SPIEGEL: The Iranian
leadership insists on its right to enrich uranium, and
every country that has signed the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is entitled to this right,
at least formally.
ElBaradei: There
are concrete suspicions against Iran. That's why I
believe that Iran has temporarily forfeited this right,
and that it will have to regain it with the
international community through confidence-building
measures. On the other hand, those in the West must
realize that if all they expect is confrontation, they
might as well forget dialogue -- and they should not be
surprised if the other side seeks retribution.
SPIEGEL: Some
politicians and senior military leaders in Israel, as
well as in the United States, are seriously considering
an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. French
President Nicolas Sarkozy has also threatened to bomb
the facilities. What do you think about the "military
option?"
ElBaradei:
Nothing at all. Perhaps a large part of the Iranian
facilities could in fact be destroyed. But something
like that would trigger a terrible conflagration in the
region, and it would certainly strengthen the positions
of those in Tehran who favor the development of a
nuclear bomb. After presumably withdrawing from the NPT,
they would then pursue such a program without any
monitoring whatsoever. The already deep conflicts
between the Islamic world and the West would explode. We
need the opposite: an intensive dialogue involving all
major players, the Europeans and especially the United
States.
SPIEGEL: Iran is
your most difficult problem child, but certainly not the
only one. North Korea...
ElBaradei:
...was, until recently, seen as equally threatening. I
am a long way from declaring all concerns over
Pyongyang's nuclear program resolved. But the
development there is positive. The Yongbyon reactor,
which is the most important one when it comes to bomb
production, has been taken offline under IAEA
supervision. This is all the result of intensive
negotiations conducted with the regime by the major
powers and neighboring countries.
SPIEGEL: One
could see it that way. But one could also say that
dictator Kim Jong Il expelled your inspectors, violated
his obligations, tested a bomb and thereby blackmailed
the international community.
ElBaradei: I am
not defending the regime in North Korea, just as the
issue is not a ranking of governments that are more or
less acceptable to me. But in Pyongyang the desire to
obtain the ultimate weapon also arose from a feeling of
insecurity and the idea that outside forces planned to
topple the regime, as well as the desire for security
guarantees. The outcome of the six-party talks with
North Korea was decisive. After five years of talking to
each other, it remains indisputable that dialogue
brought an easing of tensions and, once its nuclear
arsenal has been completely eliminated, will bring
Pyongyang back into the fold of the IAEA. This could
succeed through political pressure, combined with
economic incentives.
SPIEGEL: Isn't
this sending the wrong message to the world's despotic
rulers -- acquire nuclear weapons or seriously threaten
to develop a nuclear weapons program and you'll be taken
seriously?
ElBaradei: There
is that risk. But, on the other hand, in order to seem
credible to the nuclear wannabe states we must demand
steps toward nuclear disarmament from those who have
nuclear weapons -- an obligation that is stipulated in
the nonproliferation treaty but is not complied with. I
deplore this two-faced approach. If practically all
nuclear powers are modernizing instead of reducing their
arsenals, how can we argue with the non-nuclear states?
SPIEGEL: You
visited North Korea in March when you believed that
things had taken a decisive turn for the better. Do you
see yourself -- under similar conditions -- traveling to
Tehran toward the end of the year?
ElBaradei: I
would have nothing against traveling to Tehran tomorrow.
But while the North Koreans have complied with the UN's
wishes and are being rewarded for this positive
behavior, I currently see the Iranians in a sort of
trial period -- with an uncertain outcome.
SPIEGEL: Do you
have a good feeling about the fact that the French
president is putting a nuclear reactor in the desert for
Libya's ruler?
ElBaradei: I am
not familiar with the details of the deal, and whether I
like or trust Moammar Gadhafi is irrelevant in this
context. Libya is a member of the IAEA, and we will be
able to monitor the reactor.
SPIEGEL: What
apparently cannot be monitored or can only be monitored
highly inadequately is the nuclear black market. It was
just revealed that China has "lost" eight kilograms of
weapons-grade uranium. Enriched uranium also keeps
turning up in the states that emerged from the bankrupt
Soviet Union.
ElBaradei: Yes,
that is unfortunately the case.
SPIEGEL: There is
already speculation that al-Qaida is seeking to acquire
nuclear weapons. Do you think there is a real risk that
terrorists will obtain the ultimate weapon?
ElBaradei: That's
my greatest concern, a horror scenario. I'm not thinking
about a nuclear weapon. No terrorist organization has
the necessary know-how or potential to acquire these
weapons. But a small, so-called dirty bomb containing
radioactive material, detonated somewhere in a major
city, could cost human lives and set off massive terror
with serious economic consequences. Sometimes I think
it's a miracle that it hasn't happened yet. I pray that
it remains that way.
SPIEGEL: You are
in a conflicting situation. The IAEA's job is not just
to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and inspect
nuclear facilities, but also to promote the civilian use
of nuclear energy. However, nuclear power plants are
generally considered dangerous, and there is still no
way to permanently store radioactive waste.