Learning
From Past
Blunders
By Paul
Barratt
09/07/08
"The
Age" --
- AS WE
become
accustomed
to higher
petrol
prices
resulting
from Israeli
threats to
attack Iran,
it is timely
to ask
whether the
West's
current
approach to
Iran really
serves our
interests.
My critique centres on
three
points: the
outrage
about Iran's
assumed
nuclear
intentions
ignores the
fact that
the major
powers have
degraded the
nuclear
Non-Proliferation
Treaty; the
efforts to
bluster Iran
into
dropping its
indigenous
program are
unrealistic
and doomed
to failure;
and the
costs
associated
with any
military
strike would
be
completely
unacceptable
- to all
parties.
The NPT was
a logical
corollary of
the
Eisenhower-era
Atoms for
Peace
program. The
central
bargain was
that if
nations
forswore the
nuclear
option, the
US and other
nuclear
powers would
spread the
benefits of
the peaceful
uses of
nuclear
technology
throughout
the world,
and would
themselves
undertake
nuclear
disarmament.
NPT members
(Iran is
one) have a
right to
peaceful
nuclear
programs,
and the
nuclear
weapon
states have
an
obligation
to disarm.
Aside from
the fact
that the
nuclear arms
race
accelerated
and
enthusiasm
for
assisting
peaceful
nuclear
programs
evaporated,
the West -
and the US
in
particular -
has been
highly
selective in
its outrage
about
nuclear
proliferation.
The force of
the
proposition
that any
proliferation
whatsoever
is
unacceptable
has been
undermined
by an
attitude
that who was
proliferating
mattered
more than
the
proliferation
itself.
Iran has
historical,
commercial
and energy
security
reasons to
want as
complete a
commercial
fuel cycle
as it can
achieve. The
1980s' war
against Iraq
left Iran
obsessed
with
self-reliance.
Veterans of
that war
believe that
Iran's
interests
cannot be
safeguarded
by adhering
to
international
treaties or
appealing to
Western
public
opinion. In
this, it
mirrors
Israel's
position.
The
commercial
backdrop is
that in the
1970s Iran
lent $US1
billion to
the French
Atomic
Energy
Commission
to build its
Eurodif
enrichment
facility,
and acquired
a 10%
indirect
interest in
Eurodif - a
stake that
still
exists. It
paid another
$US180
million for
future
enrichment
services.
After the
1979 Islamic
Revolution,
the Khomeini
regime
cancelled
the Shah's
nuclear
program and
sought a
refund of
this
investment.
There
followed a
decade of
bitter
litigation,
from which
Iran was
reimbursed
$US1.6
billion for
its 1974
loan plus
interest. It
remains an
indirect
shareholder
in Eurodif,
but under a
1991
settlement
has no
access to
technology
and no right
to enriched
uranium. It
retained its
right to
dividends,
but
financial
sanctions
prevent it
from
receiving
these
dividends.
This
experience
left Tehran
deeply
distrustful
of any
proposal
that it rely
on others
for a
critical
component of
its nuclear
electricity
program.
Regarding
energy
security,
the
suggestion
that Iran
rely on
Russia for
enrichment
services
looks
profoundly
unattractive
considering
Russia's
intransigence
in turning
off the gas
supply to
Ukraine, a
move that
left the EU
anxious
about
reliance on
Russian
energy.
It may well
be that Iran
is also
establishing
for itself a
nuclear
weapons
option, an
intent the
Shah
expressed in
1974 but
subsequently
repudiated.
A better way
to persuade
Iran to
forgo the
option would
be to offer
security
rewards for
acceptance
of
full-scope
safeguards,
and for the
US to warn
Israel that
any
unilateral
attack on
Iran would
force the US
to
reconsider
its
bilateral
treaty
arrangements.
Despite its
shrill
rhetoric,
Iran does
not look
like a
country bent
on war. As a
proportion
of GDP, it
has the
second-lowest
military
spending in
the Middle
East - less
than half
Turkey's,
about
one-third of
Israel's.
Anyone with
any
knowledge of
Iran's
history and
culture will
know that it
will not be
bribed or
bullied into
doing what
the West
wants. It
has no
reason to
trust
Western
promises,
and having
endured the
suffering of
the
Iran-Iraq
War, is
unlikely to
buckle under
any
pressure,
military or
economic,
that the
West would
be prepared
to impose.
Regarding
nuclear
proliferation,
no
self-respecting
country
would accept
that its
nuclear
program is a
problem
because that
state itself
is a problem
- that an
Indian,
Israeli or
Pakistani
nuclear
capability
is
acceptable
because they
are the
right kind
of people,
but an
Iranian
capability
would be
unacceptable
because of
the nature
of Iran. The
only way to
establish a
manageable
relationship
with Tehran
is to
understand
its world
view, to
recognise
its
legitimate
interests,
and deal
with
problematic
issues on a
basis of
equality and
mutual
respect.
Iran's
demonisation
by the Bush
Administration
only serves
to undermine
Iranian
reformers,
including
pragmatic
conservatives
who see
value for
Iran in a
more
rational
relationship
with the US.
And the
constant
brandishing
of military
options is
counterproductive
- Iran has
too many
means of
retaliation.
It will be
an
indispensable
partner in
any Iraq
settlement.
A strategic
approach to
the issue
would see a
more
dispassionate
and mature
attitude to
Iran,
dealing with
it as an
important
power in a
critical
region, one
that is here
to stay and
is to be
taken
seriously.
To those who
regard such
an approach
as
"idealistic",
I would
observe that
we have
adopted the
confrontationist
approach for
29 years,
and ask when
it might
begin
working?
Paul Barratt
is a former
Australian
secretary of
the
Department
of Defence
and former
trade
negotiator.
He visited
Tehran in
1978 to
discuss the
conditions
for supply
of
Australian
uranium to
the Shah's
regime.
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