|
Pakistan shakes off US shackles
By M K Bhadrakumar
11/05/07 "Asia
Times" -- -- The pervasive impression is that the
impending judgement by the Supreme Court regarding the propriety
of President General Pervez Musharraf's re-election as president
of Pakistan for another term prompted the timing of his decision
to impose emergency rule last week. The temptation to view the
developments in Pakistan through the prism of democracy is
almost irresistible.
But democracy is not even a sub-theme in the current world of
realpolitik in Pakistan. At best it forms a miniscule part of
the story. What emerges beyond doubt is that Musharraf's move
enjoys the support of the top brass of the Pakistan armed
forces. Significantly, he signed the proclamation on emergency
rule in his capacity as the chief of army staff rather than as
the president. He has thereby signaled that the Pakistan armed
forces as a whole are backing his move.
It is on occasions such as this that the incomprehensible
alchemy of the US-Pakistan relationship fleetingly surfaces.
Clearly, it stands to reason that Musharraf took care to consult
Washington and Britain before announcing his move. But what was
the nature of these consultations?
Musharraf spoke to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown on
Thursday, hardly hours prior to the proclamation of emergency
rule. Britain was the prime mover of the Musharraf-Benazir
Bhutto rapprochement. Musharraf kept in view the need to assuage
British feelings.
Equally, Admiral William Fallon, commander of the US Central
Command, was on a visit to Pakistan, and he actually happened to
be in the general headquarters of the Pakistan armed forces in
Rawalpindi when Musharraf was giving the final touches to his
proclamation on emergency rule. The political symbolism was
unmistakable.
US reluctantly acquiesces
Fallon did his best to "dissuade" Musharraf from going ahead
with his plan, but had to ultimately give in. Fallon apparently
warned Musharraf that future American aid for his beleaguered
regime might be in jeopardy if the US Congress took a negative
view of the rollback of civil liberties in Pakistan. If so, it
is obvious that Fallon failed to impress the tough Pakistani top
brass. Equally, Musharraf estimated Washington has no choice but
to support his regime for the foreseeable future.
This wouldn't be the first time that the generals in Rawalpindi
have done their homework as regards their corporate interests
and proceeded to set aside Washington's unsolicited counsel.
Time and again in Pakistan's history it has appeared that the
unequal relationship between the US and Pakistan is far from a
one-dimensional tie-up. It would be a mistake to regard Pakistan
as a mindless American proxy - which is part of the reason why
China and Russia have an abiding interest in that country.
A famous instance arose when, as the then deputy secretary of
state in the Bill Clinton administration, Strobe Talbott,
narrates in his book Engaging India, his desperate pleas with
the Pakistani leadership not to emulate India in exploding a
nuclear device in 1998 were simply ignored by the Pakistani
generals.
A decade earlier, another Pakistani military strongman, General
Zia ul-Haq, simply refused to toe the US line to agree to an
Afghan settlement that Washington had worked out with Soviet
leader Mikhail Gorbachev, which would have restored Kabul's
traditional neutrality in the geopolitics of the region. Zia
insisted Pakistan's influence on a future regime in Kabul ought
to be predominant.
Thus, in retrospect, it turns out that the former prime minister
Bhutto's abrupt departure for Dubai in the United Arab Emirates
last Thursday against the advice rendered by most of her party
leaders happened just in time when it dawned on the US and
Britain that despite their strong urgings, the generals were
hell-bent on the imposition of emergency rule. The US and
Britain counseled her to get out of harm's way and quickly leave
the country.
The initial statements of "regret" by the Western capitals,
especially Washington, need to be taken with a pinch of salt. To
be sure, the US policy toward Pakistan finds itself in a
cul-de-sac. Musharraf's move coincides almost to the hour with
the thundering speech by President George W Bush at the Heritage
Foundation, a Washington-based think-tank, on Thursday in which
he blasted the US Congress for failing to take his "war on
terror" not seriously enough, and he went on to compare Osama
bin Laden to Adolf Hitler and Vladimir Lenin.
Addressing his neo-conservative acolytes, Bush came back to his
favorite theme that via his "war on terror", he was actually
waging a global war for democracy and freedom. He compared
Islamist "plans to build a totalitarian Islamist empire ...
stretching from Europe to North Africa, the Middle East and
South East Asia" to the Third Reich. He claimed that US-led
campaigns have "liberated 50 million people from the clutches of
tyranny" in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bush said the people in the
Middle East are "looking to the United States to stand up for
them".
Alas, we knew only a day later that just as Bush was speaking,
one of his staunchest allies in his pet global war was squashing
democracy and freedom. The US doublespeak becomes all too
apparent in the mildly reproachful comment over Musharraf's
move, bordering on resignation, by the US spokesmen. It
indicates that Washington's dealings with the Musharraf regime
will continue and normal business will resume once the dust has
settled down.
Military ties intact
The statement by the Pentagon spokesman is particularly
important for the top brass of the Pakistani armed forces. The
spokesman said the development "does not impact our military
support for Pakistan ... Pakistan is a very important ally in
the 'war on terror' and he [Secretary of Defense Robert Gates]
is closely following the fast-moving developments there".
Traditionally, it is the opinion of the Pentagon that matters
most to the brass in Rawalpindi - and not the perspectives of
the State Department or readings by the Central Intelligence
Agency. As long as the Pentagon's support remains intact, as is
the case presently, Rawalpindi will be pleased, and Musharraf
will continue to enjoy the support of the corps commanders.
At the moment, Musharraf is not looking much beyond the
endorsement of the emergency rule by the top brass of the
Pakistani armed forces. He doesn't care for his popularity
ratings in Pakistan. And, conceivably, he wouldn't be
particularly flustered by the international reaction either.
Musharraf has assessed that the worsening situation in
Afghanistan leaves the US with hardly much choice in the matter
other than working with the regime that he chooses to head.
Developments in the western Afghan province of Farah (bordering
Iran) and the southern province of Kandahar have taken a
particularly serious turn lately. The US failed to extract any
increased troop commitments at the recent North Atlantic Treaty
Organization defense ministers meeting. German Chancellor Angela
Merkel during her first-ever visit to Kabul on Saturday flatly
refused to deploy German troops in the volatile southern
provinces of Afghanistan. The new government in Tokyo has cut
back on Japan's involvement by stopping refueling of US ships
servicing the war in Afghanistan. The new government in Poland
is reviewing its association with Bush's war.
No need of US advice
Thus, Musharraf knows that the US dependence on him is only
likely to deepen in the coming weeks. Besides, Musharraf has
succeeded in underscoring in Western capitals that he is the
anchor of "stability" in Pakistan. No matter the actual ground
reality, he has succeeded in projecting a perceived threat from
militants. (The international community has no independent means
of verifying these threat perceptions either.)
To a degree, even the reaction by New Delhi - a mild statement
of "regret" and a pious hope that "normalcy" will return soon -
is an acknowledgement that Musharraf has maintained an overall
climate of peace and tranquillity as well as a degree of
predictability in relations with India. Western capitals are
quite aware of the extreme fluidity of the situation but are
literally forced to suspend their disbelief in Musharraf's claim
as the guardian of Pakistan's stability. What choice do they
have?
In the short term, therefore, Musharraf doesn't have to look
over his shoulder any more or listen to irritating Western
hectoring about democracy while he goes about resetting the
parameters of Pakistan's political life. He correctly estimates
that what matters most is his apparent willingness to wage a
strong military campaign against militants; his helping hand in
advancing an "intra-Afghan dialogue" involving the Taliban; and
his role in the event of Washington deciding on a military
showdown with Iran in the coming months.
In sum, Musharraf assesses he has a relatively free hand to
press ahead with his political agenda within Pakistan. He must
be pretty much fed up with the intrusive attitude adopted by
pretentious US functionaries and think-tanks in recent months
with regard to Pakistan's political future. He has a point
insofar as there aren't any real "Pakistan experts" as such that
the Bush administration could claim to have. His sense of
exasperation was clearly showing in recent weeks that
functionaries in the US administration who have no real grasp of
the tough lay of the land in Pakistan have been dictating to him
democracy lessons. They didn't even understand that one way or
another, historically, Pakistan always remained on the razor's
edge while life moved on.
Washington's insistence that Bhutto should join his team was the
proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. Under tremendous
US pressure, Musharraf, seemingly against his gut instincts,
acquiesced with the game plan choreographed in Washington. He
knows Bhutto is a complex personality. But he also knows she has
influential supporters, like US ambassador to the United
Nations, Zalmay Khalilzad, whose antipathies toward Musharraf
date to his posting in Kabul.
All the same, within the fortnight since Bhutto's arrival in
Pakistan from exile on October 12, Musharraf has been proved
right. The American blueprint for Pakistan's democratic
transformation became stuck in the mud. It was so visible that
all could see, especially when Bhutto began trading charges that
the establishment was conspiring to kill its future prime
minister, and the negotiations between the two sides over
fine-tuning their "deal" ground to a halt. The frustrations
deepened when Bhutto realized that she was virtually confined to
her Karachi home.
Ironically, Musharraf found he could seize the high ground once
it began to dawn on Washington that its hare-brained plan to
foist Bhutto atop the political heap in Islamabad was simply
unworkable. Plainly put, Bhutto was not acceptable to the
Pakistani establishment. Washington had no "Plan B", either.
Musharraf's agenda
Musharraf struck fast. Now that he has "liberated" himself from
the political burden that Washington expected him to carry, he
feels free to act on his own terms. This means first and
foremost that he will hold both the offices of president and
chief of army staff, at least until the elections, whenever they
are held (the January date seems unlikely now). He will in all
probability expect a new Supreme Court to endorse his
re-election as president, which will enable him to be sworn in
for another term in office. Musharraf's overwhelming win in last
month's presidential polls has not yet been ratified by the
court.
Musharraf has certainly sized up that Bhutto's political image
has been badly tarnished due to her controversial "deal" with
him. It will take a while for her to regain her credibility in
popular opinion within Pakistan. From Musharraf's point of view,
therefore, in the short term at least, she is virtually rendered
ineffectual as a rallying point of opposition, even assuming
that she has the will to act in such a role.
But he may well keep a line of communication open to her. Who
knows, he may still have a need for her, but that is something
for the future. More important, Musharraf needs to factor that
even after the present setback, Washington and London may still
not give up hope completely regarding Bhutto's return to
mainstream politics in Pakistan's leadership structure. The sad
reality is that there are no other credible figures in the
democratic opposition other than Bhutto who would be prepared in
today's circumstances to play according to the US script.
Meanwhile, Musharraf has virtually decided to continue to rely
on the present ruling party, the Pakistan Muslim League, which
has staunchly resisted Bhutto's political accommodation. He has
chosen not to upset the apple cart. The intelligence agencies
feel greatly relieved that the judiciary has been cracked and
the dark days of public accountability are over.
Musharraf continues to rely on the resourceful, crafty Choudhury
clan for holding fort in Punjab, the heartland of Pakistani
politics. His equations with the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM),
the party of the "Mohajirs" (migrants from India at the time of
the partition in 1947), remain intact. MQM leader Altaf Hussain,
who lives in exile in London, has mildly distanced himself from
the imposition of emergency rule in Pakistan, but he pointedly
drew attention to the "reasons" behind Musharraf's decision.
Hussain said sections of the judiciary, the legal fraternity and
the media exceeded their "rights, traditions and etiquettes".
The MQM's support for the regime is important for Musharraf. It
ensures that Pakistan's most populous city of Karachi takes the
imposition of emergency in its stride. Again, it is highly
possible that some elements of the Islamic parties, such as the
Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam of Maulana Fazlur Rehman will be co-opted
in the coming weeks. Rehman is a valuable link with the militant
Islamist camp. The regime has also assessed that former prime
minister Nawaz Sharif's return to Pakistan can be endlessly
stalled in the new circumstances with a pliant judiciary.
All in all, the chances of an eruption of popular agitation
under the leadership of the democratic opposition are almost nil
in immediate terms. This is despite the fact that the reasons
advanced by Musharraf for imposing emergency rule lack
credibility. He can now count on the intelligence agencies to
play their traditional role of manipulating a coalition of
political forces that will steer the regime successfully past
the next parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz
has hinted elections are unlikely for another year. Musharraf is
evidently planning for the long haul.
Who has the last laugh?
When the epitaph of the Bush era in Pakistan's contemporary
history finally gets to be written in a year's time, there will
be a complex, engrossing story to tell. Bush began reasonably
well in 2001 by threatening to bomb the daylight out of Pakistan
and to dispatch that country to the Stone Age. His threat of
shock and awe indeed worked. Musharraf quickly fell in line in
the "war on terror". The world community applauded Bush. But in
the process, Musharraf ensured his regime gained international
legitimacy.
Also, Musharraf promptly put a price tag on Pakistan's role in
the "war on terror". He negotiated hard. And he extracted out of
the Bush administration in bits and pieces over the past six
years a staggering amount of US$10 billion as assistance. That
kept the Pakistani economy going, the army well equipped and his
support base intact.
Of course, he took care to endear himself and the Pakistan army
as an indispensable ally to Bush. As time passed, like a skilful
commando, he began walking a fine line - in and out of the "war
on terror" - almost unnoticed, as he pleased. Certainly, Bush
noticed but had to pretend he didn't. There was no other option.
Bush was preoccupied in Iraq, and Musharraf knew that as well.
In fact, Bush, who once saw Russia's President Vladimir Putin's
soul in his deep blue eyes and liked it, has no choice but to
keep insisting he is on a "hunt" with Musharraf in the Hindu
Kush. Now, with a much-weakened Bush presidency almost entering
a lame-duck phase, it is only natural that Musharraf feels he
must look ahead. He will know by now as well as anyone that his
number one public liability within Pakistan is his close
association with the George W Bush presidency.
But continued US backing remains vital for Musharraf's regime.
How he reconciles the conflicting interests remains to be seen.
One thing is for sure. None of Pakistan's previous military
dictators had such mastery over the art of the possible.
M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian
Foreign Service for over 29 years, with postings including
India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey
(1998-2001).
Click on "comments" below to read or post comments
Comment Guidelines
Be succinct, constructive and
relevant to the story.
We encourage engaging, diverse
and meaningful commentary. Do not include
personal information such as names, addresses,
phone numbers and emails. Comments falling
outside our guidelines – those including
personal attacks and profanity – are not
permitted.
See our complete
Comment Policy
and
use this link to notify us if you have concerns
about a comment.
We’ll promptly review and remove any
inappropriate postings.
Send Page To a Friend
In accordance
with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material
is distributed without profit to those who have
expressed a prior interest in receiving the
included information for research and educational
purposes. Information Clearing House has no
affiliation whatsoever with the originator of
this article nor is Information ClearingHouse
endorsed or sponsored by the originator.)
|
