Revealed: The true extent of Britain's failure
in Basra
By Patrick Cockburn
02/23/07 "The
Independent" -- - The partial British military
withdrawal from southern Iraq announced by Tony Blair this week
follows political and military failure, and is not because of
any improvement in local security, say specialists on Iraq.
In a comment entitled "The British Defeat in Iraq" the
pre-eminent American analyst on Iraq, Anthony Cordesman of the
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington,
asserts that British forces lost control of the situation in and
around Basra by the second half of 2005.
Mr Cordesman says that while the British won some tactical
clashes in Basra and Maysan province in 2004, that "did not stop
Islamists from taking more local political power and controlling
security at the neighbourhood level when British troops were not
present". As a result, southern Iraq has, in effect, long been
under the control of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution
in Iraq (Sciri) and the so-called "Sadrist" factions.
Mr Blair said for three years Britain had worked to create,
train and equip Iraqi Security Forces capable of taking on the
security of the country themselves. But Mr Cordesman concludes:
"The Iraqi forces that Britain helped create in the area were
little more than an extension of Shia Islamist control by other
means."
The British control of southern Iraq was precarious from the
beginning. Its forces had neither experience of the areas in
which they were operating nor reliable local allies. Like the
Americans in Baghdad, they failed to stop the mass looting of
Basra on the fall of Saddam Hussein and never established law
and order.
American and British officials never appeared to take on board
the unpopularity of the occupation among Shia as well as Sunni
Iraqis. Mr Blair even denies that the occupation was unpopular
or a cause of armed resistance. But from the fall of Saddam
Hussein, mounting anger against it provided an environment in
which bigoted Sunni insurgents and often criminal Shia militias
could flourish.
The British forces had a lesson in the dangers of provoking the
heavily armed local population when six British military police
were killed in Majar al-Kabir on 24 June 2003. During the
uprising of Mehdi Army militia of Muqtada al-Sadr in 2004,
British units were victorious in several bloody clashes in Amara,
the capital of Maysan province.
But in the elections in January 2005, lauded by Mr Blair this
week, Sciri became the largest party in Basra followed by
Fadhila, followers of the Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, the father of
Muqtada al-Sadr. The latter's supporters became the largest
party in Maysan.
Mr Cordesman says the British suffered political defeat in the
provincial elections of 2005, and lost at the military level in
autumn of the same year when increased attacks meant they they
could operate only through armoured patrols. Much-lauded
military operations, such as "Corrode" in May 2006, did not
alter the balance of forces.
Mr Cordesman's gloomy conclusions about British defeat are
confirmed by a study called "The Calm before the Storm: The
British Experience in Southern Iraq" by Michael Knights and Ed
Williams, published by the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy. Comparing the original British ambitions with present
reality the paper concludes that "instead of a stable, united,
law-abiding region with a representative government and police
primacy, the deep south is unstable, factionalised, lawless,
ruled as a kleptocracy and subject to militia primacy".
Local militias are often not only out of control of the Iraqi
government, but of their supposed leaders in Baghdad. The big
money earner for local factions is the diversion of oil and oil
products, with the profits a continual source of rivalry and a
cause of armed clashes. Mr Knights and Mr Williams say that
control in the south is with a "well-armed political-criminal
Mafiosi [who] have locked both the central government and the
people out of power".
Could the British Army have pursued a different strategy? It has
been accused of caving in to the militias. But it had little
alternative because of the lack of any powerful local support.
The theme of President Bush and Mr Blair since the invasion has
been that they are training Iraqi forces.
Police and army number 265,000, but the problem is not training
or equipment but lack of loyalty to the central government.
Vicious though the militias and insurgents usually are, they
have a legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqis which the government's
official forces lack. Periodic clean-ups like "Corrode" and
"Sinbad" do not change this.
There is no doubt the deterioration in the situation is contrary
to the rosy picture presented by Downing Street. Messrs Knights
and Williams note: "By September 2006, British forces needed to
deploy a convoy of Warrior armoured vehicles to ferry police
trainers to a single police station and deliver a consignment of
toys to a nearby hospital." Some British army positions were
being hit by more mortar bombs than anywhere else in Iraq. There
was continual friction with local political factions.
Why is the British Army still in south Iraq and what good does
it do there? The suspicion grows that Mr Blair did not withdraw
them because to do so would be too gross an admission of failure
and of soldiers' lives uselessly lost. It would also have left
the US embarrassingly bereft of allies. Reidar Visser, an expert
on Basra, says after all the publicity about the British "soft"
approach in Basra in 2003, local people began to notice that the
soldiers were less and less in the streets and the militias were
taking over. "This, in turn, created a situation where critics
claim the sole remaining objective of the British forces in Iraq
is to hold out and maintain a physical presence somewhere within
the borders of the governorates in the south formally left under
their control, while at the same minimising their own
casualties.' Mr Visser said.
In other words, British soldiers have stayed and died in
southern Iraq, and will continue to do so, because Mr Blair
finds it too embarrassing to end what has become a symbolic
presence and withdraw them.
Other premiers' foreign policy misjudgements...
Lord Salisbury The Boer War 1899-1902
The discovery of gold in the two independent Boer republics of
Transvaal and Orange Free State led Britain to flex its military
muscle in South Africa. There was enthusiastic support for the
war back home in Britain, giving Salisbury a landslide in the
1900 general election. However, support began to wane as the war
dragged on, and there was outrage at Britain's brutal tactics -
although they led to the Boers' surrender in 1902. Despite the
apparently successful outcome, it contributed in large part to
the catastrophic defeat for the Conservatives in 1906, and
signified the beginning of the end for the British Empire.
David Lloyd George The Easter Rising 1916
Prior to the 1916 Easter Rising, there had been little appetite
among the Irish for armed struggle. But the execution of the
leaders of the uprising, and subsequent atrocities, most notably
the 1921 Croke Park massacre, only served to strengthen the
resolve of those fighting for independence. What had begun as a
small-scale armed rebellion escalated rapidly. Sinn Fein won 70
per cent of Irish seats in the 1918 general election, which was
followed by an upsurge in violence, retaliations, a declaration
of independence, a war of independence, and finally, in 1922,
independence itself.
Anthony Eden The Suez Crisis, 1956
Covertly arranged in collusion with France and Israel, the
mission was to regain control of the Suez canal (nationalised by
Egypt), and to overthrow the nationalist Nasser regime. While
the initial outcome was successful from a military point of
view, and with minimal British casualties, the perception that
Britain and France were seeking some kind of colonial resurgence
did not sit well in Washington. Eisenhower made it clear to Eden
that he did not want the operation to go ahead, and was willing
to back it up with economic threats. Eden caved in, ending his
career and Britain's status as world superpower.
Robert Peel The First Anglo-Afghan War 1839-42
The mission to curb Russian influence by deposing Dost Mohammed
and restoring former ruler Shoja Shah, was launched to
strengthen British interests. The British took Kandahar, Ghazni
and Kabul, captured Dost Mohammed and restored the Shoja to the
throne. Their job seemingly done, they withdrew, leaving a
garrison of troops and two envoys in Kabul. In 1841, however,
there was an uprising, and the garrison was forced to surrender.
The retreating British troops and civilians were massacred,
bolstering Afghanistan's growing reputation as a graveyard for
foreign armies.
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