Who the Hell Knows?
How Far is Iran from the Bomb?
By RAY McGOVERN
Former CIA analyst
one of the key questions asked of newly confirmed Director of
National Intelligence Michael McConnell at a Senate Armed Forces
Committee hearing on Tuesday. Why had McConnell avoided this
front-burner issue in his prepared remarks? Because an honest
answer would have been: "Beats the hell out of us. Despite the
billions that American taxpayers have sunk into improving U.S.
intelligence, we can only guess."
But the question is certainly a fair, and urgent one. A mere
three weeks into the job, McConnell can perhaps be forgiven for
merely reciting the hazy forecast of his predecessor, John
Negroponte, and using the obscurantist jargon that has been
introduced into key national intelligence estimates (NIEs) in
recent years. McConnell had these two sentences committed to
"We assess that Iran seeks to develop a nuclear weapon. The
information is incomplete, but we assess that Iran could develop
a nuclear weapon early-to-mid-next decade."
point McConnell received gratuitous reinforcement from Lt. Gen.
Michael Maples, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency. With
something of a flourish, Maples bragged that it was "with high
confidence" that DIA "assesses that Iran remains determined to
develop nuclear weapons."
After the judgments in the Oct. 1, 2002 NIE assessing
weapons-of-mass-destruction in Iraq—judgments stated with "high
confidence"—turned out to be wrong, National Intelligence
Council officials decided to fine-tune the word "assess" to
cover their asses. The council took the unusual step of
including a short glossary in its recent NIE on Iraq:
"When we use words such as "we assess," we are trying to convey
an analytical assessment or judgment. These assessments, which
are based on incomplete or at times fragmentary information are
not a fact, proof, or knowledge. Some analytical judgments are
based directly on collected information; others rest on previous
judgments, which serve as building blocks. In either type of
judgment, we do not have "evidence" that shows something to be a
So caveat emptor. Beware the verisimilitude conveyed by
"we assess." It can have a lemming effect, as evidenced Tuesday
by the automatic head bobbing that greeted Sen. Lindsay Graham's
(R, SC) clever courtroom-style summary argument at the hearing,
"We all agree, then, that the Iranians are trying to get nuclear
Quick, someone, please give Sen. Graham the National
Intelligence Council's new glossary.
Shoddy Record on Iran
Iran is a difficult intelligence target. Understood. Even
so, U.S. intelligence performance "assessing" Iran's progress
toward a nuclear capability does not inspire confidence. The
only quasi-virtue readily observable in the string of
intelligence estimates is the kind of foolish consistency that
Emerson called "the hobgoblin of little minds." In 1995 U.S.
intelligence started consistently "assessing" that Iran was
"within five years" of reaching a nuclear weapons capability.
But, year after year that got a little old and tired...and even
embarrassing. So in 2005, when the most recent NIE was issued
(and then leaked to the Washington Post), the timeline
was extended and given still more margin for error. Basically,
it was moved ten years out to 2015 but, in a fit of nervous
caution, the estimators created the expression
Small wonder that the commission picked by President George W.
Bush to investigate the intelligence community's performance on
weapons of mass destruction complained that U.S. intelligence
knows "disturbingly little" about Iran. Shortly after the most
recent estimate was completed in June 2005, Robert G. Joseph,
the neo-conservative who succeeded John Bolton as undersecretary
of state for arms control, was asked whether Iran had a nuclear
effort under way. He replied:
"I don't know quite how to answer that because we don't have
perfect information or perfect understanding. But the Iranian
record, plus what the Iranian leaders have said...lead us to
conclude that we have to be highly skeptical."
Is help on the way? A fresh national intelligence estimate on
Iran has been in preparation for several months—far too
leisurely a pace in present circumstances. Will it have any
appreciable effect in informing policy? Don't count on it.
One would have thought that President Bush would await those
intelligence findings before sending two aircraft carrier strike
groups to the Persian Gulf area and dispatching Vice President
Dick Cheney to help throw a scare into folks in Asia. But it is
not at all uncommon in this faith-based administration for the
intelligence to lag critical decisions; indeed, it is the
preferred modus operandi of the Cheney-Bush team and the
self-licking ice cream cone that passes for its advisers.
After all, the decision to attack Iraq was made many months
before "intelligence" (culminating in the fraudulent NIE of Oct.
1, 2002) was ginned up to support that chosen course. The
decision to send 21,500 additional troops into Iraq predated the
publication of the latest NIE on Iraq. And Defense Secretary
Robert Gates, while quickly signing up to act as surge
protector, pretended to be "unaware" of the completed NIE draft,
when his patron, Sen. John Warner (R, VA) asked the former CIA
director about it on Jan. 12 before the Senate Armed Services
Against this background, Tuesday's Senate Armed Forces Committee
hearing and the parsing of intelligence on Iran seemed almost
divorced from reality—not relevant to the "new history" that
Bush's neo-conservative advisers say they are striving to
create. Committee chair Carl Levin (D, Mich) ran the hearing
well, however, and the committee homed in on some key issues,
should there be any policymakers willing to listen.
The Good News: There's Time
If anything leaps out of all this, it is that there is time
to address, in a sensible way, whatever concerns may be driving
Iran to seek nuclear weapons—Cheney's two-year old claim of a
"fairly robust new nuclear program" in Iran, his blustering, and
his itchy trigger finger notwithstanding.
A year and a half after the 2005 estimate that concluded Iran
was five to ten years away from building a nuclear weapon,
NPR's Robert Siegel did the math and decided to follow up
with Negroponte. Drawing from Negroponte's own words the year
before (NIEs are formal documents signed by the director of
national intelligence), Siegel asked him whether he still
thought Iran could have a nuclear weapon "sometime between four
and ten years from now." "Five to ten years from now,"
Negroponte answered, barely suppressing a smirk betraying his
own disdain for the five-years-away-every-year intelligence
record on Iran.
A Radical Idea
Negroponte then gingerly raised the possibility—avoided like
the plague by neo-conservatives in good standing—that diplomacy
might help. A diplomat by profession, with the benighted idea
view that talking with adversaries can be helpful, he may have
thought he would be forgiven for breaking ranks and raising the
possibility of talks. (He was not forgiven. Rather, he found
himself demoted and sent back to the State Department a few
months later.) Here is Negroponte’s radical idea:
"I think that the pace of Iran's program gives us time, and
international diplomacy can work."
Asked by Siegel to explain why the Israelis have suggested a
much shorter timeline for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon,
Negroponte stated the obvious—this time with undiplomatic
bluntness: "I think that sometimes what the Israelis will do
[is] give you the worst-case assessment." Ironically, it was
McConnell who chose the more diplomatic path at Tuesday's
hearing, when Sen. Graham asked him the same question; i.e., did
he know why the Israelis had a different view? McConnell did a
good job of appearing puzzled (hopefully, it was just an act),
noting that U.S. and Israelis work from the same information and
Why Tehran Wants Nukes: Did Someone Say Deterrence?
In his introductory remarks Armed Forces Committee Chair
Levin said he hoped the discussion would address "the
circumstances in which Iran might give up its nuclear [weapons]
plans." Assuming Iran has such plans, or at least intends to
leave that option open for later decision when it has mastered
the enrichment process, it makes sense to try to figure out what
drives Tehran to that course.
McConnell Tuesday chose to adopt Negroponte's refreshingly
candid approach to this key issue and reject the cry-wolf
rhetoric of Cheney and the neo-cons that Iran's ultimate aim
must be to destroy Israel. McConnell noted that Iran would like
to dominate the Gulf region and deter potential adversaries;
that an integral part of Iran's strategy is to deter and, if
necessary, retaliate against forces in the region-including U.S.
forces. Similarly, he indicated that Tehran considers its
ability to conduct terrorist operations abroad a key element of
its determination to protect Iran by deterring U.S. or Israeli
attacks. These sentiments dovetail with those offered by Defense
Secretary Gates at his confirmation hearing on December 5:
"While they [the Iranians] are certainly pressing, in my
opinion, for a nuclear capability, I think they would see it in
the first instance as a deterrent. They are surrounded by powers
with nuclear weapons-Pakistan to their east, the Russians to the
north, the Israelis to the west, and us in the Persian Gulf."
Deterrence? Both Sen. Levin and ranking member John Warner (R,
VA) picked up on this, to the dismay of Sen. Graham, who sounded
as if he had just come from a briefing by the Israeli extreme
right who, with Cheney, are pushing hard for a U.S. strike on
Iran's nuclear facilities. Graham said he thought economic
sanctions might work but that, in any case, they were "the only
thing left short of military action."
The sloppy logic of the syllogism offered by the senior senator
from South Carolina is nothing short of bizarre, particularly
coming from someone who prides himself on being a lawyer:
Major premise: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has
denied the Holocaust.
Minor premise: If Iran got a nuclear weapon, it would
launch it at Israel.
Conclusion: Iran should be attacked, if sanctions do not
bring the Iranians to heel.
Seldom have I heard an American senator so openly press the U.S.
to mount an attack on a major country simply because it could be
perceived as a possible threat to Israel. There was no mention
of Israel's own arsenal of some 200-300 nuclear weapons and
multiple delivery systems. Nor did anyone allude to French
President Jacques Chirac's recent comment that, with one or two
nuclear weapons Iran would pose no big danger, because launching
a nuclear weapon against Israel would inevitably bring the
destruction of Tehran.
Sen. Warner objected strongly to the notion that, if sanctions
against Iran failed, the next step had to be military action.
With support from Levin, Warner alluded time and time again to
the effectiveness of mutual deterrence after WWII, stressing
that deterrence is a far better course than to let slip the dogs
of war. He referred to the role he played in ensuring that the
Soviet Union was deterred. It seemed as though he was about to
cry out from exasperation, Why don't we talk to the
Iranians...like I talked to the Russians? But, typically for
Warner, he elected in the end to hew to the party line and avoid
the forbidden subject of possibly talking with "bad guys."
Better To Jaw-Jaw Than War-War
But did you notice? While Cheney was abroad last week,
others persuaded the president to send representatives later
this month to a conference in Baghdad, in which representatives
of Syria and Iran will also participate to discuss the situation
in Iraq. In addition, foreign ministers of the same countries
plan to meet in early April. This sharp departure in policy
tends to confirm the guidance in internal administration memos
regarding how to influence the president. In his One Percent
Doctrine, Ron Suskind quotes one such memo: “The last verbal
briefing on a particular issue will carry the day.”
If Cheney does not sabotage such talks now that he's back home,
they could lead to direct negotiations with Iran on the nuclear
question. It makes no sense at all to refuse to talk with Iran,
which has as many historical grievances against the U.S. as vice
versa. (Someone please tell that to the president.) With Cheney
playing the heavy, it has not been possible to penetrate the
Praetorian Guard for candid discussions with the president. The
sooner that can be done the better. Hurry! Before Cheney has
time to scoot little Libbys out on pre-emptive errands.
The ultimate aim, in my view, should be a Middle East free of
nuclear weapons. That would have the best chance of stopping
whatever plans the Iranians and others have to develop nuclear
weapons. And please do not tell me that, because Israel would
not agree, we cannot move in this direction. It is time to
override the Israeli veto—for the Israelis’ own sake. The U.S.
and other Israel supporters can provide the necessary guarantees
of the security of Israel. What has become increasingly clear is
that Israeli intransigence on this issue is not a viable middle-
or long-term strategy serving Israel's own interest—not to
mention the interests of justice and peace in the region.
Forgive me for mentioning the quaint idea of justice and peace.
But THAT is the side America should be on.
Ray McGovern works with Tell the Word, the publishing
arm of the ecumenical Church of the Saviour in Washington, DC.
He chaired National Intelligence Estimates and also
prepared and briefed The President’s Daily Brief while a
CIA analyst from 1963 to 1990. He now serves on the Steering
Group of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS)
and can be reached at: email@example.com
Earlier versions of this article appeared on
Counterpunch.org and TomPaine.com.
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