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Hagit Borer: There
is little question in anybody’s mind about the special
relation between Israel and the United States. Israel is the
largest recipient of US foreign aid, to the tune of more
than $3 billion dollars a year, plus miscellaneous additions
like surplus weaponry, debt waivers and other perks. Israel
is the only country that receives its entire aid package in
the beginning of the fiscal year, allowing it to accrue
interest on it during the year. It is the only country which
is allowed to spend up to 25% of its aid outside of the
United States, placing such expenditures outside US control.
Apart from financial support, the United States has offered
unwavering support for the Israeli occupation of Palestine
and for the ongoing oppression of the Palestinians, and has
systematically supported Israel’s refusal to make any
effective peace negotiations or peace agreements. It has
vetoed countless UN resolutions seeking to bring Israel into
compliance with international law. It has allowed Israel to
develop nuclear weapons and not to sign the nuclear
anti-proliferation treaty and most recently it strongly
supported Israel’s attack on Lebanon in July of
2006. Support for Israel cuts across party lines and is
extremely strong in Congress where criticism of Israel is
rarely, if ever, heard. It also characterizes almost all
American administrations from Johnson onwards, with George
W. Bush being possibly the most pro-Israel ever.
What is the
reason for this strong support? Opinions on this matter vary
greatly. Within strong pro-Israel circles, one often hears
that the reason is primarily moral: the debt that the United
States owes Israel in the aftermath of the Holocaust; the
nature of Israel as the sole democracy in the Middle East;
Israel as the moral and possible strategic ally of the
United States in its War on Terror. Within circles that are
less supportive of Israel and which are less inclined to
view Israel and Israel’s conduct as moral, opinions vary as
well. One opinion stems from the position of Israel being a
strategic ally of the United States -- its support is simply
payment for services rendered coupled with the stable
pro-American stance of the Jewish Israeli population. Noam
Chomsky, among others, is a proponent of this view.
According to the opposing view, the United States’ support
for Israel does not advance American aims, it jeopardizes
them. The explanation for the support is to be found in the
activities of the Israel Lobby, also known as the Jewish
Lobby, or as AIPAC (the American-Israel Public Affairs
Committee), which uses its formidable influence to shape
American foreign policy in accordance with Israeli
interests. This opinion has most recently been associated
with an article published in the London Book Review,
co-authored by Professor Mearsheimer of the University of
Chicago and Professor Walt of Harvard University.
This debate is
the topic of our program today.
Let me
introduce our guests: Norman Finkelstein is a professor of
political science at De Paul University. Welcome to our
program, Norman.
Norman
Finkelstein: Thank you.
HB: Professor
Finkelstein is the author of several books on the history of
Zionism and the role of the Holocaust in present day Israeli
policies. His latest book, published in 2005,
Beyond Chutzpah: On The Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the
Abuse of History.
Our second
guest is James Petras. James is an Emeritus Professor of
sociology at SUNY, Binghamton. Welcome to our program,
James.
James Petras:
Glad to be here, Hagit.
HB: Professor
Petras is the author of numerous books on state power and
the nature of globalization in the context of the US and
Latin America, and most recently in the Middle East. His
latest book, published in 2006, is titled
The Power of Israel in the United States. Perhaps
starting with you, James, perhaps you could tell us by way
of a short opening statement where you would place yourself
on this issue of a debate on the source of the United States
lasting and enduring support for Israel.
JP: Well,
I think I would probably argue that the pro-Israel lobby,
the Zionist Lobby, is the dominant factor in shaping US
policy in the Middle East, particularly in the most recent
period. And I think one has to look at this beyond AIPAC. I
mean, we have to look at a whole string of pro-Zionist think
tanks from the American Enterprise Institute on down, and
then we have to look at a whole power configuration, which
not only involves AIPAC, but also the President of the Major
American Jewish Organizations, which number 52. We have to
look at individuals occupying crucial positions in the
government, as we had recently with Elliott Abrams and Paul
Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith and others. We have to look at the
army of op-ed writers who have access to the major
newspapers. We have to look at the super-rich contributors
to the Democratic Party, media moguls, etc. And I think
this, together with the leverage in Congress and in the
Executive, is the decisive factor in shaping US foreign
policy in the Middle East. And I want to emphasize that.
HB: James,
just to stop you, and maybe we can also have some kind of an
opening statement from Norman.
NF: Well,
first of all, thank you for having me. I would say that I
situate myself on the spectrum somewhere towards the
middle. I don’t think it is just the Lobby which
determines the US relationship with Israel. And I don’t
think it is just US interests which determine the US
relationship with Israel. I think that you have to look at
the broad picture and then you have to look at the local
picture. On the broad picture, that is to say US policy in
the Middle East generally speaking, the historical
connection between the US and Israel has been based on the
useful services that Israel has performed for the United
States in the region as a whole. And that became most
prominent in June 1967, when Israel knocked out the main
challenge, or potential challenge, to US dominance in the
region, namely Abdul Nasser of Egypt. So, on the broad
question of the US-Israel relationship that is the regional
relationship, I think it is correct to say that the alliance
has been based fundamentally on services rendered. On the
other hand, it is very clear from looking at the documentary
record that the US was euphoric when Israel knocked out
Egypt -- or knocked out Nasser and Nasserism. It is also
clear from looking at the documentary record that the United
States has never had any big stake in trying to maintain
Israel’s control over the territories it conquered in the
June 1967 war, that is to say the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula,
the Syrian Golan Heights and, at that time, the Jordanian
West Bank and Jerusalem. The US clearly had no stake in it
and, already from July 1967, wanted to apply pressures on
Israel to commit itself from fully withdrawing. It was
pretty obvious, if you look at the record again, that
Israel, at that point, was able to bring to bear the Lobby.
In 1967-68 it meant principally the forthcoming Presidential
election and the Jewish vote. It was to bring to bear the
power of the Jewish vote to resist efforts to withdraw. And
since '67, the Lobby has been very effective, I think, in
raising the threshold before the US is willing to act and
force an Israeli withdrawal, pretty much like the withdrawal
it forced on Indonesia in 2000 to leave [East] Timor. The
two occupations begin in roughly the same period: in 1974,
Indonesia invades Timor with the US green light, and in 1967
Israel conquers the West Bank, Gaza and so forth with the US
green light. And so the obvious question is: Both
occupations endured for a long period. The Indonesian
occupation was infinitely more destructive, killing more
than one-third of the East Timorese population. But it is
true to say come 2000 the US does order Indonesia to
withdraw its troops. Why hasn’t it done so in the case of
the Israel-Palestine occupation? And there I think its true
to say, ‘It’s the Lobby.’
HB: I
have a feeling that one of the things we really need to
start with when we try to address this issue is: What is it
that we recognize, if we could recognize, on more or less a
global level, as ‘American Interests’? Such that we can say
that they have so some degree systematically characterized
different US Administrations. This is because it seems to me
that it would be very difficult to evaluate to what extent
policies that are going on with respect to Israel aren’t
compatible with American interests, if we don’t talk a
little bit about what we perceive to be ‘American
interests.’ So James, would you like to talk about that a
little bit?
JP: Yes, I would. As a matter of fact, on that
question we have to be clear if we are talking about the US
government and corporate interests in the Middle East in
particular, or if we are talking about what should be US
interests.
HB: Let’s
talk about what they are . . . Let’s say, what the aims of
various administrations are as opposed to what is in the
best interest of either the American or the Israeli people,
which may be very different.
JP: Very
good. On that count, I think it is very clear that US policy
is directed toward empire-building, extending its political,
economic and military control over the world as a whole and,
in particular, the Middle East. And it pursues that policy
either through military means or through market mechanisms,
such as the expansion of corporations, the capture of pliant
client regimes, etc. And if we look at the Middle East in
particular, the US has been very successful in securing
agreements with most of the oil-producing countries except
Iraq and Iran, and even there it is mainly because of its
own rejection of relations with both those countries. US oil
companies have done extremely well through non-military
means. They have expanded their commercial ties -- Goldman
Sachs has just signed a big agreement with the biggest Saudi
bank. Britain is organizing a secondary market in Islamic
bonds. Wall Street is very interested in that. None of the
oil companies supported a war in Iraq. And it is part of the
rubbish that has been peddled -- that the war was about
oil. The oil companies were doing fabulously before the war
and were very nervous about getting involved in a war. This,
I think, leads us to the whole question of ‘why then?’ if it
was prejudicial to the major US economic interests. As we
can see, there were many US military people who were opposed
to going into Iraq because they felt it would prejudice the
US overall military capacities to defend the Empire -- just
like the war in Viet Nam prejudiced the capacity of the US
to intervene in Central America against the Sandinistas,
against the overthrow of the Shah, etc. So from the point
of view of global imperial interests, the war in Iraq was
certainly not on the behest of the oil companies. I have
looked at all the documents, I’ve done interviews with oil
companies, I’ve looked at their publications for the five
years in the run-up to the war and there is absolutely no
evidence. On the contrary, if you pursue research on the
various members of the Zionist power configuration in the
United States, which I think is a conceptually more correct
way of talking about this, rather than ‘the Lobby,’ you will
find that people of dubious loyalties, like Paul Wolfowitz,
Douglas Feith, Richard Perle and Elliott Abrams -- the
felon, that had an agenda of furthering Israel’s interests.
HB: James,
maybe we should go on with this: Basically if I understand
what your are saying, your are suggesting that up to the
point of getting involved militarily with Iraq, you would
characterize American policies in the Middle East . . . you
know, the Lobby notwithstanding . . . as extremely
successful. So, I am just wondering . . .
JP: It’s
what we call ‘market imperialism.’
HB: Yes.
Norman, do you want to comment on this?
NF: Well. You
have to look at the interests at many different levels. And
unfortunately it becomes murky and complicated, where one
would prefer a simple picture, I don’t think it is all that
simple when you try to figure it out. Number one, you have
to look at the interests in terms of who is defining
them. And, I agree, I think it is fairly obvious, certainly
to your listeners, that there are different interests that
are being defined by corporate power, or are being defined
democratically by the desires and choices of ordinary people
in any democratic system. So, lets limit ourselves to the
first -- the question of the corporate interests, since
obviously they are playing the dominant role in determining
US policy. Or it should be obvious, not that it always is.
HB: Let’s
assume it is fairly obvious.
NF: It’s
playing the determinant role. Then you have to look at ‘how
do they conceive the best way to preserve and expand their
interests.’ Now the way they perceive it may seem to a
person like you and me to be irrational. It’s that they are
pursuing policies which are actually hurting them. But the
fact that they may seem irrational to us does not mean that
that is the way they perceive these as the best way to
preserve their interests. So you take the concrete case at
hand. It may be the case that it was irrational for the US
to go into Iraq because there are other ways to control the
oil, or as some people have argued, that the market
mechanisms are such that, on a world scale, you no longer
need to control a natural resource in order to make sure you
get the lowest price or make sure it is flowing at the
lowest price. Control isn’t all that important anymore in
the modern world. It is not like when Lenin was writing his
Imperialism. Now that may be rationally correct and
maybe there is a good argument for making it, but that
doesn’t mean that those in power aren’t making decisions to
further their own interests, which may seem irrational to
us. In the case of Iraq, if you look concretely at what
happens: Number 1 -- There is no evidence, whatsoever, that
people like Wolfowitz or the others were trying to further
an Israeli agenda.
HB: Let
me interrupt. What would be the Israeli agenda, if there was
one?
NF: There
is an Israeli agenda, and I am not disputing it. The Israeli
agenda is basically the following: Israel does not care
which country you smash up in the Middle East, just so long
as, every few years, and sometimes every few months, you
smash up this or that Arab country to send a lesson or to
transmit the message to the Middle East that we are in
charge and whenever you get out of line we are going to take
out the ‘big club’ and break your skull. Now, it happens
that in the late 1990s Israel would have preferred that the
skull that was cracked would have been the Iranian
one. There was no evidence that Iraq was uppermost on the
Israeli agenda. In fact, all of this talk about the famous
document that was written up by these neo-cons to attack
Iraq -- that famous document -- was handed to Netanyahu when
he came to office to try convince him to put Iraq at the top
of the agenda. It’s not as if Israel passed that document to
the neo-cons, who then plotted to get the US government to
attack Iraq. It was the opposite. Israel would have
preferred to attack Iran. However, once those in our
government, maybe for misguided reasons for all I know,
decided to fasten on to Iraq -- that is to attack Iraq --
Israel was of course ‘gung ho’ because Israel is always
‘gung ho’ about smashing up this or that Arab country. That
has always been its policy for the last hundred years --
since the beginning of Zionism. The most commonplace cliché
of Israeli power is, ‘Arabs only understand the language of
force.’ So, when the US embarked on its campaign against
Iraq, the Israelis were gleeful -- but they are always
gleeful. It doesn’t mean that people like Wolfowitz, let
alone people like Cheney, are trying to serve an Israeli
agenda. There is no evidence for claims like that. Its pure
speculation based on things like ethnicity.
Lets take a
simple example, that, I’ll call him James, I don’t usually
call people by their first names, but Jim Petras mentioned .
. . Let’s take the case of Elliott Abrams. These are
interesting cases. Elliott Abrams is the son-in-law of
Norman Podhoretz. And Norman Podhoretz was the first big
neo-conservative supporter of Israel, the editor of
Commentary, the magazine. But if you look at people like
Podhoretz, you look at their history, I’ll take a book which
I am sure Jim is familiar with, in 1967 Podhoretz publishes
his famous memoir called Making It. It’s how he
succeeded and made it in American life. He was a young man
and the editor of Commentary Magazine. You read that
book, his celebrated memoir written two months before the
June 1967 war, there is exactly one-half of one sentence in
the whole book on Israel. People like Podhoretz, Midge
Decter, all the neo-cons . . . I have gone through the
whole literature on the topic and have read it quite
carefully. Before June 1967, they didn’t give a hoot about
Israel. Israel never comes up in any of their memoirs, in
any of the histories of the period. They become pro-Israel
when Israel is useful to them in their pursuit of power and
fortune in the United States. Elliott Abrams is as committed
to Israel as his father-in-law, Norman Podhoretz, was
committed to Israel: When it is convenient and when it is
useful. This idea of trying to serve an Israeli agenda,
especially coming from somebody as sophisticated as Jim
Petras, strikes me as absurd. He knows as well as I do that
power . . .
HB: Lets
me just interrupt to let James . . .
JP: Its
very strange that one says Wolfowitz was not influenced by
the Israeli agenda when he was caught passing documents to
Israel in the 1980s. And Douglas Feith lost his security
clearance for handing documents to Israel. Elliott Abrams
has written a book calling for maintaining the ‘purity’ of
the Jewish race . . .
NF: I
know. They write that crap . . . and you believe them? Jim,
do you think they care?
JP: Its
not a question of believing them, it’s a question of looking
at the documentary evidence of uncritical, support for
Israel in all of its policies -- a position that is taken by
the Presidents of the Major American Jewish Organizations.
They give unconditional support!
HB: Let
me perhaps interject here a little bit. I think that there a
couple of things. One is . . . I am wondering, for
instance, I don’t know whether you would agree, James, with
the particular Israeli interest that Norman had identified
with respect to the invasion of Iraq. But assuming that you
would agree that the Israeli interests is precisely that,
namely to smash some Arab country mainly because it is a
‘good idea’ . . .
JP: I
think that’s very superficial . . .
HB: The
question is also . . . has it been in American interests? So
we have seen America go after countries, which are
sometimes, in terms of their power, are otherwise really
quite negligible -- just so as to make a point that anybody
who dares to stand up to American power is just a bad
example and needs to be smashed . . .
NF: I
totally agree with that . . .
JP: Israel
was running guns to Iran as late as 1987 during the infamous
Iran-Contra Scandal . . . To say that they weren’t
interested in destroying Iraq as a challenge to Israel’s
hegemony and Iraq’s support for the Palestinians,
particularly funding the families of assassinated
Palestinian leaders . . . that’s absurd. And I think . .
.
NF: Oh
look . . .
HB: Could
I stop you at this particular point . . . because we need
to take a station break.
JP: I
want to answer your question . . .
HB: We
will come back to it . . . At this point I think we should
try to shift the topic a little bit and . . .
JP: Let
me finish my last comment. I think when the Pentagon offices
are flooded, like a crowded bordello on Saturday night, with
Israeli intelligence officers, crowding out even members of
their own Pentagon staff -- full of Mossad, full of Israeli
generals, in the making of Iraq policy, I don’t think you
can say that they are ‘just any old Pentagon officials.’ I
think you can’t dismiss the fact that Feith, Wolfowitz,
Elliott Abrams have a lifetime commitment to putting
Israel’s interests as their prime consideration in the
Middle East. I think it is absurd to think that somehow they
just happen to be right-wing policy makers that happen to
support a militarist policy. Wolfowitz designed the
program. Feith put together the Office of Special Plans, the
policy board that fabricated the information for the Iraq
war. They were constantly consulting on a day-day,
hour-to-hour basis with the Israeli government. This has
absolutely been documented a hundred times and I think it is
impossible to deny this and say, "Well, you can’t deduce
policy from ethnic affiliations." Yes, you can! When that
ethnic group puts forward a position that puts the primacy
of a foreign government at the center of their foreign
policy and prejudices the lives of thousands of Americans .
. . its economic interests in the area . . . then it’s
absurd to say, ‘These are a bunch of irrational
policy-makers.’
HB: James,
let me pursue this and actually go into a slightly different
point. That is: Wouldn’t it be possible, you know, it’s a
question for both of you, for instance to think about
whatever the neo-con group is . . . it’s not a group that
represents Israeli interests, it’s a group which represents
interests that ‘happen’ to perhaps coincide for both
countries and which represent alliances of particular
politicians in both countries with one another, and
particular power configurations in both countries with one
another -- but not by any means -- all Israeli politicians
or the entire Israeli power structure, or all American
politicians or all American power structures.
JP: Absolutely.
HB: So
in that case, these are not really American interests. These
are just interests of a particular group of people, which is
just as interested in bringing to effect in the United
States as it is in Israel. It’s just basically, if you wish,
a wonderful symbiotic relationship. What would you say,
Norman to something like that?
NF: I’ve
said in my remarks at the beginning that there is an
overlapping of interests in a regional level for reasons of
which, in part, you suggested earlier. You said that the
United States often goes after weak regimes as a kind of
demonstration effect of its power and Israel also has a
desire for demonstrating its power. Often there is an
overlapping, or confluence of interests. I think, however,
its also true to say on the specific question on the
occupation -- there is a conflict of interests. Were there
not a Lobby, its quite likely that the US would have exerted
the kinds of pressures needed to force an Israeli
withdrawal.
On questions
like Iraq and Iran, I don’t see any evidence whatsoever of
its being driven by cloak-and-dagger type of operations in
the Pentagon. These operations, which Jim mentions, are so
trivial next to the very high level planning that goes on
between the United States and Israel: conscious, legal
high-level planning on a daily basis. High-level planning
and high level coordination. You don’t have to conjure up
cloak-and-dagger tales, many of them true, going on inside
the Pentagon in order to demonstrate there is collusion,
planning and coordination between the United States and
Israel. The question is not whether that goes on. The
question is, whose interests are being served by it? There
is this notion that somehow they are managing to distort and
deform US policy in a crucial region, on a crucial resource,
which doesn’t, in my opinion, have any basis in fact. It
defies any kind of reason or any kind of common sense
reasoning -- especially coming from, in my youth, I used to
be a student of James Petras at SUNY Binghamton from 1971-74
and he used to be a Marxist, and at that time he would tell
you how people in power act from interests, which spring
from . . . a basis in which they are the main
beneficiaries.
HB: Norman,
let me ask you . . .
NF: Just
a second . . . Mr. Wolfowitz, Mr Feith and all the others .
. . their power springs from the American state. If Israel
gets stronger, their power does not increase. If the United
States gets weaker, their power decreases. So now we are
having this weird phenomenon of people, due to their ethnic
loyalties, are willing to strengthen another state and
thereby weaken the sources of power from which their power
comes . . . that doesn’t sound believable.
JP: This
is a convoluted thinking. I am sure Norman didn’t take that
logic from my classes. I’m afraid he has gone off the track
somewhere -- despite some very good books he has written on
the Zionist ‘shakedowns’, on the Holocaust and the
refutation of the plagiarism of [Alan] Dershowitz. I am
afraid that when it comes to dealing with the predominantly
Jewish lobby, he has a certain blind spot, which is
understandable. In many other national and ethnic groups --
where they can criticize the world but when it comes to
identifying the power and malfeasance of their own group . .
. .
HB: I
think maybe we should all . . . perhaps we can move away
from this topic. OK?
JP: Let
me finish my sentence. There is nothing ‘cloak-and-dagger’
about the multiplicity of pro-Israel groups, that have
pressured Congress, that are involved in the executive body
in shaping American policy in the Middle East. The US does
not support any other colonial power; it has opposed
colonial occupation/imperialism since World War II. They
opposed the British occupation of the Suez in
1956/1955. They have been pushing these countries of Europe
and other countries out in order to establish US hegemony
through economic and military agreements. The policy with
the Israelis is very different from the policies the US
follows everywhere else in the world. It’s the only country
that gets $3 billion dollars a year for 30 years. This is
not just something that happens because of
‘cloak-and-dagger.’ This is the result, as Norman knows --
as a very brilliant analyst, from organized power, an
organized power that openly admits and states very
explicitly that Israel is their major concern . . . and
‘what’s good for Israel is good for the United States.’ They
say that, Norman.
NF: I
know that. But regardless of what they say . . .
HB: Let
me interrupt you. I need to do a station ID and maybe we
could change the topic.
JP: OK. Norman
was a good student of mine.
HB: I
think that at this point we can agree that you guys have a
lot of mutual respect for each other. But obviously you do
not agree on some topics. I wanted to move on to the
question of whether there are in fact cases that show that
when there are conflicts of interests, say between the US
and Israel, that there are instances where the United States
does in fact pressure Israel to, at least in some cases, act
in ways which are against what Israeli wishes would be.
Because it seems to me that if we don’t find cases along
these lines, then basically the discussion becomes one of
‘the eyes of the beholder.’ We see a lot of cooperation, a
lot of joint interest, but they could be coming from either
side. If there are cases where perhaps there are interests
which part ways and where we can see, in fact, there is a
discord that we can talk about. Norman, since you are the
one who believes that this is a possibility, could you talk
about that?
NF: Well,
the thing is, I don’t want to make the argument that these
kinds of individual cases can prove one side or the
other. You pick up a book by Steve Zunes, and he is going to
demonstrate that the US government always gets its way. You
pick up something by somebody on the other side, and they
are going to demonstrate that it’s Israel that always gets
its way when there are conflicts of interests. And each side
can give a list of examples to demonstrate his or her case.
I don’t think you can prove anything by citing a handful of
cases on one side -- Professor Chomsky will cite the recent
case where Israel was severely reprimanded by Bush for
trying to sell technology to China -- and then you will find
cases on the other side. Even though it’s important to look
at the empirical record, I don’t think the empirical record,
in and of itself, resolves the question.
Let me give you
a couple of examples of how I think it works: Let’s take two
prime examples. Let’s start with 1948. Why did President
Truman recognize Israel? There are all sorts of debate about
that question. One claim that is constantly made was/is the
role of the Jewish lobby. Namely Truman was heading for
elections and wanted, in particular, the New York vote . .
. and the Democratic Party wanted Jewish money. It was due
to the Jewish lobby of its time that Truman quickly
recognized Israel, even though he was bound to alienate Arab
interests which were very hostile to Israel’s founding. What
does the record show? I have gone through the record very
carefully. The records shows: Number 1 -- our main interest
at that time was in Saudi oil and the US enters into
discussions with the Saudis: ‘What will you allow the US
government to do regarding the founding of the state of
Israel?’ And the Saudis basically said the following: ‘We
will let you recognize Israel, but if you supply arms then
there is going to be trouble.’ They are referring to arms
after Israel was founded when there was an imminent war.
What does the US do? It recognizes Israel, that is to say,
it goes the limit. Truman goes the limit, because he wants
that Jewish vote and he wants Jewish money. But he
immediately slaps an arms embargo on the region. And the
Secretary of State, Marshall, at the time says: ‘It looks
like Israel is going to lose the war.’ That is what our
intelligence tells us. We were wrong, but that is what US
intelligence said at the time. So they were willing to let
Israel be annihilated, because that’s what our intelligence
told us, if the price was losing the support of the Saudis.
It is true that Truman went the limit -- the limit was
‘recognizing Israel’ to get the Jewish vote, but he never
went beyond the limit of alienating a prime US interest in
the region, namely the Saudis.
Let’s take
1956, which Jim mentioned, but I don’t think he knows what
happened. In 1956, it’s true the United States told Britain,
France and Israel they had to get out of Egypt. And its
true, we looked very anti-colonial. But the only reason the
United States did that was because the British, the French
and the Israelis acted behind the back of the United States.
The very moment the tripartite invasion of Egypt occurred,
the US was plotting to overthrow the government of Syria.
And the US wanted to knock out Nasser, but they didn’t like
the timing -- because the timing was not of the US choosing
but rather the British, French and Israelis behind our
backs. Once again it was the US interests that determined US
policy, not any commitment to anti-colonialism or crap like
that. It was the US interest.
JP: He’s
had five minutes already. I demand equal time. He’s been
giving us long lectures. If you look at US policy toward
Israel, the US alienates practically the whole world in
favor of a tiny country, which has practically no economic
value to the United States, which is a diplomatic albatross
and has its own hegemonic, military and political interests
in dominating the Middle East. We go into the United Nations
and we alienate the whole of Europe and the Third World when
Israel destroys Jenin, when it engages in genocidal policies
in the Occupied Territories, when it violates the Geneva
Agreements. The US backs it and totally discredits itself
before anyone seriously concerned with international law,
with the niceties of international relations. I am not just
talking about Moslem opinion, Arab opinion . . . I am
talking about world opinion. Secondly, to say that the
United States has overlapping interests with Israel is
totally off the wall. I mean, I don’t know where Norman’s
head is. The United States gets involved in countries to set
up neo-colonial regimes. They are not into occupying and
setting up colonial governments. They’d prefer local
clients. And they had one in Lebanon, with the President
(Fouad) Sinoria, who was receiving US backing when Israel
attacks Lebanon, presumably to attack Hezbollah -- but
totally undermines the US puppet.
Is that in US
interests?
NF: Yes.
JP: And
when you talk about the fact that Israel is taking measures,
overlapping with US policymakers, you are overlooking the
fact that most of the US generals were opposed to the war in
Iraq, and the Israeli agents in the United States -- and
that’s what they are and they should register themselves as
agents of a foreign power -- were attacking them (the
generals) as wimps. Attacking them because they wouldn’t
follow the war precepts of the Zionists in the Pentagon.
There is a whole string of military officials and
conservative politicians who were opposed to going into
Iraq. And if you look at the data . . . if you look at
Cheney, Cheney was getting his from Irving (Scooter) Libby
-- another landsman, another member of the fraternity linked
to Wolfowitz. He’s a protégé of Wolfowitz.
NF: I
think Cheney can think for himself.
JP: Look,
if you are trying to set up a matrix of power, dealing with
US policymaking in the Middle East, to simply say that this
is ‘shared interests’ without looking at the fact that the
Israelis blew up a US surveillance ship, killing scores of
US sailors, and get away with it and continue to get US
economic aid and the US officers that were wounded or
murdered by the Israeli warplanes, with US flags flying over
the ship, and say . . . that’s overlapping interests.
That’s chutzpah! That is really chutzpah. And it is very
revealing that when you went into a detailed explanation, or
purported to be explanation, about the Suez, you leave out
that in 1967 the Israelis are the only country in US history
that bombs a US ship and doesn’t even have to apologize --
and receives no retaliation from the United States. Now that
is ‘power’ for you. That’s ‘influence’ for you. And I think
to deny these realities and say, ‘this is just overlapping
interests, the Zionists have no power in the US government,
or if they are Zionists then they are not tied to Israel,
etc’ -- that’s a strange kind of Zionist that doesn’t have
allegiance to the state of Israel.
HB: We
have only five minutes left. I want to ask you about a
couple of things that I want the cover. Maybe the most
important one has to do with the fact that this debate about
the Israel Lobby, in general, has broken surface into the
mainstream in the last year or so. Of course a lot of it had
to do with the Mearsheimer and Walt article, and
subsequently, let’s say, by the attacks on [Jimmy] Carter’s
book. There were attacks before and reviews and debates
about the role of the Lobby before. But they never made it
to the mainstream and they were never reviewed by, lets say,
the New York Review of Books, and they were never
discussed by major outlets in the United States. In fact,
the Mearsheimer and Walt article originally was turned down
for publication by the Atlantic Magazine, which had
commissioned it. So maybe you can comment a little bit about
why this debate is finally breaking surface and why is it
that it is now a much more legitimate thing to debate within
American mainstream circles?
JP: I’ll
give your three fast reasons: One, because of the disaster
in Iraq, the public is open to discussion, particularly with
the prominence of Zionists in bringing about the war -- so I
think you have public opinion open because of the discontent
with the war and their concern about who got us into the war
and into this mess. Second reason is that there is an
inter-elite fight in the United States, between sectors of
the military, sectors of the Congress, conservatives versus
the pro-Israel crowd, the pro-war crowd. And the third
reason is the arrogance and bullying by the Zionists, in
particular, their organizations that go around trying to
prevent this discussion has backfired and I think people are
fed up with the Zionist banning [the play about Rachel]
Corrie in New York and elsewhere -- so I think these are the
reasons.
HB: James,
we have to move on. We have only a few minutes. We have only
a minute and a half. So Norman, could you say some final
words?
NF: Well,
I agree with the reasons . . . maybe I wouldn’t state them
the same way as Jim does. Its clear that the debacle in Iraq
forms the overall framework for the opening up of
discussion. In my opinion, that’s probably not the most
positive result because its going to end up with, I think,
creating a ‘scapegoat’ for disastrous war by the US. I think
the second reason is that the Israeli approach, which seemed
to have been successful since 1967, the approach of simply
applying force to every break in conformity with US policy,
of applying overwhelming force, plainly is not working. And
so there are questions about the ‘usefulness’ of Israel’s
guidance and instruction in how to control the Middle East.
It has not worked in Iraq and it proved to be a disaster in
Lebanon this summer (July-August 2006). So there is a
question about the ‘effectiveness’ of the Israeli approach,
in addition to the effectiveness of Israel itself as a
‘strategic asset,’ which is very different than it was in
1967. And the third reason, it seems to me, is that Israel
is becoming more and more what you might call a ‘bloated
banana republic’ with scandals daily and this kind of
squandering of resources and, that being the case, it has
alienated large sectors of American ‘liberal’ Jewish
opinion.
HB: I
thank you very much, James and Norman. I think on this point
of accord between you, we need to end. Thank you so very
much for being here.
Hagit Borer
is a Professor of Linguistics at University of Southern
California College. She can be reached at:
borer@usc.edu.
James Petras,
a former Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University,
New York, owns a 50-year membership in the class struggle,
is an adviser to the landless and jobless in Brazil and
Argentina, and is co-author of
Globalization Unmasked (Zed Books). His
latest book is,
The Power of Israel in the United States
(Clarity Press, 2006). He can be reached at:
jpetras@binghamton.edu.
Norman G.
Finkelstein teaches political theory at DePaul
University in Chicago. He is the author of five books, most
recently
Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of anti-Semitism and the
Abuse of History (University of California Press,
2005) and
The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the exploitation of
Jewish Suffering (Verso: 2000; expanded second
edition, 2003). He can be reached at:
normangf@hotmail.com.
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