07/02/08 "ICH"
- -- -If we as individual citizens
are to remain allegiant to the abstraction known as the
United States of America, do we have to alter our innate
sense of morality where it seems at variance with the
morality of the state? Or, in a weaker version, to what
extent do we have to alter our innate sense of morality in
order to bring it into line with the morality of the state?
Thanks to a new entity known as
Wikileaks and the anonymous leaker, ‘Peryton’, we are
provided another formal measure of the moral capacity of our
government, specifically in how it relates to our conduct in
our role as invader and occupier of Iraqi sovereign
territory.
The leaked document in this
case is the US Forces Rules of Engagement for Iraq,
classified Secret. Protocol concerning the authorization for
the use of force is specified for circumstances where there
can be expected a level of collateral damage.
Leaving aside the moral
ambiguity inherent in the use of deadly force in an area
where even “no collateral damage” is expected (but may
occur), there remain the two higher classifications of
expectation, “low collateral damage” and “high collateral
damage”.
Dealing with the most obvious
dimension of collateral damage, that of non-combatant
casualties, we’re taught how to distinguish between the two.
The “high” assessment occurs when there is a probability of
ten percent that the damage would amount to an estimated 30
or greater non-combatant casualties (sometimes known as
“innocents”).
We can infer from this that an
assessment of “low”, at least as pertains to non-combatant
casualties, would cover the estimated range of 1-29.
The distinction between each of
the three assessments (no, low, and high) represents a shift
in moral category and therefore signals a shift of moral
responsibility for initiation of an action.
Upon the authority of the
Multi-National Corps Commander, a low collateral damage
strike can be initiated. The high collateral damage strike
requires the authorization of the Secretary of Defense.
This means that it takes the
Secretary of Defense to authorize a strike with consequences
on the order of the Columbine massacre (counting injured as
casualties) and the Virginia Tech massacre.
Since we have no hesitation in
describing these school shootings as massacres, and since we
have no such proclivity (officially speaking) in the case of
a mission authorized by our Defense Secretary, the
difference would seem to be the stakes.
From the point of view of the
state, a massacre is the killing of innocents when there is
nothing to be gained (low stakes). When the Secretary of
Defense orders a strike with a high collateral damage
assessment, the justification is (and must always be) that
there is sufficient gain involved (high stakes).
If the morality of an act
cannot be ascertained save for its postulated benefit, then
who gets to do the postulating? If we can agree that this
matter cannot be left in individual hands, this leaves only
a collection of hands (an abstraction).
If we regard this collection as
valuable, we are led toward answering the question first
proposed in the affirmative. We will have to alter our
innate sense of morality.
To pose the weaker version of
the question is to admit the abdication of individual
morality, which can now be no more than a reflection of the
collective.
To the extent that one’s
patriotism manifests itself as allegiance to the state, such
patriotism will involve a forfeiture of individual morality.
This is less a statement about the merits of allegiance than
it is about its limits.
It simply posits a necessary
sacrifice, in this case distinct from the sacrosanct
sacrifice (for one’s country) customarily thought of as
patriotic. This is the sacrifice of one’s own morality.
Those who regard this sacrifice
as low stakes may feel comfortable in the role of patriot.
Those who regard it as high stakes may feel more comfortable
in the role of partisan. The words have apparent
similarities, but the latter is far more involving.
James Rothenberg -
jrothenberg@taconic.net
