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There Is No “War on Terror”
By Edward S. Herman and David Peterson
20/01/08 "ZNet"
-- -- One
of the most telling signs of the political naiveté of
liberals and the Left in the United States has been
their steadfast faith in much of the worldview that
blankets the imperial state they call home. Nowhere has
this critical failure been more evident than in their
acceptance of the premise that there really is something
called a "war on terror" or “terrorism”[1]—however
poorly managed its critics make it out to be—and that
righting the course of this war ought to be this
country's (and the world’s) top foreign policy
priority. In this perspective, Afghanistan and
Pakistan rather than Iraq ought to have been the war on
terror's proper foci; most accept that the U.S. attack
on Afghanistan from October 2001 on was a legitimate and
necessary stage in the war. The tragic error of the
Bush Administration, in this view, was that it lost
sight of this priority, and diverted U.S. military
action to Iraq and other theaters, reducing the
commitment where it was needed.
Of course we expect to find this line of criticism
expressed by the many former supporters who have fled
from the sinking regime in Washington.[2]
But it is striking that commentators as durably hostile
to Bush policies as the New York Times's Frank
Rich should accept so many of the fundamentals of this
worldview, and repeat them without embarrassment. Rich
asserts that the question "Who
lost Iraq? is but a distraction from the more damning
question, Who is losing the war on
terrorism?" A repeated theme of Rich's work has been
that the
Cheney - Bush
presidency is causing "as
much damage to fighting the war on
terrorism as it does to civil liberties." Even
in late 2007, Rich still lamented the
"really bad news" that, "Much as Iraq distracted
America from the war against Al Qaeda, so a strike on
Iran could ignite Pakistan, Al Qaeda's thriving base and
the actual central front of the war on
terror."[3]
Other
expressions of faith in something called the "war on
terror" abound. Thus in a long
review of several books in which she urged "[r]evamping
our approach to terrorism" and "recapturing hearts and minds" around the world, Harvard's Samantha
Power, a top lieutenant in the humanitarian brigade,
wrote that "most Americans still rightly believe that
the United States must confront Islamic terrorism—and
must be relentless in preventing terrorist networks from
getting weapons of mass destruction. But Bush's
premises have proved flawed…."[4]
Most striking was Power's expression of disappointment
that "millions—if not billions—of people around the
world do not see the difference between a suicide
bomber's attack on a pizzeria and an American attack on
what turns out to be a wedding party"—the broken moral
compass residing within these masses, of course, who
fail to understand that only the American attacks are
legitimate and that the numerous resultant casualties
are but “tragic errors” and “collateral damage.”[5]
Like Samantha
Power, the What We're Fighting For statement
issued in February 2002 by the Institute for American
Values and signed by 60 U.S. intellectuals, including
Jean Bethke Elshtain, Francis Fukuyama, Mary Ann
Glendon, Samuel Huntington, Harvey C. Mansfield, Will
Marshall, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Michael Novak, Michael Walzer, George Weigel, and James Q. Wilson,
declared the war on terror a “just war.” "Organized
killers with global reach now threaten all of us," it
is asserted in one revealing passage. "In the name of
universal human morality, and fully conscious of the
restrictions and requirements of a just war, we support
our government's, and our society's, decision to use
force of arms against them."[6]
The idea that "killers with global reach" who are far
more deadly and effective than Al Qaeda could be found
at home doesn’t seem to occur to these intellectuals.
And like Power, they also make what they believe a
telling distinction between the deliberate killing of
civilians, as in a suicide bombing, and "collateral
damage"-type casualties even in cases where civilian
casualties are vastly larger and entirely predictable,
though not specifically intended.[7]
Throughout these reflections, the purpose is to
distinguish our murderous acts from theirs.
It is the latter that constitute a "world-threatening
evil...that clearly requires the use of force to remove
it."[8]
In the same
mode, Princeton University international law professor
Richard Falk's early contributions to The Nation
after 9/11 found a "visionary program of international,
apocalyptic terrorism" behind the events. "It is truly
a declaration of war from the lower depths," Falk wrote,
a "transformative shift in the nature of the terrorist
challenge both conceptually and tactically….There is no
indication that the forces behind the attack were acting
on any basis beyond their extraordinary destructive
intent….We are poised on the brink of a global,
intercivilizational war without battlefields and
borders…." Some weeks later, in a nod to "just war"
doctrine, Falk argued that the "destruction of both the
Taliban regime and the Al Qaeda network…are appropriate
goals….[T]he case [against the Taliban] is
strengthened," he added, "to the degree that its
governing policies are so oppressive as to give the
international community the strongest possible grounds
for humanitarian intervention."[9]
Peter
Beinart, a liberal-leaning former editor of the New
Republic and the author of the 2006 book
The
Good Fight: Why Liberals—-and
Only Liberals—Can
Win the War on Terror and Make
America Great Again,
wrote in the aftermath of Cheney - Bush's 2004
re-election: "Today, the war on
terrorism is partially obscured by the war in
Iraq, which has made liberals cynical about the purposes
of U.S. power. But, even if Iraq is Vietnam, it no more
obviates the war on terrorism
than Vietnam obviated the battle against communism.
Global jihad will be with us long after American troops
stop dying in Falluja and Mosul. And thus, liberalism
will rise or fall on whether it can become, again, what
[Arthur] Schlesinger called 'a fighting faith'."[10]
Even David
Cole and Jules Lobel, authors of a highly-regarded
critique of Cheney - Bush policies on “Why America Is
Losing the War on Terror,” take the existence of its
"counterterrorism strategy" at face value; this strategy
has been a "colossal failure," they argue, because it
has "compromised our spirit, strengthened our enemies
and left us less free and less safe." The U.S. war in
Iraq "permitted the Administration to turn its focus
from Al Qaeda, the organization that attacked us on
9/11, to Iraq, a nation that did not. The Iraq war has
by virtually all accounts made the United States, the
Iraqi people, many of our allies and for that matter
much of the world more vulnerable to terrorists. By
targeting Iraq, the Bush Administration not only
siphoned off much-needed resources from the struggle
against Al Qaeda but also created a golden opportunity
for Al Qaeda to inspire and recruit others to attack US
and allied targets. And our invasion of Iraq has turned
it into the world's premier terrorist training ground."[11]
Elsewhere,
appearing at a forum in New York City sponsored by the
Open Society Institute to discuss his work, David Cole
made the remarkable assertion that "no one argued" the
post-9/11 U.S. attack on Afghanistan was “not a
legitimate act of self-defense.” No less remarkable was
Cole's statement shortly thereafter that the United
States' "holding [of prisoners] at Guantanamo would not
have been controversial practice had we given them
hearings at the outset," because, as Cole explained it,
such hearings "would have identified those people as to
whom we had no evidence that they were involved with Al
Qaeda and then they would be released."[12]
Cole's first
remark ignores the UN Charter, which allows an attack on
another state in self-defense only when an imminent
attack is threatened, and then only until such time as
the Security Council acts on behalf of the threatened
state. But given the absence of such urgency and the
absence of a UN authorization, and given that the
hijacker bombers of 9/11 were independent terrorists and
not agents of a state, the October 2001 U.S. war on
Afghanistan was a violation of the UN Charter and a
“supreme international crime,” in the language of the
Judgment at Nuremberg.[13]
Would Cole have defended Cuban or Nicaraguan or Iraqi
bombing attacks on Washington D.C. as legitimate acts of
self-defense at any juncture in the past when the United
States was attacking or sponsoring an attack on these
countries? We doubt it. Cole also seems unaware that
the United States attacked after refusing the Afghan
government’s offer to give up bin Laden upon the
presentation of evidence of his involvement in the
crime.[14]
Furthermore, the war began long after bin Laden and his
forces had been given time to exit, and was fought
mainly against the Taliban government and Afghan people,
thousands of whom were killed under targeting rules that
assured and resulted in numerous “tragic errors” and can
reasonably be called war crimes.
Given the
illegality and immorality of this war—now already well
into its seventh year—the killing of people in
Afghanistan cannot be regarded as
“legitimate”—and neither can the taking of prisoners
there under any conditions. Cole's second remark also
ignores the modes of seizure of prisoners, some turned
over in exchange for cash bounties; or their treatment
in Afghanistan, en route to Guantanamo, and in rendition
facilities, apart from delays in or absence of
“hearings at the outset.” Last, Cole is wrong even on
the alleged general agreement on the legitimacy of this
act of “self-defense” in Afghanistan. Despite the
domestic hysteria in the United States at the time, a
number of lawyers here contested its legitimacy .[15]
Furthermore, a series of opinion polls in 37 different
countries by Gallup International in late September 2001
found that in no less than 34 of these countries,
majorities opposed a U.S. military attack on
Afghanistan, preferring instead to see the events of
September 11 treated as crimes (i.e.,
non-militarily), with extradition and trial for the
alleged culprits. The three countries where opinion ran
against the majority in the other 34 were the United
States (54%), India (72%), and Israel (77%). Otherwise,
it appears that significant and sometimes overwhelming
majorities of the world's population were opposed to the
U.S. resort to war.[16]
What War on Terror?
But talk of
the "failure" of the war on terror rests on the false
premise that there really is such a war. This
we reject on a number of grounds. First, in all serious
definitions of the term,[17]
terror is a means of pursuing political ends,
an instrument of struggle, and it makes little
sense to talk about war against a means and instrument.
Furthermore, if the means consists of modes of
political intimidation and publicity-seeking that use or
threaten force against civilians, a major problem with
the alleged “war” is that the United States and Israel
also clearly use terror and support allies and agents
who do the same. The “shock and awe” strategy that
opened the 2002 invasion-occupation of Iraq was openly
and explicitly designed to terrorize the Iraq population
and armed forces. Much of the bombing and torture, and
the attack that destroyed Falluja, have been designed to
instill fear and intimidate the general population and
resistance. Israel’s repeated bombing attacks, ground
assaults, and targeted assassinations of Palestinians
are also designed to create fear and apathy, that is,
terrorize. As longtime Labour Party official Abba Eban
admitted years ago, Israel’s bombing of Lebanon
civilians was based on “the rational prospect,
ultimately fulfilled, that afflicted populations [i.e.,
civilians deliberately targeted] would exert pressure
for the cessation of hostilities.”[18]
This was a precise admission of the use of terrorism,
and surely fits Israeli policy in the years of the
alleged “war on terror.” Former Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon has also acknowledged an intent to attack
civilians, declaring in March 2002 that "The
Palestinians must be hit and it must be very painful: we
must cause them losses, victims, so that they feel the
heavy price."[19]
The United
States and Israel actually engage in big-time terror,
like strategic bombing, helicopter attacks, torture on a
continuing basis, and large-scale invasions and invasion
threats, not lower-casualty-inflicting actions like
occasional plane hijackings and suicide bombings. This
has long been characterized as the difference between
wholesale and retail terror, the
former carried out by states and on a large scale, the
latter implemented by individuals and small groups,
much smaller in scale, and causing fewer civilian
victims than its wholesale counterpart.[20]
Retail terrorists don’t maintain multiple detention
centers in which they employ torture (at the height of
its state terror activities in the 1970s the Argentinian
military maintained an estimated 60 such centers,
according to Amnesty International;[21]
the United States today, on land bases and naval vessels
and in client state operated facilities, uses dozens of
such centers).
Furthermore,
retail terror is often sponsored by the wholesale
terrorists—notoriously, the Cuban refugee network
operating out of the United States for decades, the
U.S.-supported Nicaraguan contras, Savimbi’s UNITA in
Angola in the 1980s, backed by both South Africa and the
United States, the South Lebanon Army supported by
Israel for years, and the Colombian rightwing death
squads still in operation, with U.S. support. Thus, a
meaningful war on terror would surely involve
attacks on the United States and Israel as premier
wholesale terrorists and sponsors, a notion we have yet
to find expounded by a single one of the current
war-on-terror proponents.
In short, one
secret of the widespread belief that the United States
and Israel are fighting—not carrying out—terror is the
remarkable capacity of the Western media and
intellectual class to ignore the standard definitions
of terror and the reality of who does the most
terrorizing, and thus to allow the Western political
establishments to use the invidious word to apply to
their targets. We only retaliate and engage in
“counter-terror”—our targets started it and their lesser
violence is terrorism.
A second and
closely related secret of the
swallowing of war-on-terror propaganda is the ability of
the swallowers to ignore the U.S. purposes and program.
They never ask: Is the United States simply responding
to the 9/11 attack or do its leaders have a larger
agenda for which they can use 9/11 terrorism as a
cover? But this obvious question almost answers itself:
Documents of the prior decade show clearly that the Bush
team was openly hoping for another "Pearl Harbor" that
would allow them to go on the offensive and project
power in the Middle East and across the globe. In the
rightfully infamous words of the Project for the New
American Century (2000), "the process of transformation,
even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be
a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing
event—like a new Pearl Harbor."[22]
The huge military forces that have been built up in this
country conveniently permit this power-projection by
threat and use of force, and their buildup and use has
had bipartisan support, reflecting in large measure the
power and objectives of the military establishment,
military contractors, and transnational corporations.
The military buildup was not for defensive purposes in
any meaningful sense; it was for power-projection, which
is to say, for offense.
In this
connection we should point out that at the time of 9/11
in the year 2001, Al Qaeda was considered by most
experts to be a small non-state operation, possibly
centered in Afghanistan and/or Pakistan, but loosely
sprawled across the globe, and with at most only a few
thousand operatives.[23]
It is clear that such a small and diffuse operation
called for an anti-crime and intelligence response, not
a war. Of course a war could be carried out against the
country which was their principal home, but given the
lags involved and the threat that a war, with its
civilian casualties and imperialist overtones, would
possibly strengthen Al Qaeda, the quick resort to war in
the post-9/11 period suggests covert motives, including
vengeance and taking advantage of 9/11 for
power-projection. And while a war could be launched
against Afghanistan and an attack made on Al Qaeda
headquarters, this was hardly a war on terror.
Nor could the huge military buildup that ensued have
been based on a fight in Afghanistan or against tiny Al
Qaeda.[24]
It is also
notable that there has been no attempt by the organizers
of the war on terror to try to stop terrorism at its
source by addressing the problems that have produced the
terrorists and provided their recruiting base. In fact,
for the organizers and their supporters in the "war on
terror," raising the question of “why” is regarded as a
form of apologetics for terror, and they are
uninterested in the question, satisfied with clichés
about the terrorists envy, hatred of freedom, and
genetic or religious proclivities. This is consistent
with the view that getting rid of terror is not their
aim, and that in fact they need the steady flow of
resisters-terrorists which their actions produce to
justify their real purpose of power projection
virtually without limit. Failure to end terrorism is
not a failure of the “war on terror,” it is a necessary
part of its machinery of operation.
In short, the
war on terror is an intellectual and propaganda cover,
analogous—and in many ways a successor—to the departed
“Cold War,” which in its time also served as a cover for
imperial expansion. Guatemala, Vietnam, Chile,
Indonesia, Zaire (and many others) were regularly
subverted or attacked on the ground of an alleged Soviet
menace that had to be combated. That menace was rarely
applicable to the actual cases, and the strained
connection was often laughable. With that cover gone,
pursuing terrorists is proving to be an admirable
substitute, as once again a gullible media will accept
that any targeted rebels are actual or potential
terrorists and may even have links to Al Qaeda. The FARC
rebels in Colombia are terrorists, but the
government-supported rightwing paramilitaries who kill
many more civilians than FARC are not and are the
beneficiaries of U.S. “counter-terrorism” aid. Hugo
Chavez’s Venezuela, on the other hand, which does not
kill civilians, is accused of lack of cooperation in
the U.S. “counter-terrorism” program, and is alleged to
have “links” to U.S. targets such as Iran and Cuba,
which allegedly support terrorists.[25]
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, and other torture-prone
states are “with us” in the war on terror; states like
Venezuela, Iran and Cuba are not with us and are easily
situated as terrorist or “linked” to terrorist states.
If Al Qaeda
didn’t exist the United States would have had to create
it, and of course it did create it back in the 1980s, as
a means of destabilizing the Soviet Union. Al Qaeda’s
more recent role is a classic case of “blowback.” It
is also a case of resistance to power-projection, as Al
Qaeda's terrorist activities switched from combating a
Soviet occupation, to combating U.S. intervention in
Saudi Arabia, Palestine and elsewhere. It was also
spurred by lagged resentment at being used by the United
States for its Soviet destabilization purposes and then
abandoned.[26]
While U.S.
interventionism gave Al Qaeda a strong start, and while
it continues today to facilitate Al Qaeda recruitment,
it has also provoked resistance far beyond Al Qaeda, as
in Iraq, where most of the resistance has nothing to do
with Al Qaeda and in fact has widely turned against it.
If as the United States projects power across the globe
this produces resistance, and if this resistance can be
labeled “terrorists,” then U.S. aggression and wholesale
terror are home-free! Any country that is willing to
align with the United States can get its dissidents and
resistance condemned as "terrorists," with or without
links to Al Qaeda, and get U.S. military aid. The war on
terror is a war of superpower power-projection, which is
to say, an imperialist war on a global scale.
The issue of
who terrorizes whom is hardly new. Back in
1979, Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman's The Washington
Connection and Third World Fascism featured the
U.S. terror gulag in great detail, and even had a
frontispiece showing the flow of economic and military
aid from the United States to 26 of the 35 countries
using torture on an administrative basis in that era.
Herman's The Real Terror Network of 1982 also
traced out a U.S.-sponsored terror gulag and showed its
logical connection to the growth of the transnational
corporation and desire for friendly state-terrorists who
would produce favorable climates of investment (recall
Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos's statement to U.S.
oil companies back at the time of his 1972 accession to
power: “We’ll pass laws you need—just tell us what you
want.”[27]).
But these works were ignored in the mainstream and could
hardly compete with Claire Sterling's The Terror
Network, which traced selected retail
terrorisms—falsely—to the Soviet Union. This fit the
Reagan-era “war on terror” claims, which coincided with
the Reagan era support of Israel's attack on Lebanon and
subsequent “iron fist” terrorism there, Reagan's
support of the Argentine military regime, Suharto,
Marcos, South Africa, the Guatemalan and Salvadoran
terror regimes, Savimbi, the Cuban terror network, and
the Nicaraguan contras.
This historical record of
U.S. terrorism and support of terrorism occasionally
surfaces in the mainstream, but is brushed aside on the
ground that the United States has taken a new course, so
that long record can be ignored. In a classic of this
genre, Michael Ignatieff, writing in the New York
Times Magazine, claimed that this was so because
President George Bush said so!
"The democratic turn in American foreign policy has been
recent," he wrote, adding that at long last, the current
George Bush has "actually risked his presidency on the
premise that Jefferson might be right."[28]
This capacity to ignore history, and the institutional
underpinning of that history, complements the mainstream
media and intellectuals' ability to take as a premise
that the United States is virtuous and in its foreign
dealings is trying to do good or is just defending
itself against bad people and movements who for no good
reason hate us. As noted, the amazing definitional
systems in use are de facto
Alice-in-Wonderland: Terrorism is anything I choose to
target and so designate.
Two novelties
of the Bush era projection of power and wholesale
terrorism are their brazenness and scope. Past U.S.
employment of torture, and of gulags in which to hold
and work-over alleged or possible terrorists or
resisters, were more or less sub rosa, the
cruelties and violations of international law and U.S.
involvement kept more or less plausibly deniable. The
Bush team is open about them, calling for legalization
of torture and their other violations of international
law, which they rationalize by heavy-handed
redefinitions of “torture” and claims of the
inapplicability of international law to their new
category of “enemy combatants.”[29]
Bush also brags in public about the extension of the
U.S. killing machine to distant places and the extent to
which declared enemies have been removed, implicitly by
killing, obviously without hearing or trial. On
September 17, 2001, Bush signed a "classified
Presidential Finding that authorized an unprecedented
range of covert operations," the
Washington
Post
later reported,
including "lethal measures
against terrorists and the expenditure of vast funds to
coax foreign intelligence services into a new era of
cooperation with the CIA."[30]
And in his State of the Union speech of 2003, Bush
asserted that “more than 3,000 suspected terrorists” had
been arrested across the globe “and many others have met
a different fate—Let’s put it this way: They are no
longer a problem
to
the United States and our friends and allies.”[31]
As Chris Floyd has pointed out, this represents the work
of a “universal death squad,”[32]
the authorization and accomplishments of which were
barely acknowledged in the mainstream media.
U.S.
state-terrorism has also been broadened in scope and is
a facet of globalization. In accord with the principles
of globalization, there has been a major increase in the
privatization of terrorism. Blackwater Worldwide is
only the best known of mercenary armies in Iraq that now
outnumber regular armed force members, and who are free
from some of the legal constraints of the armed forces
in how they treat the local population. The global
American gulag of secret prisons and torture centers to
which an unknown number of people have been sent, held
without trial, worked over and sometimes killed as well
as tortured, is located in many countries: The "spider's
web" first described by a Council of Europe
investigation identified landings and takeoffs at no
fewer than 30 airports on four different continents;[33]
and earlier research by Human Rights First estimated
that the United States was operating dozens of major and
lesser known detention centers as part of its "war on
terror": These included the obvious cases of Guantanamo,
Abu Ghraib and other prisons in Iraq, the U.S. Air Force
base at Bagram in Afghanistan, Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo,
and other suspected centers in Pakistan, Jordan, Diego
Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and on U.S. Navy ships at
sea.[34]
Still others are operated by client and other states at
the torture-producing end of the “extraordinary
rendition” chain (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Morocco). Given
the vastness of this U.S. enterprise, surely we are
talking about tens-of-thousands of prisoners, a great
many picked-up and tortured based on rumor, the
inducement of bonus payments, denunciations in
vendettas, and accidents of name or location.[35]
We know that a great majority of those imprisoned in
sweeps in Iraq were taken without the slightest
information on wrong-doing even on aggressor-occupier
terms.[36]
There is strong anecdotal evidence that suggests that
the same is true in Afghanistan.
Another
notable feature of the “war on terror” is the extent to
which this mythical war has been advanced via the UN and
the "international community," the UN’s work in
particular serving as an extension of U.S. policy. This
has been in marked contrast to their treatment of open
aggression and violations of the UN Charter's
prohibition of aggressive war. Time and again the
United States and Israel have violated this fundamental
international law during the past decade, and they are
clearly the global leaders in state-terrorism that many
observers believe to be the main force inspiring a
global resistance and spurring on various forms of
Islamic terrorism, including Al Qaeda. But instead of
focusing on the causal wars and state-terrorism,
following the U.S. lead the UN and international
community have focused on the lesser and derivative
terrorism, and taken the "war on terror" at face value.
In other words, they have once again assumed the role of
servants of U.S. policy, in this instance helping the
aggressor states and wholesale terrorists struggle
against the retail terror they inspire.
We can trace this pattern at least as far back as
October 1999
(almost two years before 9/11), when the Security
Council adopted Resolution 1267 "on the situation in
Afghanistan." This Resolution deplored that the
"Taliban continues to provide safe haven to Usama bin
Laden," and it demanded that the "Taliban turn over
Usama bin Laden without further delay to appropriate
authorities in a country where he has been indicted."
1267 also created the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions
Committee to manage this effort to squeeze the Taliban
and anyone linkable to either of them.[37]
At the time, bin Laden had been indicted by a U.S.
Federal Court for his alleged involvement in the August
1998 suicide bombings at the
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing some 250
people; Al Qaeda had also been designated a terrorist
organization by the U.S. Department of State. "The
international community has sent a clear message,"
President Bill Clinton announced. "The choice between
co-operation and isolation lies with the Taliban." But
the Taliban complained that "This unfair action was
taken under the pressure of the United States….So far,
there has not been any evidence of Osama's involvement
in terrorism by any one"—essentially
the same retort that the Taliban made to Bush White
House demands after 9/11 that the Taliban surrender bin
Laden.[38]
1267 thus extended key components of the 1996 U.S.
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's
category of states designated "not cooperating with U.S.
anti-terrorism efforts" beyond U.S. borders to the level
of internationally-enforceable law.
Only four
days after 1267, the Council adopted companion
Resolution 1269 "on the responsibility of the Security
Council in the maintenance of international peace and
security." 1269 condemned the "practices of terrorism
as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their
motivation," and stressed the "vital role" of the UN "in
combating terrorism."[39]
Similarly, Resolution 1373, adopted shortly after the
9/11 attacks and just days before the United States
launched its war to remove the Taliban, greatly expanded
the UN's involvement in the U.S. "war on terror,"
creating the Counter-Terrorism Committee to manage the
fight against terrorism and criminalizing all forms of
support for individuals and groups engaged in
terrorism. Like 1267 and, later, 1540 (April 24, 2004),
which created a committee to prevent "non-State actors"
from acquiring "weapons of mass destruction,"[40]
the Security Council adopted each of these resolutions
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, on the basis of
which the Council is to supposed to respond to "threats
to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression."
All of this
vigilance with respect to "terrorism," and the notion
that "non-State actors" and "terrorists" of the Al Qaeda
variety deserve this intense UN concern, stands in
dramatic contrast with the treatment of literal
aggression, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, and genocidal
actions such as the U.S.-U.K.-UN "sanctions of mass
destruction" that killed possibly a million Iraqi
civilians during the years between the first and second
wars against Iraq, ca. 1991-2003.[41]
Yet, in his report In
larger freedom (March, 2005), Kofi Annan argued
that "It is time to set aside debates on
so-called 'State terrorism'. The use of force by States
is already thoroughly regulated under international
law. And the right to resist occupation must be
understood in its true meaning. It cannot include the
right to deliberately kill or maim civilians."[42]
But these
comments contain a major falsehood and reflect serious
pro-state-terrorism and anti-resistance bias—there is no
"thorough" regulation of state-terrorism, and in fact
there is none at all, as evidenced by the fact that the
United States and its allies have been able to attack
three countries in a single decade (the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq) without
the slightest impediment from Kofi Annan's United
Nations,[43]
but also in each case with the UN's ex post facto
assent. Note also Annan's
failure to suggest that states should not have
the "right to deliberately kill or maim civilians," a
concern that he exhibits only as regards resisters to
state violence and occupation. This despite the fact
that in their recent and ongoing wars the United States
and its allies have killed,
maimed, starved, and
driven from their homes vastly more civilians than has
Al Qaeda or all of the world's retail terrorists
combined. Note also that within the targeted countries,
political leaders have been captured by these
aggressors, and subjected to trial by tribunals—but
never the leadership of the great powers. In pursuing
their enemies to the farthest reaches of the earth, they
continue to enjoyed complete impunity.[44]
Concluding Note
In sum, the
war on terror is a political gambit and myth used to
cover over a U.S. projection of power that needed
rhetorical help with the disappearance of the Soviet
Union and Cold War. It has been successful because U.S.
leaders could hide behind the very real 9/11 terrorist
attack and pretend that their own wars, wholesale
terrorist actions, and enlarged support of a string of
countries—many authoritarian and engaged in state
terrorism—were somehow linked to that attack and its Al
Qaeda authors. But most U.S. military actions abroad
since 9/11 have had little or no connection with Al
Qaeda; and you cannot war on a method of struggle,
especially when you, your allies and clients use those
methods as well.
It is widely
argued now that the war on terror has been a failure.
This also is a fallacy, resting on the imputation of
purpose to the war’s organizers contrary to their actual
aims—they were looking for and found the new “Pearl
Harbor” needed to justify a surge of U.S. force
projection across the globe. It appears that Al Qaeda is
stronger now than it was on September 11, 2001; but Al
Qaeda was never the main target of the Bush
administration. If Al Qaeda had been, the Bush
administration would have tried much more seriously to
apprehend bin Laden, by military or political action,
and it would not have carried out policies in
Iraq, Palestine, Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere that have
played so well into bin Laden’s hand—arguably, policy
responses that bin Laden hoped to provoke. If Washington
really had been worried at the post-9/11 terrorist
threat it would have followed through on the 9/11
Commission’s recommendations for guarding U.S. territory
(ports, chemical plants, nuclear facilities, airports
and other transportation hubs, and the like).[45]
The fact that it hasn’t done this, but instead has
adopted a cynical and politicized system of terrorism
alerts, is testimony to the administration's own private
understanding of the contrived character of the war on
terror and the alleged threats that we face.
Admittedly,
the surge in power projection that 9/11 and the war on
terror facilitated has not been a complete and
unadulterated success. But the “war on terror” gambit
did enable this surge to come about, and it should be
recognized that the invasion-occupation of Iraq was not
a diversion, its conquest was one of the intended
objectives of this war. That conquest may be in
jeopardy, but looked at from the standpoint of its
organizers, the war has achieved some of the real goals
for which it was designed; and in this critical but
seldom appreciated sense it has been a success. It has
facilitated two U.S. military invasions of foreign
countries, served to line-up many other states behind
the leader of the war, helped once again to push NATO
into new, out-of-area operations, permitted a further
advance in the U.S. disregard of international law,
helped bring about quasi-regime changes in some major
European capitals, and was the basis for the huge growth
in U.S. and foreign military budgets. While its
destabilization of the Middle East has possibly
benefited Iran, it has given Israel a free hand in
accelerated ethnic cleansing, settlements, and more
ruthless treatment of the Palestinians, and the United
States and Israel still continue to threaten and isolate
Iran.
Furthermore,
with the cooperation of the Democrats and mass media,
the “war on terror” gave the “decider” and his clique
the political ability to impose an unconstitutional,
rightwing agenda at home, at the expense of the rule of
law, economic equality, environmental and other
regulation, and social solidarity. The increased
military budget and militarization of U.S. society, the
explosive growth in corporate "counter-terrorism" and
"homeland security" enterprises, the greater
centralization of power in the executive branch, the
enhanced inequality, the unimpeded growth of the
prison-industrial complex, the more rightwing judiciary,
and the failure of the Democrats to do anything to
counter these trends since the 2006 election, suggests
that the shift to the right and to a more militarized
society and expansionist foreign policy may have become
permanent features of life in the United States. Is
that not a war on terror success story, given the aims
of its creators?
---- Endnotes ----
[1]
We will use the phrases 'war on terror' and 'war
on terrorism' interchangeably. Nor are we aware
of any nuance in meaning to be gained by
distinguishing one phrase from the other. This
caveat also holds for the similar phrase 'global
war on terror'. (Etc.)
[2]
See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, America at the
Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the
Neoconservative Legacy (Yale University
Press, 2006). Along with 24 others that
included Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul
Wolfowitz, Zalmay Khalilzad, Lewis Libby, Paula
Dobriansky, and Norman Podhoretz, Fukuyama was a
founding member of the Project for the New
American Century, whose efforts to "rally
support for the cause of American global
leadership" and a "Reaganite policy of military
strength and moral clarity" the world continues
to suffer beneath.—See the Project's "Statement
of Principles," June 3, 1997.
[3]
Frank Rich,
"Where
Were You That Summer of 2001?" New York
Times, February 25, 2007;
"The Wiretappers That
Couldn't Shoot Straight," January 8, 2006;
and
"Noun
+ Verb + 9/11 + Iran = Democrats' Defeat?"
New York Times, November 4, 2007.
[4]
Samantha Power, "Our
War on Terror," New York Times
Book Review, July 29, 2007.—Power also used
this review to lavish praise on the recently
updated
The U.S. Army/Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency Field Manual
(University of Chicago Press, 2007), assembled
by U.S. Army General David Petraeus et al.,
the current commander of the U.S.-led
Multinational Force in occupied Iraq, along with
critical input from members of the humanitarian
brigades, including Sarah Sewall, a colleague of
Power's at Harvard's Carr Center for Human
Rights Policy.
[5]
Note that Samantha Power implies that an
"American [bombing] attack on what turns out to
be a wedding party" is a unique and excusable
"error." This is false. It was not even the
only wedding party bombed in Iraq and
Afghanistan by U.S. forces, and the notable
feature of both U.S. wars in these countries is
the lavish use of devastatingly powerful
explosives in places where civilian casualties
are certain. In Afghanistan, the United States
has bombed every kind of civilian
infrastructure—dams, telephone exchanges,
schools, power stations, bridges, trucks on
roads, mosques, Al Jazeera radio, and even the
well-marked Red Cross facilities in Kabul. It
has also used cluster bombs on a massive scale.
In his exhaustive analysis of civilian
casualties, Marc W. Herold states that the
3,000-3,400 civilian deaths resulting from U.S.
bombing in the period October 7, 2001 - March
2002 can be explained best by “the low value put
upon Afghan civilian lives by U.S. military
planners and the political elite, as clearly
revealed by their willingness to bomb heavily
populated areas." He concludes that “the U.S.
bombing campaign which began on the evening of
October 7th, has been a war upon the people, the
homes, the farms and the villages of
Afghanistan, as well as upon the Taliban and Al
Qaeda.” (Marc W. Herold, "A
Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States'
Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan,"
Revised Edition, March 2002.) This bombing war
relied heavily on people like Samantha Power and
the media to keep the ruthlessly anti-civilian
character of this war out of public sight.
(Also see Tom Engelhardt, "'Accidents'
of War: The Time Has Come for an Honest
Discussion of Air Power,"
TomDispatch, July 9, 2007.)
[6]
What We're Fighting For: A
Letter from America,
Institute for American Values, February, 2002.
This document is also reproduced in
David
Blankenhorn et al., The Islam/West
Debate: Documents from a Global Debate on
Terrorism, U.S. Policy, and the Middle East
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pp. 21-40.
[7]
For a critique of this notion of civilian deaths
as "collateral damage," a legal ploy by which
Americans distinguish the "unintended" deaths
caused by their "far more terrifying violence"
from the "premeditated" deaths caused by
enemies, see Michael Mandel, How America
Gets Away With Murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral
Damage and Crimes Against Humanity (Pluto
Press, 2004), pp. 46-56.
[8]
In their discussion "A Just War?" the Institute
for American Values asserted: "Although in some
circumstances, and within strict limits, it can
be morally justifiable to undertake military
actions that may result in the unintended but
foreseeable death or injury of some
noncombatants, it is not morally acceptable to
make the killing of noncombatants the
operational objective of a military action."
They continued: "On September 11, 2001, a group
of individuals deliberately attacked the United
States….Those who died on the morning of
September 11 were killed unlawfully, wantonly,
and with premeditated malice - a kind of killing
that, in the name of precision, can only be
described as murder….Those who slaughtered more
than 3,000 persons on September 11 and who, by
their own admission, want nothing more than to
do it again, constitute a clear and present
danger to all people of good will everywhere in
the world, not just the United States. Such
acts are a pure example of naked aggression
against innocent human life, a world-threatening
evil that clearly requires the use of force to
remove it." (What
We're Fighting For: A Letter from America,
Institute for American Values, February, 2002.)
[9]
Richard Falk, "A
Just Response," The Nation,
October 8, 2001; and "Defining
a Just War," The Nation,
October 29, 2001.—To his credit, Falk was under
no illusions that the Cheney - Bush regime would
heed any limits on the use of force.
[10]
Peter Beinart, "A
Fighting Faith," New Republic,
December 13, 2004 (as posted to the Free
Republic website). Also see his
The Good Fight: Why Liberals—-and
Only Liberals—Can
Win the War on Terror
and Make America Great Again
(HarperCollins, 2006).
[11]
David Cole and Jules Lobel, "Why
We're Losing the War on Terror,"
The Nation, September 24, 2007. Also see
their Less Safe, Less Free: Why America Is
Losing the War on Terror (The New Press,
2007), esp. Ch. 5, "The Costs of Overreaching,"
pp. 129-146.
[12]
"OSI
Forum—Less Safe, Less Free," Open
Society Institute, November 14, 2007. —David
Cole's own words were: "I just don't see anybody
around the world who has questioned the notion
that the United States has the right to respond
to the attacks that we suffered [on September
11, 2001] by going to Afghanistan. There are
people who say it wasn't the best policy. But
no one argued it was not a legitimate act of
self-defense." And: "If you have the right to
go to war—you have the right to kill the people
you're fighting against—surely you have the
right to hold them for the duration of that
conflict. So that's not a controversial issue.
And holding them at Guantanamo would not have
been controversial practice had we given them
hearings at the outset. Which, for one, would
have identified those people as to whom we had
no evidence that they were involved with Al
Qaeda and then they would be released—and then
we wouldn't have the problem of innocent people
being held at Guantanamo." (Our transcription
picks-up Cole's remarks beginning at
approximately the 49:35 minute mark of the
full-length audio clip.)
[14]
According to Radio Voice of Shari'ah in Mazar-e
Sharif, the capital of Balkh province in
northern Afghanistan, "senior officials" of the
Taliban released a statement as early as
September 13, 2001 in which they "honestly asked
America to give clear and substantial evidence
for what it considers Usamah to be responsible
for, and the [Taliban] will hand him over to one
of the Islamic courts of the world in order to
be tried. The stance of the [Taliban] is clear
in this regard. Otherwise, nobody can accuse
others by bringing false and groundless
allegations." In the same statement, the Taliban
"condemn" the events of 9/11, calling them
"against the welfare and interests of the
world." The Taliban also "expresses its
sympathy for the American people," adding that
it "expects the USA not to resort to irreparable
measures before discovering the facts."
("Afghan Taleban ready to hand Bin-Ladin to
Islamic court if USA provides evidence - radio,"
BBC Monitoring Central Asia, September 13,
2001.) News of this and subsequent offers
communicated by Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, the
Taliban's foreign minister, and by
Abdul Salam
Zaeef, the Taliban's
ambassador to Pakistan, were reported by
Reuters, The Herald (Glasgow), the
New York Times, the Washington Post,
the International Herald Tribune, the
Boston Globe, and The Independent
(London). But as the record makes clear, no one
will ever know how genuine these offers really
were—the Bush White House categorically rejected
them, and the offers died there.
[15]
Among the professors of law at U.S. universities
who contested the legality of the U.S. war on
Afghanistan are Marjorie Cohn, currently
president of the National Lawyers Guild, Michael
Ratner, now president of the Center for
Constitutional Rights, Francis Boyle, Brian
Foley, Jordan Paust, and John Quigley.
[16]
See "Gallup
International poll on terrorism in the U.S.
(figures)," Gallup International,
late September, 2001. Also see Abid Aslam,
"Polls Question Global Support for Military
Campaign," Inter-Press Service, October 8, 2001;
and David Miller, "World
Opinion Opposed the Attack on Afghanistan,"
Sterling Media Research Center, Scotland,
November 21, 2001 (as posted to the
Religion-online website). Miller noted that
"When polling companies do ask about
alternatives [to the war-option], support for
war falls away." Hence, he added, this was the
reason why so much news media coverage
systematically distorts the facts away from
informing people about real alternatives and the
real impact of the war on Afghanistan. In
Pakistan, a case with great resonance today, a
Gallup International poll sponsored by
Newsweek in the early days after the start
of the U.S. war found that "Eighty-three percent
of Pakistanis surveyed say they side with the
Taliban, with a mere 3 percent expressing
support for the United States." ("Shifting
Sympathies," Newsweek Web
Exclusive, October 18, 2001.)
[17]
Here we are content to cite two definitions of
terrorism. (1) "[V]violent acts or
acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United
States or of any State, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the
jurisdiction of the United States or of any
State;" and that "appear to be intended - (i) to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii)
to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the
conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping…." (United States
Code, Title 18, Part I, Ch. 113B,
Section 2331,
1984.) And (2) "Any action…that is intended to
cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians
or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act,
by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a Government or an
international organization to do or to abstain
from doing any act." (A
more secure world: Our shared responsibility.
Report of the Secretary-General's High-level
Panel on Threats
(New York: United Nations, 2004), par. 164(d).)
[18]
Abba Eban, "Morality and Warfare," Jerusalem
Post, August 16, 1981.
[19]
In
Matt
Rees, "Streets Red With Blood," Time
Magazine, March 10, 2002.
[20]
See, e.g., Edward S. Herman, The Real Terror
Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda
(South End Press, 1982), esp. Ch. 2, "The
Semantics and Role of Terrorism," pp. 21-45; and
with Gerry O'Sullivan, The "Terrorism"
Industry: The Experts and Institutions That
Shape Our View of Terror (Pantheon Books,
1989), esp. Ch. 3, "The Western Model and
Semantics of Terrorism," pp. 37-51.
[21]
Oscar Alfredo
González and Horacio Cid de la Paz,
Testimony on Secret Detention Camps in Argentina
(Amnesty International, 1980).
[23]
The last major "terrorism" report by the U.S.
Department of State prior to 9/11 was
Patterns of Global
Terrorism 2000
(April 30, 2001). Within its Appendix B, "Background
Information on Terrorist Groups," the
entry for "al-Qaida" stated that the group "May
have several hundred to several thousand
members," adding that "Bin Ladin…is said to have
inherited approximately $300 million that he
uses to finance the group." In the
Congressional Research Services' last major
assessment of "Near Eastern Terrorism" published
the day before 9/11, the CRS reported that "Bin
Ladin is estimated to have about $300 million in
personal financial assets with which he funds
his network of as many as 3,000 Islamic
militants." (Kenneth Katzman,
Terrorism: Near Eastern
Groups and State Sponsors, 2001,
Congressional Research Service, September 10,
2001, p. 13.)
[24]
According to conservative estimates on global
military trends in the annual Yearbook
published by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, whereas the last Clinton
budget for fiscal year 2001 devoted $345 billion
to military account, by fiscal year 2006, Bush's
fifth, this had increased to at least $529
billion (i.e., both in constant 1985 dollars).
The SIPRI Yearbook 2007 reports that
"U.S. outlays…increased by 53 percent…between
2001 and 2006, primarily as a result of
allocations of $381 billion for military
operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
elsewhere." World military expenditure in 2001
was $839 billion, but by 2006 was "estimated to
have reached $1204 billion in current U.S.
dollars," an increase of "37 percent between
1997 and 2006." The primary driver of these
huge increases: The mythical Global War on
Terror which, in reality, has witnessed the most
aggressive U.S. and allied military expansion in
history. (See
SIPRI Yearbook 2002
Summary,
pp. 12-13; and
SIPRI Yearbook 2007
Summary,
pp. 12-13.)
[25]
See, e.g., Larry Birns and Michael Lettieri, "Washington
May Soon Try to Pin the Venezuelan Uranium Tail
on the Iranian Nuclear Donkey,"
Council on Hemispheric Affairs, May 9, 2006; and
Larry Birns and Tiffany Isaacs, "Chávez
Could Fuel U.S. Propaganda Campaign with
Upcoming Bilateral talks with Kim Jong Il, If
Misguided Strategy Is Adopted,"
Council on Hemispheric Affairs, July 16, 2006.
[26]
See Chalmers Johnson, "Abolish
the CIA!," TomDispatch,
November 5, 2004. Also see Johnson's
Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American
Empire, 2nd. Ed. (Metropolitan Books,
2004).
[27]
"Philippines: A government that needs U.S.
business," Business Week, November 4,
1972.
[29]
See, e.g., Marjorie Cohn, Cowboy Republic:
Six Ways the Bush Gang Has Defied the Law
(PoliPoint Press, 2007).
[30]
Dana Priest, "Foreign Network at Front of CIA's
Terror Fight," Washington Post,
November 18, 2005.
[32]
Chris Floyd, "Sacred
Terror,"
Moscow Times,
December 8, 2005 (as posted by the Information
Clearing House).
[33]
Dick Marty
et al.,
Alleged secret detentions
and unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees
involving Council of Europe member states
(Doc.
10957), Council of Europe, June 12,
2006,. Annex, "The global 'spider's web'."
Also
see Christos Pourgourides
et al.,
Enforced Disappearances
(Doc.
10679), Council of Europe, September
19, 2005; and Dick Marty
et al.,
Secret detentions and
illegal transfers of detainees involving Council
of Europe member states: Second report
(AS/Jur/2007/36),
Council of Europe, June 7, 2007.
[36]
Based on interviews that it conducted in late
2003 and early 2004 with U.S. military personnel
serving in Iraq, a confidential report that the
International Committee of the Red Cross used to
highlight prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib and
other prisons run by the occupying forces is
reputed to have estimated that "70
percent to 90 percent of prisoners had been
wrongly arrested"—and,
we might add, this is assuming that the
occupying forces had any right to arrest
anybody. See
Peter Slevin, "System
Failures Cited for Delayed Action on Abuses,"
Washington Post, May 20, 2004; and
R. Jeffrey Smith, "Army
Report Warned in November About Prison
Problems," Washington Post, May 30,
2004.
[38]
Anthony Goodman, "UN sanctions on Taliban to
surrender Bin Laden force," The Independent,
October 16, 1999; "Taleban
slams U.N. sanctions over Osama
bin Laden," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, October 16,
1999.—Among
the body of statements attributed to bin Laden
over many years are several that identify the
United Nations with the United States precisely
because, in his view, various agencies of the UN
have aligned themselves with the U.S. "war on
terror."
[39]
Resolution 1269 (S/RES/1269),
October 19, 1999.
Barbara Crossette, "U.N.
Council in Rare Accord: Fight Terrorism,"
New York Times, October 20, 1999.
[41]
John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions
of Mass Destruction,"
Foreign Affairs, May/June,
1999.—These authors noted that economic
sanctions (i.e., warfare) have been "deployed
frequently, by large states rather than small
ones, and may have contributed to more deaths
during the post-Cold War era than all weapons of
mass destruction throughout history….The
destructive potential of economic sanctions can
be seen most clearly, albeit in an extreme form,
in Iraq….No one knows with any precision how
many Iraqi civilians have died as a result, but
various agencies of the United Nations, which
oversees the sanctions, have estimated that they
have contributed to hundreds of thousands of
deaths….If the U.N. estimates of the human
damage in Iraq are even roughly correct,…it
would appear that…economic sanctions may well
have been a necessary cause of the deaths of
more people in Iraq than have been slain by all
so-called weapons of mass destruction throughout
history."
[43]
In the case of Operation Allied Force, the
U.S.-led NATO bloc's 1999 aggression against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kofi Annan had
quietly advocated on behalf of war for as many
as nine months in advance of it.—See, e.g., Kofi
Annan, "Secretary-General Reflects on
Intervention"
(SG/SM/6613),
Ditchley Foundation Lecture, United Kingdom,
June 26, 1998; and Kofi Annan,
"Secretary-General Calls for Unconditional
Respect for Human Rights of Kosovo Citizens"
(SG/SM/6878),
NATO Headquarters, Belgium, January 28, 1999.
As Annan delivered these lectures in the context
of NATO's threats of war, we hardly believe that
they can be taken as calls for NATO to stand
down.
[44]
In the
Legality of Use of Force
cases (1999 - 2004), brought by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia against ten of the
members of NATO that attacked it in 1999, the
International Court of Justice ruled that as the
defendant-powers refused to recognize the ICJ's
jurisdiction in the cases brought before it by
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the ICJ
"manifestly lacks jurisdiction to entertain
Yugoslavia's Application" and "cannot therefore
indicate any provisional measure
whatsoever"—that is, lacking jurisdiction, it
cannot issue an injunction or rule on the
legality of NATO's use of force. (See, e.g.,
Yugoslavia v. United
States of America,
June 2,
1999. Each of the other nine cases wound up the
same.)
[45]
The 9/11 Commission Report,
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States, July 22, 2004, esp. Ch. 12,
"What To Do? A Global Strategy," and Ch. 13, "
How To Do It? A Different Way of Organizing the
Government." As recently as the first week of
January 2008, former Commission co-chairs Thomas
H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton complained about the
CIA's withholding of evidence and obstruction of
the Commission's inquiry. See "Stonewalled
by the C.I.A.," New York Times, January
2, 2008.
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