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Military
Intervention against Iran?
Implications of the National Intelligence Estimate
By Stefan Simanowitz
12/20/07 "ZNet" -- -- The findings of the US National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which state "with high confidence"
that Iran halted its nuclear weapons programme in 2003 clearly
represent a major set-back to those arguing for military
intervention against Iran in the coming months. However, if
unchallenged, it is possible that the report might strengthen
the case for military action against Iran in the coming years.
By recognising that Iran has no current nuclear weapons
programme the findings undermine the central argument of those
arguing for tougher sanctions and precipitant military strikes.
But the claim that Iran had a nuclear weapons programme in the
past not only allows that Iran has breached its obligations
under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but also that it
could restart its weaponisation programme at any moment. To
welcome this intelligence as wholly accurate is to concede the
much disputed question of whether Iran has ever had a nuclear
weapons programme.
Whilst the culminative findings of 16 intelligence agencies
cannot be ignored, it is difficult to treat the findings with
full confidence after the failings of these same agencies that
preceded the invasion of Iraq. The report is also compromised by
the fact that the 2005 NIE found "with high confidence" that
Iran was intent on developing nuclear weapons. A more reliable
source of intelligence would surely be the International Atomic
Energy Association (IAEA), the only international authority
qualified to study Iran's nuclear dossier. The IAEA were
accurate in their assessment of Iraq's WDM capacity in 2003 and
they are continuing to conduct exhaustive inspections on all of
Iran's nuclear enrichment sites. Despite nearly 3,000
person-hours of inspections, the IAEA have found no evidence,
past or present, that Iran has diverted its nuclear programme to
military purposes.
Whilst we should be glad that this intelligence on the absence
of WMDs in Iran has surfaced now rather than being discovering
it in the aftermath of a military attack as was the case with
Iraq, we should not think that this alone will stall those
intent on military intervention against Iran. Although weakened,
the neo-Conservative case for military strikes on Iran is not
dependent on the existence of a nuclear weapons programme. The
concept that Iran might develop weapons at some point in the
future, combined with accusations that Tehran is supporting
terrorists in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, and has threatened Israel
could yet be used to establish a causis belli.
Iran's Revolutionary Guard has recently been put on the US list
of "terrorist organisations" and Iran has been accused
repeatedly of supplying weapons and intelligence to terrorists
in Iran. Despite these accusations, no evidence has been
produced to demonstrate a definite link between the Iranian
government and insurgent or terrorist groups. Indeed General
Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admitted at a
Pentagon news conference this year that he had no evidence of
the Iranian government sending any military equipment into Iraq
and US commanders in Iraq suggest Iran is now limiting the flow
of weapons to Shia militias.
The claim that Iran has threatened “to wipe Israel off the face
of the map” has been repeated so often that it has almost become
received wisdom. However the much mistranslated Farsi phrase
used by President Amadinejad was “Imam ghoft een rezhim-e
ishghalgar-e qods bayad az safheh-ye ruzgar mahv shavad.” This
translates directly as “The Imam said this regime occupying
Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time. This statement is
very wise”. Whatever the interpretation of this translation, “a
regime vanishing from the page of time” is very different from a
threat to wipe a nation off the map.
Much of the debate is now centring on how long it might take for
Iran to produce a nuclear weapon should she be intent to do so.
The NIE suggests if she were to ‘restart’ her weaponisation
programme, Iran might be able to produce warheads by 2010 or
2015. There is little dispute that Iran’s current low-level
uranium enrichment is barely adequate for reactor fuel, let
alone the highly enriched uranium necessary for a nuclear
weapon. It is also agreed that Iran’s 3,000 centrifuges are
running far below capacity and there are problems with
contaminated feedstock. But arguments about the possible
timeline for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapons capacity become
academic if we ensure the continued Iranian cooperation with the
IAEA and their inspections regime. Novembers’ report by the IAEA
states that all of the enriched uranium produced to date
"remains under Agency containment and surveillance" and there is
no suggestion of a covert weaponisation programme.
Whilst the NIE report does not fit neatly into the Bush/Cheney
plan for building a case for military intervention against Iran,
it might still be used to their advantage. A consensus of
opinion that Iran had a secret nuclear weaponisation programme
in the past which could be restarted at any time, combined with
predictions that Iran could manufacture a nuclear warhead within
the space of 2 years could be used to justify attacks. The NIE
reports suggestions that Iran had a nuclear weapons programme
should be treated with a degree of scepticism and debates around
hypothetical timelines should not be allowed to distract us from
the important task of diffusing this dangerous standoff between
those intent on military intervention and an Iranian government
determined not to back down from its legitimate enrichment
activities.
Founded in London in 2006 the Westminster Committee on Iran
is an independent cross-party committee which aims to increase
dialogue and understanding between Tehran and British
parliamentarians and with a view to preventing military
intervention against Iran.
Stefan Simanowitz - Chair, Westminster Committee on Iran -
London
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