|
Pakistan: The
Beginning of the Storm
By S.M. Hussain
01/01/07 "GrandeStrategy
" -- -- There has been much analysis and discussion of what
is happening in the global war between Islam and the West. Clear
analysis somehow seems missing in the mainstream media, or even
amongst well regarded analysts and think tanks. For one, we can
only see the views and propaganda of one side of the battle
taking place in Pakistan. Further, the issues run so deep and
touch us so close, that it becomes hard to think and discuss
them without being emotionally involved.
At GrandeStrategy, we believe that the fundamental battle taking
place in Pakistan is between the secular and western-based
educated pro-American elites, against the Islam-championing hard
core religious types. The former we shall here on refer to as
the Secular Pakistanis, while the latter we shall represent as
the Islamist Pakistanis, merely to ease the writing of this
article, not to imply any deeper meaning, as to what "Islamists"
are or what represents "Secular".
To get deeper into this problem, let us start by looking at the
fundamentals within a Marxist analysis. The constituencies that
the Secular Pakistanis are rooted in are the upper classes and
the upper middle class, and represent the Bourgeoisie. This
class has strong roots in Pakistan with the landed classes. At
the risk of going-off at a tangent, I'll go deeper into the
origins of this landed class. The landed classes in Pakistan go
back in history to when the British Raj took over India. To
exert control over the vast Subcontinent, the British came up
with a plan to divide and rule India by creating a class of
landowners, that would owe their position to the British. Thus
they went about granting land and setting rules and guidelines
to create this petite bourgeoisie. While in other parts of the
Subcontinent, the power and influence of this class greatly
diminished after partition, in Pakistan, this class not only
managed to maintain its power base but to expand it, to the
point that they became the new bourgeoisie. While new power
groups emerged, such as the industrial class, expatriate
Pakistanis, corrupt wealth accumulators and the elite of the
armed forces, these groups soon became assimilated to this now
thriving elite "melting pot".
These families together represent the heart of Pakistan's ruling
class. It may be instructive to paint a typical picture of such
a family - education begins at English language schools,
graduating with British qualifications such as O Levels and A
Levels. Thereafter, one can go off to college abroad or at a top
local university. Families usually have at least some relatives
living abroad. Career choices include the armed forces, good
civilian jobs at top organizations (gotten through family
connections), running the family business or pursuing almost any
career abroad. Marriage is typically arranged and one favorable
choice is within the extended family. Often they marry their own
cousins. However, other families of a similar status are also
common matchmaker potential.
The Islamist Pakistanis have their roots in the lower and lower
middle class of Pakistan. With Pakistan's rapid Malthusian
population growth, these classes have expanded faster than it
has been possible for the government to adequately support them.
These people live hard working lives, at best being able to
afford motorcycles. They live from day to day and find life to
be an endless struggle. These people by and large do not care
about political parties, instinctively knowing that these are
but instruments of the elite. They know that their is no real
rule of law, that police are their to rob them and that any
member of the elite can easily get away by paying off a judge or
the policeman. When they manage to go abroad, typically to the
Gulf states, they go as modern indentured servants.
These classes typically come from disadvantaged families that
either get their eduction through Islamic schools called
madrassas or through government run schools. Those that make it,
can hope to reach financial advantage either through business,
through joining the civil service and gaining wealth through
corruption, going abroad (but here as low cost slave-labor,
particularly to Arab states) and joining the military.
With the hard economic conditions of the 1990s and the
radicalization of the madrassas, these classes have been a
steady source of men, materials and financing for the
extremists. Many amongst these classes have their sympathies and
loyalties with these extremists. Many revere OBL as a savior,
and this is reflected in the name Ossama becoming the most
popular baby name in Pakistan after the 9/11 attacks. Success of
the Islamist Pakistanis thus far is a direct result of being
able to channel their anger against the elite, linking the
latter to the West's anti-Islam crusade. With no real political
channel to bring their boiling anger out, their only channel
becomes the Islamist Pakistanis.
Further, the open pro-western stance of the establishment,
clampdown on any form of serious dissent, the black and white
manner in which the US has come out against Islam, all have
colluded to bring matters to a boiling point.
The Secular Pakistanis have not had this level of success with
their constituency. Many of their own children, particularly
those in their 20s, and a good portion of all ages that have
lived abroad, have become increasingly pro-Islam and anti-West.
This is the critical problem that could eventually lead to the
collapse of the established elite in Pakistan. Within them, the
two groups mentioned, the local college-aged pro-Islamist group
and the expatriate pro-Islamists need to be analyzed more
closely.
The College-Aged Pro-Islamists represent a thorny quandary for
the established elite. The problem results from the clear
anti-Islam crusade that the US is conducting, their just isn't
any ambiguity left to argue against. Further, the establishment
has done a poor job in its propaganda, in appropriately
socializing their own progeny. Open access to information via
the internet has also played a role. The main political outlet
for this group are college campuses. With the government
crackdown (backed by ISI) of the college campuses, it remains to
be seen if this group can reinvent itself elsewhere. For the
Islamist Pakistanis, if this group builds an active alliance and
joins with the hard-core militant extremists, then it could very
well spell the end of Pakistan as Secular Pakistan has known it.
However, the likelihood of this happening is less, given that
these westernized progeny has as little in common with the
militant extremists as Shanghai Chinese would have with a
Redneck America.
The expatriate community is another important piece in the chess
board. One characteristic is that the expat community is truly
radicalized: while in Pakistan proper we find the overwhelming
majority of the people somewhere inbetween the two wider
positions, the expat Pakistani community is either strongly
secular or strongly Islamist. The key problem for the
establishment however, is that the Secular expats want to
distance themselves and assimilate into their Western hosts
while the increasing number is Islamists are rallying and going
back in large numbers. They are also better organized and better
connected, and perhaps even have more resources backing them up.
This group has had a huge hand in the economic prosperity
Pakistan has seen post 9/11, as they have brought back skills,
money and key contacts to establish marketing channels. If ever
the Islamist Pakistanis can unite as a whole, it would be under
their banner.
The Pakistan Army is the central institution that runs the
country, whether there is a democratic government or not.
Militarily, the Pakistan army is well trained and seasoned,
adequately armed and excellent at smaller unit combat. At full
theater combat Pakistan, like India have developed a mental
block. This stems (for both Pakistan and India), perhaps to the
fact that the generals are not well trained in their art. Since
in British India, the British took the higher positions, their
is a deep grained mental block in thinking strategically, and
going through with wider plans. The comedy of errors during 1965
is an able testament to this. The 1971 strategy of regional
commands was a glaring red light. Further, with the involvement
of the Pakistan army in politics and country running, these
generals have become corrupt and this has further deteriorated
their prowess. The Pakistan Army also breeds linear thinkers.
Anybody who has been in close association with the Pakistan Army
knows the specific setting they have and the manner in which the
specific manner in which they think. Hierarchy and rank are also
very important.
The Pakistan army further suffers from insidious inside
politics, and with Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and now Musharraf, this
level of politicization has only gone up. General Kiyani's
attempt seems to be to somehow rectify this, how far he will be
successful in doing so is yet to be seen. Jehangir Karamat's
attempt had for some time really helped stall this slide but
with Musharraf this has become much worse.
One of the key mistakes that Musharraf made post 9/11 and after
joining the US has been within the Pakistan Army. There was huge
outrage within the Pakistan Army, and this included many
officers, including General Usmani, the man who saved
Musharraf's life when he took control of the civilian airport he
was being denied landing to during the fiasco with Nawaz Sharif.
Musharraf chose to eliminate this opposition by removing
"Islamic" style officers, stereotypically "officers with
beards". This was a huge move and surprisingly did not receive a
lot of media attention, because a significant number of officers
where removed. Unfortunately for the Pakistan Army, these were
some of the very best men in the Army, some of the most sincere,
hardworking and well-trained officers. For many of the other
soldiers in the army, this really threw their morale out the
window, particularly since they have, ever since joining the
army, been told that they have been fighting a "jihad" against
India. (This author has literally spent time arguing with a
Pakistani soldier who he at length couldn't convince to the
contrary, a few years before 9/11).
What has really gone under the radar is that many of these
officers, particularly those from the NWFP, have since leaving
the army, found their way to the tribal belts, and have joined
the rebellion there. If one analyzes the tactics and
organization of the Pakistani Taliban, they seem to be somehow
differently organized to the Afghan Taliban, even though they
are the same force, literally. This, in our opinion, is as a
result of the profusion of these Pakistani officers, who have
really helped in taking the Taliban organizationally to the next
level. This has been one of the factors why the Pakistani
Taliban have faired so well in recent years. The tactical
retreat from Swat, while a political loss, was also extremely
well executed.
With the death of Benazir, the Secular Pakistanis are in
disarray, and their allies in Western capitals are in a state of
panic. Benazir was the Queen on the chess board for the Western
/ Secular side. The Pakistan army is in disarray and fraught
with internal issues, with their noses too far into Politics. At
the same time, rumors are rife of an internal revolt within the
army, under apparently a 3 star general. Desertion to the
Pakistani Taliban has also become an increasingly steady flow.
At Pakdef, the premier forum to gage the pulse of the
establishment, members seem less sure of themselves, and somehow
have lost those smug comments about how they will crush the
tribal belt.
Yet, even with all this, the sheer power of the Pakistani
establishment is hard to match for the aspiring Islamist
Pakistanis. And even if all else gives way, they still have to
contend with General Kiyani, and this gentleman has the brains
and conviction to change the face of the game. What will his
next move be? Nobody really knows, but the ball is in his (and
Musharraf's) court.
S.M. Hussain - m.hussain'at'grandestrategy.com
Click on "comments" below to read or post comments
Comment Guidelines
Be succinct, constructive and
relevant to the story.
We encourage engaging, diverse
and meaningful commentary. Do not include
personal information such as names, addresses,
phone numbers and emails. Comments falling
outside our guidelines – those including
personal attacks and profanity – are not
permitted.
See our complete
Comment Policy
and
use this link to notify us if you have concerns
about a comment.
We’ll promptly review and remove any
inappropriate postings.
Send Page To a Friend
In accordance
with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material
is distributed without profit to those who have
expressed a prior interest in receiving the
included information for research and educational
purposes. Information Clearing House has no
affiliation whatsoever with the originator of
this article nor is Information ClearingHouse
endorsed or sponsored by the originator.)
|
