"We Were Basically Hiring
Terrorists"
The U.S. signed up legions of sketchy Iraqi fighters to help
stop sectarian violence. Now, most may lose their security jobs
-- but remain armed and angry.
By Anna Badkhen
07/08/08 "Salon" -- - Aug. 6, 2008 | BAGHDAD, Iraq -- Donning
pale yellow shirts with Iraqi flags stitched on the chest, Alah
al-Janabi and Mahmoud al-Samorai stood recently in the
blistering sun at the crowded entrance to the bustling Dora
Market. Al-Janabi, 30, proudly displayed a shiny black pistol on
his hip; al-Samorai, 25, slung his Kalashnikov assault rifle
over his shoulder as he patted down a shopper entering the
market. Nine months ago, the two men joined the Sons of Iraq --
the U.S.-funded, mostly Sunni organization of 103,000 armed
guards that functions as part neighborhood security watch and
part paramilitary force, and has been instrumental in tamping
down violence in Iraq.
What these men did prior to this work -- when sectarian militias
and Iraqi security forces fought pitched battles through the
Dora neighborhood, killing and wounding scores of people -- is
unclear. When asked, the two looked at each other and shrugged.
"There were no jobs," al-Samorai finally said. Maybe he and his
colleague hid in their homes while sectarian fighting raged
outside. But it is also possible that they fought alongside the
Sunni militias, as did many Sons of Iraq members, according to
American forces that patrol the area.
"When the SOIs stood up, we were basically hiring terrorists,"
said Lt. Justin Chabalko, using the military acronym for the
Sons of Iraq. Chabalko's 2-4 Infantry Battalion of the 4th
Brigade, 10th Mountain Division frequently patrols the Dora
Market.
The Sons of Iraq was formed in 2007, when Sunni tribal leaders,
tired of violence and disillusioned with Islamic fundamentalists
such as al-Qaida in Iraq, encouraged tribal members -- including
some former militia members -- to guard Sunni and mixed
neighborhoods against takeover by sectarian gangs. The Americans
touted the creation of the Sons of Iraq as a major diplomatic
success and agreed to finance the organization, paying each
member a monthly salary of $300, despite the protests from the
Shiite-dominated Iraqi government, which never liked the idea of
legitimizing the Sunni-dominated fighting force.
The force helped quell the Sunni insurgency in Baghdad and in
Iraq's tribal heartlands, such as the restive Anbar province.
But what a year ago looked like a brilliant solution to
sectarian violence is now looking like a time bomb. Many of the
force's members once fought alongside al-Qaida in Iraq and other
Sunni insurgency organizations against American troops and the
predominantly Shiite Iraqi security forces. And now, a joint
U.S.-Iraqi government plan to disband the force could put up to
80,000 men out of work -- and leave them armed and disgruntled.
As Iraq becomes safer, the Sons of Iraq are less essential to
security. Under a draft plan by U.S. forces and the Iraqi
government, 20 percent of the force will be gradually folded
into Iraqi security forces, after careful screening and
additional training. The rest, Americans say, will be offered
basic vocational training, which would allow them to take up
such jobs as janitors, secretaries, electricians and plumbers.
As of June, approximately 17,000 Sons of Iraq members have
joined Iraqi security forces.
But conversations with the Sons of Iraq members and their
leaders suggest that the majority of them do not want to do
anything that does not involve carrying weapons, traditionally
an honorable status in Iraqi society.
"A lot of them would prefer doing that because it gives them
power of carrying a weapon and providing security," said Capt.
Emiliano Tellado, a member of the 2-4 Infantry Battalion.
Potentially, 80,000 armed and trained fighters could soon find
themselves unemployed, or employed in jobs they do not want --
and angry at the American forces and Iraqi government because
they didn't get picked for service in the security forces.
Al-Janabi and al-Samorai applied for jobs in the Iraqi police
nine months ago for the first time, and reapplied twice since.
They have not heard back from the Iraqi government, and they
could well be among the many thousands who don't get to join
Iraqi security forces. But both dismissed the idea that they
would lay down their guns and take up other work tools.
"That is not my job," al-Samorai responded, firmly.
"I want to defend my people," said al-Janabi.
A key question is, to what extent have members of the Sons of
Iraq such as these severed their past allegiances. Working as
U.S.-paid neighborhood guards was supposed to rehabilitate those
who once fought against American and Iraqi forces, said Capt.
Brett Walker, the spokesman for the 2-4 Infantry Battalion. Over
time, approximately 18,000 Shiite members joined the force as
well, working mostly in Shiite and mixed neighborhoods and
ostensibly bringing some sense of sectarian rapprochement.
But some of the organization's Sunni members may still be
cooperating with sectarian militias, acknowledged Tellado. Even
if the Sons of Iraq continues to function in its current format,
the organization is a wild card as far as its members' loyalties
are concerned.
Several months ago, the 2-4's soldiers detained one Sons of Iraq
leader who was once associated with al-Qaida in Iraq, Tellado
said. "He had a bad background, and it finally caught up with
him," he explained. "There was a possibility that he was still
active" in the extremist Sunni organization. The man is now in
Camp Bucca, a giant American detention center in southern Iraq.
"Sometimes they don't reform," Tellado said.
Chabalko said that some Sons of Iraq in his area use their
positions "as an opportunity to play both sides of the fence,
usually the guys at checkpoints." American soldiers say that
Sunni members of the force extorted money from Shiite civilians
and attacked people they believed were members of Shiite
militias.
In Baghdad's religiously mixed Risala neighborhood in May, U.S.
Army medics treated a man who had been beaten and kicked in the
face and torso by Sons of Iraq, who believed that the man was an
informant for the Mahdi army, the militia loyal to the
anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The man survived because
the local Sons of Iraq leader, Karim al-Gortani, happened by and
ordered them to stop, said U.S. Army Capt. Sean Chase, whose
soldiers treated the man. Chase suspects that Gortani, a former
Iraqi army colonel under Saddam Hussein, at one point was either
a member of al-Qaida in Iraq or Jaish al-Islami, another Sunni
extremist group.
In Dora, where 450,000 people live, the Sons of Iraq have not
carried out any overt acts of violence, U.S. soldiers say -- at
least not to the Americans' knowledge. But that could be because
Dora, a middle-class neighborhood that is home to many former
officials of Saddam Hussein's government, is almost homogenously
Sunni.
Yet, even here the Sons of Iraq have a potential nemesis -- the
Iraqi National Police, a SWAT-like organization that patrols
Dora. On many streets, members of the two armed groups man
checkpoints together, but there is little amicability between
them. "At first there was no open conflict, but there was open
verbal conflict," Tellado recalls.
In order to create a rapport between the Sunni guards and the
Shiite officers, who also enjoy little trust from Dora's Sunni
population, the Americans have made the Sons of Iraq formally
subordinate to the police force.
"On payday, I hand the money over to the [National Police]
supervisor, and he hands the money to the SOI leader, and that
guy hands the money to SOI members," Tellado said. "It literally
takes place in the same room."
American military leaders understand the fragility of the peace
between the Sons of Iraq and Shiite security forces, and the
importance of keeping the Sunni force happy. "We're gonna
continue to pay the SOI guys until the government takes over or
until they transition into other jobs," said 4th Infantry
Division Lt. Col. Steven Stover, the spokesman for American
troops in Baghdad.
"These Sons of Iraq will eventually go away, and now the most
important thing is to find jobs for all those individuals," Lt.
Col. Timothy Watson, the 2-4 commander, recently told a
gathering of Sunni leaders in Dora. "It's just as important
providing jobs as it is security."
Nonetheless, local leaders say the Sons of Iraq remains
suspicious of the policemen. Hashem Ajili, one of the senior
neighborhood leaders in northern Dora, said American presence is
crucial to mediate any potential conflicts between the two
groups.
"Currently the relations are getting better -- with the support
of coalition forces," Ajili said. If the Americans leave, will
the two groups be at each other's throats? Ajili smiled, and
responded diplomatically: "If the coalition forces go back to
the States, I am afraid I don't know what will happen between
those two elements."
Eddie Bello, an Iraqi-born cultural advisor to the American
military in Iraq, was more specific. "It is like sitting on a
volcano," he said. "You never know when it will explode."
Anna Badkhen has reported from Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya,
Somalia, the West Bank and Gaza. She lives in Massachusetts with
her husband, David Filipov, and their two sons.
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