King George's loyalty oaths
Loyalty has been Bush's royal principle, but as the
scandals spread his loyalists try to save themselves
by betraying each other.
By Sidney Blumenthal05/17/07 "The
Guardian" -- -- Loyalty has always been the
alpha and omega of George Bush's presidency. But all
the forms of allegiance that have bound together his
administration - political, ideological and personal
- are being shredded, leaving only blind loyalty.
Bush has surrounded himself with loyalists, who
fervently pledged their fealty, enforced the loyalty
of others and sought to make loyal converts. Now
Bush's long downfall is descending into a series of
revenge tragedies in which the characters are
helpless against the furies of their misplaced
loyalties and betrayals. The stage is being strewn
with hacked corpses - on Monday, former Deputy
Attorney General Paul McNulty; imminently, World
Bank president Paul Wolfowitz; tomorrow, whoever
remains trapped on the ghost ship of state. As the
individual tragedies unfold, Bush's royal robes
unravel.
Loyalty to Bush is the ultimate royal principle
of the imperial presidency. The ruler must be
unquestioned and those around him unquestioning.
Allegiance to Bush's idea of himself as the "war
president", "the decider" and "the commander guy" is
paramount. But the notion that the ruler is loyal to
those loyal to him is no longer necessarily true.
While he must be beheld as the absolute incarnation
of kingly virtue, his sense of obligation to those
paying homage has become perilously relative.
Those who feel compelled to tell the truth rather
than stick to the cover story are cast in the dust,
like McNulty. Those Bush defends as an extension of
his authority but who become too expensive become
expendable, like Wolfowitz. And those who exist
solely as Bush's creations and whose survival is
crucial to his own are shielded, like Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales.
On Tuesday, James Comey, the former deputy
attorney general, disclosed a story that might have
been written by
Mario Puzo, and it explained the rise of
Gonzales as attorney general. On March 10, 2004,
Comey was serving as acting attorney general while
John Ashcroft was in an intensive-care unit being
treated for pancreatitis. After an "extensive
review" by the justice department's office of legal
counsel, which concluded that Bush's warrantless
domestic surveillance program was illegal, Comey
refused to sign its reauthorization. An aide to
Ashcroft tipped Comey off that White House legal
counsel Gonzales and chief of staff Andrew Card were
headed to Ashcroft's hospital to get him to sign it.
Comey rushed to the darkened room, where he briefed
the barely conscious Ashcroft. Gonzales and Card
entered minutes later, demanding that Ashcroft
comply. He refused, pointing to Comey, saying he was
the attorney general. "I was angry. I had just
witnessed an effort to take advantage of a very sick
man," Comey testified.
Gonzales and Card then summoned Comey to the
White House, where they attempted to intimidate him
by telling him that Vice President Dick Cheney and
his counsel, David Addington, were in favor of the
reauthorization. Comey still refused. And the
program went forward without the legal justice
department approval. Comey and other high justice
department officials prepared their resignation
letters. The next day, having heard about the
planned mass resignations, President Bush met alone
with Comey, who briefed him on what needed to be
done to bring the program under the law. Several
weeks later Comey signed the authorization for a
legal program. But during that period it was
conducted outside the law.
Then, after Bush's reelection, Ashcroft was not
reappointed. In his place Bush sent a new name to
the Senate for confirmation - Alberto Gonzales.
Every position he had held was the result of his
undying loyalty to Bush. The confrontation in
Ashcroft's hospital room had been a turning point in
his rise. Comey, who Bush privately derided as
"Cuomo", quit. In his confirmation hearing before
the senate judiciary committee, Gonzales was asked
about domestic surveillance, and he blithely misled
the senators, acting as if he would always uphold
the existing law, even though he had pressured
Ashcroft and Comey to approve the illegal program.
"The government cannot do that without first going
to a judge," he said. "Government goes to the FISA
[Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] court and
obtains a warrant to do that." Gonzales spoke those
lines knowing he had done precisely the opposite.
His lie demonstrated his higher loyalty to his
patron.
At the moment that Comey was finishing his
testimony about the drama at Ashcroft's sickbed,
Gonzales was delivering a speech at the National
Press Club blaming his former deputy for the
political purge of eight US attorneys. "You have to
remember," said Gonzales, "at the end of the day,
the recommendations reflected the views of the
deputy attorney general. The deputy attorney general
would know best about the qualifications and the
experiences of the United States attorneys
community, and he signed off on the names." Gonzales
had previously accepted generic "responsibility",
claimed he didn't know anything about the dismissals
and also blamed his former chief of staff, Kyle
Sampson.
McNulty had, in fact, testified truthfully before
the senate, which reportedly infuriated Gonzales.
Though ostensibly in charge of the US attorneys,
McNulty was kept out of the loop of the detailed
planning for the purge, informed only in outline and
briefed to give false testimony about the reasons
for the firings by Sampson and others at his
February appearance before the senate judiciary
committee. After McNulty conveyed his talking points
about the US attorneys being dismissed for
"performance related" problems, he conceded under
questioning that one had been replaced in order to
fill his post with one of Karl Rove's protégés. That
revelation blew up the scandal. McNulty's
scapegoating and resignation were inevitable.
McNulty was tainted as a betrayer for telling the
truth. He had been an operator for two decades
within the Republican Party, but his loyal service
could not protect him. A graduate of the Capital
University Law School in Columbus, Ohio, he had
striven upward as a faithful party man, making a
career of political networking. His adherence to the
principles of the
Federalist Society lent him an imprimatur as a
reliable conservative. He served as counsel to the
house judiciary committee during the impeachment of
President Clinton. His partisanship was considered
so solid that he was named head of the Bush
transition team for the justice department. He
received the plum appointment as US attorney for
Northern Virginia, the so-called rocket docket, used
for high-profile terrorism cases after 9/11, like
that of John Walker Lindh. With Comey's departure,
he rose to deputy attorney general.
In the end, McNulty suffered Comey's fate. His
loyalty to party did not extend beyond the
boundaries of the law. Thus he became a betrayer and
a fall guy. His reputation was tarnished while
Gonzales remained. Gonzales carried out his
shameless finger-pointing at McNulty without the
slightest hesitation. The destruction of trust
within his department seemed to bother him not at
all. His instinct for self-preservation easily
triumphed over his desire for self-respect. Bush's
loyalty to Gonzales is a monument to his
vulnerability if he were to resign.
Monica Goodling, the former no 3 ranking justice
department official, presents another version of
loyalty, that of the religious fanatic. Her refusal
to testify before the Senate, invoking the
Fifth Amendment, was brushed aside last week by
a federal court that granted her limited immunity.
Her equation of loyalty is to faith, a complete
commitment in which her political agenda is part of
a destined plan for salvation. Goodling sees Bush as
the crusader king and herself as loyal vassal.
Within this administration, she is not deluded, and
her rise without visible credentials was proof that
she was well prepared by Pat Robertson's Regent
University to serve Bush as the Lord Ruler.
As Gonzales maintained his grip on his office
while his deputy and aides were tossed into the
inferno, the Wolfowitz drama inexorably moved to its
final act. Wolfowitz, intellectual architect of the
Iraq war as deputy secretary of defense, and even
before, had had a long career before receiving
Bush's patronage. Bush, indeed, is not his patron,
but Cheney, for whom Wolfowitz was an aide when
Cheney was secretary of defense in the elder Bush's
administration, is. Wolfowitz's career precedes that
period, too, as one of the most fully formed
neoconservatives in Washington. Unlike Gonzales, he
is not Bush's creature. But Bush's policy is his. In
being loyal to Wolfowitz, Bush is tacitly
acknowledging his debt, not his majesty. He should
feel compelled to defend Wolfowitz not because he is
his appointee as president of the World Bank, but
because Wolfowitz formulated the central purpose of
the Bush presidency in the invasion of Iraq.
In his loyalty to his own ideas, Wolfowitz
exhibits his loyalty to the man of ideas - himself.
From abstraction to abstraction, he has bullied his
cause and career forward. His loyalty to Bush is
contingent on Bush's embrace of Wolfowitz's schemes.
Wolfowitz has never shown allegiance to the
institutions where he served: not to the defense
department, which was an instrument for his notions,
nor to the World Bank. He surrounded himself with
ill-qualified ideological aides, whose loyalty was
above all to him and through him to his ideas. The
professional staffs at both the Pentagon and the
World Bank seethed at Wolfowitz's highhanded
managerial style, a combination of arrogance and
incompetence.
At the World Bank, he entangled himself in a
scandal involving his girlfriend, Shaha Riza,
personally arranging for the bank to pay her a large
salary increase to move her to a state department
foundation, then blaming the bank's staff for having
approved the decision. According to the World Bank
report issued this week, Wolfowitz muttered a
malediction to the head of the bank's human
resources department: "If they fuck with me or
Shaha, I have enough on them to fuck them too." Thus
Wolfowitz
posed as Tony Soprano and depicted the World
Bank as the Bada Bing. Loyalty would be forthcoming,
or else.
The report described Wolfowitz as a person of
"questionable judgment and a preoccupation with
self-interest" who "saw himself as the outsider to
whom the established rules and standards did not
apply". His insistence that he had been requested by
the bank to arrange Riza's job "simply turns logic
on its head".
On Tuesday, Wolfowitz defended himself by blaming
his girlfriend, saying of the bank staff, "Its
members did not want to deal with a very angry Ms.
Riza". He added that her "intractable position"
forced him to give her a large salary increase. With
that, the honorable gentleman attributed his rule
breaking to his emotionally volatile girlfriend. In
short, the bitch set him up.
In a final letter of defense, Wolfowitz pleaded
that he was the victim of "unfair" treatment, that
he was maligned as being described as a "boyfriend"
and that Riza was also denigrated as a "girlfriend".
He reminded the bank board of his dear children.
Meanwhile, Cheney, demonstrating his loyalty,
called Wolfowitz "a very good president of the World
Bank", adding, "I hope he will be able to continue".
As part of the salvage effort, Treasury Secretary
Henry Paulson, the former chief of Goldman Sachs,
was enlisted to telephone finance ministers to urge
them to support keeping Wolfowitz. A recent
appointee, with no history of involvement with
Wolfowitz, Paulson lent his reputation to the
scandal-ridden neocon as an act of loyalty to the
administration as though it were just a business
matter. He simply nicked him as part of the damage.
Paulson, too, was left out to dry when White House
press secretary Tony Snow announced that insofar as
Wolfowitz's future was concerned "all options are
open", a formula applied also to Iran.
The root of "loyal" is loi, or French for law.
Under Bush, loyalty has become a law unto itself.
Bush is loyal to those who break the rules but
adhere to him. Avowing loyalty for the
administration becomes a substitute for making
difficult ethical and moral decisions. Yet the less
Bush and his loyalists are willing to engage the
harsh realities they have created, the more comfort
they draw from loyalty. Once loyalty is no longer
reciprocal, as in the McNulty case, the leader
becomes more isolated as those beneath him become
increasingly insecure and paranoid about their
status. Demonstrations of loyalty cease being
effective as displays of power and greatness.
Instead, they are seen as stonewalling or
sandbagging, more like the levees of New Orleans
that will be inevitably breached. Loyalty to Bush
has become loyalty to his self-image and, in the
case of Gonzales, loyalty above the law, betraying
the meaning of the word itself.