US-North
Korean Nuclear Agreement: Clearing The Decks For Iran
By John Chan & Peter Symonds
02/17/07
WSW" -- The deal reached between the US and
North Korea at six-party talks in Beijing on Tuesday has
been variously described in the international media as a
“landmark” and an “historic agreement”—holding out the
prospect of ending more than five decades of
confrontation between the two countries.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Far from
marking a fundamental change in the militarist course of
the Bush administration, the deal represents a temporary
and tactical shift that conveniently sidelines a
potentially explosive issue as the US prepares for war
against Iran.
Superficially at least, the deal involves an about-face
on the part of the US. After coming to office and
tearing up the previous 1994 Agreed Framework with North
Korea, the Bush administration had adamantly refused to
hold bilateral talks with Pyongyang or “reward bad
behaviour”—that is, to provide incentives for North
Korea to abandon its nuclear programs. In 2002, Bush
declared North Korea to be part of an “axis of evil” and
repeatedly denounced North Korean leader Kim Jong Il as
“a tyrant” and “a dictator”.
Over the past year, Bush has refrained from publicly
denigrating the North Korean leadership. In the lead-up
to the current round of six-party talks, chief US
negotiator Christopher Hill met one-to-one with his
North Korean counterpart in Germany to thrash out the
agreement reached this week. And a key element of the
deal is the provision of fuel oil or its equivalent in
return for North Korean commitments on its nuclear
programs.
However, a closer examination of the agreement reveals
that the US is committed to very little, particularly in
the long term. The only concrete timetable is for an
initial phase of 60 days in which North Korea will
freeze all activity at its Yongbyon nuclear plant and
allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
inspectors back into the country in return for 50,000
tonnes of fuel oil. North Korea is also required to
provide a list of all its nuclear programs, including
plutonium extracted from used fuel rods.
On the other hand, all the US pledges are easily
reversible. The US will “start” bilateral talks aimed at
“moving towards” full diplomatic relations. The US will
“begin” the process of ending Pyongyang’s designation as
a state sponsor of terrorism. “Working parties” will be
established to discuss the denuclearisation of the
Korean peninsula, the normalisation of US-North Korean
relations and Japanese-North Korean relations, regional
security and economic cooperation.
In the second stage, for which no timetable is given,
North Korea is obliged to permanently disable all its
nuclear facilities, including its research reactor and
plutonium reprocessing plant, in return for an
additional 950,000 tonnes of fuel oil. As far as
Pyongyang is concerned, the agreement involves giving up
its claim to two light-water reactors promised under the
previous Agreed Framework and to dismantling all its
nuclear programs—its chief bargaining chip—in return for
rather vague promises about normalising relations with
the US and Japan. Enormous pressure, particularly from
ally China, has been applied to force North Korea to
sign up to this arrangement.
For the Bush administration, it is an agreement cheaply
bought. The total aid concretely being offered to North
Korea—a million tonnes of fuel oil—is worth about $400
million and is equivalent to just two years supply
previously guaranteed under the Agreed Framework. South
Korea, which along with Russia, China and Japan has a
seat at the six-party talks, has agreed to fund most of
the aid. A temporary hitch in the five days of talks
occurred when Japan refused to pay for any of the aid.
Like Washington, Tokyo has adopted a highly aggressive
stance toward Pyongyang.
The international press is full of speculation about
North Korea’s willingness to hold up its side of the
bargain. The real question is just how long it will be
before the Bush administration manufactures a pretext to
walk away from the agreement and resume its menacing
posture. If one goes by the record, it will be sooner
rather than later.
The agreement has already provoked a barely concealed
snarl from the most militarist elements of the Bush
administration and among its extreme right-wing backers.
Former US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, who is due
to be installed as US deputy secretary of state,
immediately denounced the agreement as “a bad deal”. “It
contradicts fundamental premises of the president’s
policy he’s been following for the past six years,” he
said. “And second, it makes the administration look very
weak at a time in Iraq... when it needs to look strong.”
The Wall Street Journal published an editorial on
Wednesday deriding the agreement as “faith-based
proliferation”. After declaring that “perhaps Mr Bush
feels that this is best he can do in the waning days of
his administration,” the newspaper guardedly pointed to
the actual purpose of the deal. “Or perhaps, in the most
favourable interpretation, he wants to clear the decks
of the issue in order to have more political capital to
control Iran’s nuclear ambitions,” the editorial
commented.
The contradiction between the Bush administration’s
attitude to Iran and to North Korea is glaringly
obvious. Unlike North Korea, which has tested a crude
nuclear device, Iran is a party to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, has abided by its terms and
insists that its nuclear programs are for peaceful
purposes. Yet Washington has repeatedly refused to hold
talks with Tehran, is engaged in an escalating
propaganda war against Iran and is amassing a large
naval armada in the Persian Gulf to menace her.
While the Wall Street Journal and Bolton warn that the
North Korean deal sends the wrong message to Iran, the
Bush administration has no intention of reversing its
war drive. Whatever the tactical differences in the
White House over North Korea, there is unanimity on the
aggressive confrontation that is recklessly being
prepared against Tehran. As the Wall Street Journal
hints, the logical explanation for the deal with North
Korea is that it “clears the decks”.
In the public debate, one voice has been so far notably
absent—Vice President Dick Cheney, whose support for an
aggressive policy against North Korea and for “regime
change” in Pyongyang is well known. Cheney previously
has vigorously opposed any watering down of the US
stance on North Korea or any, even small, concession to
Pyongyang.
In 2003, as the US State Department was engaged in
feverish diplomatic activity to resurrect the six-party
talks, Cheney effectively scuttled the process by
rejecting the terms of the negotiations. In comments
reported in Knight Ridder newspapers on December 19 that
year, he told a meeting of top US officials: “I have
been charged by the president with making sure that none
of the tyrannies in the world are negotiated with. We
don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it.”
In September 2005, at the previous round of six-party
talks, a broad framework for a settlement was agreed by
all sides. Almost immediately the deal was upset, as
North Korea discovered that the US Treasury Department
had frozen $24 million of assets in the Macau-based
Banco Delta Asia (BDA), claiming the money came from
illicit activities. The move and subsequent US efforts
to impose a financial embargo provoked outrage in
Pyongyang, which denounced Washington for bargaining in
bad faith and refused to return to talks.
Several media reports indicated that Cheney’s office had
a hand in sabotaging the talks. Tensions boiled over
again after North Korea ignored international warnings
and test-fired a long-range ballistic missile last July,
then exploded a small nuclear bomb in October. Japan and
the US pushed through two UN resolutions—with the
backing of China and Russia—imposing sanctions on North
Korea.
If the most militarist elements of the Bush
administration, led by Cheney, have not vetoed or
sabotaged the latest agreement—as yet—it is not because
they have had a change of heart. Rather it is because
they have concluded that with the US military mired in
an escalating war in Iraq, and preparations underway for
new aggression against Iran, the US is in no position
immediately to deal with a third crisis in North Korea.
In the long-term, however, the US cannot avoid a
confrontation in North East Asia. Just as its wars in
the Middle East are aimed at dominating that oil-rich
region, the Bush administration’s confrontation with
North Korea is bound up with America’s strategic and
economic interests. The tensions over North Korea’s
nuclear programs have been a convenient pretext for
maintaining and bolstering the US military presence in
the region, and pressuring its rivals—particularly
China.
As the Wall Street Journal noted, the latest agreement
was “a victory for China, which has sought to take a
higher profile in global diplomacy and has played a
major role in spreading the talks”. In other words,
Bush’s “diplomatic success” has weakened the US position
in North East Asia. Such a situation is simply
unacceptable to the US ruling elite.