April 3rd, 2003

About A Possible Use of Unconventional Weapons in the Conflict Between Iraq and the Anglo-American Coalition

Today a feeling of concern wouldn't leave since the morning.

1. The war's been planned, especially, as an elimination of Iraq's UW.

2. Routinely since the beginning of the conflict, the coalition's asserting that Saddam's going to use UW, although the only place where he could succeed in doing so, is his own territory.

3. In recent reports the coalition speaks of a 95% probability of its (UW's) use (a precise probability! not clear how exactly counted), and about a certain red line around the city, although it's obvious that the use of chemical weapons in one's own capital is a suicide of the regime, and something Saddam shall never do.

4. The coalition's forces weren't enough even to capture a single town, excluding the scarcely populated regional seaport Umm-Qasr.

5. The ground forces' insufficiency has been revealed as early as after a week of fighting, in the beginning of the battle for Nasiriya, when the coalition's troops had to retreat for a day to regroup. However, in spite of the necessity of reinforcement with reserves, troops were sent round the town, without capturing it, and such a tactic has been observed during the entire course of the operation.

6. The impossibility of seizing any specific town is being ignored, and a movement towards a next town up north happens, up-stream the Euphrates.

7. In spite of the insufficiency of the ground forces and reserves present in the combat area that could enter combat immediately, the troops are shoving towards Baghdad.

8. To capture a city such as Baghdad, at least an equality in the numbers of the attacking and defending, is needed, something that really isn't there.

9. Despite an amassing superiority in the air, use of aviation and armoured vehicles inside a city is difficult, without carpet bombings and a complete destruction of the defending living blocks.

10. The only possible choice for attackers to win - is to use weapons of mass destruction. Having claimed the enemy's used it.

11. It's obvious that Iraq's inability to use nuclear weapons leads to a simple conclusion - Iraq's application of chemical or bacteriological weapons on a large scale.

12. Because it'd be impossible to find out the producer of chemical weapons used on the battlefield, there's absolutely no doubt that its use is going to be written off to the insane malicious tyrant, who's already used it in the past. And who won't forgo losing lives of the town's civilians.

13. This assertion (about a possible use of UW by the coalition) explains:

a) why the military campaign's been so poorly prepared;
b) why there aren't enough ground forces for its realisation;
c) why reserves are far from the battleground and, correspondingly, won't be able to approach it in the moment when unconventional weapons are used, something that'll spare unnecessary coalition victims;
d) why a force that's not enough to capture the city, is longing towards Baghdad, in spite of an impossibility of taking over the town with such forces;
e) why exactly in the final stage of the attack an outrageously false information of victories in the operation, has started to be fed - exactly so as to present the use of UW as a desperate gesture on behalf of the defenders.

14. It's obvious that a very narrow circle of people is initiated into the plan of use of chemical weapons - that explains the appearance of conflicts between the military and political command of the entire operation. The military haven't been cleared on the true reason of their movements towards Baghdad.

15. This explains an absolute confidence in victory after two weeks of protracted battles without capturing cities, without much-needed reserves and without a sufficient number of troops to storm the city.

16. A quick ending to the operation and its justifying in the eyes of the world community shall make up for the losses that the coalition suffered and shall suffer as a result of using UW on its own troops.

17. Furthermore, it shall allow to hide any previous combat losses of the coalition before the moment of use of unconventional weapons.

This explains too much - and this does disturb. Especially, this explains the mass hysterics about as of yet not found Baghdad's chemical or bacteriological arms, that's being forced on everyone.

About the type of weapons to be used. Chemical weapons, possessing a practically instantaneous action, however have a serious disadvantage as compared with biological ones - chemical weapons are local. Biological armament, having a certain latent period to allow inhalation of a vaccine or antidote, however, is much more effective in a densely populated city, due to mutual infection inside the population. The question about unconventional weapons type can't be answered with certainty. There's a possibility for the virulent cultures to spread to other areas, yet the desert that surrounds the city makes it easier to establish a quarantine needed in such a case.

The probability of use of nuclear weapons by America is low, as then questions from the entire world will follow, about why it was used in an area where there's a lot of civilian population. Any other kind of unconventional weapons can be attributed to Iraq with a real ease. Which is why those statements are made about revealing either warehouses with chemical protective suits, or certain mythical "objects" producing unconventional weapons. Which is why coalition's troops are dressing up in protective suits as they approach the city.

I ask not to consider this message a statement, just a likely assumption based on the analysis of the above-listed facts.