‘Where Are the Weapons of
Mass Destruction?’
By Scott Ritter
13/08/08 "Truthdig"
-- - 11/08/08 -- In the past two decades I have
had the opportunity to participate in certain experiences
pertaining to my work that fall into the category of “no one
will ever believe this.” I usually file these away, calling on
them only when events transpire that breathe new life into these
extraordinary memories. Ron Suskind, a noted and accomplished
journalist, has written a new book, “The Way of the World: A
Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism,” in which he
claims that the “White House had concocted a fake letter from
Habbush [Tahir Jalil Habbush, the director of the Mukhabarat],
to Saddam [Hussein], backdated to July 1, 2001.” According to
Suskind, the letter said that “9/11 ringleader Mohammad Atta had
actually trained for his mission in Iraq—thus showing, finally,
that there was an operational link between Saddam and al Qaeda,
something the Vice President’s Office had been pressing CIA to
prove since 9/11 as a justification to invade Iraq.”
This is an extraordinary charge, which both the White House and
the CIA vehemently deny. Suskind outlines a scenario which dates
to the summer and fall of 2003, troubled times for the Bush
administration as its case for invading Iraq was unraveling. I
cannot independently confirm Suskind’s findings, but I, too,
heard a similar story, from a source I trust implicitly. In my
former line of work, intelligence, it was understood that
establishing patterns of behavior was important. Past patterns
of behavior tend to repeat themselves, and are thus of interest
when assessing a set of seemingly separate circumstances around
the same source. Of course, given the nature of the story line,
it is better if I introduce this information within its proper
context.
In the summer of 2003 I was approached by Harper’s Magazine to
do a story on the work of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), a
CIA-sponsored operation investigating Saddam’s
weapons-of-mass-destruction programs in the aftermath of the
invasion and occupation of Iraq. David Kay, a former
International Atomic Energy Agency inspector who served briefly
in Iraq in 1991 and 1992, was at that time the head of the ISG.
By October 2003 the group had prepared a so-called interim
report, which claimed to have eyewitness evidence of Iraqi WMD-related
activities prior to the invasion in March. The key to the ISG’s
interim report was the testimony of “cooperative sources,”
Iraqis of unstated pedigree purportedly providing the ISG with
unverifiable information. With one exception—an Iraqi nuclear
scientist who had been killed by coalition forces—David Kay
failed to provide the name or WMD association of any of the
sources he used for his report, making any effort to verify
their assertions impossible. Many of the senior Iraqis who had
openly contradicted Kay’s report were, and still are to this
day, muzzled behind the walls of an American prison in Baghdad.
But there was another group of Iraqis, the former scientists and
technicians involved in Iraq’s WMD programs who were known to
have been interviewed by the ISG, and who were released back
into Iraqi society. These scientists held the key to deciphering
the vague pronouncements of the ISG interim report, and could
help to distinguish between fact and fiction.
Many of these scientists remained intimidated by their ISG
experience, which often involved lengthy imprisonment and harsh
interrogation. Loath to run afoul of their American occupiers,
and tethered financially to a monthly stipend designed to keep
them from exporting their WMD know-how out of Iraq (and, it has
been suggested, from talking too freely with the media), these
Iraqi scientists possessed a wealth of data which was difficult
to tap into. In my own effort to research the veracity of David
Kay’s assertions, I made use of my connections within the
community of former Iraqi WMD scientists to try to gain access
to what they knew. One in particular, who, because of ongoing
security concerns, will be identified only as Mohammed, worked
to facilitate my visit, arranging for meetings with Iraqis who
possessed firsthand knowledge about not only the past WMD
programs but also the ongoing efforts of the ISG.
“You are welcome to Baghdad,” Mohammed wrote me in mid-October
2003, after I had informed him of my intent to travel there and
what my purpose was. “You can have my full support.” After a
back-and-forth exchange of e-mails with Mohammed on the subject
of my visit, I finalized my agenda and reconfirmed the
interviews I wanted arranged. I followed my e-mail to Mohammed
on Nov. 5 with a detailed communication to the Coalition
Provisional Authority, outlining both my proposed schedule in
Iraq and requests for interviews with CPA and ISG officials and
tours of related facilities.
My schedule had me departing the United States two days later.
That morning, I did one final check of my e-mail and found a
disturbing communication from Mohammed. In it, he reiterated how
dangerous the situation had become in Baghdad. But he said more:
“I understand that there are some people who wish to bury any
new facts concerning the subject of WMD in Iraq. They are ready
to liquidate any person or group who ventures into this
subject.” Iraqi officials who had been involved with WMD,
Mohammed said, “ ... are not ready to give interviews because
that endangers their life. It would endanger your life as well.
I am serious in my warning,” he wrote. “Nobody can guarantee
your life. Nor the fate of the material you will be collecting
in Baghdad.”
“I request that you adjourn your scheduled trip to Baghdad,”
Mohammed pleaded. “If you decide to continue with your
intention, then I am very sorry to tell you that taking the
overall environment in my country I am not able to support your
mission. The main reason would be to preserve my life during or
after it is concluded.”
One does not view such a communication lightly. I immediately
contacted Lewis Lapham at Harper’s Magazine, as well as some
trusted colleagues with experience in journalism and
intelligence affairs. All agreed that in this case, discretion
was the better part of valor. My trip to Baghdad was called off,
but not the pursuit of the fate of Iraq’s WMD. The journey of
discovery had simply been re-routed, and instead of going to
Mohammed, I brought Mohammed to me. Mohammed made his way to
Amman, Jordan, where we met over a period of five days in
December 2003 to discuss Iraq’s past proscribed weapons
programs. Before we could move forward on that complex topic,
however, I needed to clear up the canceled Baghdad trip and, in
particular, Mohammed’s e-mail regarding a threat to his, and my,
life.
“This was very real,” Mohammed said. “I had made several
important contacts in regards to your trip.” I asked him to
elaborate. “As you know, the situation inside Iraq is very
dangerous and confused, and many people were hesitant to meet
with you.” Who were they afraid of? “The Americans,” he said.
“They were afraid of what the Americans might do if it was found
out that they had met with you.”
One of the contacts Mohammed had arranged for me to meet with
while in Baghdad was a former official in the Iraqi Mukhabarat,
the intelligence arm of Saddam Hussein’s regime, who was
intimately familiar with that organization’s surveillance of
U.N. weapons inspectors, both in Iraq and in New York. “The
Mukhabarat never went away,” Mohammed said. “They just
disappeared into the shadows. They are still very much a
presence in Baghdad and Iraq.”
Mohammed had passed on my proposed schedule to the Mukhabarat
official, who told Mohammed he “would check with his sources” to
see if my visit was feasible or not. On the evening of Dec. 5,
2003, the Mukhabarat agent appeared at Mohammed’s home. “You
must cancel the visit,” he told Mohammed. “Mr. Ritter’s life is
at risk if he comes here, as well as the life of any Iraqi he
meets with.”
The Mukhabarat had been preparing for the American occupation of
Iraq for months before the initiation of hostilities in March
2003. By January 2003, orders had been issued to the various
Mukhabarat departments to begin preparations for an American
occupation. Mukhabarat personnel were instructed that in the
case of the occupation of Iraq by the United States, they were
to return to their homes and await further instructions. Those
agents who were able to do so were encouraged to join the ranks
of the various opposition parties that were expected to follow
the Americans into Iraq, and to actively cooperate with the
American occupiers. In this manner, the Mukhabarat was able to
establish a network of informers inside the very ranks of the
organizations that were seeking its demise. According to
Mohammed, the Mukhabarat had been very successful in this
regard. And it was this success, he said, that led to the
warning from the Mukhabarat about the threat to my life, and the
lives of those who cooperated with me, if I were to go to
Baghdad.
According to Mohammed, Baghdad in late 2003 crawled with
assassination squads. In addition to simple criminal gangs
interested in extortion and murder, there were squads of killers
who worked on behalf of the various political forces vying for
power inside occupied Baghdad, settling old scores and
eliminating potential competitors. One of the major themes among
those positioning themselves for a leading role in post-Saddam
Iraq was de-Baathification, a policy of identifying and
neutralizing the members of the former ruling party, which was
associated with the most horrific abuses of the regime of Saddam
Hussein. De-Baathification was a primary objective of the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and major policy
initiatives were passed to remove the Baathists from positions
of power and influence. Opponents of the regime of Saddam
Hussein were only too willing to aid and assist the CPA in its
crusade against the Baathists, using their own networks of
informants to locate Baathist members and sympathizers for the
American occupiers. Given the abuses of power that occurred in
Iraq under the Baathists, however, oftentimes the members of the
newly empowered opposition took matters into their own hands,
meting out street justice in the form of targeted assassination.
Among the more effective, and brutal, of these politically
motivated assassination units were those run by SCIRI (the
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) and its
armed militia, the Badr Brigade. Their efforts to exterminate
Baath Party remnants still loyal to Saddam Hussein, or those who
were accused of committing crimes against SCIRI or its
sympathizers, attracted the attention of the “black” side of the
CPA-run de-Baathification efforts —covert operations run by the
CIA and elite Special Operations units of the United States
military. An abortive effort to formally acknowledge the role
played by the various anti-Saddam militias in confronting the
Baath holdouts offered a glimpse into what is an unspoken
element of the U.S. policy regarding de-Baathification —let the
Iraqis do the dirty work. And the Badr militia stood out among
those willing and able to take the fight to the Baathist
holdouts. For that reason, the Badr militia not only attracted
the attention of the CPA but also the Mukhabarat, which,
according to Mohammed, had infiltrated the SCIRI-run militia.
Mohammed’s Mukhabarat connection had disturbing news. According
to the source, the CPA had passed to the Badr militia my name,
the dates of my planned trip to Baghdad, my proposed agenda and
a list of Iraqis I had planned to meet with, including Mohammed.
This information was in turn passed on to the unit in the Badr
militia which specialized in targeted assassination in Baghdad.
“Mr. Ritter cannot come to Iraq,” the Mukhabarat agent told
Mohammed. “If he does, his life is at risk, your life is at
risk, and everyone associated with his visit’s life will be at
risk.” And so Mohammed sent his e-mailed warning to me.
On the surface, Mohammed’s story was too much to believe. I was
willing to accept any account that held that specific Iraqi
groups, such as Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress, were
opposed to my visit to the extent that they might issue threats
in an effort to intimidate me from coming. But the concept of
the United States government being involved boggled the mind.
The problem with disbelieving was there were too many pieces of
this puzzle that seemed to fit together. The timing of the
threat coincided too neatly with my communication with the CPA
about my plans while in Baghdad. People in the CPA certainly had
the information if they decided to pass it on—I had telephoned
and sent faxes and e-mails providing my dates of travel, where I
wanted to stay and how I wanted to interact with the CPA. The
ability of the U.S. intelligence community to monitor my e-mail
communications with Mohammed was a given. And then there was the
disturbing fact that, since the time that I had notified the CPA
of my intent to travel to Iraq to write this story for Harper’s
Magazine, I had been red-flagged by the United States
government. On both occasions that I left the United States on
assignment for Harper’s Magazine (once to London and Prague, the
other to Amman), I had been pulled aside by U.S. immigration and
customs officials upon my return for special treatment.
Apparently taking their cues from computer instructions, the
customs officials involved were very interested in where I had
traveled, whom I had met with, and any documents I might be
carrying. When I asked a senior customs official in Washington’s
Dulles Airport what the problem was, he simply shrugged. “I
guess it’s just because you are who you are,” he said. A customs
officer in New York’s JFK Airport, after looking at instructions
sent to him on his computer, looked up to me. “You used to work
for the U.S. government?” he asked. Prompted again by the
computer, he called over a supervisor, who was very interested
in documents I had in my possession concerning Iraq’s
weapons-of-mass-destruction programs. In both cases, the only
thing that seemed to save me from an even greater intrusion into
my personal belongings was a letter from Lewis Lapham
identifying me with Harper’s Magazine. The letter was carefully
examined by customs officers and photocopied, and became the
apparent subject of intense exchanges between the customs
officers and whoever was on the other end of the computer. In
both cases, my First Amendment rights prevailed over the
concerns of the U.S. government, and I was allowed to proceed
with my notes intact.
Mohammed’s dire warning aside, it seemed clear that my new
assignment for Harper’s Magazine had caught the attention of
someone in the U.S. government. What about my probing into the
weapons-of-mass-destruction issue could prompt such extreme
measures? What would make the U.S. government so afraid as to
justify its attempt to intimidate a journalist—even an activist
journalist such as myself—from carrying out his work? As a
former weapons inspector with the United Nations, I was
intimately familiar with the fraudulent case made by the Bush
administration before the 2003 invasion, and had quite publicly
challenged the president’s allegations. I do not believe the
Bush administration would undertake any activity, directly or
indirectly, beyond simply harassing me, because of my stance on
pre-war WMD claims. However, knowing that I was going to Baghdad
to meet with Iraqis who had firsthand knowledge of what had
transpired since the invasion was another matter. What could I
have learned that troubled them so? I will relay the story as I
received it from Mohammed.
On a bright morning one day in late June 2003 Mohammed waited
patiently on the side of a street in the Jadariyah district of
Baghdad. As a former official in the ousted regime of Saddam
Hussein, he had knowledge of programs and activities of interest
to the Americans who now occupied the palaces of the former
Iraqi president; these programs and activities included but were
not limited to weapons of mass destruction. Mohammed had been
summoned to a meeting with a special intelligence cell that
reported not to David Kay’s Iraq Survey Group, but instead
directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld. Shortly before 9 in the morning, a small convoy
consisting of three unmarked Toyota Land Cruisers pulled up
alongside Mohammed. Seated in the front passenger seat of the
lead vehicle was a short, stocky blond woman named Stacey. One
might not have guessed from her plain khaki cargo pants and
simple white T-shirt that she was a lieutenant commander in the
United States Navy. Stacey motioned for Mohammed to enter the
vehicle, and the small convoy sped off.
Crossing the 14th of July Bridge, the convoy turned right, into
the grounds of the Republican Palace. Through gates once manned
by the most elite forces of the regime of Saddam Hussein, the
Special Republican Guard, the small convoy now negotiated
checkpoints manned by the soldiers of Iraq’s new master, the
United States. The Land Cruisers snaked past the main palace
building itself, where four large bronze heads of Saddam
sporting a Moghul helmet stared impassively above them (these
statues were later removed under the orders of the then-head of
the CPA, Paul Bremer). The SUVs moved north toward the far end
of the former palace complex, now known as the Green Zone. In
front of the former offices of the Iraqi National Security
Committee, the convoy turned right, cutting through some
administrative buildings before emerging on an embankment road
running alongside the Tigris River. Heading south, the three
vehicles came upon a villa complex surrounded by small
decorative ponds, each pond connected with a small footbridge.
On each island was an open barbecue pit, complete with
accompanying stack of firewood, of the type favored by the
former Iraqi president. Disembarking from the Land Cruiser,
Stacey led Mohammed to the main villa, where they were ushered
in by security personnel wearing similar nondescript clothing.
Seated on a couch in the middle of the elaborately furnished
villa was a small, thin woman in her late 30s with short blond
hair who introduced herself as Carol. On the table before the
couch were plates full of sweets and fruit slices, imported from
Kuwait, which Carol invited Mohammed to taste. Stacey joined
them, and soon she and Carol began questioning Mohammed. About
five minutes into the session, the two women were joined by a
third person, an Army lieutenant colonel who introduced himself
as Dave. Dave was dressed in the same khaki trousers as Stacey
and Carol, but sported a gray T-shirt emblazoned with the seal
of the United States and the words “U.S. Embassy Kuwait.” A
short, athletic-looking man with gray hair, Dave quickly took
over the proceedings, with Carol and Stacey taking notes. For
four hours Dave questioned Mohammed about various matters
dealing with the Iraqi’s former work.
The final line of questioning focused on weapons of mass
destruction. Dave was on his feet, pacing before Mohammed,
before turning to him and asking straight out, “Where are the
weapons of mass destruction?” Mohammed, who had intimate
knowledge of certain aspects of the Iraqi WMD effort, replied
straight back: “There are no WMD in Iraq.”
Dave continued pacing back and forth in front of Mohammed. “My
president,” he said, “is in trouble. Can you help him?”
Mohammed was taken aback by the question. “Excuse me?” he asked.
“Could you repeat yourself?”
Dave sat down next to the Iraqi. “George Bush is in trouble. Our
people did not find any WMD in Iraq. Can you help us?”
Mohammed looked back at Dave. “How?”
“Can we prepare something for that? We could bring in some
nuclear material from the former Soviet Union, and pretend they
are Iraqi.”
Mohammed, stunned by the unexpected nature of the request,
indicated that such a ploy could be easily uncovered by forensic
examination of the evidence by outside experts, such as UNSCOM
(the United Nations Special Commission) or the IAEA, who would
undoubtedly be called in to verify such a finding. Dave sat in
silence for a few moments, before springing to his feet. “I have
to leave for a meeting,” he said. “Stacey will show you out.”
Mohammed was to meet again with Dave, Stacey and Carol in the
weeks that followed. The subject of WMD, Iraqi or otherwise, was
never again broached by Dave or anyone else in his team.
In my extensive dealings with him, Mohammed has never lied to me
or exaggerated about events he was personally involved in. His
story establishes a pattern of behavior which shows how the Bush
administration, especially when operating in the form of small,
ideologically motivated teams functioning outside the norms and
conventions of the mainstream, was able to consider (in
Mohammed’s case) manufacturing data and circumstances to bolster
its false case for invading Iraq, and (per author Ron Suskind)
actually manufacture such data and circumstances. I trust
Mohammed. And so I am willing to believe Suskind and his sources
about similar cases of fraud, this time in the form of the CIA’s
manufactured Mukhabarat document.
The question is, what is Congress doing about this? At what
point in time will it become clear that a crime against America
has been committed, not by any foreign terrorist group, but
rather the highest officials in the land, those entrusted with
safeguarding the Constitution? If the rule of law is to have any
meaning today, Congress has no choice but to institute
proceedings mandated by the Constitution against those high
officials who have committed high crimes and misdemeanors
against the American people. Far from stating that impeachment
is off the table, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi rightfully
has no option but to instruct the House of Representatives to
initiate investigations into the crime of fraud and other
related obstructions of government undertaken by the
administration of President George W. Bush. And if these
investigations confirm that such crimes have indeed occurred,
she must, as a servant of the Constitution, undertake
impeachment proceedings. That Bush is a lame-duck president, and
his time in office is short, is no excuse for failure to defend
the rule of law to its fullest.
Scott Ritter is a former Marine Corps intelligence specialist
and was a chief weapons inspector for the United Nations in
Iraq. He is the author of many books, including “Iraq
Confidential: The Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy to
Undermine the UN and Overthrow Saddam Hussein” and “Target Iran:
The Truth About the White House’s Plans for Regime Change.”
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Truthdig, L.L.C. All rights reserved.
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