Boomerang Effect
When Will the First IED Strike
Cleveland?
By William Lind
12/09/06 "Military.com" -- -- Last week, one of my
students, a Marine captain, asked whether I had heard a
news report about an “IED-like device” supposedly found
near Cincinnati, and if I thought we would soon start
seeing IEDs here in the U.S. I replied that I had not
heard the news story, but as to whether we would see
IEDs here at home, the answer is yes.
One of the things U.S. troops are learning in Iraq is
how people with little training and few resources can
fight a state. Most American troops will see this within
the framework of counterinsurgency. But a minority will
apply their new-found knowledge in a very different way.
After they return to the U.S. and leave the military,
they will take what they learned in Iraq back to the
inner cities, to the ethnic groups, gangs, and other
alternate loyalties they left when they joined the
service. There, they will put their new knowledge to
work, in wars with each other and wars against the
American state. It will not be long before we see police
squad cars getting hit with IEDs and other techniques
employed by Iraqi insurgents, right here in the streets
of American cities.
I know this thought -- not to speak of the reality when
it happens -- will be shocking to some readers. To
anyone who really understands Fourth Generation war, it
should not be. Fourth Generation war does not merely
work on the will of a state’s political leaders, as some
theorists have said. It does something far more
powerful. It pulls an opposing state apart at the moral
level.
We saw this phenomenon in the effect the defeat in
Afghanistan had on the Soviet Union. Just as that defeat
led to the disintegration of the USSR, so defeat in the
current Afghan war will bring the disintegration of
NATO. We are seeing 4GW pull Israel apart today, to the
point where a leaden blanket of Kulturpessimismus now
oppresses that country.
We will see the same thing here, powerfully I think, as
a result of our defeat in Iraq. It will manifest itself
in many ways, and one of those ways will be the
progression of inner-city and gang crime into something
close to warfare, including war against the state.
Police will not be surprised by this prediction. I have
talked with cops about Fourth Generation war, and they
“get it” much better than do American soldiers and
Marines. Many have told me that they already recognize
elements of war in what they are encountering,
especially in inner cities. Cops have been killed while
just sitting in their cruisers, because they represent
the authority of the state. How big a step is it for
those cruisers to get hit with IEDs instead of pistol
shots?
The Bush administration, as usual, has it exactly
backwards. The danger is not that the “terrorists” we
are fighting in Iraq will come here if we pull out
there. Rather, American involvement in 4GW in Iraq will
create “terrorism” here from among the people we have
sent to fight the war there. Well educated in the ways
of successful insurgency, they will come home embittered
by a lost war, by friends dead and crippled for life to
no purpose. Thanks to America’s de-industrialization,
they will return to no jobs, or lousy “service” jobs at
minimum wage. Angry, frustrated and futureless, some of
them will find new identities and loyalties in gangs and
criminal enterprises, where they can put their new
talents to work.
It will, of course, be only a small minority of
returning troops who will go this route. But something
else they will have learned from the Iraqi insurgents,
along with how to make and deploy IEDs, is that it takes
very few people to create and sustain an insurgency.
The boomerang effect is a central element of Fourth
Generation war. When a state involves itself in 4GW over
there, it lays a basis for 4GW at home. That is true
even if it wins over there, and all the more true if it
loses, as states usually do. The toxic fallout from
America’s 4GW defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan will be
far greater than most people expect, and it will fall
most heavily on America’s police.
Copyright 2006 William Lind
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