Bush & Blair: The Iraq fantasy
Neither will admit that Iraq is a disaster. But while their
state of denial may cost votes in Washington and London, on the
frontline in the Middle East, it continues to cost lives
By Patrick Cockburn
11/05/06 "The
Independent" -- -- "When does the incompetence end
and the crime begin?" asked an appalled German Chancellor in the
First World War when the German army commander said he intended
to resume his bloody and doomed assaults on the French fortress
city of Verdun.
The same could be said of the disastrous policies of George Bush
and Tony Blair in Iraq. At least 3,000 Iraqis and 100 American
soldiers are dying every month. The failure of the US and
Britain at every level in Iraq is obvious to all. But the White
House and Downing Street have lived in a state of permanent
denial. On the Downing Street website are listed 10 "Big Issues"
affecting the Prime Minister, but Iraq is not one of them.
The picture of what is happening in Iraq put out by Messrs Bush
and Blair no longer touches reality at any point. They claim US
and British troops are present because Iraqis want them there.
But a detailed poll of Iraqi attitudes by WorldPublicOpinion.org,
published six weeks ago, shows that 71 per of Iraqis want the
withdrawal of US-led forces within a year. No less than 74 per
cent of Shia and 91 per cent of Sunni say they want American and
British troops out. Only in Kurdistan, where there are few
foreign troops, does a majority support the occupation.
Hostility to the American and British troops has a direct and
lethal consequence for the soldiers on the ground. The same poll
shows that 92 per cent of Sunni and 62 per cent of Shia approve
of attacks on US-led forces. This is the real explanation for
the strength of the insurgency: it is widely popular.
For the past three-and-a-half years in Iraq, one needed to close
both eyes very hard or live in Baghdad's Green Zone not to see
that the occupation was detested by most Iraqis. At places where
US Humvees had been blown up or US soldiers killed or wounded
there were usually Iraqis dancing for joy.
Supposedly, the centrepiece of American and British policy is to
stay "until the job is done" and hand over to Iraqi army and
police who will cope with powerful militias like the Mehdi Army.
But in police stations in many parts of southern Iraq,
photographs pinned to the wall include one of British armoured
vehicles erupting in flames, beside a portrait of Muqtada al-Sadr,
the leader of the Mehdi Army.
In the first year of the occupation it could be argued that Bush
and Blair were simply incompetent: they did not understand Iraq,
were misinformed by Iraqi exiles, or were simply ignorant and
arrogant. But they must know that for two-and-a-half years they
have controlled only islands of territory in Iraq. "The
Americans haven't even been able to take over Haifa Street [a
Sunni insurgent stronghold] though it's only 400 yards from the
Green Zone," a senior Iraqi security official exclaimed to me
last week.
But the refusal to admit, as the British army commander Sir
Richard Dannatt pointed out, that the occupation generates
resistance in Iraq, means that no new and more successful policy
can be devised. It is this that is criminal. And it is all the
worse because the rational explanation for Mr Bush's persistence
in bankrupt policies in Iraq is that he has always given
priority to domestic politics. Holding power in Washington was
more important than real success in Baghdad.
It is easy enough to say that Mr Bush lives in a world of
fantasy in Iraq. His aides are notoriously averse to giving him
bad news. Officials who do so lose their jobs. But this probably
underestimates the man. After 9/11 he successfully presented
himself as the security president. For the first time since the
1920s, the Republicans held the presidency and both houses of
Congress. The war in Afghanistan was successful at little cost.
He thought the same would be true in Iraq.
There was a spurious series of highly publicised turning points
in the war, such as the capture of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the
return of sovereignty to Iraq and the recapture of Fallujah in
2004, the elections and referendum on the constitution of 2005.
In each case reality was always different. Nobody in Iraq
thought Saddam was the leader of the resistance, and his capture
had no effect on the insurgency. The return of sovereignty had
little meaning: last week the Iraqi prime minister, Nouri
al-Maliki, admitted that he could not move a company of Iraqi
troops without US permission.
Fallujah was very publicly stormed by the US Marines in November
2004, but a few days later the insurgents, in an operation
hardly mentioned by the administration, captured the much larger
city of Mosul in northern Iraq, seizing arms worth $40m (£21m).
The elections and referendum in 2005 deeply divided Iraq's
communities along sectarian and ethnic lines, and led directly
to civil war in central Iraq.
The US media was under extreme pressure to report the
non-existent good news that the White House accused them of
ignoring.
I used to think how absurd it was for me to risk my life by
visiting the Green Zone, the entrances to which were among the
most bombed targets in Iraq, to see diplomats who claimed that
the butchery in Iraq was much exaggerated. But when I asked them
if they would like to come and have lunch in my hotel outside
the zone, they always threw up their hands in horror and said
their security men would never allow it.
The fantasy picture of Iraq purveyed by Mr Bush and Mr Blair is
now being exposed. The Potemkin village they constructed to
divert attention from what was really happening in Iraq is
finally going up in flames.
But it is too late for the Iraqis, Americans and British who
died because they were unwitting actors in this fiction,
carefully concocted by the White House and Downing Street to
show progress where there is frustration, and victory where
there is only defeat.
The Occupation: War and Resistance in Iraq
by Patrick Cockburn has just been published by Verso
© 2006 Independent News and Media Limited
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