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Afghan Presidential Election Is a False Hope for Change By Haroun Mir September 25, 2009 "Quqnoos" -- Thursday, 24 September 2009 - Almost eight years after military defeat of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan is back to square one Insecurity and poverty are Afghans’ utmost concern. In addition, the same powerbrokers, who should have been sidelined from political process after president Karzai’s election in 2004, still manipulate Afghan politics. Meanwhile, a majority of senior officials from Afghan Diaspora, who were once considered a hope for the country, have lost their credibility by enriching themselves at the detriment of the very poor people. Eventually, lack of enthusiasm for the upcoming presidential election among the ordinary people is an indication of their disenchantment with democracy. Thus, no matter who will win the Afghan presidential election, the next president will have hard time to quickly fix an obsolete and dysfunctional Afghan administration. During the past seven years, the US government had too often reacted to the development of situation in Afghanistan. The Bush administration failed to elaborate a clear strategy in Afghanistan. Its “forward strategy for freedom” in the case of Afghanistan focused on the military side of the conflict alone, despite of a dire need to foster good governance and strengthen democratic institutions in the country. Worsening of security since 2006 is a key factor behind deterioration of situation in Afghanistan. It took the US administration Mr. Obama’s election, to develop a clear strategy for Afghanistan. The US military surge will take time, before the military could secure some of the districts in the South and East of Afghanistan, where government authority is totally absent. In addition, increasing the number of Afghan security forces up to 400,000 from the current 85,000 soldiers and 70,000 police forces, as it is indicated in the new US strategy for Afghanistan, will take probably another decade. The relationship between security and development in Afghanistan resemble to chicken and egg causality dilemma. Development experts criticize lack of security as a main cause for slow pace of development, whereas NATO generals accuse slow pace of development as a hindrance to improving security. In reality lack of coordination among different donor countries, a deteriorating security situation, and absence of capacity within the Afghan government lead to mediocre accomplishments and mismanagement of funds. Today the Afghan administration and its major NATO allies are still struggling to deal with endemic administrative corruption and narcotics as they did in early 2003-2004. Despite, creation of various new institutions within the archaic Afghan bureaucracy and ample financial resources dedicated by the donor countries, little progress has been achieved in fighting corruption and narcotics. During the past seven years, no single drug lord or a corrupt senior government official has been indicted in any Afghan court. The gap between a new class of rich and the rest of population is widening very fast and the Taliban are recruiting young men even in relatively peaceful Northern provinces such as in Kunduz. I warned about the rise of insurgency in northern and westerns provinces in my article published with Central Asia Caucasus Institute Analyst in June 27, 2007. Afghans in general are disillusioned about the US model of democracy and free market economy because they witness their country sliding slowly towards political chaos and mafia type of economy. Afghans have little enthusiasm for the outcome of last month’s presidential election because major power brokers, who secretly stand behind major candidates, are those who abused people during the last three decades. In addition, they know that the problems could not be fixed only with a change of leadership in Kabul. In the absence of political parties, candidates are forced to seek the support of influential power brokers in order to build large coalitions. Thus, any coalition government, in the context of the three decades of armed conflict in Afghanistan, will lack political will to fight corruption and narcotics, which are among the main syndromes of bad governance. We fear that the next Afghan leader will mainly focus in satisfying conservative views of his or her coalition partners rather than fixing the Afghan administration. For instance no candidate talks about reducing the size of Afghan government which has more than 34 ministers, and who’s work overlap with each other. Because they don’t want to alienate potential coalition partners who could only be satisfied by appointing them ministers. In addition, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are not sitting inactive and watching from distance political debates in Kabul. Their leadership knows well that the recent polemic about civilian casualties caused by NATO forces served in their favor. In fact their corroboration in allowing voter registration throughout the country is an indication of their new political strategy. They will support pro-Taliban candidates in the provincial council’s elections this year and in the parliamentary elections next year. By using terror and coercion, they hope to constitute a bloc of their sympathizers in the next national assembly. Indeed, a very weak coalition government in Kabul, confronted by a parliament influenced by radical MPs, will be the worst case scenario for the US administration and NATO forces in Afghanistan. In addition, the Afghan government will succumb to their demands, which will certainly undermine the Afghan constitution and other internationally accepted values such as Human Rights. For instance the recent adoption of controversial Shiia Family Law by the Afghan parliament is just a prelude for more pressure from the radical elements within the Afghan National Assembly. More than security and development, the country suffers from a tremendous political challenge. The US’ military and civilian surge will certainly improve security and speed up the pace of reconstruction and economic development. However, fixing the Afghan administration, and preventing rise of the radical groups as a political force seem to be daunting and beyond the mandate of the coalition partners in Afghanistan. The Obama administration has little more than a year to show that their strategy in Afghanistan is working before the US public opinion decides otherwise by the US midterm elections. Bidding on the next Afghan leader to fix what has gone wrong during the past several years is too risky for both Afghanistan and the US. Contrary to the Bush doctrine, the current US administration must be proactive about the development of situation in Afghanistan because the Afghan political landscape has always been unpredictable. The Author, Haroun Mir, is director of Afghanistan’s Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS). |
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