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“Don’t Mess With Us,”
Pakistan’s Nukes Are Here To Stay, Get Used To
It
By Ahmed Quraishi
| The ‘real’
Pakistani officials in charge of the nation’s vast
nuclear and strategic arsenal have spent the past
few months quietly laughing at the doomsday
scenarios that American politicians and media
organizations have been spinning for months now.
These Pakistani officials say they are calm because
of their confidence in their capabilities. However,
this Pakistani calm should not be mistaken for
weakness. “My message is: Don’t mess with us,” says
Air Commodore Khalid Banuri, with pride. |
18/01/08 "World
View" -- -- ISLAMABAD,
Pakistan—Last November, The New York Times published what many
analysts in Islamabad described as a misleading story, claiming
that the United States had spent up to $ 100 million over the
past five years to help Pakistan secure its nuclear weapons.
The story coincided with reports
alleging that elite U.S. troops already had access to Pakistan’s
vast arsenal of nuclear and other strategic weapons.
Pakistani officials preferred to
ignore these reports, confident about their capabilities and a
little curious about where these bogus stories were coming from.
These officials were also content with assurances from the Bush
administration it had nothing to do with these reports.
But over the following weeks,
Pakistani analysts carefully watched how the U.S. media campaign
portraying Pakistan as a nuclear power incapable of securing its
weapons grew bigger and was joined by prominent American
academics and politicians.
The quality of the ‘media reports’
about Pakistani nukes also changed. Now the American media was
talking about actual ‘war games’ conducted by American military
institutions and think tanks as a prelude to sending in elite
troops to ‘grab’ Pakistani nuclear weapons in case of
instability in Pakistan on the pattern of typical Hollywood
movie scripts.
The propaganda reached its zenith
in January when Mrs. Hillary Clinton, the U.S. presidential
hopeful, proposed joint American and British ‘supervision’ of
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.
But there is a reason why Pakistani
responses to these reports remained mostly calm and calculated.
It is because the women and men in charge of the Pakistani
strategic arsenal were quietly making fun of the American
allegations and at first did not even take them seriously.
“It’s laughable,” said Air
Commodore Khalid Banuri, a director at the Strategic Plans
Division, or the S.P.D., which is the Secretariat of the
National Command Authority that controls the Pakistani strategic
assets. “We did make the bomb, didn’t we? The world thought we
couldn’t do it.”
Nevertheless, one of the founding
members of the team that created Pakistan’s National Command
Authority, retired Brigadier Naeem Salik, who is currently
teaching at Washington’s Johns Hopkins University as a visiting
scholar, is advising caution while dismissing the American
reports.
“We can’t dismiss it as a media
campaign. There is a background to it,” he told me last week
during a visit to Islamabad.
I have argued that this U.S. media
trial of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities is not natural. It’s
not like a few American journalists suddenly found themselves
out of stories and thought, “what the heck, let’s talk about
Pakistani nukes.”
This campaign must be seen in the
context of a deliberate U.S. strategy to destabilize Pakistan.
This strategy includes the war on terror, the American
exploitation of late Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, and the situation in
Afghanistan.
By early December, 2007, Pakistani
officials started watching this American campaign closely.
On 11 December, the chairman of
Pakistan's Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Tariq Majid, blasted
reports by “vested and hostile elements in the international
media” about the security of its nuclear weapons, an army
statement said.
"Suggestions have been made that
our assets could either be neutralized or taken away towards
safer places to prevent them from falling into wrong hands," the
statement quoted Majid as saying after witnessing the launch of
the Pakistani-developed Babur-Hatf-7 cruise missile.
"Though no responsible state in
the world can contemplate such an impossible operation, yet if
someone did create such a scenario, Pakistan would meet the
challenge strongly," the statement said.
"Pakistan's nuclear assets are
very safe and secure, and the nation needs not to worry on that
account. There is a very strong security system in place, which
can ward off all threats, internal as well as external."
Back at the S.P.D., I interviewed
Air Commodore Banuri, on camera, and asked him about all the
possibilities, including what Pakistan would do if its strategic
installations came under attack.
His answer was simple: “My message
is: Don’t mess with us.”
Here are excerpts from the
interview. The entire television version is posted on the
homepage of this website. A link is also provided below.
THE INTERVIEW
Ahmed Quraishi: Do we
have a logistical problem in handling or managing our strategic
assets?
Air Commodore Khalid
Banuri: It is laughable. We did make the bomb, didn’t we? The
world thought we couldn’t do it. We, too, were always concerned
about how to protect it. Since 1998, when
South Asia went
overtly nuclear … this is 2007, we have consistently augmented
our systems, a point that many people forget or overlook.
Ahmed Quraishi: Who
holds the authority to push the nuclear button in Pakistan?
Khalid Banuri: The
short answer is very easy: Not an individual but the National
Command Authority, comprised of all the senior decision makers
of the country, [they] would look at all the issues including
the deployment, if it ever comes to that.
AQ: Is it possible
there could be a scientist on the inside, an extremist with
links to terrorists, maybe Osama bin Laden, who could steal a
Pakistani weapon …
KB: In a Tom
Clancy fiction that could be a possibility. We are very sure of
what our systems are.
AQ: What about the
reports before 9/11 that mentioned the links between some of the
scientists in our strategic programs, names, who met terrorists
in Afghanistan?
KB: Those
names, when you actually go into the details, had nothing to do
with the classified side of our programs,[they might have been]
some people from the system who perhaps were power plant
engineers who had some sympathies and were doing some charity
work.
The key thing here
is that Pakistan investigated those situations and now we have a
system that takes care of all aspects, even for our very
respected scientists who retire. There is a system where they
will be occupied in various ways and we will know what they are
doing.
AQ: Let’s say there
is a violent change of government in Islamabad. Someone hiding
in the foothills of Islamabad breaks into one of your
facilities, kills 5 or 6 guards, goes inside, picks up one of
those nuclear weapons held in a very elaborate security
parameter, takes it out, comes out of the building, puts it in
the back of a truck or van and speeds away. How possible is this
scenario?
KB: Absolutely not
possible. But it is a fair question. We have several layers—a
multitude of systems of security and technical solutions for
security, some of which are non-intrusive and invisible. There
are no exceptions for anyone from the outside going into a
facility. There are various levels of access. Then there is the
issue of insider threat. Not possible. We look at each
individual who works within the system very closely. We look at
them from various angles, something that the West knows at
‘persona reliability’, the human factor. We look into
everything, background checks, medical records, police records,
any history of possible impulsive behavior. And if there is
anyone who doesn’t have a smooth graph of behavior, they are not
put into any sensitive jobs. Even if there is someone in
personal distress, for example because of a death in the family,
there is a way for relieving them for a few days from sensitive
responsibility.
AQ: So the cinematic
perception of a Pakistani equivalent of a suitcase carried at
all times by the President or the Prime Minister, containing the
button for a nuclear missile or something, is not correct?
KB: The decision
making about nuclear assets is very carefully thought out. It’s
not a hair trigger situation. We all have seen many Cold War
movies and many of these idea come from them.
AQ: Well said. Where
are we keeping our nuclear bombs?
KB: The response
to this question is in two words: Strategic Ambiguity. If anyone
even claims he knows where our weapons are, they are wrong. And
if they think they do, they are in for a rude shock. Even within
the system, if someone doesn’t need to know about sensitive
sites, they don’t have that information. So very few in
Pakistan
would know where they are. And I’m not going to tell you
[smiling].
AQ: Really, I was
kind of hoping for a hint. Okay, are the safeguards in the
United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, Israel and India
any better than the Pakistani nuclear safeguards?
KB: Even if I
sound arrogant, ours are better. We have the advantage of
hindsight. We have worked hard, we have trained hard, and we are
very sure of what we have. We have learned from the best
international practices. We don’t have aircrafts flying around
with unauthorized nuclear missiles and we have a short nuclear
history compared to some of the countries you mentioned.
AQ: Media reports
have suggested that the Americans have helped Pakistan secure
its nuclear assets, which implies that the Americans have access
to Pakistani nukes?
KB: Ensuring
nuclear security is our own interest. We made the bomb, we have
the means to protect it, and we’re confident of that security.
But we do not mind exposure to education and awareness, but in a
completely non-intrusive way.
AQ: So you’re saying
you have exchanged ideas with the Americans but not given them
any access?
KB: Absolutely.
That’s out of the question. That’s the red line that was defined
even before we got into this exchange of ideas. We do have some
rudimentary equipment and some training [from the
U.S.]. And the kinds
of figures you have seen in the media [about U.S. financial aid
to secure Pakistani nuclear assets] are highly exaggerated.
AQ: The figure quoted
was in the tens of millions …
KB: A $100 million
was quoted in one report [New York Times, Nov. 2007].
Nowhere in that range.
AQ: Really?
KB: Nowhere.
AQ: Some Pakistanis
are concerned and are asking what if the rudimentary equipment
handed over to you contained a transmitter that could send out
signals to a satellite or something exposing where our
installations are?
KB: You have
responded to the question yourself. Anyone concerned in
Pakistan
would have thought about this. The Pakistani nuclear
establishment is always concerned about even the remotest of
possibilities. We have this responsibility on behalf of this
whole nation. It’s a sacred responsibility.
AQ: So let me put
this to rest once and for all: you have not given access to the
Americans as part of accepting their ‘help’?
KB: No access
whatsoever. There are no foreigners who have any access to any
Pakistani assets and they will never have. There are very few
Pakistanis, even within our policy circle, who have all the
information.
AQ: Does everyone
concerned inside and outside the region understand there will be
consequences if Pakistan’s strategic assets are attacked?
KB: Let me say it
in plain words: Those who have hostile intent would know that
any endeavor to attack
Pakistan in any way
will not be successful and it will be disastrous. Our weapons
are meant for deterrence and not for [aggression]. But we have
the capability to deal with any threat.
AQ: So we will
respond if we are attacked?
KB: My message is:
Don’t mess with us.
AQ: Late Mrs. Benazir
Bhutto had publicly warned a few weeks before her tragic death
that extremists could descend on the Pakistani capital,
Islamabad, and take control of the nearby nuclear installations
at Kahuta. Is this true?
KB: I don’t want
to get into the politics of this statement. But I’d like to make
two points.
One, Pakistan’s
nuclear assets are safe and secure. I say this with a lot of
confidence. And, Two, I’d request all Pakistanis, wherever they
are, that they should not mix politics with nuclear security.
[End of Interview]
Click here to listen to this interview
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