What If Iran Had Invaded Mexico?
Putting the Iran Crisis in Context
By Noam Chomsky
04/06/07 "ICH"
-- - Unsurprisingly, George W. Bush's announcement of a
"surge" in Iraq came despite the firm opposition to any such
move of Americans and the even stronger opposition of the
(thoroughly irrelevant) Iraqis. It was accompanied by
ominous official leaks and statements -- from
Washington and Baghdad -- about how Iranian intervention
in Iraq was aimed at disrupting our mission to gain victory,
an aim which is (by definition) noble. What then followed
was a solemn debate about whether
serial numbers on advanced roadside bombs (IEDs) were
really traceable to Iran; and, if so, to that country's
Revolutionary Guards or to some even higher authority.
This "debate" is a typical illustration of a primary
principle of sophisticated propaganda. In crude and brutal
societies, the Party Line is publicly proclaimed and must be
obeyed -- or else. What you actually believe is your own
business and of far less concern. In societies where the
state has lost the capacity to control by force, the Party
Line is simply presupposed; then, vigorous debate is
encouraged within the limits imposed by unstated doctrinal
orthodoxy. The cruder of the two systems leads, naturally
enough, to disbelief; the sophisticated variant gives an
impression of openness and freedom, and so far more
effectively serves to instill the Party Line. It becomes
beyond question, beyond thought itself, like the air we
breathe.
The debate over Iranian interference in Iraq proceeds
without ridicule on the assumption that the United States
owns the world. We did not, for example, engage in a similar
debate in the 1980s about whether the U.S. was interfering
in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, and I doubt that Pravda,
probably recognizing the absurdity of the situation, sank to
outrage about that fact (which American officials and our
media, in any case, made no effort to conceal). Perhaps the
official Nazi press also featured solemn debates about
whether the Allies were interfering in sovereign Vichy
France, though if so, sane people would then have collapsed
in ridicule.
In this case, however, even ridicule -- notably absent --
would not suffice, because the charges against Iran are part
of a drumbeat of pronouncements meant to mobilize support
for escalation in Iraq and for
an attack on Iran, the "source of the problem." The
world is aghast at the possibility. Even in neighboring
Sunni states, no friends of Iran, majorities, when asked,
favor a nuclear-armed Iran over any military action against
that country. From what limited information we have, it
appears that significant parts of the U.S. military and
intelligence communities are opposed to such an attack,
along with almost the entire world, even more so than when
the Bush administration and Tony Blair's Britain invaded
Iraq, defying enormous popular opposition worldwide.
"The Iran Effect"
The results of an attack on Iran could be horrendous.
After all, according to a
recent study of "the Iraq effect" by terrorism
specialists Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, using
government and Rand Corporation data, the Iraq invasion has
already led to a seven-fold increase in terror. The "Iran
effect" would probably be far more severe and long-lasting.
British military historian Corelli Barnett speaks for many
when he warns that "an attack on Iran would effectively
launch World War III."
What are the plans of the increasingly desperate clique
that narrowly holds political power in the U.S.? We cannot
know. Such state planning is, of course, kept secret in the
interests of "security." Review of the declassified record
reveals that there is considerable merit in that claim --
though only if we understand "security" to mean the security
of the Bush administration against their domestic enemy, the
population in whose name they act.
Even if the White House clique is not planning war, naval
deployments, support for secessionist movements and
acts of terror within Iran, and other provocations could
easily lead to an accidental war. Congressional resolutions
would not provide much of a barrier. They invariably permit
"national security" exemptions, opening holes wide enough
for the
several aircraft-carrier battle groups soon to be in the
Persian Gulf to pass through -- as long as an unscrupulous
leadership issues proclamations of doom (as Condoleezza Rice
did with those
"mushroom clouds" over American cities back in 2002).
And the concocting of the sorts of incidents that "justify"
such attacks is a familiar practice. Even the worst monsters
feel the need for such justification and adopt the device:
Hitler's defense of innocent Germany from the "wild terror"
of the Poles in 1939, after they had rejected his wise and
generous proposals for peace, is but one example.
The most effective barrier to a White House decision to
launch a war is the kind of organized popular opposition
that frightened the political-military leadership enough in
1968 that they were reluctant to send more troops to Vietnam
-- fearing, we learned from the Pentagon Papers, that
they might need them for civil-disorder control.
Doubtless Iran's government merits harsh condemnation,
including for its recent actions that have inflamed the
crisis. It is, however, useful to ask how we would act if
Iran had invaded and occupied Canada and Mexico and was
arresting U.S. government representatives there on the
grounds that they were resisting the Iranian occupation
(called "liberation," of course). Imagine as well that Iran
was deploying massive naval forces in the Caribbean and
issuing credible threats to launch a wave of attacks against
a vast range of sites -- nuclear and otherwise -- in the
United States, if the U.S. government did not immediately
terminate all its nuclear energy programs (and, naturally,
dismantle all its nuclear weapons). Suppose that all of this
happened after Iran had overthrown the government of the
U.S. and installed a vicious tyrant (as the US did to Iran
in
1953), then later supported a Russian invasion of the
U.S. that killed millions of people (just as the U.S.
supported Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran in 1980, killing
hundreds of thousands of Iranians, a figure comparable to
millions of Americans). Would we watch quietly?
It is easy to understand an observation by one of
Israel's leading military historians, Martin van Creveld.
After the U.S. invaded Iraq, knowing it to be defenseless,
he
noted, "Had the Iranians not tried to build nuclear
weapons, they would be crazy."
Surely no sane person wants Iran (or any nation) to
develop nuclear weapons. A reasonable resolution of the
present crisis would permit Iran to develop nuclear energy,
in accord with its rights under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, but not nuclear weapons. Is that outcome feasible?
It would be, given one condition: that the U.S. and Iran
were functioning democratic societies in which public
opinion had a significant impact on public policy.
As it happens, this solution has overwhelming support
among Iranians and Americans, who generally are in agreement
on nuclear issues. The Iranian-American consensus includes
the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere (82%
of Americans); if that cannot yet be achieved because of
elite opposition, then at least a "nuclear-weapons-free zone
in the Middle East that would include both Islamic countries
and Israel" (71% of Americans). Seventy-five percent of
Americans prefer building better relations with Iran to
threats of force. In brief, if
public opinion were to have a significant influence on
state policy in the U.S. and Iran, resolution of the crisis
might be at hand, along with much more far-reaching
solutions to the global nuclear conundrum.
Promoting Democracy -- at Home
These facts suggest a possible way to prevent the current
crisis from exploding, perhaps even into some version of
World War III. That awesome threat might be averted by
pursuing a familiar proposal: democracy promotion -- this
time at home, where it is badly needed. Democracy promotion
at home is certainly feasible and, although we cannot carry
out such a project directly in Iran, we could act to improve
the prospects of the courageous reformers and oppositionists
who are seeking to achieve just that. Among such figures who
are, or should be, well-known, would be
Saeed
Hajjarian, Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi, and
Akbar
Ganji, as well as those who, as usual, remain nameless,
among them labor activists about whom we hear very little;
those who publish the
Iranian
Workers Bulletin may be a case in point.
We can best improve the prospects for democracy promotion
in Iran by sharply reversing state policy here so that it
reflects popular opinion. That would entail ceasing to make
the regular threats that are a gift to Iranian hardliners.
These are bitterly condemned by Iranians truly concerned
with democracy promotion (unlike those "supporters" who
flaunt democracy slogans in the West and are lauded as grand
"idealists" despite their clear record of visceral hatred
for democracy).
Democracy promotion in the United States could have far
broader consequences. In Iraq, for instance, a firm
timetable for withdrawal would be initiated at once, or very
soon, in accord with the will of the overwhelming majority
of Iraqis and a significant majority of Americans. Federal
budget priorities would be virtually reversed. Where
spending is rising, as in military supplemental bills to
conduct the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would sharply
decline. Where spending is steady or declining (health,
education, job training, the promotion of energy
conservation and renewable energy sources, veterans
benefits, funding for the UN and UN peacekeeping operations,
and so on), it would sharply increase. Bush's tax cuts for
people with incomes over $200,000 a year would be
immediately rescinded.
The U.S. would have adopted a national health-care system
long ago, rejecting the privatized system that sports twice
the per-capita costs found in similar societies and some of
the worst outcomes in the industrial world. It would have
rejected what is widely regarded by those who pay attention
as a "fiscal train wreck" in-the-making. The U.S. would have
ratified the Kyoto Protocol to reduce carbon-dioxide
emissions and undertaken still stronger measures to protect
the environment. It would allow the UN to take the lead in
international crises, including in Iraq. After all,
according to opinion polls, since shortly after the 2003
invasion, a large majority of Americans have wanted the UN
to take charge of political transformation, economic
reconstruction, and civil order in that land.
If public opinion mattered, the U.S. would accept UN
Charter restrictions on the use of force, contrary to a
bipartisan consensus that this country, alone, has the right
to resort to violence in response to potential threats, real
or imagined, including threats to our access to markets and
resources. The U.S. (along with others) would abandon the
Security Council veto and accept majority opinion even when
in opposition to it. The UN would be allowed to regulate
arms sales; while the U.S. would cut back on such sales and
urge other countries to do so, which would be a major
contribution to reducing large-scale violence in the world.
Terror would be dealt with through diplomatic and economic
measures, not force, in accord with the judgment of most
specialists on the topic but again in diametric opposition
to present-day policy.
Furthermore, if public opinion influenced policy, the
U.S. would have diplomatic relations with Cuba, benefiting
the people of both countries (and, incidentally, U.S.
agribusiness, energy corporations, and others), instead of
standing virtually alone in the world in imposing an embargo
(joined only by Israel, the Republic of Palau, and the
Marshall Islands). Washington would join the broad
international consensus on a two-state settlement of the
Israel-Palestine conflict, which (with Israel) it has
blocked for 30 years -- with scattered and temporary
exceptions -- and which it still blocks in word, and more
importantly in deed, despite fraudulent claims of its
commitment to diplomacy. The U.S. would also equalize aid to
Israel and Palestine, cutting off aid to either party that
rejected the international consensus.
Evidence on these matters is reviewed in my book
Failed States as well as in The Foreign Policy
Disconnect by Benjamin Page (with Marshall Bouton),
which also provides extensive evidence that public opinion
on foreign (and probably domestic) policy issues tends to be
coherent and consistent over long periods. Studies of public
opinion have to be regarded with caution, but they are
certainly highly suggestive.
Democracy promotion at home, while no panacea, would be a
useful step towards helping our own country become a
"responsible stakeholder" in the international order (to
adopt the term used for adversaries), instead of being an
object of fear and dislike throughout much of the world.
Apart from being a value in itself, functioning democracy at
home holds real promise for dealing constructively with many
current problems, international and domestic, including
those that literally threaten the survival of our species.
Noam Chomsky is the author of
Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on
Democracy (Metropolitan Books), just published in
paperback, among many other works.
