The Bush/Cheney
Holocaust in Iraq
Criminality,
Immorality, Incompetence and Desperation
By Walter C. Uhler
Part One: Criminality and Immorality
I. Criminality
06/30/07 "Huffington Post" -- -- According to Article VI of
our U.S. Constitution, treaties entered into by the United
States become the "Supreme Law of the Land." At the urging
of President Harry Truman, on July 28, 1945, the U.S. Senate
ratified the United Nations Charter by a vote of 89 to 2,
with 5 abstentions. Thus the UN Charter became the supreme
law of the land. And, thus, the United States was legally
prohibited from waging war unless attacked, unless an attack
was imminent, or unless the United Nations approved such a
war.
Not for the first time, but most egregiously, did a
President of the United States violate both his oath to
uphold the Constitution and international law when President
Bush ordered the unprovoked invasion of Iraq. Unbeknownst to
the American public at the time, criminal plans for removing
Saddam Hussein not only dominated the early 2001 meetings of
Bush's National Security Council, they also crowded out time
and attention that would have been better spent attempting
to thwart the impending terrorist attacks by al Qaeda
terrorists -- about which the Bush/Cheney regime had been
frequently warned.
Why the obsession with Iraq? Credit the decade-old drumbeat
for war by America's neoconservatives. Then, like
cockroaches, they literally infested the newly installed
Bush/Cheney regime. Thus, it became an article of faith --
explicitly expressed during the NSC meetings in early 2001
-- that regime change in Iraq would reshape the Middle East
and, thus, enhance Israel's security and strengthen
America's ability to leverage the region's oil.
Unfortunately the very success of al-Qaida's criminal plans
for 9/11 provoked the very anger and fear within the U.S.
that enabled the Bush/Cheney regime to implement its
criminal plans. By successfully (although falsely) linking
Iraq to al-Qaida's 9/11 attacks, the Bush/Cheney regime was
able to portray its long-planned war as unavoidable
self-defense. After all the UN Charter permits its members
to engage in wars of self-defense while explicitly
prohibiting "the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any
state."
Thus, members of the Bush/Cheney regime soon were giving
speeches that falsely and maliciously conflated 9/11 and
Iraq. Subsequently, they also began to warn about the grave
and growing threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and ties to al-Qaida. Although nobody but
the dumbest of ignorant Americans should have been persuaded
by hints of Iraq's complicity in the 9/11 attacks, in fact,
a majority of Americans were persuaded. Imagine, then, how
easily persuaded they were by false assertions about Iraq's
WMD and ties to al-Qaida.
Only after the invasion would Americans learn conclusively
that Iraq possessed no WMD, that Iraq had no significant
ties to al-Qaida. Then the questions cascaded: Were the
false assertions by the Bush/Cheney regime mere mistakes or
were they evil lies?
The Bush/Cheney regime responded by blaming the failure to
find WMD on the poor intelligence provided by America's
intelligence community -- adding that the intelligence
services of other countries also mistakenly believed that
Iraq possessed WMD. Although such scapegoating contained a
large nugget of truth, it was designed to obscure two
important facts: (1) the intelligence reports often
contained qualifiers, expressions of doubts about Iraq's WMD
that were not publicized by the Bush/Cheney regime before
the invasion and (2) senior officials in the Bush/Cheney
regime embellished the faulty intelligence, lied about it,
and fabricated contrary intelligence to render the evidence
more ominous than it actually was (see "Immorality").
Moreover, when it became certain that the UN would not
approve a second resolution, one that authorized the use of
force against Iraq, the U.S. (acting jointly with Britain
and Spain) withdrew its draft of the second resolution from
the UN Security Council. Why? Because Britain's Lord
Goldsmith warned, "if the sponsors of the U.S.-UK draft
resolution sought a vote at the council and failed to get
it, serious doubts would be cast on the legality of military
action against Iraq."
After withdrawing the second resolution, the Bush/Cheney
regime made the following argument: because resolution 1441
"decided that Iraq has been and remains in material breach
of all relevant resolutions," the U.S. already possessed the
authority to use force. This argument was blatantly false,
especially because it is up to the UN Security Council, not
individual members, "to decide whether and how to enforce
its resolutions." [John Burroughs and Nicole Deller, "The
United Nations Charter and the Invasion of Iraq," Neo-Conned
Again pp. 368-69]
Such slimy behavior fooled almost nobody in the world except
a large number of Americans, including Americans in the news
media. Which explained why the UN Secretary General, Kofi
Annan, called the Bush/Cheney regime's subsequent invasion
of Iraq "illegal." In fact, as the Nuremberg War Crimes
Tribunal put it (in the wake of Nazi Germany's defeat), "To
initiate a war of aggression" is "the supreme international
crime."
Lesser war crimes by the Bush/Cheney regime already had been
committed. As the Guardian reported, "Evidence of prisoner
abuse and possible war crimes at Guantanamo Bay reached the
highest level of the Bush administration as early as autumn
2002, but Donald Rumsfeld, the defense secretary, chose to
do nothing about it." ["Bush team 'knew of abuse' at
Guantanamo," Sept. 13, 2004] The paper also reported, "The
secret 'special access program' facilitating much of the
mistreatment, widely held to have contravened the Geneva
convention, was established following a direct order from
the president." [Ibid]
The criminal rot from Guantanamo was "eventually transferred
wholesale" to Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, where subsequent
revelations of prisoner torture there by U.S. soldiers
irreparably dishonored the United States in the eyes of the
world. Writing in the 27 June 2007 issue of the New Yorker,
Seymour Hersh notes a May 2004 meeting, during which Army
Major General Antonio M. Taguba informed Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and others about the torture of
prisoners occurring at Abu Ghraib. Taguba "described a naked
detainee lying on the wet floor, handcuffed, with an
interrogator shoving things up his rectum, and said, 'That's
not abuse. That's torture.'"
According to Hersh, General Craddock and Vice-Admiral
Timothy Keating, the director of the Joint Staff of the
J.C.S., were e-mailed a summary of the Abu Ghraib abuses in
January 2004. Thus, Rumsfeld appears to have lied when, "in
his appearances before the Senate and the House Armed
Services Committees on May 7th, [he] claimed to have had no
idea of the extensive abuse." [Hersh, New Yorker 27 June
2007] Only when the scandal became public, did the regime's
cover-up fall apart.
Yet, the crimes continue. According to Human Rights Watch,
"In the past five years the administration has authorized
torture and other abusive interrogation techniques,
"disappeared" dozens of suspected terrorists into secret
prisons, twisted domestic law to permit indefinite detention
without charge of persons suspected of links to terrorism,
and confined hundreds at Guantanamo Bay without charge while
denying them information about the basis for their detention
and meaningful opportunity to contest it. The administration
has sought to exempt its actions from court oversight."
[Human Rights Watch, "United States," World Report 2007]
II. Immorality
In order to support their BIG LIE about the grave and
growing threat to the U.S. posed by Iraq, the Bush/Cheney
regime not only pressured the intelligence community to
produce conclusions that supported its own preconceptions
about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ties to al-Qaida,
it also embellished and lied about that intelligence.
Moreover, it fabricated damning intelligence where the
intelligence community found none.
Thus, to say "the intelligence community got it wrong" or
"intelligence agencies in other countries also concluded
that Iraq possessed WMD" still doesn't explain Cheney's
deceptive half-truth, asserted at the Veterans of Foreign
Wars 103rd National Convention on August 26, 2002. Cheney
told his audience, "The Iraq regime has in fact been very
busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and
biological agents." Worse, he claimed, "We now know that
Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons."
To support that claim, Cheney cited evidence provided by
Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel Hassan, who
claimed that Iraq possessed WMD. What Cheney failed to
mention, however, was that Kamel also said: "All chemical
weapons were destroyed. I ordered the destruction of all
chemical weapons. All weapons-biological, chemical, missile,
nuclear-were destroyed." Only after the illegal, immoral
invasion would we learn that Kamel had told the truth -- and
that Cheney had deceived us.
Neither do the glib assertions, "the intelligence community
got it wrong" and "intelligence agencies in other countries
also concluded that Iraq possessed WMD" explain why the then
National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, would assert
that the high-strength aluminum tubes that Iraq was
allegedly attempting to purchase could "only" be used in a
nuclear weapons program. In fact, when she told her lie, Ms.
Rice already knew that disagreement existed within the
intelligence community about how such tubes might be used.
Building upon that lie, Ms. Rice then fear mongered by
asserting: "The problem here is that there will always be
some uncertainty about how quickly he [Saddam] can acquire
nuclear weapons. But we don't want the smoking gun to be a
mushroom cloud."
When, in September 2002, Defense Secretary Donald H.
Rumsfeld said, "American intelligence had "bulletproof"
evidence of links between al-Qaida and the government of
President Saddam Hussein of Iraq," he deceived Americans
about the nature of that intelligence. First, America's
intelligence community already had dismissed such "links" as
insignificant. Second, because the intelligence community
already had discounted such "links", a rogue intelligence
unit headed by neocon ideologue Douglas Feith was set up
inside the Pentagon and specifically tasked with finding
such links.
Feith's "Gestapo Office" proceeded to fabricate
"intelligence" from shards of evidence already dismissed by
the intelligence community. Such shards were then passed to
neocon Paul Wolfowitz, then Rumsfeld and Cheney for public
dissemination. Former Director of Central Intelligence,
George Tenet, has commented on such intelligence in his
recent book, At the Center of the Storm. [W]e weren't too
impressed with their work�especially their willingness to
blindly accept information that confirmed preconceived
notions." [p. 348] Calling such work, "Feith-based
analysis," [Ibid] Tenet adds, "The best source of
information was our January 2003 paper, which said that
there was no Iraqi authority, direction, or control over al-Qa'ida."
[Ibid, p. 358]
President Bush, not only conflated Iraq and 9/11 and
reiterated the canards about Iraq's WMD and ties to al-Qaida,
he also repeated Ms. Rice's scare mongering about a mushroom
cloud and added a few unique lies of his own. For example,
while speaking to reporters in mid-July 2003, our immoral
President answered a question about Iraq by asserting: "The
larger point is, and the fundamental question is, did Saddam
Hussein have a weapons program? And the answer is,
absolutely. And we gave him a chance to allow the inspectors
in, and he wouldn't let them in."
In fact, Saddam had permitted the UN weapons inspectors to
return. But our lying President preempted their work, lest
they prove that Iraq had no WMD. As USA Today reported on
March 17, 2003: "In the clearest sign yet that war with Iraq
is imminent, the United States has advised U.N. weapons
inspectors to begin pulling out of Baghdad." Although such
lies failed to persuade most of the world, they did persuade
the dumbest or most frightened of Americans. And, armed with
their support, the Bush/Cheney regime was able to exert
political pressure on incumbents in Congress during the
months before mid-term Congressional elections of November
2002, by questioning the patriotism of any congressman
(congresswoman)), who didn't support the regime's rush to
war.
To get a better idea of the effectiveness of such immoral
political hardball, simply compare the votes in favor of
authorizing the Bush/Cheney regime's war of choice with the
actual number of congressmen who actually read the October
2002 National Intelligence Estimate -- the document that
supposedly proved (while actually raising doubts about) the
existence of Iraq's threatening WMD, and thus justified war.
On the "Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution of 2002," the House of Representatives adopted
the resolution on October 10, 2002, by a vote of 296-133 and
the Senate adopted the resolution on October 11, 2002, by a
vote of 77-23. Yet, "no more than six senators and a handful
of House members who did not serve on the house and senate
Intelligence Committess read beyond the five-page National
Intelligence Estimate executive summary." [Tenet, quoting
from the Washington Post , p. 337] Such gross negligence on
the part of our congressional representatives constitutes a
distinct type of immorality.
But nothing captures the immorality of the Bush/Cheney
regime as the contrast separating the President's very
gestures on the eve of initiating his war of choice and the
devastating impact it made -- and continues to make -- in
Iraq. Recall that during the moments before Bush "gave his
national address announcing that the war had begun, a camera
cought Bush pumping his fist as though instead of initiating
a war he had kicked a winning field goal or hit a home run.
'Feels good,' he said." [Paul Waldman, Fraud, p. 8]
Some two weeks later, at eleven A.M on March 30,
fourteen-year-old Arkan Daif was killed by an explosion that
lacerated his body with white-hot shrapnel. One piece tore
off the back of his skull. You see, Arkan and two cousins
were digging a trench in front of his house; a feeble
attempt to protect it from the bombs that Bush unleashed two
weeks earlier with such inhuman insouciance. [Anthony Shadid,
Night Draws Near, pp. 73-74]
To date, Bush's immoral insouciance has claimed the lives of
more than 3,500 American soldiers, wounded another 29,000
plus -- many having their brains shattered or becoming
double or triple amputees -- killed or wounded hundreds of
thousands of Iraqis and caused some five million Iraqis to
flee their homes for other parts of Iraq or for safety
outside the country.
Part Two: Incompetence
By Walter C. Uhler
Last month -- more than four years after the Bush/Cheney
regime's criminal and immoral invasion -- oil rich Iraq was
able to produce only 2 million barrels of oil per day, some
500,000 barrels per day less than it produced on the eve of
the U.S. invasion. It also produced but an average of 3,700
megawatts of electricity, or some 300 megawatts less than it
produced on the eve of the U.S. invasion. [Jason Campbell,
Michael O'Hanlon and Amy Unikewicz, "The State of Iraq: An
Update," New York Times, June 10, 2007]
Such sobering facts highlight the incompetence of the
ideologue who most fervently argued in favor of undertaking
the regime's criminal invasion, Paul Wolfowitz. Speaking to
Congress about Iraq's oil just one week after the invasion
began, Wolfowitz asserted: "We are dealing with a country
that can really finance its own reconstruction and
relatively soon."
In fact, as the General Accountability Office (GAO) reported
just last month, "From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, the
United States spent about $5.1 billion to rebuild the oil
and electricity sectors. The United States also spent an
additional $3.8 billion in Iraqi funds on these sectors.
However, Iraq will need billions of additional dollars to
rebuild these sectors." [GAO Report No. 07-677, "Rebuilding
Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore
Iraq's Oil and Electricity Sectors," May 2007]
Moreover, as the Chicago Tribune reported four days ago,
"Across the country, most provinces get electricity 10 to 12
hours a day. Baghdad usually had been getting about two
hours, and when sabotage attacks destroyed all but one
transmission line to the city in late May, many city
residents got just one hour." [James Janega, "After 4 Years,
Electricity Still Luxury," Chicago Tribune, June 25, 2007]
The GAO report blamed "poor security conditions" for slowing
reconstruction and rising costs. By "poor security
conditions," the report means looting, sabotage, insurgency
and civil war. Yet, all these ills are direct and
predictable consequences of Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld's failure to dispatch a military force to Iraq that
was large enough to secure the peace.
Notably, it was Rumsfeld's deputy, Wolfowitz, who ridiculed
General Shinseki's (strikingly prescient) prewar estimate
that peacekeeping in Iraq would require "something on the
order of several hundred thousand soldiers." Calling it,
"widely off the mark," Wolfowitz added: "It's hard to
conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability
in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war
itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam's security
forces and his army. Hard to imagine." [George Packer, The
Assassins' Gate, pp. 114-15]
Lacking such imagination, the ideologues running the
Pentagon failed to plan for an insurgency. But, worse, they
adamantly refused to do any planning at all for
post-invasion Iraq, lest they be required to inform Congress
about the potential problems that might arise. As one
Defense official told George Packer, "The senior leadership
in the Pentagon was very worried about the realities of the
postconflict phase being known, because if you are [Douglas]
Feith or if you are Wolfowitz, your primary concern is to
achieve the war." [Ibid, p. 114]
Two erroneous assumptions permitted Rumsfeld and the
neoconservatives in the Pentagon to justify their
politically inspired negligence: (1) the war would be a
"cakewalk," because Iraqis would greet American troops as
liberators and (2) the technological superiority of
America's forces, thanks to the "revolution in military
affairs," was a force multiplier that rendered a huge
invading force and post-invasion plans unnecessary.
Eager for war, the Bush/Cheney regime spent much of 2002
planning for the invasion - Phase I (the buildup of troops),
Phase II (covert operations) and Phase III (air and ground
assaults). In fact, by early 2002 military resources had
been diverted from Afghanistan to support the invasion of
Iraq. On February 19, 2002 General Tommy Franks admitted as
much when he confidentially told Florida's Senator, Bob
Graham: "Senator, we are not engaged in a war in
Afghanistan" because "military and intelligence personnel
are being redeployed to prepare for an action in Iraq."
[Graham, Intelligence Matters p. 125]
(According to Graham, "[O]nce America turned to Iraq, al
Qaeda was able to regroup, refocus, and begin carrying out
attacks again. From September 2002 until the train bombings
in Spain in 2004, al Qaeda carried out twelve attacks that
took, in all, more than 600 lives." [Graham, p. 218])
Eager for war, the Bush/Cheney regime also ignored two
Intelligence Community Assessments issued in January 2003
that warned about the numerous potential problems that might
result from an invasion of Iraq. These reports warned about
the difficulty of establishing democracy in Iraq, about the
opportunities that the invasion would provide for al Qaeda,
about the possibility of unleashing violent conflict in a
divided society (e.g., civil war), about fueling a
heightened terrorist threat, a surge in political Islam and
increased funding of terrorist groups, and about how Iran
might profit from the whole ordeal. ["Report on Prewar
Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq," Select
Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, May 25,
2007, pp. 6-12]
(Note the total abuse of intelligence: First, the
Bush/Cheney regime pressured the intelligence community (IC)
to produce conclusions that supported its own preconceptions
about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ties to al
Qaeda. Then, it embellished or lied about the IC's WMD
intelligence while fabricating damning intelligence about
Saddam's ties to al Qaeda, when the IC found none. Finally,
it ignored the IC's quite accurate assessments about
potential problems resulting from an invasion.)
Consequently, "by March 2003, the planning for Phase IV
[postwar operations] was barely under way." [Packer, p. 119]
Moreover, when General Franks -- the man responsible for
Phases 1 through 3 - was asked about Phase IV, he replied:
"Mr. Wolfowitz is taking care of that." [Packer, p. 120]
Wolfowitz assigned responsibility for postwar planning to
his subordinate, Douglas Feith. In mid-January 2003, Feith
asked retired lieutenant general Jay Garner to take the job.
Garner eventually accepted and commenced work. But when he
asked Feith for copies of planning documents, "Feith told
him nothing useful existed." [Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial
Life in the Emerald City, p. 31]
And, thus, the Bush/Cheney regime started a war without
having a plan to win the peace. Not only did it field too
few troops, it gave them no orders about how to handle the
looters who ravaged Iraq after the invasion. According to
Noah Feldman, an adviser in Iraq, "The key to it all was the
looting. That was when it was clear that there was no order.
There's an Arab proverb: Better forty years of dictatorship
than one day of anarchy." The looting "told them that they
could fight against us and we were not a serious force."
[Packer, p.138]
Or, as former Reagan administration official, Fred Ikle,
characterized the American response to the looting: "America
lost most of its prestige and respect in that episode. To
pacify a conquered country, the victor's prestige and
dignity is absolutely critical." [Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco,
p. 136]
The invasion also answered the prayers of Osama bin Laden
and his al Qaeda terrorists. For, as bin Laden's number two
man, Ayman al-Zawahiri, asserted in late 2003: "We thank God
for appeasing us with the dilemma in Iraq after
Afghanistan�If they [the Americans] withdraw they will lose
everything and if they stay, they will continue to bleed to
death." [Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris, p. xxi]
By its failure to plan to prevent looting, which "caused far
more damage to Iraq's infrastructure than the bombing
campaign" [Chandrasekaran, p. 46] and reached into the
depths of Iraq's (and the world's) cultural treasures, the
Bush/Cheney regime not only proved that it was riddled with
barbarians, it also violated international law. As noted in
a very significant June 2007 report, "War and Occupation in
Iraq," issued by the Global Policy Forum, the 1954 Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Properties in the
Event of Armed Conflict "specifies that an occupying power
must take necessary measures to safeguard and preserve the
cultural property of the occupied country and must prevent
or put a stop to 'any form of theft, pillage or
misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed
against cultural property." ['War and Occupation in Iraq,"
p. 20]
Yet, when, on April 11, 2003, Rumsfeld was asked about the
looting in Iraq, he responded, "Stuff happens!" Perhaps he
simply was unaware that even the Nazis felt compelled to
protect the Louvre.
The insurgency born of the looting picked up steam in
mid-May 2003 with the arrival of L. Paul Bremmer in Baghdad
to replace Garner and to head the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA). On May 16 Bremmer issued his "De-Baathification"
order, which threw some 85,000 members of Saddam's Baath
Party out of work. Doctors, professors and other
professionals - the kind of people "'that you can't do
without' in running a society" [Ricks, p. 161] - were out of
work.
On May 23, 2003, Bremmer issued the order, which dissolved
the Iraqi armed services, the staff of the Ministry of
Interior and the presidential security units. As one expert
observed: "Abruptly terminating the livelihoods of these
[720,000] men created a vast pool of humiliated, antagonized
and politicized men." [Ricks, p. 162] And, as Army Colonel
John Agoglia subsequently observed: That was the day "that
we snatched defeat from the jaws of victory and created an
insurgency." [Ibid, p. 163]
But the incompetence didn't end there. As Rajiv
Chandrasekaran detailed in his book, Imperial Life in the
Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone the CPA was teeming
with incompetents. "One 24-year old official with no
background in finance was given the job of resurrecting the
Baghdad stock exchange. Another aide, tasked with devising
new traffic regulations, down-loaded those of Maryland from
the internet. A 21-year old charged with helping to
rehabilitate the interior ministry boasted that his most
meaningful job to date had been as an ice cream truck
driver." [Chandrasekaran, "Lords of misrule still in charge
at the Baghdad bubble," TIMESONLINE, June 24, 2007]
Ignorant of what he had wrought, as well as the implications
of Bremmer's incompetent acts, a complacent Wolfowitz told
Congress, in June 2003, that the insurgency was the
"remnants of the old regime�I think these people are the
last remnants of a dying cause." [Ricks, p. 170] Rumsfeld
called the insurgents "dead-enders," not knowing that he
would be politically dead long before the insurgency.
Predictably, Bush uttered the dumbest statement of them all.
On July 2, 2003, from the safety of the White House, our
brave president observed: "There are some who feel that the
conditions are such that they can attack us there. My answer
is: Bring 'em on." [Ricks, p. 172]
And "Bring 'em on" they did! When Bush opened his big mouth
in July 2003, insurgent attacks already averaged 16 per day.
Moreover, while Bush attempted to bamboozle Americans with
one bogus "turning point" after another, the insurgents
increasingly brought 'em on.
Thus, when Saddam Hussein was captured in December 2003, the
insurgents were averaging 19 attacks per day. When L. Paul
Bremmer signed the hand-over of sovereignty in June 2004, it
was 45. When Iraq held its elections for a transitional
government in January 2005, it was 61. Notwithstanding these
mounting daily attacks, Cheney seized a moment in June to
make yet another asinine assertion: the insurgency is "in
the last throes."
Yet, in December 2005, six months into its "last throes"
when Iraqis voted for a permanent government, the daily
attack rate had reached 75. And when terrorist mastermind
Abu Musab al Zarqawi was killed in June 2006, it was up to
90. [See Tom Lasseter, Miami Herald, Aug. 16, 2006] Worse,
in October 2006 attacks surged to a record high of 176 per
day.
Even in the teeth of Bush's so-called "surge," attacks
averaged 164 per day in February 2007, 157 in March and 163
in April. Thus, enemy attacks for the entire month of April
totaled approximately 4,900. "Bring 'em on," indeed!
In addition to nurturing an ever-growing insurgency and
civil war, the Bush/Cheney regime's criminal, immoral and
incompetent invasion and occupation of Iraq "has helped
spawn a new generation of Islamic radicalism" that "has
metastasized and spread across the globe."
That's the conclusion reached in the April 2006 National
Intelligence Estimate titled: "Trends in Global Terrorism:
Implications for the United States." Moreover, thanks to the
regime's incompetence, "the overall terrorist threat has
grown since the Sept. 11 attacks." [Mark Mazzetti, "Spy
Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terror Threat," New York Times
, 24 Sept. 2006]
And while the attacks increase in Iraq and the terrorist
threat grows around the world, the U.S. Army, to quote
retired General Colin Powell, is "about broken." As retired
Army Colonel Andrew Bacevich has observed: "President Bush
has nickeled and dimed the nation's fighting forces to the
verge of collapse. Even today he remains oblivious to the
basic problem that his administration has confronted for the
past four years - too much war and too few soldiers." [Bacevich,
"Bushed Army," The American Conservative June 4, 2007]
Finally, one cannot complete an examination of the gross
incompetence of the Bush/Cheney regime without noting the
perverse results of its objective to reshape the Middle
East. Not only did it fail to increase Israel's security and
leverage the region's oil, it inadvertently fostered Iran's
emergence as a regional force to be reckoned with.