengthening America's military might and thereby protecting
America," said Rove. His strategy was premised on the idea that
Republicans win elections by maximizing the turnout of their
conservative base; his method was to polarize the electorate as
much as possible. Rove's tactic was to challenge the patriotism
of Democrats by creating false issues of national security in
which they could be demonized. September 11 gave his politics of
polarization the urgency of national emergency.
Bush's politics sustained his remaking of the government that
had been the agenda of his vice president from the start. Even
before September 11, when "wartime" was used to justify secrecy,
Bush resisted transparency. He fought in the courts the
disclosure of the names of the participants on Vice President
Dick Cheney's energy panel. Kenneth Lay, Enron's chief executive
officer, was among them. Enron was the biggest financial
supporter of Bush's political career, before that had been a
partner in Bush's oil ventures and provided its corporate jets
to the Bush campaign for its Florida contest. Bush, who referred
to Lay as "Kenny Boy," claimed he didn't get to "know" him until
after he became governor and then hardly at all.
Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
were the prime movers behind the concentration of power in the
executive. Their experience going back to the Nixon presidency
had imbued them with belief in absolute presidential power,
disdain for the Congress ("a bunch of annoying gnats," Cheney
called its members, of which he had once been one), and secrecy.
Executive power was rationalized by a radical theory called the
"unitary executive," asserting that the president had complete
authority over independent federal agencies and was not bound by
congressional oversight or even law in his role as
commander-in-chief.
Bush constructed a hidden world of his "war on terror"
consisting of "black sites," secret CIA prisons holding
thousands of "ghost" detainees deprived of legal due process and
approved methods of torture. Cheney insisted it was necessary to
go to "the dark side," as he called it.
Attorneys in the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of
Justice wrote numerous memos to justify the "unitary executive"
and the president's unfettered right to engage in torture and
domestic spying. Bush's White House legal counsel Alberto
Gonzales (appointed Attorney General in the second term) derided
the Geneva Conventions against torture as "quaint" and Bush
overruled strenuous objections from the military, Secretary of
State Powell and senior officials in the Department of Justice
in abrogating U.S. adherence to them. Indeed, Bush signed a
directive stipulating that as commander-in-chief he could
determine any law he wished in dealing with those accused of
terrorism.
At Gonzales's request, on August 1, 2002, the Office of Legal
Counsel at the Justice Department sent him a memo on torture. It
was signed by OLC's director Jay Bybee (later appointed a
federal judge) and written by an OLC deputy, John Yoo, who
drafted at least a dozen crucial memos justifying absolute
presidential power. In this memo, the president's authority to
conduct torture without any oversight and by rules he determined
was asserted as fundamental to his power: "Any effort by the
Congress to regulate the interrogation of battlefield combatants
would violate the Constitution's sole vesting of the Commander
in Chief authority in the President." The memo defined torture
specifically and broadly: "Physical pain amounting to torture
must be equivalent to intensity to the pain accompanying serious
physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily
function, or even death."
Revelations of torture at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq were the
tip of the iceberg of the vast network of the detained and
disappeared. The International Committee of the Red Cross was
forbidden access. Those at the top of the chain of command were
shielded from legal accountability while a few soldiers and the
female general in charge at Abu Ghraib were offered up as
scapegoats. After FBI agents witnessed gruesome spectacles of
torture at Guantánamo, the Bureau issued orders that it would
not participate in this netherworld.
At the same time, Bush ordered the National Security Agency to
conduct domestic spying dragnets outside the legal confines of
the Foreign Surveillance Intelligence Act and without seeking
warrants from the FISA court. Conservative lawyers within the
Justice Department wrote memos justifying the practice on the
same grounds as they had rationalized torture -- the right of
the commander-in-chief to do as he saw fit. Once again, the
presidency was construed as a monarchy. Bush and Cheney argued
publicly that operating outside the FISA court might have
prevented the terrorist attacks of September 11, though nothing
stopped the administration from getting warrants to eavesdrop on
calls from the United States to al Qaeda before or after.
Foreign policy was captured by neoconservative ideologues, a
small group of sectarians rooted in the hothouse environment of
the capital's right-wing think tanks. Its principals had been
fired from the Reagan administration after the Iran-contra
scandal and banished from the elder Bush's administration, but
Bush rewarded them with positions at the strategic heights of
national security. These cadres operated with a Leninist
sensibility following a party line, engaging in fierce polemics,
using harsh invective, and showing equal contempt for
traditional Republicans and liberal Democrats. Cheney acted as
their sponsor, protector and promoter. Under his aegis, they ran
foreign policy from the White House and the Pentagon. Secretary
of State Colin Powell was sidelined. The Undersecretary of State
John Bolton, inserted by Cheney, blocked Powell's initiatives
and spied on him and his team, reporting back to the Office of
the Vice President. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice
made a separate peace and turned the National Security Council
into an augmented force for Cheney and the neocons. Meanwhile,
Republican realists, including elder Bush's closest associates
such as Brent Scowcroft, were isolated or purged.
The 60-year tradition of bipartisan internationalism was
jettisoned. After the Afghanistan war against the Taliban, the
administration elevated into a "Bush Doctrine" the policy of
preemptive attack, previously alien to the principles of U.S.
foreign policy and expressly rejected as dangerous to the
nation's security by presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy during
the Cold War.
In the run-up to the Iraq war, an internal campaign was waged
against professionals of the intelligence community and
diplomatic corps who still upheld standards of objective
analysis and carrying on the traditions of U.S. foreign policy.
Intense political pressure was applied to them to distort or
suppress their assessments if they contained caveats and to give
credence to disinformation fabricated by Iraqi exiles favored by
the neoconservatives. A special operation of neocons was set up
at the Pentagon, the Office of Special Plans, to "stovepipe"
information directly into the White House without passing
through the analytical filter of the CIA and other intelligence
agencies. Cheney made several unprecedented personal visits to
CIA headquarters to try to intimidate analysts into certifying
the disinformation. The caveats and warnings of the State
Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Department of Energy, and the
intelligence services of Germany and France were all ignored.
In making its case for war the administration stampeded public
opinion with false and misleading information about Saddam
Hussein's possession and development of weapons of mass
destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. Later his National
Security Adviser Rice (promoted to Secretary of State in the
second term) admitted that President Bush had made a false
statement in his 2003 State of the Union address about Iraq's
seeking uranium to produce nuclear weapons. Yet Bush, Cheney,
Rice and other officials had constantly suggested that Hussein
was linked to terrorism and those behind the attacks on
September 11. Secretary of State Powell's best-case presentation
before the United Nations was later proven to contain 26 major
falsehoods. Not a single substantial claim he made turned out to
be true. He explained he had been "deceived." He called it the
biggest "blot" on his record. His chief of staff Colonel
Lawrence Wilkerson said it was the "lowest point of my life." It
was certainly the lowest point of U.S. credibility.
After he resigned in 2005, Wilkerson revealed how a "Cheney-Rumsfeld
cabal" controlled national security policy: "Its insular and
secret workings were efficient and swift -- not unlike the
decision-making one would associate more with a dictatorship
than a democracy. This furtive process was camouflaged neatly by
the dysfunction and inefficiency of the formal decision-making
process, where decisions, if they were reached at all, had to
wend their way through the bureaucracy, with its dissenters,
obstructionists and 'guardians of the turf.' But the secret
process was ultimately a failure. It produced a series of
disastrous decisions and virtually ensured that the agencies
charged with implementing them would not or could not execute
them well."
Less than a year after September 11, the administration was
beset by disclosures that it had refused to take terrorism
seriously before the attacks and by stories about dysfunction at
the FBI. An FBI agent at the Minneapolis bureau, Coleen Rowley,
emerged with documentation of how the Bureau had ignored
warnings of the coming terrorist strike. On the day that she
testified before the Senate, June 6, 2002, Bush suddenly
announced a dramatic reversal of his position against the
Democratic proposal for a Department of Homeland Security.
Rowley's story was blotted out.
Bush now turned the issue of a new department against the
Democrats in the midterm elections, following Rove's script. In
Bush's proposal the department would not recognize unions, and
because the Democrats believed that employees should have the
right to form unions they were cast as weak on homeland security
and terrorism. Against this backdrop, Rove helped direct attacks
on the patriotism of Democrats in the 2002 midterm elections. In
one Republican television commercial, the face of Senator Max
Cleland of Georgia, a Vietnam veteran who had lost three limbs,
was morphed into that of Osama bin Laden, and Cleland lost. The
Republicans captured the Senate by one seat.
The tactics used against Democrats were also deployed to stifle
contrary views within the administration and to taint the
motives of those who had served and become critics. Any
loyalist, no matter the egregious error of judgment, was
vaunted; any heretic was burned. Bush's radical remaking of
government demanded a relentless war against professionals who
did not operate according to ideological tenets but objective
standards of analysis.
In 2003, the disillusioned Secretary of the Treasury Paul
O'Neill, the former CEO of Alcoa, a traditional
business-oriented Republican, published a memoir, "The Price of
Loyalty," recounting that the deficit was deliberately fostered
as a political tool contrary to economic merits. He disclosed
that the invasion of Iraq was raised at a National Security
Council meeting ten days after the inauguration. And he
described the president among his advisers as being "like a
blind man in a roomful of deaf people." The administration's
response was to investigate O'Neill for supposedly unlawfully
making public classified materials. It was a patently false
charge, he was exonerated, but it succeeded in changing the
subject and silencing him.
When, in 2003, retired Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni
criticized the administration's Iraq policy and the
neoconservatives' instrumental part played in its formulation,
conservative media retaliated by labeling him "anti-Semitic."
The former U.S. commander of Central Command and Bush's envoy to
the Middle East, who had endorsed Bush in 2000, had told the
Washington Post, "The more I saw, the more I thought that this
was the product of the neocons who didn't understand the region
and were going to create havoc there. These were dilettantes
from Washington think tanks who never had an idea that worked on
the ground ... I don't know where the neocons came from -- that
wasn't the platform they ran on."
In July 2003, former U.S. ambassador Joseph Wilson wrote an
op-ed article in the New York Times detailing that he had been
sent on a mission by the CIA before the Iraq war to Niger, where
he discovered that the administration claim that Saddam Hussein
was trying to purchase enriched yellowcake uranium there for
building nuclear weapons was untrue. Despite his report and that
of two others the president insisted in his 2003 State of the
Union that Hussein was in fact seeking uranium for nuclear
weaponry. The counterattack against Wilson was swift. A week
after his piece appeared, the conservative columnist Robert
Novak wrote that "two senior administration officials" had
informed him that Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame, an undercover
CIA operative, had been responsible for sending him on his
mission. The intent was somehow to cast aspersions on Wilson's
credibility. (For his service as the acting U.S. ambassador in
Iraq during the Gulf War, elder Bush had called him "a hero.")
The disclosure of Plame's identity was an apparent felony
against national security, a violation of the Intelligence
Identity Protection Act, and soon a special prosecutor was
appointed, and the president and the vice president were
interviewed, along with much of the White House senior staff.
Cheney's chief of staff and national security adviser, I. Lewis
"Scooter" Libby, was indicted for perjury and obstruction of
justice.
When, in March 2004, Richard Clarke, chief of counterterrorism
on the National Security Council, testified before the 9/11
Commission and elaborated in a book, "Against All Enemies," that
the Bush administration had ignored terrorism before September
11, his credibility was attacked by the administration and his
motivations questioned. By then, the smearing of whistleblower
career professionals had become a familiar pattern.
Traditional Republicans emerged among Bush's most penetrating
critics, from O'Neill to Wilkerson, from Zinni to Clarke. They
were not hostile to Bush when he entered office; on the
contrary, they were willing and eager to serve under him. They
observed first-hand, more than opponents on the outside, the
radical changes Bush was making within the government. As
Republicans, more than Democrats, they understood which
traditions of their own were being traduced.
Bush's war on terror melded with his culture war at home. Never
before had a president attempted so vigorously to batter down
the wall of separation between church and state. In 2005, Bush
proclaimed himself a votary of the "culture of life" as he
signed unprecedented legislation seeking to reverse numerous
state and federal court decisions that the husband of a woman
named Terri Schiavo, in a persistent vegetative state for years,
could end her life support. Political opportunism in the guise
of theology trampled the Constitution.
Bush's appointments to the federal judiciary were an attempt to
reverse the direction of the law for at least 70 years. Nearly
all of his nominees were members of the Federalist Society, a
conservative group of lawyers who seek to propagate certain
doctrines and advance each other's careers. One of these
doctrines is called "originalism," the belief that the intent of
the framers can be applied to all modern problems and lead to
conservative legal solution. Yet another is called the
"Constitution in exile," a school of thought that argues that
the true Constitution has been suppressed since President
Franklin D. Roosevelt began naming justices to the Supreme Court
and that its hidden law must be revived. One of Bush's judiciary
appointments, Janice Rogers Brown, lecturing before a Federalist
Society meeting, referred to the New Deal as "Revolution of
1937," and denounced it as "the triumph of our socialist
revolution." It was hardly a surprise that Bush's nominee to the
Supreme Court, federal appellate court judge Samuel Alito, was a
proponent of the theory of the "unitary executive" and a
wholehearted supporter of executive power.
No other president has ever been hostile to science. Russell
Train, the Environmental Protection Agency administrator under
presidents Nixon and Ford, observed, "How radically we have
moved away from regulation based on independent findings and
professional analysis of scientific, health and economic data by
the responsible agency to regulation controlled by the White
House and driven primarily by political considerations."
Bush's opposition to stem cell research was just the beginning
of his enmity toward science. The words "reproductive health"
and "condoms" were forbidden from appearing on websites of
agencies or organizations that received federal funds. At the
Food and Drug Administration, staff scientists and two
independent advisory panels were overruled in order to deny the
public access to emergency contraception. At the Centers for
Disease Control, scientifically false information was posted on
its website to foster doubt about the effectiveness of condoms
in preventing HIV/AIDS. At the President's Council on Bioethics,
two scientists were fired for dissents based on scientific
reasoning. At the National Cancer Institute, staff scientists
were suppressed as the administration planted a story on its
website falsely connecting breast cancer to abortion. The top
climate scientist at NASA, James Hansen, longtime director of
the agency's Goddard Institute for Space Studies, was ordered
muzzled after he noted at a scientific conference the link
between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. The
president also suggested that public schools should equally
teach evolution, the basis of all biological science, and
"Intelligent Design," a pseudo-scientific version of
creationism. "I think that part of education is to expose people
to different schools of thought," Bush said.
Bush's antipathy to science had an overlapping political appeal
to both the religious right and industrial special interests.
Scientific research was distorted and suppressed at the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, the Department of Agriculture, and
the Environmental Protection Agency. The administration censored
and misrepresented scientific reports on climate change, air
pollution, endangered species, soil conservation, mercury
emissions, and forests. Scientists were dismissed or rejected
from numerous science advisory committees, from the Lead
Poisoning Prevention Panel to the Army Science Board.
In February 2004, 60 of the nation's leading scientists,
university presidents, medical experts, and former federal
agency directors from both Democratic and Republican
administrations, including 20 Nobel laureates, issued a
statement entitled "Restoring Scientific Integrity in
Policymaking." It declared: "The distortion of scientific
knowledge for partisan political ends must cease if the public
is to be properly informed about issues central to its well
being, and the nation is to benefit fully from its heavy
investment in scientific research and education."
When Hurricane Katrina landed in August 2005 scientific reality
and dysfunctional government collided. Bush had systematically
distorted, suppressed and ignored evidence of global warming,
which scientists believed was responsible for intensifying
hurricanes. The director of the National Hurricane Center had
briefed Bush on the devastating impact on New Orleans and the
Gulf Coast of Katrina before it hit, but the president
disregarded the advance warning. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency, which under President Clinton had been one of
the most efficient and effective, had become a morass of
incompetence and political cronyism. Amid its abject failure,
Bush praised its director Michael Brown, whose previous
experience was as the head of the International Arabian Horse
Association, as doing "a heck of a job." New Orleans, a major
and unique American city, was destroyed. In the immediate
aftermath of the storm, Bush traveled six times to the city,
promising to rebuild it to its former glory, but most of the
city lay in ruins a year later. In January 2006, Bush declared
that he had received no rebuilding plan, apparently unaware that
he had already rejected it.
During the 2004 campaign, Bush's essential appeal was that he
alone could keep the country safe from terrorists. Before and
after the Iraq war, he implied that Saddam Hussein was in league
with those responsible for September 11. On May 1, 2002, in his
speech on the USS Abraham Lincoln, behind a banner reading
"Mission Accomplished," he declared, "The battle of Iraq is one
victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11, 2001
-- and still goes on." This theme was at the core of his
campaign message and stump speech. When under questioning late
in the campaign he admitted Saddam Hussein had nothing to do
with September 11, he still insisted Saddam was involved with al
Qaeda. Bush's closing television commercial in his 2004 campaign
showed a pack of wolves symbolizing terrorists about to prey on
the viewer. The voiceover intoned: "And weakness attracts those
who are waiting to do America harm."
As his supporters saw him, his simplistic rhetoric was straight
talk, his dogmatism fortitude, his swagger reassuring, his
stubbornness made him seem like a rock against danger, and his
rough edges were proof that he was a man of the people. His
evangelical religion was central to his image as a man of
conviction and his purity of heart. This persona helped insulate
Bush from accusations that he got things wrong, misled and had
ulterior motives.
Faith was as important in sustaining Bush's politics as fear.
Evangelical ministers and conservative Catholic bishops turned
their churches into political clubhouses. At the behest of Karl
Rove, right-wingers put initiatives against gay marriage on the
ballot in 16 swing states that were instrumental in maximizing
the vote for Bush there in the 2004 election.
The White House carefully tended an alternative universe of
belief into which its supporters took a leap of faith. From the
Schiavo case to Intelligent Design, from the morning after pill
to abstinence, Bush sent signals of encouragement to the
religious right. His anti-scientific approach helped arouse
suspicion and detestation of "experts." Critics were tainted as
"elitists." Contempt for contrary facts was cultivated as a
psychological prop of the leader's authority.
In 2004, the University of Maryland Program on International
Policy Attitudes issued a study, "The Separate Realities of Bush
and Kerry Supporters." It reported that 72 percent of Bush
supporters believed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction
even after the U.S. Iraq Survey Group had definitively concluded
that it had none. Seventy-five percent of Bush supporters
believed that Saddam Hussein had been providing help to al
Qaeda; 55 percent believed that the 9/11 Commission had proved
that point, though the commission's report had disproved it and
Bush had been forced to deny it. The social scientists
conducting the survey observed that respondents held these
beliefs because they said the Bush administration and
conservative media had confirmed them.
Near the end of the campaign, a senior White House aide
explained the "faith-based" school of political thought to
reporter Ron Suskind, who wrote in the New York Times Magazine:
"The aide said that guys like me were 'in what we call the
reality-based community,' which he defined as people who
'believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of
discernible reality.' I nodded and murmured something about
enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. 'That's
not the way the world really works anymore,' he continued.
'We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own
reality. And while you're studying that reality -- judiciously,
as you will -- we'll act again, creating other new realities,
which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out.
We're history's actors ... and you, all of you, will be left to
just study what we do.'"
The method described by the Bush aide was an updated version of
the insight of the philosopher Francis Bacon, who, in 1625,
wrote in his essay "Of Vaine-Glory": "For Lies are sufficient to
breed Opinion, and Opinion brings on Substance."
The "separate realities" of Bush and Kerry supporters studied by
the University of Maryland extended to the facts of their
military records, controversies about which became decisive
events in the campaign and case studies in the manipulation of
information. Bush had numerous mysterious discrepancies in his
Vietnam era service in the Texas Air National Guard, especially
being absent without leave for a year. It is indisputable that
he never actually completed his service. How he entered his unit
through special preference and under what circumstances he was
discharged without having finished his requirements was the
subject of an investigation by CBS's "60 Minutes." The program's
use of documents that could not be authenticated, though various
witnesses confirmed the underlying facts, aroused an intense
attack from Republican activists and the White House, and the
entire exposé was discredited because of the journalistic lapse.
The Bush White House had anticipated the potential scandal in
his military background, particularly in contrast to the record
of Senator Kerry, who was a genuine war hero, awarded the Silver
Star, Bronze Star and three Purple Hearts. In order to undermine
Kerry's strong point and defend Bush's weak one, a group called
Swift Boat Veterans for Truth was created, funded and its public
relations handled by Bush allies, and led by one John O'Neill,
who had been selected by the Nixon White House to hector Kerry
during the Vietnam era. The group accused Kerry of having
falsely earned his medals and subsequently lied about his war
experiences. Though the Navy officially affirmed his right to
his medals and those who served directly with him upheld his
account, the Swift Boat Veterans were granted extensive media
attention as if their fabrications were a valid point of view
that must be heard. On cable television especially, and on CNN
in particular, a perverse form of objectivity prevailed in which
the news organization abdicated establishing the facts and
allowed defamation to be presented as though it was just one
reasonable side of a debate.
The Bush White House, drawing harsh cautionary lessons from the
Nixon experience, considered the press an extremely dangerous
enemy that must be treated with contempt -- isolated,
intimidated, and, if not made pliable, discredited. The
administration favored Fox News and other conservative media,
using them as quasi-official government propaganda organs.
Joining the long project by the conservative movement, the
administration sought to bring the press into disrepute and
marginalize it. If journalists did not support the
administration's talking points or operate from its premises,
they were assailed as unfair and biased.
The conservative campaign against journalism as "liberal media"
was Leninist in its assumption that truth and fact were
inherently sectarian and instrumental. Acting on this premise,
the press was subjected to constant and elaborate campaigns of
intimidation. The administration enjoyed unprecedented success.
Not a single report in any major newspaper or on the broadcast
news networks covered the campaign of intimidation, as the press
had once readily reported on Nixon's early effort, progenitor of
the current strategy.
As giant corporate conglomerates with extensive holdings in
industries subject to all manner of government regulation, media
outlets were sensitive to pressure from the administration. The
effort to make the mainstream media compliant was so dedicated
that even Cheney himself called corporate owners to complain
about individual correspondents and stories. (In 2005, Time
Warner, which owns CNN, hired Republican House Majority Leader
Tom DeLay's chief of staff, Timothy Berry, as its chief
Washington lobbyist.)
After September 11 and in the rush to war in Iraq, a jingoist
spirit infected elements of the press corps and for a long time
they largely abandoned holding the government accountable. The
New York Times' news reports on weapons of mass destruction and
the Washington Post's editorials were indispensable in lending
credence to the disinformation on which the administration made
its case for the Iraq war. (The Times published a lengthy
editor's note on the failures of its coverage and the Times'
chief correspondent on WMD, Judith Miller, eventually resigned
from the newspaper. The Post refused to acknowledge how it had
been misled in its editorials before the war.) The long-term
damage to the credibility of the prestige press is incalculable.
Reality was often too radical and threatening for many in the
press to venture covering. Those who dared were frequently
thrust into fierce conflicts. Some were subject to legal
investigations by the Justice Department (for example, the New
York Times for reporting on Bush's warrantless domestic
surveillance and the Washington Post for reporting on secret
prisons for detainees). Some were even subjected to innuendo and
invasions of private life (for example, after broadcasting a
story on Army morale an ABC News reporter was outed as gay by
right-wing gossip columnist Matt Drudge, who claimed he was
given the information by a White House source).
A gay prostitute without journalistic background, carrying press
credentials from a phony media operation financed by right-wing
Texas Republicans, was granted access to the regular White House
press briefings and the press secretary employed the tactic of
calling on him to break up the questioning of legitimate
reporters. The White House also funneled federal funds to
conservatives posing as legitimate journalists and commentators.
Bush's chairman of the Public Broadcasting System, Kenneth
Tomlinson, drove distinguished journalist Bill Moyers off the
air for his heretical views and approved a show for the Wall
Street Journal editorial board. Tomlinson commissioned an
enemies list of "liberal media" on PBS in order to guide purging
the network. (Tomlinson resigned in November 2005 after the
Inspector General of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
found he had violated PBS rules by meddling in programming and
contracting.)
By containing and curbing the press, Bush attempted to remove
another constitutional check and balance on his power. When
President Bush made an extended joke at the 2004 Radio and
Television Correspondents Dinner about his inability to find WMD
in Iraq -- "Not here," he said, narrating a film depicting him
looking under his desk in the Oval Office -- the 1,500 members
of the assembled press corps burst into raucous laughter like
pledges to his fraternity.
Bush's admirers have cast him in the mold of Shakespeare's Henry
V, a wastrel royal son who upon rising to the purple realizes
his leadership in war. Some detractors offered an opposite
portrait of the dry drunk. But these literary and psychological
theories failed to assess Bush's radicalism in the historical
and constitutional terms of the American presidency.
Bush has deliberately sought to institute radical changes in the
character of the presidency and American government that would
permanently alter the constitutional system. He used the "global
war on terrorism" to impose a "unitary executive" of absolute
power, disdainful of the Congress and brushing aside the
judicial branch when he felt it necessary (for example, his
domestic surveillance outside the FISA court). He issued many
"signing statements" (a device originally designed by Samuel
Alito when he served as an aide in the Reagan Justice
Department) to express his own understanding of the meaning of
enacted legislation and how the executive branch would or would
not enforce it. The Bush White House concept of the executive
was the full flowering of the imperial presidency as conceived
by Richard Nixon.
Operationally, within the White House, the Office of the Vice
President controlled foreign policy, making the National
Security Council its auxiliary, and the flow of information to
the president. No vice president was ever as powerful.
Bush was unusually incurious and passive in seeking facts. He
never demanded worst-case scenarios. His circle of advisers was
tightly restricted. Only a select few of the White House staff
were permitted to see him, much less interact with him. He made
no effort to establish independent sources of information. He
never circulated to his staff articles that sparked a policy
interest in him. When his support in public opinion declined, he
soaked up the flattery of his aides that the people had
momentarily lapsed in their appreciation of his heroic strength
and vision.
Accountability was treated as a threat to executive power, not
as essential to democratic governance. No one up the chain of
command was held responsible for the crimes of Abu Ghraib. No
one who committed grievous errors of judgment in the Iraq war
was held to account. Instead they were showered with honors,
medals and promotions.
Bush's radical White House depended on one-party control of the
Congress. The Republican Congress supported the consolidation of
executive power, even at the expense of congressional
prerogatives. Oversight was studiously neglected. On any matter
that might cause irritation to the White House, hearings were
not held or quashed. When the White House did not produce
requested documents, for example, on its conduct in response to
Hurricane Katrina, there were no repercussions from the
Republican Congress. The intelligence committees and the House
Armed Services, among other committees, covered up
administration malfeasance. The Senate Intelligence Committee
skewed and distorted its report on intelligence leading into the
Iraq war to acquit the administration of responsibility and
refused to conduct a promised investigation into administration
political pressures on the intelligence community.
The Republicans in Congress enforced discipline by creation of a
pay-for-play system. Lobbyists, trade associations and law firms
were told that unless they contributed to Republican campaign
funds and hired Republicans they would be treated with disfavor.
House Majority Leader Tom DeLay developed this political
machine, called the K Street Project, to a high degree of
control over Washington, until he was forced to resign his post
due to indictment for criminal campaign fundraising practices.
Jack Abramoff, a super-lobbyist, worked closely with DeLay, and
when Abramoff pled guilty in January 2006 to fraud, tax evasion
and criminal conspiracy he triggered the biggest congressional
scandal in modern history. Abramoff was also plugged into the
White House, linked to Rove, and even attended staff meetings.
Bush's presidency was uniquely radical in its elevation of
absolute executive power, dismissal of the other branches of
government, contempt for law, dominant power of the vice
president, networks of ideological cadres, principle of
unaccountability, stifling of internal debate, reliance on
one-party rule, and overtly political use of war. Never before
had a president shown disdain for science and sought to batter
down the wall of separation between church and state. None of it
seemed in the offing upon Bush's inauguration in 2001. Yet these
actions were not sudden impulses, spontaneous reactions or
accidental gestures. They were based on deliberate decisions
intended to change the presidency and government fundamentally
and forever. And these decisions had deep historical roots.
One of the distinctive sources of Bush's radicalism was that he
was the first Southern conservative ever elected to the
presidency. Southern politics has always contained varied and
conflicting traditions. Through Bush, a reactionary Southern
political tradition captured the center of the federal
government, a phenomenon that has never occurred before. His
brand of conservatism is the expression of a commodity-based
oligarchy rooted in Texas, deeply hostile to the New Deal,
dedicated to neglect of public services, seeking to maintain
class and racially based hierarchies. Using the rhetoric of
limited government and states' rights these Texas conservatives
claim control over government in order to consolidate power and
wealth. Both Bush and Cheney (former chief executive officer of
Halliburton, a Texas based company) come out of the oil patch
background. Bush's language about "compassionate conservatism"
was a simple emollient to ease the way for his harsher political
and policy imperatives.
In method, spirit and goals, Bush's project was the opposite of
the New Deal, which was a great improvisation in the spirit of
American pragmatism, "bold, persistent experimentation," as
Franklin D. Roosevelt put it. The New Deal, in the face of the
greatest domestic crisis since the Civil War, mobilized the
capacities of government for the general welfare. The New
Frontier of John F. Kennedy and the Great Society of Lyndon
Johnson extended the New Deal in its social inclusiveness,
reforming immigration policy, ending poverty among the elderly,
and expanding education. Most significantly, on racial justice,
the frustrated legacy of Reconstruction and the great Civil War
constitutional amendments was finally realized.
The three Southern presidents of the 20th century were all
progressive Democrats -- Lyndon Johnson, Jimmy Carter and Bill
Clinton. If Woodrow Wilson were to be counted as a fourth,
having been born in Virginia, he would also fit the profile of
progressive (though definitely of the pre-civil rights era,
given his support for segregation within the federal
government). Harry Truman, from the border state of Missouri,
must be categorized as one of the great liberals (including on
civil rights).
In the 19th century, the Southerners in the White House, from
Jefferson through Andrew Jackson, represented expanded
democracy. The only Southern conservative to hold the office
before the Civil War was John Tyler, who acceded to the
presidency after the sudden death of William Henry Harrison, the
first Whig president. Tyler was a conservative Democrat from
Virginia and a man without a party whose tenure was an
accidental one term. Zachary Taylor, the last Whig, from
Louisiana, a national hero as the triumphant commander in the
Mexican War, was setting himself against the pro-slavery forces
from the South, including his son-in-law Senator Jefferson Davis
of Mississippi, at the time of his death. Andrew Johnson,
another accident and anomaly, was both a vehement populist and
conservative, who used the presidency to attempt to scuttle
Reconstruction in the name of a white man's democracy. Lyndon
Johnson, the first elected Southerner since the Civil War, of
course, was the greatest president on civil rights since Ulysses
Grant.
The two great epochal crises in American history after the
revolution -- the Civil War and the Great Depression -- were
accelerated and deepened by passive, accommodating or stubbornly
out of touch presidents -- James Buchanan and Herbert Hoover.
Political and economic forces they failed to control or
understand overcame them. But neither sought conflict or courted
turmoil, even though they accelerated it. By contrast, Bush
purposefully polarized differences in the country for political
advantage.
In foreign policy, Bush freely appropriated the language of
Woodrow Wilson about freedom and democracy. But Wilson sought to
bring the U.S. into a new international system of law. Bush's
unilateralism opposed the Wilsonian heritage at every turn,
exemplified by his appointment of John Bolton as ambassador to
the United Nations.
Bush also claimed to stand in the conservative tradition of
Ronald Reagan. Indeed, Reagan sought to overturn longstanding
policies of Democratic and Republican presidents alike in his
pursuit of a radical and often fanciful conservatism. But when
he found himself cornered by realities, Reagan the ideologue
gave way to Reagan the old union negotiator prepared for
compromise. Facing reality, he gave up his rhetoric about
privatizing Social Security to join with Democrats to fund its
long-term solvency. After the Iran-contra scandal, he summarily
dismissed his neoconservative aides and forged a détente with
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that helped lead to the end of
the Cold War. That achievement, which required disenthralling
his administration from the right wing, was his finest moment
and the enduring basis of his presidential reputation. Had he
not cast out the right, he would have remained covered with
disgrace in history.
George W. Bush's father, Reagan's vice president and successor,
George H.W. Bush, pointedly blackballed the neoconservatives
from his administration. Yet the son George dusted off Reagan's
discredited zealots and their doctrines to provide him with
reasons for a war of choice in Iraq. His rejection of his
father's realism in foreign policy was pointed and that
rejection signaled a larger radicalism.
Nothing like Bush's concerted radicalism has ever been seen
before in the White House. One would have to go back to the
Civil War era to find politics as polarized. But not even the
president of the Confederate States of America, Jefferson Davis,
ran as extreme and insulated an administration. Davis, a former
U.S. senator and Secretary of War, appointed men he knew to be
experienced politicians and diplomats to responsible positions
within his government, and kept the radical Fire-eaters at bay.
As soon as the Fire-eaters' vision of an independent slave
republic materialized through secession they were consigned to
the sidelines, where they remained as critics of the Confederate
president for the duration of the Civil War.
Never before has a president so single-handedly and willfully
been the source of national and international crises. The
tragedy of September 11 cannot be offered as the sole
justification to explain his actions. In his first inaugural
address, Bush cited a biblical passage about an "angel in the
whirlwind." His presidency has been a self-created whirlwind.
In 1900, Theodore Roosevelt wrote a sympathetic biography of
Oliver Cromwell, the leader of the short-lived English republic
of the 17th century. While Roosevelt admired many of Cromwell's
intentions to create representative government, he described how
Cromwell's volatile temperament undermined his virtuous goals.
"In criticizing Cromwell, however, we must remember that
generally in such cases an even greater share of blame must
attach to the nation than to the man." Roosevelt continued:
"Self-governing freemen must have the power to accept necessary
compromises, to make necessary concessions, each sacrificing
somewhat of prejudice, and even of principle, and every group
must show the necessary subordination of its particular
interests to the interests of the community as a whole. When the
people will not or cannot work together; when they permit groups
of extremists to decline to accept anything that does not
coincide with their own extreme views; or when they let power
slip from their hands through sheer supine indifference; then
they have themselves chiefly to blame if the power is grasped by
stronger hands."
The tragedy that Theodore Roosevelt described is not reserved in
its broad dimensions to Britain. Roosevelt wrote his history as
a lesson for Americans, who had been spared the travesties of
the English revolution. Instead of Cromwell, we had had
Washington. Ultimately, a people are responsible for its
leaders. Bush's legacy will encompass a crisis over democracy
that only the American people can resolve.
Note: The text above is the introduction to Sidney
Blumenthal's new book, "How
Bush Rules: Chronicles of a Radical Regime, " recently
published by the Princeton University Press.
-- By Sidney Blumenthal
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