Can We Let
Intelligence Officials Lie With Impunity?”
By Ray McGovern and W. Patrick Lang
01/05/06 "Information
Clearing House" -- -- Lies
have consequences . All those who helped President
George W. Bush launch a war of aggression—termed by
Nuremberg “the supreme international crime”—have blood on
their hands and must be held accountable. This includes
corrupt intelligence officials. Otherwise, look for them to
perform the same service in facilitating war on Iran.
“They should have been shot,”
said former State Department intelligence director, Carl
Ford, referring to ex-CIA director George Tenet and his
deputy John McLaughlin, for their “fundamentally dishonest”
cooking of intelligence to please the White House. Ford was
alluding to “intelligence” on the menacing but non-existent
mobile biological weapons laboratories in Iraq.
Ford was angry that Tenet and
McLaughlin persisted in portraying the labs as real several
months after they had been duly warned that they existed
only in the imagination of intelligence analysts who, in
their own eagerness to please, had glommed onto second-hand
tales told by a con-man appropriately dubbed “Curveball.” In
fact, Tenet and McLaughlin had been warned about Curveball
long before they let then-Secretary of State Colin Powell
shame himself, and the rest of us, by peddling Curveball’s
wares at the U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2003.
After the war began, those same
analysts, still “leaning forward,” misrepresented a
tractor-trailer found in Iraq outfitted with industrial
equipment as one of the mobile bio-labs. Former U.N. weapons
inspector David Kay, then working for NBC News, obliged by
pointing out the equipment “where the biological process
took place... Literally, there is nothing else for which it
could be used.”
George Tenet knows a good man
when he sees him. A few weeks later he hired Kay to lead the
Pentagon-created Iraq Survey Group in the famous search to
find other (equally non-existent, it turned out) “weapons of
mass destruction.” (Eventually Kay, a scientist given to
empirical evidence more than faith-based intelligence,
became the skunk at the picnic when, in January 2004, he
insisted on telling senators the truth: “We were almost all
wrong—and I certainly include myself here.” But that came
later.)
On May 28, 2003, CIA’s intrepid
analysts cooked up a fraudulent six-page report claiming
that the trailer discovered earlier in May was proof they
had been right about Iraq’s “bio-weapons labs.” They then
performed what could be called a “night-time requisition,”
getting the only Defense Intelligence Agency analyst
sympathetic to their position to provide DIA “coordination,”
(which was subsequently withdrawn by DIA). On May 29,
President George W. Bush, visiting Poland, proudly announced
on Polish TV, “We have found the weapons of mass
destruction.”
When the State Department's
Intelligence and Research (INR) analysts realized that this
was not some kind of Polish joke, they “went ballistic,”
according to Ford, who immediately warned Colin Powell that
there was a problem. Tenet must have learned of this
quickly, for he called Ford on the carpet, literally, the
following day. No shrinking violet, Ford held his ground. He
told Tenet and McLaughlin, “That report is one of the worst
intelligence assessments I’ve ever read.”
This vignette—and several like
it—are found in Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin,
Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War by Michael
Isikoff and David Corn, who say Ford is still angry over the
fraudulent paper. Ford told the authors:
It was clear that they
[Tenet and McLaughlin] had been personally involved in
the preparation of the report... It wasn’t just that it
was wrong. They lied.
This, of course, was just one
episode in the long drama of deliberate perversion of
intelligence to grease the skids for justifying the invasion
of Iraq—the most serious foreign policy blunder in our
nation’s 230-year history.
“Hubris,” the overweening
arrogance that brought down many a protagonist of the Greek
tragedies, is an aptly-chosen title for the revealing
Isikoff/Corn study. Some of the ground they cover is
familiar to us Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity
(VIPS), who well before the war started chronicling the Bush
administration’s lies. What makes the book different is its
cumulative impact—the detailed, first-hand accounts of lie
and cover-up, lie and cover-up, ad nauseam .
Protagonists need a supporting
cast. And many of the dramatis personae were
intelligence analysts—former colleagues of mine. The
question lingers: How could they allow themselves to be
seduced into enlisting in the meretricious march to mayhem
in Iraq? Much of the answer (and much of the reason this
misguided war is allowed to continue) lies in the fact that
those planning and facilitating the war in Iraq are not
fighting it. Unlike Vietnam, no one “important” is being
asked to put life and limb at risk; nor, generally speaking,
are their children. Interestingly, most of our troops come
from towns with populations of less than 10,000.
Theirs Not To Reason Why
Into the valley of death rode
the 3,000. “U.S. Toll in Iraq Reaches 3,000” screamed The
Washington Post ’s lead story on New Year’s Day, which
included the Pentagon’s count of more than 22,000 troops
injured. As is known, the Pentagon does not count dead
Iraqis, but reputable estimates put that number at about
650,000. As we pass this sad milestone, it behooves us to
pause and consider the enormity of what has been allowed to
happen—and how to prevent it from happening again. The House
and Senate Intelligence committees in the new Congress need
to reinstitute genuine oversight, including a close look at
why so many intelligence officers cooperated in the
dishonesty leading to war. We owe that to the 25,000, not to
mention the 650,000.
Start with Tenet and McLaughlin
and include Alan Foley, the retired chief of CIA’s Center
for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control
(WINPAC) and devotee of imaginative intelligence on
bio-labs, uranium from Niger, aluminum tubes and other
artifices to justify an unnecessary war. Most of the
suspects owe their meteoric careers in large measure to
Defense Secretary Robert Gates who, as head of CIA analysis
and later as CIA director, institutionalized the
politicization of CIA analysis more than 20 years ago,
mostly by moving malleable managers up the pay scale.
Another beneficiary of Gates is
George Tenet who, as staff director of the Senate
Intelligence committee in 1991, helped Gates overcome strong
opposition to his confirmation as director. It is a safe bet
that Gates returned the favor by recommending that Tenet be
kept on as director when George W. Bush became president in
2001.
Gates learned well at the knee
of his original mentor, William Casey, President Ronald
Reagan’s CIA director. They and those that followed had
remarkable success in perpetrating the dual crime of which,
long ago, Socrates was accused: making the worse case appear
the better and corrupting the youth. Thus, in September 2002
when Senate Intelligence committee Democrats Dick Durban and
Bob Graham insisted on a National Intelligence Estimate on
“weapons of mass destruction” before Congress voted for war,
George Tenet found himself the ultimate beneficiary of
Robert Gates’ finely tuned Geiger counter for
corruptibility. The pliant managers promoted originally by
Gates were happy to conjure up a formal estimate written to
the specifications of their frequent visitor, Vice President
Dick Cheney.
Those who tell consequential
lies need to be held accountable. That includes, of course,
Colin Powell. Congress needs to ask the former Secretary of
State why he decided to disregard the objections of his own
intelligence analysts and turned instead to faith-based
intelligence for war. He has expressed regret for his
scandalous performance at the U.N., but only because it put
“a blot on my record.” I would like to see him try that out
on Cindy Sheehan and 3,000 other bereaved mothers.
Powell and I grew up a mile from
each other in the Bronx. There we had a word for his forte,
which remains a ubiquitous scourge in Washington. It was
both noun and verb: “brownnose.” And it has nothing to do
with skin color. It was a familiar word before I learned
“sycophant.” Webster’s provides this meaning: “To ingratiate
oneself with, to curry favor with; from the implication that
servility is equivalent to kissing the hinder parts of the
person from whom advancement is sought.”
Rep. Lloyd Doggett, D, Texas,
put the effects of all this most succinctly in a floor
speech last year:
This war was launched
without an immediate threat to our families... Radical
"know-it-all" ideologues here in Washington bent facts,
distorted intelligence and perpetrated lies designed to
mislead the American people into believing a third-rate
thug had a hand in the 9/11 tragedy and was soon to
unleash a mushroom cloud.
Much is being said today about
honoring the sacrifices of our fallen soldiers. Perhaps the
best way to do that is to find out who did the misleading
and hold them to account before they do it again
Ray McGovern was an Army
infantry/intelligence officer before his 27-year career as a
CIA analyst. W. Patrick Lang, a retired Army colonel, served
with Special Forces in Vietnam, as a professor at West Point
and as Defense Intelligence Officer for the Middle East (DIA).
Both are with Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity.
First published at TomPaine.com
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