The Path
Towards War With Iran
Ramifications of the
proposal to add Iran's Revolutionary Guard to the
list of terrorist organizations
By Jeremy R. Hammond
08/23/07 "ICH" -- - This month saw yet
another escalation of the U.S. policy of isolating
and pressuring Iran as the White House announced its
intention to add Iran's Revolutionary Guard to the
State Department's list of terrorist organizations.
There is something to be learned from this about the
nature of U.S. foreign policy if we care to examine
the implications; and the ramifications of such a
decision could be quite serious and potentially
deadly, so it warrants a look.
The announcement was
preceded by yet another declaration from the
Pentagon that Iran was supplying "explosively formed
penetrators" (EFPs) to Shiite militias combating the
U.S. occupying forces in Iraq. The weapon is
basically an improvised explosive device which
projects a slug of metal upon detonation capable of
penetrating armor. July, the Pentagon said, was a
record-breaking month for incidents in which U.S.
forces were faced with such weapons.
The actual evidence
implicating the Iranian government in supplying the
weapons is scant and relies upon two assumptions.
The first is that Iraqis are not capable of
assembling such a weapon, or at least not capable of
manufacturing the required components, and the
devices must therefore be supplied from elsewhere.
The second is that the use of components
manufactured in Iran could not occur without the
knowledge and blessing of the Iranian government.
Both assumptions are questionable, but the claim is
given much the same appearance as fact as claims of
Iraq's WMD were prior to that invasion.
Whether the charges are
true or not, the criticism of Iran is that they are
contributing to the violence in Iraq. When Iran does
so, it's bad, presumably one of those things which
makes Iran a part of an "axis of evil". The U.S., on
the other hand, which created the current state of
violent affairs by waging what is known in
international law as a war of aggression, "the
supreme international crime", against Iraq, is good.
Our violence is legitimate and our intentions
benevolent, while Iran's violence (real or alleged),
though far lesser in scale and in consequence, is
illegitimate and their intentions evil. This
unquestionable axiom is one of the most basic
elements of the existing framework for discussion.
Similarly, reporting on
the announcement that the White House is preparing
to declare the Revolutionary Guard a terrorist
organization has been completely devoid of any
examination of whether this designation would be
appropriate or not. The reasons for the proposal are
given: Iran has defied the U.S. and refused to
comply with U.N. resolutions calling for it to
renounce its rights under the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty (NPT) to continue with
research and development of its nuclear program
while monitoring and verification inspections by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are
ongoing; Iran has supported attacks upon U.S. troops
by supplying weapons to Iraqis combating the foreign
occupation of their country; Iran has helped to arm
the resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan; and Iran has
also supported Lebanon's Hezbollah organization,
such as during Israel's war on Lebanon last summer.
This case against Iran
is stronger in some respects than in others.
Hezbollah, during last summer's war, engaged in
actions that clearly fall under the definition of
"terrorism"; namely its indiscriminate use of rocket
attacks against Israel. Iranian support for
Hezbollah, then, it could reasonably be argued,
would be support for terrorism. Indeed, this
argument is quite commonly made and rarely, if ever,
questioned. Yet the corollary, if we apply the same
standard—that Israel's indiscriminate attacks
against Lebanon were, therefore, likewise acts of
"terrorism", that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is
a terrorist organization, and that the U.S.
government's support for Israel is, therefore,
likewise support for terrorism—is inconceivable for
commentators and policy-makers.
If the charge was true,
a similar argument in favor of the White House
proposal could be made in the case of Iranian
support for the Taliban. The charge happens to be
frivolous. Iran has historically opposed the Taliban
and supported its opponents, the U.S.'s allies in
the Northern Alliance (when many of these same
warlords were removed from power by the Taliban, the
Taliban were greeted as liberators). In fact, it was
the U.S.'s allies Saudi Arabia and Pakistan that
historically supported the Taliban. Pakistan openly
supported the Taliban right up until 9/11. At that
time, Pakistan officially ceased its support and
joined the U.S. as its "ally" in the "war on
terrorism". Unofficially, Pakistani support for the
Taliban arguably never ended (a situation which has
caused some complications in relations between the
"allies", including threats of U.S. forces entering
Pakistan).
As for the U.S. itself,
it too was friendly towards the Taliban.
Representatives from the Taliban were wooed by U.S.
energy corporation executives and there were
proposals (in need of government approval) to work
with the Taliban to construct a pipeline across
Afghanistan to transfer the wealth of oil and gas
from the Caspian Sea region to a port in neighboring
Pakistan. Eventually, public outrage against the
Taliban and their treatment of women (their
harboring of Osama bin Laden was not such an issue
then) forced both corporations (namely UNOCAL) and
the government to turn a cold shoulder to the
Taliban and policy shifted more towards regime
change in order to create stable enough conditions
to go ahead with the proposed deals.
Even so, in 2001, in
the months prior to 9/11, the U.S. gave $168 million
in what it called aid to the Taliban. In May alone,
the U.S. pledged to give $43 million, ostensibly to
assist the Taliban in its efforts to eradicate the
poppy crop in Afghanistan, which, except for a very
brief spell under Taliban rule, has long provided
the world with most of its heroin (this was one
result of the Soviet-Afghan war as it provided
financing for the U.S.-backed Mujahedeen; and
production since the U.S. war on Afghanistan has
once again soared, blowing away all past records).
Iran, on the other
hand, opposed the Taliban from the beginning,
preferring the warlords which the U.S. now also
calls allies. Evidence that Iranian policy has
shifted from the historical precedent by180 degrees
is nonexistent—but, as was the case with the
invasion of Iraq—evidence is hardly necessary.
Policy makers simply make this stuff up and expect
people to believe it (an expectation which,
unfortunately, is not unreasonable, as the case of
Iraq proved). Then when hindsight proves them wrong,
the inconsistency between what was stated and the
truth can be attributed as an "intelligence
failure".
The Taliban has been
responsible for acts of terrorism in Afghanistan
since the U.S. began its war there and, prior to
that, harbored Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda
organization which was presumably responsible for
the attacks of 9/11. If the charge was true, the
case could be made that Iran's support for the
Taliban was support for terrorism. But once again,
applying the same standard to itself leads to
uncomfortable conclusions for the U.S. It was the
U.S. and its allies, and not Iran, that supported
the Taliban. One could go further and point to the
U.S.'s support for the Mujahedeen during the
Soviet-Afghan war, which gave birth to al Qaeda
("the base") and precipitated the rise of the
Taliban to begin with. We have historically found
the same phenomenon with many other cases of U.S.
foreign policy across the globe, such as the U.S.
support for the Contras in the war against Nicaragua
(for which the U.S. was condemned by the World
Court). Further examples abound.
The most prominent
charge against Iran in the case to list a branch of
its military as a terrorist organization is its
alleged support for Iraqi militias fighting U.S.
troops. While this claim has been given significant
coverage in news articles reporting on the White
House's intention to add the Revolutionary Guard to
the list of terrorist organizations, the fact that
such actions don't fall within the definition of
"terrorism" has gone unmentioned and the
reasonableness of adding Iran to the list based upon
this charge left unquestioned. Under international
law, attacks upon military personnel of a foreign
occupying power are not terrorism, but legitimate
acts of self-defense. This is a well recognized fact
to any competent observer, but inconvenient. If we
acknowledged this, we would either have to face up
to our own hypocrisy or reasonably explain why the
same standard applied to others isn't also applied
to ourselves, and vice versa. Hence it is simply
ignored.
As for Iran's nuclear
program, as a member of the NPT it is quite legal
for Iran to research and develop nuclear technology
so long as it is used for peaceful purposes only.
There is no evidence that Iran is attempting to use
its technology to build a nuclear weapon. It's
reasonable to be concerned about Iran's intentions,
but the IAEA should be allowed to fulfill its
function to ensure that members of the NPT comply
with its terms. More to the point, researching and
developing nuclear technology as a member of the NPT
does not fall within the definition of "terrorism",
which has become a catch-all phrase used to describe
anything foreign nations do that the U.S. doesn't
approve of. The word has thus become virtually
meaningless, much as "communism" had been before it
with relation to U.S. foreign policy.
This is the existing
framework, and the consequence of continuing within
its limited confines is perfectly well understood:
the U.S. will engage in military attacks against
Iran with devastating and predictable consequences
which will subsequently be seen as perhaps
regrettable, but unaffecting our claims of
benevolent intent. This violent end is becoming
increasingly inevitable because the existing
framework makes it so; it is designed to make it so.
Current U.S. policy towards Iran is designed to
create a casus belli for attacking Iran.
Then, when it occurs, it will be pointed to as
justification for the policy that led to it.
U.S. pressure against
Iran through the U.N. Security Council, it's
insistence that Iran give up its nuclear program
despite being a member of the NPT and despite the
enforcement of sanctions, will lead to Iran becoming
increasingly defiant until the point they finally
decide to withdraw from the NPT treaty (which they
have already threatened to do, as predicted) and
insist upon the withdrawal of all IAEA personnel.
Iran has claimed its nuclear program is intended for
peaceful purposes only, but threats of violence
against Iran by the U.S. and its Middle East ally,
Israel, can only demonstrate to Iran its need for a
nuclear weapon to deter aggression from these
nuclear powers that have openly declared their
intention to bomb should Iran refuse to comply with
U.S. demands. This future consequence, too, is well
understood, and predictable. U.S. policy towards
Iran is self-fulfilling, which is to say that it
produces the very result it claims to be trying to
prevent.
This was true for U.S.
policy towards Iraq, as well. It was well understood
that, given the assumption that Iraq actually had
weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—a claim for
which there was no credible evidence at the
time—Saddam Hussein would only be willing to use his
WMD against the U.S. or U.S. forces as a final act
of desperation in the event that the U.S. invaded
Iraq. Iraq had no WMD, of course, and this never
occurred, but the fact is that U.S. leaders claimed
the policy was designed to prevent such an
occurrence while in fact bringing about the very
circumstances required to make such an occurrence
most likely.
In addition, the war
was ostensibly fought to secure and destroy alleged
stockpiles of WMD to prevent them from winding up in
the hands of terrorists while actually exponentially
increasing the chances that this very thing would
happen, as a result of the chaos and looting that
would occur as a result of destabilizing the
government and the resulting foreseeable breakdown
of law and order. Had Iraq had WMD, it is quite
possible that the weapons would have ended up in the
hands of terrorists not in spite of but as a result
of the U.S. invasion.
The U.S. claimed that
Iraq was an enemy in the "war on terrorism" and
justifies the ongoing occupation by arguing that it
needs to stay to combat the terrorism and other
violence that exists there now as a consequence of
the U.S. invasion. The war, as predicted, has also
had the effect of increasing anti-American sentiment
throughout the region and served as a catalyst for
recruitment of increasingly frustrated and
disillusioned Muslims into radical and violent
organizations willing to use terrorism to achieve
their ends. The "war on terrorism", in other words,
has increased the threat of terrorism by no small
measure. In this case, though predicted, the intent
of the policy was not to increase the threat of
terrorism; it simply wasn't a consideration that
warranted much attention in their planning.
Further examples abound
and the pattern is a well established aspect of U.S.
foreign policy, not only in the Middle East but
across the globe. There is no slight inconsistency
with the declared intention of U.S. policy and its
actual consequences. If their declared intentions
are honest, then U.S. leaders would appear to be
inept. On the other hand, if U.S. leaders are not
incompetent, then the declared purposes of policies
they establish cannot possibly be the correct ones.
Assuming our leaders aren't nincompoops, the
corollary seems all too obvious: policy-makers
constantly deceive the public about their true
motives for implementing existing policies. Thus,
the U.S. didn't go to war to prevent Iraq from using
WMD or from providing WMD to terrorists. We may
debate true purpose of the invasion, but that the
declared intentions were completely implausible and
ridiculous should be fairly self-evident to all by
now (as it was at the time for many of us).
In the case of Iran,
U.S. policy makers claim to be trying to ensure
peace and stability in the region by preventing Iran
from developing a nuclear weapon and from supporting
terrorism. The policies themselves, however, only
serve to isolate Iran and increase the likelihood
that Iran will withdraw from the NPT and actually
begin to develop a nuclear weapon, as well as to
provide motive for Iran to support attacks against
U.S. forces in Iraq. Numerous commentators and
foreign policy experts have observed that if the
U.S. were to attack Iran, one likely consequence
would be Iranian support for attacks against the
U.S., from increased support for the Iraqi
resistance fighters to support for terrorist acts by
Hezbollah or other organizations against U.S.
interests throughout the region, and possibly even
at home. Once again, we see policies greatly
increasing the likelihood of consequences
policy-makers claim they are trying to prevent.
So what is the true
reason for existing U.S. policies towards Iran?
There may be a number of motivating influences, but
we may again learn from the lesson of Iraq to make
an educated guess about the answer. In that case, it
was clear that Saddam Hussein had for too long
successfully defied the U.S. and thus threatened
U.S. credibility as the global superpower. An
example had to be made of Iraq, and the consequences
for the Iraqi people were simply not a
consideration. This was true for the sanctions as
well as for the war. For instance, when asked about
UN sanctions that had resulted in the deaths of half
a million children, then Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright responded, "we think the price is
worth it". It was well understood at the time that
the sanctions only served to strengthen the Hussein
regime's hold over the Iraqi people while
collectively punishing the Iraqi people themselves.
But the policy remained consistent.
Like any good mafia
don, credibility was at stake and the U.S. had to
take action to set an example. This motive is easily
identifiable amongst documents written by current
policy makers, such as the 1992 Defense Planning
Guidance draft, The Project for a New American
Century's "Rebuilding America's Defenses" document,
or the U.S. National Security Strategy announced
early on by the Bush administration.
Also, Iraq has lots of
oil.
That this is the true
purpose of U.S. policy should not come as all too
surprising, particularly when policy makers have
openly declared their intention of establishing
global dominance with a focus on the energy-rich
Middle East. What is more difficult for many people
to accept is that the reasons they are given for a
particular policy, which are important to them, are
of little or no consideration to policy-makers.
Thus, as former Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz had noted, the
issues of WMDs and terrorism were chosen as the
dominant justifications for the war. This was for a
good reason; not because preventing proliferation
and terrorism are high on the government's agenda,
but because it's something the American people feel
they have an interest in (particularly when made to
feel threatened by images of a "mushroom cloud" that
could be the "smoking gun" in the case of Iraq). The
war was thus consciously and deliberately sold to
Americans upon this false pretext. It's not that
policy makers don't care about proliferation and
terrorism; it's just wasn't a consideration when
policy was being made towards Iraq.
The devastating
consequences that many observers have predicted
would result from an attack upon Iran do not have to
be inevitable. A change of course is possible and
there are alternatives to violence that would
increase the likelihood that the stated purpose for
U.S. policies would actually be fulfilled. In the
case of Iran, this would mean establishing policies
that increase the chances for peace and stability in
the region. Ceasing from waging war and encouraging
instability would be a good first step for the U.S.
But we can go further.
It might be possible to
establish policies that help increase the chances
that Iran will continue to cooperate with the IAEA
to ensure that its nuclear program is intended for
peaceful purposes only. This would require a
cessation of the effort to isolate Iran and an
increased effort to engage Iranian leaders in a
constructive dialogue. And with relation to Iraq, it
presents a historic opportunity for the U.S. to open
up a dialogue with Iran and come to some consensus
on what needs to be done to heal the situation,
which might not be too difficult since both
countries share similar interests in achieving a
secure and stable Iraq led by a democratic,
Shiite-dominated government. So far, meaningful
steps towards peace and stability have been rejected
by the current U.S. administration and a path
towards war has once again been chosen as the
desired course of action.