| Targeting the
Nuclear Program? Or the Regime? Air-target
planners orchestrate strikes on the basis of desired
target destruction criteria. In the case of an attack on
Iran, after five nights of bombing, we can be relatively
certain of target destruction. It is even possible to
project the degree to which parts of the Iranian nuclear
program would be set back. For example, using Web
pictures of the Natanz enrichment facility, it is
possible to see three years worth of construction. An
attack on that construction might appear to set the
program back three years. But it is hard to judge. David
Kay, the former top U.S. weapons inspector, observed
during our discussions that there is the program we see,
but there is also the program we do not see. Because of
the gaps in U.S. intelligence on Iran, and specifically
on Iran’s nuclear program, American military leaders are
growing increasingly uneasy about the reliability and
comprehensiveness of target selection.12 In other words,
after the five-night military attack we would not be
able with any degree of certainty to say how we had
impacted the Iranian nuclear program.
If this uncertainty does not appear to worry the
proponents of air strikes in Iran it is in no small part
because the real U.S. policy objective is not merely to
eliminate the nuclear program, but to overthrow the
regime. It is hard to believe, after the misguided talk
prior to Iraq of how American troops would be greeted
with flowers and welcomed as liberators, but those
inside and close to the administration who are arguing
for an air strike against Iran actually sound as if they
believe the regime in Tehran can be eliminated by air
attacks.
In this case, the concept is not a ground force
Thunder Run into Tehran of the sort used in Baghdad. It
is a decapitation-based concept. Kill the leadership and
enable the people of Iran to take over their government.
More reasonable leadership will emerge.
Under this concept, the air operation would take
longer than the five nights. The targets would be
expanded. The Revolutionary Guard units would be
attacked since according to the argument they are the
primary force that keeps the current regime in power.
There are other regime protection units in Tehran. Most
important, the U.S. operation would move into targeted
killing, seeking to eliminate the leadership of Iran.
It sounds simple. Air planners always tell a good
story. By the same token, they almost always fall short
of their promises, even in strictly military terms. That
was true in World War II. It was true in Korea. It was
true in Vietnam. It has just proved true with the
Israeli attacks on Hezbollah. No serious expert on Iran
believes the argument about enabling a regime change. On
the contrary, whereas the presumed goal is to weaken or
disable the leadership and then replace it with others
who would improve relations between Iran and the United
States, it is far more likely that such strikes would
strengthen the clerical leadership and turn the United
States into Iran’s permanent enemy.
Iran’s Response
Having demonstrated that air strikes are unlikely
either to eliminate the nuclear program or to bring
about the overthrow of the Islamic regime in Iran, we
must now turn to what, precisely, they would achieve. It
is important to remember that some of Iran’s threats,
demonstrations of new weapons, and military exercises
are designed to have a deterrent effect. As such we
should not deduce too much about what Iran would do in
the event of an attack on the basis of what it might say
and do in advance of an attack. A former CIA Middle East
Station Chief told me once that predicting the
consequences of a strategic event in the Middle East was
as difficult as predicting how an Alexander Calder
mobile would come to rest after you flicked one of its
hanging pieces.
It is possible, however, to identify some high
probability immediate consequences.
The Iranians would likely look to target Israel as a
response to a U.S. strike, using Hezbollah as the
primary vehicle for retaliation. For Tehran, there is
the added benefit that blaming Israel (even for a U.S.
strike) would play well at home, and probably throughout
the region.
Moqtada al-Sadr has said publicly that if the United
States were to attack Iran, he would target U.S. forces
in Iraq.
Iran could channel more individuals and weapons into
Iraq. Specifically, Iran could upgrade technology among
Shiite militias, with weapons like the laser-guided
anti-tank missiles Hezbollah had in Lebanon. We might
even see more direct operations like missile attacks
against U.S. forces.
Moqtada al-Sadr controls the large Facilities
Protection Service forces in Iraq. Some estimates put
this force as large as 140,000. Among other missions,
they guard the oil pipelines. If Iran wants to cut the
flow of oil, Iraq is the best place to begin, and the
means are in place to take on the mission. The impact of
severing Iraq’s oil supplies would be an immediate
increase in its own oil revenue.
Iran is not going to wipe Israel from the map or
force the United States to leave Iraq with these
operations. But in causing these various complications,
Iran can still achieve a degree of success. As we
recently witnessed in the clash between Hezbollah and
Israel, Iran can seem stronger just by virtue of making
the United States and Israel seem weaker.
Round Two
Once the nature of the Iranian retaliation becomes
apparent, the United States will not likely declare
success and walk away from the problem. Clearly, the
pressure will be to expand the targets and punish Iran
even more. The government of Iran is fragile, the
thinking goes; it could even be on the verge of falling;
it is time to “enable” the Iranian people. The Iranians
will react with their own horizontal escalation. (See
Table 2.)
Iran has been sending mixed signals about whether or
not it would cut its own oil production or attempt to
restrict the flow of oil from the Gulf. A strike of five
nights might not push them to cut the flow of oil. But
continued operations probably would. Iran does have some
flexibility to do without oil revenues for a period
because of surpluses from currently high oil prices. In
addition, it has plans for rationing refined petroleum
products that it must import.
Executing the oil option might not be limited to
operations against tankers moving in and out of the
Gulf. Iran has the capability, and we have seen some
indications of the intent, to attack facilities of other
oil providers in the region.
It would be tougher for Iran and Hezbollah to attack
UN forces in Lebanon. If the UN forces were to become
too aggressive in response to Hezbollah attacks against
Israel, they would most likely become targets. In
addition, at some point in the expanding conflict, Iran
might see a value to making the war about attempts at
Western domination of the region and not just about the
United States and Israel. In that case, a focused attack
on something like the Italian headquarters would
resonate in the region.
It took a while for the nations of the region to
react to the Israeli attack into Lebanon. That most
likely would be the case in the event of a U.S. strike
against Iran. As attacks continued and as the television
coverage intensified, however, we could see something
similar to the reactions to the Danish cartoons. We
could see the “Arab Street” asserting itself.
Syria and Iran signed a defense agreement on June 15.
Under this agreement Syrian forces would be brought into
a fight if Iran were attacked. Syrian President Bashar
Assad might be a reluctant participant, but as the
conflict expands, he might not have a choice.
The Iranians could conduct targeted killing outside
the region. They have used this tactic in the past: in
1991, Shapour Bakhtiar, the Shah’s last prime minister,
was decapitated in his apartment in Paris.
Continued air strikes and demonstrations could have a
compounding effect. Weak governments in the Muslim world
could be threatened. The governments of Pakistan,
Jordan, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia are vulnerable.
|
Table 2. Consequences of an
Attack
|
| |
Type of Operation
|
| |
Short Strike
|
Regime Change
|
| Hezbollah attacks on Israel |
High probability
|
High probability
|
| Attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq |
High probability
|
High probability
|
| Sabotage pipelines in Iraq |
High probability
|
High probability
|
| Street demonstrations on a wide
scale |
Possible
|
High probability
|
| Hezbollah attacks outside the region |
Possible
|
High probability
|
| Iran stopping its own oil exports |
Possible
|
High probability
|
| Iran blocking Gulf oil flow |
High probability
|
High probability
|
| Iran attacking other regional oil
facilities |
Possible
|
Possible
|
| Iran suicide attacks |
Not likely
|
Possible
|
| Syria involved |
Not likely
|
Possible
|
| Threats to regional governments |
Not likely
|
Possible
|
|
As an obvious consequence of the instability
resulting from a U.S. strike, the price of oil almost
certainly will spike. The impact will depend on how high
and how long. The longer the conflict goes, the higher
the price. A former Kuwaiti oil minister privately
suggested a plateau of $125 per barrel. Confidential
analysis by a major European bank suggests it would
level off at $130, and a very conservative estimate
would be over $200.
With prices surging to this level, third order
consequences become apparent. The most obvious would be
a global, synchronized recession, intensified by the
existing U.S. trade and fiscal imbalances. Another
political consequence would be that oil exporting
countries outside the region would enjoy significant
surges in revenue from higher prices. As a result,
countries such as Venezuela and Russia would enjoy
expanded influence while the West would be reeling from
recession.
I should note that in the preceding discussion of the
cycle of action and reaction, I have not mentioned large
U.S. ground unit formations. That is because I do not
believe we will come to a point where that option will
make sense to policymakers. This is the one lesson the
administration seems to have learned from
Iraq—occupation does not work. And that realization
brings us back to why the air strike option has been so
attractive to the administration from the beginning.
Excerpted from The End of the “Summer of
Diplomacy”: Assessing U.S. Military Options on Iran,
a new report for The Century Foundation by Retired Air
Force Colonel Sam Gardiner. Download the full report as
a PDF
here. Read the press release
here. |
