It
all comes down to control
Noam Chomsky is a noted linguist, author and foreign
policy expert. On February 9, Michael Shank interviewed
him on the latest developments in US policy toward Iran,
Iraq, North Korea and Venezuela.
02/21/07 "FPIF" -- - Michael Shank: With similar nuclear
developments in North Korea and Iran, why has the United
States pursued direct diplomacy with North Korea but
refuses to do so with Iran?
Noam Chomsky: To say that the United States has pursued
diplomacy with North Korea is a little bit misleading.
It did under the [Bill] Clinton administration, though
neither side completely lived up to their obligations.
Clinton didn't do what was promised, nor did North
Korea, but they were making progress. So when [George W]
Bush came into the presidency, North Korea had enough
uranium or plutonium for maybe one or two bombs, but
then very limited missile capacity. During the Bush
years it's exploded. The reason is, he immediately
canceled the diplomacy and he's pretty much blocked it
ever since.
They made a very substantial agreement in September 2005
in which North Korea agreed to eliminate its nuclear
programs and nuclear development completely. In return,
the United States agreed to terminate the threats of
attack and to begin moving toward the planning for the
provision of a light-water reactor, which had been
promised under the framework agreement. But the Bush
administration instantly undermined it.
Right away, it canceled the international consortium
that was managing the the light-water-reactor project,
which was a way of saying we're not going to agree to
this agreement. A couple of days later they started
attacking the financial transactions of various banks.
It was timed in such a way to make it clear that the
United States was not going to move toward its
commitment to improve relations. And of course it never
withdrew the threats. So that was the end of the
September 2005 agreement.
That one is now coming back, just in the last few days.
The way it's portrayed in the US media is, as usual with
the government's party line, that North Korea is now
perhaps a little more amenable to accept the September
2005 proposal. So there's some optimism. If you go
across the Atlantic, to The Financial Times, to review
the same events they point out that an "embattled George
W Bush administration", it's their phrase, needs some
kind of victory, so maybe it'll be willing to move
toward diplomacy. It's a little more accurate, I think,
if you look at the background.
But there is some minimal sense of optimism about it. If
you look back over the record - and North Korea is a
horrible place, nobody is arguing about that - on this
issue they've been pretty rational. It's been a kind of
tit-for-tat history. If the United States is
accommodating, the North Koreans become accommodating.
If the United States is hostile, they become hostile.
That's reviewed pretty well by Leon Sigal, who's one of
the leading specialists on this, in a recent issue of
Current History. But that's been the general picture,
and we're now at a place where there could be a
settlement on North Korea.
That's much less significant for the United States than
Iran. The Iranian issue I don't think has much to do
with nuclear weapons, frankly. Nobody is saying Iran
should have nuclear weapons - nor should anybody else.
But the point in the Middle East, as distinct from North
Korea, is that this is center of the world's energy
resources. Originally the British and secondarily the
French had dominated it, but after World War II, it's
been a US preserve.
That's been an axiom of US foreign policy, that it must
control Middle East energy resources. It is not a matter
of access, as people often say. Once the oil is on the
seas, it goes anywhere. In fact if the United States
used no Middle East oil, it'd have the same policies. If
we went on solar energy tomorrow, it'd keep the same
policies. Just look at the internal record, or the logic
of it: the issue has always been control. Control is the
source of strategic power.
[Vice President] Dick Cheney declared in Kazakhstan or
somewhere that control over a pipeline is a "tool of
intimidation and blackmail". When we have control over
the pipelines it's a tool of benevolence. If other
countries have control over the sources of energy and
the distribution of energy, then it is a tool of
intimidation and blackmail, exactly as Cheney said. And
that's been understood as far back as [late US adviser,
diplomat, political scientist and historian] George
Kennan and the early postwar days when he pointed out
that if the United States controls Middle East
resources, it'll have veto power over its industrial
rivals. He was speaking particularly of Japan, but the
point generalizes.
So Iran is a different situation. It's part of the major
energy system of the world.
Shank: So when the United States considers a potential
invasion you think it's under the premise of gaining
control? That is what the United States will gain from
attacking Iran?
Chomsky: There are several issues in the case of Iran.
One is simply that it is independent and independence is
not tolerated. Sometimes it's called successful defiance
in the internal record. Take Cuba. A very large majority
of the US population is in favor of establishing
diplomatic relations with Cuba and has been for a long
time, with some fluctuations. And even part of the
business world is in favor of it too.
But the government won't allow it. It's attributed to
the Florida vote, but I don't think that's much of an
explanation. I think it has to do with a feature of
world affairs that is insufficiently appreciated.
International affairs is very much run like the mafia.
The godfather does not accept disobedience, even from a
small storekeeper who doesn't pay his protection money.
You have to have obedience, otherwise the idea can
spread that you don't have to listen to the orders, and
it can spread to important places.
If you look back at the record, what was the main reason
for the US attack on Vietnam? Independent development
can be a virus that can infect others. That's the way
it's been put, [former secretary of state Henry]
Kissinger in this case, referring to [Salvador] Allende
in Chile. And with Cuba it's explicit in the internal
record. Arthur Schlesinger, presenting the report of the
Latin American Study Group to incoming president [John]
Kennedy, wrote that the danger is the spread of the
[Fidel] Castro idea of taking matters into your own
hands, which has a lot of appeal to others in the same
region that suffer from the same problems. Later
internal documents charged Cuba with successful defiance
of US policies going back 150 years - to the Monroe
Doctrine - and that can't be tolerated. So there's kind
of a state commitment to ensuring obedience.
Going back to Iran, it's not only that it has
substantial resources and that it's part of the world's
major energy system, but it also defied the United
States. The United States, as we know, overthrew the
parliamentary government, installed a brutal tyrant, was
helping him develop nuclear power. In fact the very same
programs that are now considered a threat were being
sponsored by the US government, by Cheney, [Paul]
Wolfowitz, Kissinger and others in the 1970s, as long as
the shah was in power. But then the Iranians overthrew
him, and they kept US hostages for several hundred days.
And the United States immediately turned to supporting
Saddam Hussein and his war against Iran as a way of
punishing Iran. The United States is going to continue
to punish Iran because of its defiance. So that's a
separate factor.
And again, the will of the US population and even US
business is considered mostly irrelevant. Seventy-five
percent of the population here favors improving
relations with Iran, instead of threats. But this is
disregarded. We don't have polls from the business
world, but it's pretty clear that the energy
corporations would be quite happy to be given
authorization to go back into Iran instead of leaving
all that to their rivals. But the state won't allow it.
And it is setting up confrontations right now, very
explicitly. Part of the reason is strategic,
geopolitical, economic, but part of the reason is the
mafia complex. They have to be punished for disobeying
us.
Shank: Venezuela has been successfully defiant, with
President Hugo Chavez making a swing towards socialism.
Where are they on our list?
Chomsky: They're very high. The United States sponsored
and supported a military coup to overthrow the
government. In fact, that's its last, most recent effort
in what used to be a conventional resort to such
measures.
Shank: But why haven't we turned our sights more toward
Venezuela?
Chomsky: Oh, they're there. There's a constant stream of
abuse and attack by the government and therefore the
media, who are almost reflexively against Venezuela. For
several reasons. Venezuela is independent. It's
diversifying its exports to a limited extent, instead of
just being dependent on exports to the United States.
And it's initiating moves toward Latin American
integration and independence. It's what they call a
Bolivarian alternative, and the United States doesn't
like any of that.
This again is defiance of US policies going back to the
Monroe Doctrine. There's now a standard interpretation
of this trend in Latin America, another kind of party
line. With rare exceptions, Latin America is all moving
to the left, from Venezuela to Argentina, but there's a
good left and a bad left. The good left is [Peruvian
President Alan] Garcia and Lula [Brazilian President
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva], and then there's the bad
left, which is Chavez, [Bolivian President Evo] Morales,
maybe [Ecuadorean President Rafael] Correa. And that's
the split.
In order to maintain that position, it's necessary to
resort to some fancy footwork. For example, it's
necessary not to report the fact that when Lula was
re-elected in October, his first foreign trip and one of
his first acts was to visit Caracas to support Chavez
and his electoral campaign and to dedicate a joint
Venezuelan-Brazilian project on the Orinoco River, to
talk about new projects and so on.
It's necessary not to report the fact that a couple of
weeks later in Cochabamba, Bolivia, which is the heart
of the bad guys, there was a meeting of all South
American leaders. There had been bad blood between
Chavez and Garcia, but it was apparently patched up.
They laid plans for pretty constructive South American
integration, but that just doesn't fit the US agenda. So
it wasn't reported.
Shank: How is the political deadlock in Lebanon
impacting the US government's decision potentially to go
to war with Iran? Is there a relationship at all?
Chomsky: There's a relationship. I presume part of the
reason for the US-Israel invasion of Lebanon in July -
and it was US-Israeli, the Lebanese are correct in
calling it that - I suppose was that Hezbollah is
considered a deterrent to a potential US-Israeli attack
on Iran. It had a deterrent capacity, ie rockets. And
the goal, I presume, was to wipe out the deterrent so as
to free up the United States and Israel for an eventual
attack on Iran. That's at least part of the reason.
The official reason given for the invasion can't be
taken seriously for a moment. That's the capture of two
Israeli soldiers and the killing of a couple others. For
decades Israel has been capturing and kidnapping
Lebanese and Palestinian refugees on the high seas, from
Cyprus to Lebanon, killing them in Lebanon, bringing
them to Israel, holding them as hostages. It's been
going on for decades - has anybody called for an
invasion of Israel?
Of course, Israel doesn't want any competition in the
region. But there's no principled basis for the massive
attack on Lebanon, which was horrendous. In fact, one of
the last acts of the US-Israeli invasion, right after
the ceasefire was announced but before it was
implemented, was to saturate much of the south with
cluster bombs. There's no military purpose for that; the
war was over, the ceasefire was coming.
UN de-mining groups that are working there say that the
scale is unprecedented. It's much worse than any other
place they've worked: Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq,
anywhere. There are supposed to be about 1 million
bomblets left there. A large percentage of them don't
explode until you pick them up, a child picks them up or
a farmer hits it with a hoe or something. So what it
does basically is make the south uninhabitable until the
mining teams, for which the United States and Israel
don't contribute, clean it up. This is arable land. It
means that farmers can't go back; it means that it may
undermine a potential Hezbollah deterrent. They
apparently have pretty much withdrawn from the south,
according to the UN.
You can't mention Hezbollah in the US media without
putting in the context of "Iranian-supported Hezbollah".
That's its name. Its name is "Iranian-supported
Hezbollah". It gets Iranian support. But you can mention
Israel without saying US-supported Israel. So this is
more tacit propaganda. The idea that Hezbollah is acting
as an agent of Iran is very dubious. It's not accepted
by specialists on Iran or specialists on Hezbollah. But
it's the party line. Or sometimes you can put in Syria,
ie "Syrian-supported Hezbollah", but since Syria is of
less interest now, you have to emphasize Iranian
support.
Shank: How can the US government think an attack on Iran
is feasible given troop availability, troop capacity,
and public sentiment?
Chomsky: As far as I'm aware, the military in the United
States thinks it's crazy. And from whatever leaks we
have from intelligence, the intelligence community
thinks it's outlandish, but not impossible. If you look
at people who have really been involved in the
Pentagon's strategic planning for years, people like
[retired US Air Force colonel] Sam Gardiner, they point
out that there are things that possibly could be done.
I don't think any of the outside commentators, at least
as far as I'm aware, have taken very seriously the idea
of bombing nuclear facilities. They say if there will be
bombing it'll be carpet bombing. So get the nuclear
facilities but get the rest of the country too, with one
exception. By accident of geography, the world's major
oil resources are in Shi'ite-dominated areas. Iran's oil
is concentrated right near the Gulf, which happens to be
an Arab area, not Persian.
Khuzestan is Arab, has been loyal to Iran, fought with
Iran, not Iraq, during the Iran-Iraq War. This is a
potential source of dissension. I would be amazed if
there isn't an attempt going on to stir up secessionist
elements in Khuzestan. US forces right across the border
in Iraq, including the surge, are available potentially
to "defend" an independent Khuzestan against Iran, which
is the way it would be put, if they can carry it off.
Shank: Do you think that's what the surge was for?
Chomsky: That's one possibility. There was a release of
a Pentagon war-gaming report, in December 2004, with
Gardiner leading it. It was released and published in
The Atlantic Monthly. They couldn't come up with a
proposal that didn't lead to disaster, but one of the
things they considered was maintaining troop presence in
Iraq beyond what's to be used in Iraq for troop
replacement and so on, and use them for a potential land
move in Iran - presumably Khuzestan, where the oil is.
If you could carry that off, you could just bomb the
rest of the country to dust.
Again, I would be amazed if there aren't efforts to
sponsor secessionist movements elsewhere, among the
Azeri population, for example. It's a very complex
ethnic mix in Iran; much of the population isn't
Persian. There are secessionist tendencies anyway and
almost certainly, without knowing any of the facts, the
United States is trying to stir them up, to break the
country internally if possible. The strategy appears to
be: try to break the country up internally, try to impel
the leadership to be as harsh and brutal as possible.
That's the immediate consequence of constant threats.
Everyone knows that. That's one of the reasons the
reformists, Shirin Ebadi and Akbar Ganji and others, are
bitterly complaining about the US threats, that it's
undermining their efforts to reform and democratize
Iran. But that's presumably its purpose. Since it's an
obvious consequence, you have to assume it's the
purpose. Just like in law, anticipated consequences are
taken as the evidence for intention. And here it's so
obvious you can't seriously doubt it.
So it could be that one strain of the policy is to stir
up secessionist movements, particularly in the oil-rich
regions, the Arab regions near the Gulf, also the Azeri
regions and others. Second is to try to get the
leadership to be as brutal and harsh and repressive as
possible, to stir up internal disorder and maybe
resistance. And a third is to try to pressure other
countries, and Europe is the most amenable, to join
efforts to strangle Iran economically. Europe is kind of
dragging its feet, but they usually go along with the
United States.
The efforts to intensify the harshness of the regime
show up in many ways. For example, the West absolutely
adores [President Mahmud] Ahmadinejad. Any wild
statement that he comes out with immediately gets
circulated in headlines and mistranslated. They love
him. But anybody who knows anything about Iran,
presumably the editorial offices, knows that he doesn't
have anything to do with foreign policy. Foreign policy
is in the hands of his superior, the Supreme Leader
[Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali] Khamenei.
But they don't report his statements, particularly when
his statements are pretty conciliatory. For example,
they love it when Ahmadinejad says that Israel shouldn't
exist, but they don't like it when Khamenei right
afterward says that Iran supports the Arab League
position on Israel-Palestine. As far as I'm aware, it
never got reported. Actually you could find Khamenei's
more conciliatory positions in The Financial Times, but
not here.
And it's repeated by Iranian diplomats, but that's no
good. The Arab League proposal calls for normalization
of relations with Israel if it accepts the international
consensus of the two-state settlement, which has been
blocked by the United States and Israel for 30 years.
And that's not a good story, so it's either not
mentioned or it's hidden somewhere.
It's very hard to predict the Bush administration today
because they're deeply irrational. They were irrational
to start with, but now they're desperate. They have
created an unimaginable catastrophe in Iraq. This
should've been one of the easiest military occupations
in history, and they succeeded in turning it into one of
the worst military disasters in history. They can't
control it, and it's almost impossible for them to get
out for reasons you can't discuss in the United States
because to discuss the reasons why they can't get out
would be to concede the reasons why they invaded.
We're supposed to believe that oil had nothing to do
with it, that if Iraq were exporting pickles or jelly
and the center of world oil production were in the South
Pacific that the United States would've liberated them
anyway. It has nothing to do with the oil, what a crass
idea! Anyone with their head screwed on knows that that
can't be true.
Allowing an independent and sovereign Iraq could be a
nightmare for the United States. It would mean that it
would be Shi'ite-dominated, at least if it's minimally
democratic. It would continue to improve relations with
Iran, just what the United States doesn't want to see.
And beyond that, right across the border in Saudi Arabia
where most of Saudi oil is, there happens to be a large
Shi'ite population, probably a majority.
Moves toward sovereignty in Iraq stimulate pressures
first for human rights among the bitterly repressed
Shi'ite population but also toward some degree of
autonomy. You can imagine a kind of a loose Shi'ite
alliance in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran, controlling
most of the world's oil and independent of the United
States. And much worse, although Europe can be
intimidated by the United States, China can't. It's one
of the reasons, the main reasons, why China is
considered a threat. We're back to the Mafia principle.
China has been there for 3,000 years, has contempt for
the barbarians, is overcoming a century of domination,
and simply moves on its own. It does not get intimidated
when Uncle Sam shakes his fist. That's scary. In
particular, it's dangerous in the case of the Middle
East. China is the center of the Asian energy-security
grid, which includes the Central Asian states and
Russia. India is also hovering around the edge, South
Korea is involved, and Iran is an associate member of
some kind. If the Middle East oil resources around the
Gulf, which are the main ones in the world, if they link
up to the Asian grid, the United States is really a
second-rate power. A lot is at stake in not withdrawing
from Iraq.
I'm sure that these issues are discussed in internal
planning. It's inconceivable that they can't think of
this. But it's out of public discussion, it's not in the
media, it's not in the journals, it's not in the
Baker-Hamilton report. And I think you can understand
the reason. To bring up these issues would open the
question why the United States and Britain invaded. And
that question is taboo.
It's a principle that anything our leaders do is for
noble reasons. It may be mistaken, it may be ugly, but
basically noble. And if you bring in normal moderate,
conservative, strategic, economic objectives, you
threatening that principle. It's remarkable the extent
to which it's held. So the original pretexts for the
invasion were weapons of mass destruction and ties to
al-Qaeda that nobody but maybe Wolfowitz or Cheney took
seriously.
The single question, as they kept reiterating in the
leadership, was: Will Saddam give up his programs of
weapons of mass destruction? The single question was
answered a couple of months later, the wrong way. And
quickly the party line shifted. In November 2003, Bush
announced his freedom agenda: our real goal is to bring
democracy to Iraq, to transform the Middle East. That
became the party line, instantly.
But it's a mistake to pick out individuals because it's
close to universal, even in scholarship. In fact you can
even find scholarly articles that begin by giving the
evidence that it's complete farce but nevertheless
accept it. There was a pretty good study of the freedom
agenda in Current History by two scholars, and they give
the facts. They point out that the freedom agenda was
announced on November 2003 after the failure to find
weapons of mass destruction, but the freedom agenda is
real even if there's no evidence for it.
In fact, if you look at our policies, they're the
opposite. Take Palestine. There was a free election in
Palestine, but it came out the wrong way. So instantly,
the United States and Israel, with Europe tagging along,
moved to punish the Palestinian people, and punish them
harshly, because they voted the wrong way in a free
election. That's accepted here in the West as perfectly
normal. That illustrates the deep hatred and contempt
for democracy among Western elites, so deep-seated they
can't even perceive it when it's in front of their eyes.
You punish people severely if they vote the wrong way in
a free election. There's a pretext for that too,
repeated every day: Hamas must agree to first recognize
Israel, second to end all violence, third to accept past
agreements. Try to find a mention of the fact that the
United States and Israel reject all three of those. They
obviously don't recognize Palestine, they certainly
don't withdraw the use of violence or the threat of it -
in fact they insist on it - and they don't accept past
agreements, including the roadmap.
I suspect one of the reasons why Jimmy Carter's book has
come under such fierce attack is because it's the first
time, I think, in the mainstream, that one can find the
truth about the roadmap. I have never seen anything in
the mainstream that discusses the fact that Israel
instantly rejected the roadmap with US support. They
formally accepted it but added 14 reservations that
totally eviscerated it.
It was done instantly. It's public knowledge - I've
written about it, talked about it, so have others, but
I've never seen it mentioned in the mainstream before.
And obviously they don't accept the Arab League proposal
or any other serious proposal. In fact they've been
blocking the international consensus on the two-state
solution for decades. But Hamas has to accept them.
It really makes no sense. Hamas is a political party,
and political parties don't recognize other countries.
And Hamas itself has made it very clear, they actually
carried out a truce for a year and a half, didn't
respond to Israeli attacks, and have called for a
long-term truce, during which it'd be possible to
negotiate a settlement along the lines of the
international consensus and the Arab League proposal.
All of this is obvious, it's right on the surface, and
that's just one example of the deep hatred of democracy
on the part of Western elites. It's a striking example,
but you can add case after case. Yet the president
announced the freedom agenda, and if the dear leader
said something, it's got to be true, kind of North
Korean-style. Therefore there's a freedom agenda even if
there's a mountain of evidence against it. The only
evidence for it is in words, even apart from the timing.
Shank: In the 2008 US presidential election, how will
the candidates approach Iran? Do you think Iran will be
a deciding factor in the elections?
Chomsky: What they're saying so far is not encouraging.
I still think, despite everything, that the US is very
unlikely to attack Iran. It could be a huge catastrophe;
nobody knows what the consequences would be. I imagine
that only an administration that's really desperate
would resort to that. But if the Democratic candidates
are on the verge of winning the election, the
administration is going to be desperate. It still has
the problem of Iraq: can't stay in, and can't get out.
Shank: The Senate Democrats can't seem to achieve
consensus on this issue.
Chomsky: I think there's a reason for it. The reason is
just thinking through the consequences of allowing an
independent, partially democratic Iraq. The consequences
are non-trivial. We may decide to hide our heads in the
sand and pretend we can't think it through because we
cannot allow the question of why the United States
invaded to open, but that's very self-destructive.
Shank: Is there any connection to this conversation and
why we cannot find the political will and momentum to
enact legislation that would reduce carbon-dioxide
emission levels, institute a cap-and-trade system, etc?
Chomsky: It's perfectly clear why the United States
didn't sign the Kyoto Protocol. Again, there's
overwhelming popular support for signing - in fact it's
so strong that a majority of Bush voters in 2004 thought
that he was in favor of the Kyoto Protocol, it's such an
obvious thing to support. Popular support for
alternative energy has been very high for years. But it
harms corporate profits. After all, that's the
administration's constituency.
I remember 40 years ago talking to one of the leading
people in the government who was involved in arms
control, pressing for arms-control measures, detente,
and so on. He's very high up, and we were talking about
whether arms control could succeed. And only partially
as a joke he said, "Well, it might succeed if the
high-tech industry makes more profit from arms control
than it can make from weapons-related research and
production. If we get to that tipping point, maybe arms
control will work." He was partially joking, but there's
a truth that lies behind it.
Shank: How do we move forward on climate change without
beggaring the South?
Chomsky: Unfortunately, the poor countries, the South,
are going to suffer the worst according to most
projections - and that being so, it undermines support
in the North for doing much. Look at the ozone story. As
long as it was the Southern Hemisphere that was being
threatened, there was very little talk about it. When it
was discovered in the north, very quickly actions were
taken to do something about it. Right now there's
discussion of putting serious effort into developing a
malaria vaccine, because global warming might extend
malaria to the rich countries, so something should be
done about it.
Same thing on health insurance. Here's an issue where,
for the general population, it's been the leading
domestic issue, or close to it, for years. And there's a
consensus for a national health-care system on the model
of other industrial countries, maybe expanding Medicare
to everyone or something like that. Well, that's off the
agenda, nobody can talk about that. The insurance
companies don't like it, the financial industry doesn't
like and so on.
Now there's a change taking place. What's happening is
that manufacturing industries are beginning to turn to
support for it because they're being undermined by the
hopelessly inefficient US health-care system. It's the
worst in the industrial world by far, and they have to
pay for it. Since it's employer-compensated, in part,
their production costs are much higher than those
competitors who have a national health-care system.
Take GM [General Motors]. If it produces the same car in
Detroit and in Windsor across the border in Canada, it
saves, I forget the number, I think over $1,000 with the
Windsor production because there's a national
health-care system in Canada, it's much more efficient,
it's much cheaper, it's much more effective.
So the manufacturing industry is starting to press for
some kind of national health care. Now it's beginning to
put it on the agenda. It doesn't matter if the
population wants it. What 90% of the population wants
would be kind of irrelevant. But if part of the
concentration of corporate capital that basically runs
the country - another thing we're not allowed to say but
it's obvious - if part of that sector becomes in favor,
then the issue moves on to the political agenda.
Shank: So how does the South get its voice heard on the
international agenda? Is the World Social Forum a place
for it?
Chomsky: The World Social Forum is very important, but
of course that can't be covered in the West. In fact, I
remember reading an article, I think in The Financial
Times, about the two major forums that were taking
place. One was the World Economic Forum in Davos and a
second was a right-wing forum in Herzeliyah in Israel.
Those were the two forums. Of course there was also the
World Social Forum in Nairobi, but that's only tens of
thousands of people from around the world.
Shank: With the trend toward vilifying the G77 at the
UN, one wonders where the developing world can
effectively voice its concerns.
Chomsky: The developing-world voice can be amplified
enormously by support from the wealthy and the
privileged, otherwise it's very likely to be
marginalized, as in every other issue.
Shank: So it's up to us.
Foreign Policy In Focus contributor Michael Shank is the
policy director for the 3D Security Initiative.