The Role of Private & Mercenary Armies in International Conflict

Private Military Companies are subject to even fewer restraints than traditional mercenaries are, given that their services are rarely judged to be of the same criminal nature. Although they are legitimate formal corporations and they cannot simply be dismissed as conventional mercenaries, Private Military Companies, where they are active combatants in conflicts may prove to be a dangerous variation on traditional mercenary practices.

Written by Bruce Blain, Director

Edited by Damian Hornich

I. Introduction 

                Throughout history, mercenaries- individuals who work as soldiers as a means of financial gain, in a country or conflict which is alien to their own nationality[i]- have played an active role in warfare. Although the United Nations (UN) and its individual member states have succeeded in establishing numerous international treaties which diminish a state's ability to wage a high intensity conflict, attempts to eliminate mercenary armies have fallen far short of their intended outcome. In many of today’s protracted conflicts, especially those in Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the recruitment of mercenaries has prolonged these conflicts to unnecessary lengths. 

                Furthermore, the end of the Cold War has given rise to a second and far more ambiguous issue regarding mercenarism. Known as Private Military Companies (PMCs), corporations, complete with shareholders, a board of directors and head offices, offer their clientele professional military services, sometimes acting as logistics consultants while at other times working as active combatants, in exchange for monetary payment and in many cases, for mining rights to areas of potential wealth.[ii] These companies are subject to even fewer restraints and legal controls than traditional mercenaries are. More often than not, PMCs act as consultants and only a very few of the large corporations have taken on the role of active combatants in a conflict. A third function that many PMCs offer is in the field of security for large corporations, especially those involved with mining and oil projects in the developing world.

                The nature of warfare in the post- Cold War era, as well as declining international commitments from the developing world has helped to prolong conflicts. As the former Canadian peacekeeper James Davis has observed: "modern wars tend to disdain direct combat between forces and concentrate on targeting the civilian populations in an effort to destroy the political and ethnic power base of opposing forces… as opposed to focusing on victory through battlefield casualties".[iii] Not surprisingly, the result has been prolonged and horrendous civil wars in states such as the Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and numerous others, where in effect, the state has collapsed into war between factions. This has been exacerbated by the fact that declining military and aid budgets as well as declining international commitments in the West, coupled with the collapse of the Eastern bloc- a traditional source of aid and military support to many developing countries- has meant that post- Cold War conflicts, especially in Africa, have not received the attention which they deserve. Out of this shortcoming has emerged a strong market for the services of PMCs for the purpose of restoring stability.

Nevertheless, whether they are the traditional mercenaries, or the new corporate soldiers, mercenary armies of any sort can pose a direct threat to both national sovereignty and human security. Clearly, due to the inadequacies of current legislation, much stronger international agreement is required to control these ‘soldiers of fortune’.                      

 II. History 

                Mercenaries are as old as war itself. Nevertheless, the modern mercenary traces its origins back to the Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) Crisis which was fought between 1960 and 1965, following that country’s independence from Belgium. The presence of European and American mercenaries, often supporting a particular ideological faction, was a common trend throughout Cold War conflicts in Africa. Over the course of innumerable conflicts during and after the Cold War, mercenaries have proven to be a valuable tool for governments that are seeking to preserve their power base, as well as insurgent groups that have sought to overthrow existing regimes. Although it is not the only continent to be plagued by mercenaries, Africa is the location of most mercenary operations. Most recently, the ongoing conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have all been prolonged in large part due to the continued presence and employment of mercenary forces by both governments and rebel groups.[iv] Traditional mercenaries give little thought to allegiance to a particular side or cause, save for their own material gain. Although it is widely agreed that these mercenaries pose a direct threat to the stability of any state in which they operate, adequate international legislation has yet to be ratified and thus to be put into practice.  In 1989, the United Nations General Assembly attempted to outlaw all mercenary activity through the establishment of the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries. However, to date, only 19 of the requisite 22 states have ratified or acceded to this convention, meaning that it has yet to come into effect.[v]

More recently, a second and far more contentious issue has been the rise of Private Military Companies (PMCs). WatchGuard International, which was founded in Britain in the 1960s by a group of ex- Special Air Service (SAS) officers led by Colonel Sir David Stirling, is often cited as the first PMC. However, an argument can be made that the American company DynCorp which was founded in 1946, was the first, as it provided "technology and logistics support for the American army in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, and the Gulf War".[vi]  However, regardless of which company was the first PMC, the rise of private defence really traces its growth to the end of the Cold War, which has resulted in the incorporation of dozens of PMCs. Some of the more notorious corporations are: the American companies Vinnell Corporation and Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI); Defence Systems Limited (DSL) which bases its operations out of the United Kingdom; Sandline, a company that is incorporated in the Bahamas, Lordan-Levdan of Israel, Keeni- Meeny Services (KMS), and the now disbanded South African firm Executive Outcomes (EO). Most of these companies were founded by formerly high- ranking military personnel who have since retired. Executive Outcomes (EO), for example, was founded by ex- South African military officers who had years of military experience fighting wars in defence of South Africa’s apartheid regime. The British firm DSL, which has a world- wide staff of over 4000 people, was founded by former officers of the British SAS[vii], as was Keeni- Meeny Services which was created by ex- SAS Colonel David Walker to take on projects that David Sterling and WatchGuard were unwilling to accept.[viii] Finally, MPRI’s board of directors has been described by one author as “a virtual Who’s Who of retired Pentagon brass”.[ix]

        Executive Outcomes is by far the most notorious of the Private Military Companies that developed after the Cold War. EO played an important role in conflicts across Africa in the 1990s. Founded in 1989 after the overthrow of the Apartheid regime in South Africa, by 1997 the firm was active in more than a dozen African countries.[x] Its most important and infamous missions were in Angola and Sierra Leone. In Angola, in 1992 EO secured a contract to guard oil facilities near Soyo, for the oil companies Gulf- Chevron and Petrangoil. EO proved to be so successful, that in 1993 the government of Angola tendered a contract to Executive Outcomes asking it to help restructure, train and support the Angolan army in its fight against Jonas Savimbi's rebel group UNITA. In mid- 1996, after two- and- a half years of service in Angola, which netted the firm roughly $80 million (US),[xi] EO was asked by the Angolan government to leave the country.

EO's next major contract, and its final major contract it turned out, was in Sierra Leone. There, it was recruited by the government of Captain Valentine Strasser to help the government in its fight against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Once again, it was to be EO's job to support the military, both with military hardware, training and other logistical support, as well as to aid it in the job of fighting the RUF. From 1995 until January 1997, EO provided its services to the government of Sierra Leone. However, it soon became apparent that the government of Sierra Leone could not afford to pay EO for the services rendered. Although EO's bill had been $2 million per month, in 1996, the newly elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah told EO that they must reduce the cost to $1.2 million per month.[xii] In January 1997, under pressure from the international community, the Sierra Leonean government's inability to pay and the demand of the RUF's leader Foday Sankoh that EO's departure was a precondition for peace talks, Executive Outcomes withdrew from Sierra Leone. In both Angola and Sierra Leone, EO, in what would become a precedent received both cash payments and concessions to mining territories in Sierra Leone and an agreement to receive a share of the Angolan government's share of the profits from the countries wealth of natural resources as compensation.[xiii]

In 1998, Executive Outcomes found itself without any viable contracts and without the patronage of the British millionaire Anthony Buckingham, who had acted as EO's main benefactor and was the liaison that suggested EO to the governments of Angola and Sierra Leone. Buckingham himself had acted to preserve his own extensive natural resource holdings in Africa. His reduced ties to EO stemmed from the fact that he had in fact created a new PMC, Sandline International. Finally, national regulation in South Africa in the form of the 1998 Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act placed EO under greater scrutiny. The result was that in January 1999, Executive Outcomes ceased all operations.  

However, by this point, other PMCs found themselves involved in the many of the areas that EO had played a role in. Most notably, Sandline International, headed by the retired Lieutenant- Colonel Timothy Spicer, found itself involved in Sierra Leone and facing many of the controversies that Executive Outcomes had faced. In 1998, Sandline International was investigated for breaching a UN arms embargo against Sierra Leone while fulfilling a contract to help to restore the democratically elected regime of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Sandline had been contracted by the Indian born millionaire Rakesh Saxena, who in turn had been contracted by Kabbah and offered exploration rights to Sierra Leonean diamond, bauxite and gold deposits in exchange for helping to restore his government.[xiv]  Sandline went about fulfilling its portion of the agreement by attempting to export 30 tonnes of small arms to the West African nation; a clear violation of a UN arms embargo.[xv] Sandline insisted that this was done with the tacit understanding and approval of the British Foreign Office.[xvi] Although Sandline’s arms shipment arrived too late to play a significant role in the counter- coup d’etat that overthrew the government of Major Johnny Koroma, it nevertheless was in violation of an international embargo.[xvii]

PMCs, with their extensive military experience and connections have become popular defence alternatives not only for failing governments and insurgent groups, but also for Western governments which have in recent years cut their defence expenditures and curtailed their international commitments. For example, in 1996, MPRI received a “$400 million State department contract to train and equip the Bosnian Croat- Muslim Federation Army”, even though the government of the United States was supposed to be impartial towards the warring parties in the Bosnian War. [xviii] 

Finally, for the last ten years, the American corporation Vinnell Corporation has held a $170 million contract to train and equip the Saudi Arabian National Guard.[xix]

The examples cited here are but a small fraction of the dozens of contracts that are agreed upon between states and Private Military Companies. In 1998 alone, the industry had sales which totaled $58 billion.[xx] Clearly, the growth of the Private Security and military business has been staggering, but it also poses serious ethical and regulatory difficulties for the international community.

 III. Current Conditions 

                Given that the General Assembly’s 1989 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries has not been ratified, defining the legality mercenaries falls under the jurisdiction of individual state governments. As such, the strictness of legal controls on mercenary activities varies tremendously across the globe. Most states have established laws that make it illegal for their citizens to serve as mercenaries; however, adequate legislation which outlaws the “recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries” does not exist in many parts of the world.[xxi] This is further complicated by the fact that, as history has indicated, when it serves their interests, states are willing to be highly selective as to how stringently they enforce their own laws regarding mercenaries.[xxii]

                Private Military Companies are subject to even fewer restraints than traditional mercenaries are, given that their services are rarely judged to be of the same criminal nature. Although they are legitimate formal corporations and they cannot simply be dismissed as conventional mercenaries, Private Military Companies, where they are active combatants in conflicts may prove to be a dangerous variation on traditional mercenary practices.

 IV. Relevant International Actions

                 The first major effort to control mercenaries was a 1972 act by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) a document called the "Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa".  More substantial progress was made five years later with an addition to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, pertaining to humanitarian law in times of armed conflict. Drafted in 1977, Article 47, (1) of Protocol I of the Convention denies mercenaries the status of combatant or a prisoner- of- war, while Article 47 (2) of Protocol I of the Convention defined what a mercenary is.[xxiii] Over the course of the United Nations' history, numerous attempts have been made to condemn the role of mercenaries in international conflicts. Most recently, in 1989, the United Nations General Assembly completed the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries. Finally, the United Nations General Assembly appointed Peruvian Special Rapporteur, Enrique Bernard- Ballesteros, to investigate the continuing role of mercenaries in global conflict.  In his report, the Special Rapporteur stated that mercenarism does exist and that it is a clear violation of basic human rights, sovereignty and of the self- determination of peoples.[xxiv] Mr. Bernales- Ballesteros also illustrated the close ties between mercenary activities and serious crimes such as terrorism, and arms and drug trafficking.[xxv] Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur recommended that with the utmost haste, all member states adopt the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries, and that they adopt stricter laws against the recruitment, use and financing of mercenaries.[xxvi]

 V. Analysis

         Clearly, mercenaries are an issue of tremendous controversy. In the wake of the Cold War, this controversy has only been exacerbated due to the rise of Private Military Companies. Whereas the traditional mercenary was generally an individual soldier of fortune seeking monetary remuneration for his services, PMCs are far more subtle. For the most part they do not conform to the traditional concepts of mercenarism. In fact, of the major PMCs, only Executive Outcomes and Sandline International have actually fulfilled contracts that required active combat services. There is a far greater tendency amongst PMCs to work as consultants. Leading firms such as MPRI and DSL are a source of logistical support and training rather than active combatants. Furthermore, rather than soldiers of fortune, PMCs are multimillion dollar corporations with board of directors, shareholders, head offices, who are often more concerned with legitimacy than they are with simply gaining contracts. With the overall decline in aid budgets, defence budgets and international commitments in general, Private Military Companies have gained popular support, especially in the West. It has even reached the point where major PMCs are working very closely with national governments and might even be considered a tool of foreign policy.[xxvii] The former Canadian peacekeeper and security consultant James Davis divides PMCs into three categories: major firms such as MPRI, DSL, Vinnell Corporation; mid-level companies that tend to serve corporations by providing armed guards, such as Lifeguard, a company made up of former EO employees; and finally, small, one- man independent contractors, who will take almost any job and who pose the greatest danger, as, among other things, they do come closest to the traditional definition of a mercenary.[xxviii] Morally opprobrious though the idea of mercenaries may seem to some, PMCs, due to the variety of professional services that they provide have a large number of staunch defenders. As history has shown, they did have an impact on conflict resolution or prevention in some states. In Sierra Leone for example, four months after Executive Outcomes left the country in 1997, a coup d'etat overthrew the Kabbah government. In fact, in commenting on the civil war in Sierra Leone, one aid worker went so far as to claim that "if you bring back EO or find another battalion of mercenaries, this war would be over in a week. Then we could finally help these people".[xxix] Similarly, DSL by the late 1990s had redefined itself such that it became a valuable source of support for humanitarian aid in Bosnia and Kosovo.[xxx] 

In their own defence, major PMCs have proclaimed that they only aid legitimate, internationally recognized state governments and corporations.[xxxi] Some, such as Sandline, have even expressed a willingness to submit to external regulation if necessary.[xxxii] Throughout its operations in Angola and Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes was careful to ensure that the company did not engage in human rights abuses; a charge that is frequently leveled against mercenaries. As a former CEO of Executive Outcomes, Nick Van den Berg, noted: "the fastest thing that would get us out of business is human rights violations"[xxxiii]. Nevertheless, an international body to monitor the activities of PMCs to ensure that they observe the rules of war in conflicts where they are active participants does not exist.[xxxiv]  

Clearly, the rise of PMCs has also raised some deeply troubling issues. It has been noted that “private companies respond to their own interests, which [are often]… alien to those of States”[xxxv] and the international community. Simply put, PMCs are private firms that do respond foremost to cost- benefit analysis. In a situation where a PMC is losing significant amounts of money in a project, or not receiving payments, as occurred with EO in Sierra Leone, there is very little to prevent a PMC from cutting its losses and simply withdrawing from a country where a project has failed. This could leave a contracting government in a very precarious position.

 While PMCs have in the short run shown themselves to be of some value, in the long run, they may nevertheless prove to be inimical to the interests of the states in which they operate. Due to the high price tag that the services of PMCs come with, the future may see more and more governments conceding contracts for the exploitation of natural resources in exchange for the military services of various PMCs, such as with Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone, or Lordan-Levdan’s acquisition of Block III of the Republic of the Congo’s (Congo- Brazzaville) offshore oil fields.[xxxvi] One critic of military companies has noted that after companies gain concessions: 

"the firm apparently begins to exploit the concessions it has received by setting up a number of associates and affiliates which engage in such activities as air transport, road building and import and export, thereby acquiring a significant, if not hegemonic, presence in the economic life of the country in which it is operating".[xxxvii]


            Furthermore, at present, PMCs are not controlled beyond the regulations that govern any corporation. They are subject to the laws and regulations of their home state but, as previously mentioned, there is not an international regime which regulates or even constrains the behaviour of PMCs. While they do not always conform to traditional definitions of mercenaries, where PMCs are active combatants, this is tantamount to mercenarism. The UN's special Rapporteur has voiced precisely this concern when he announced that “to suggest that some mercenary activities are illegal and others legal is to make a dangerous distinction which could affect the international relations of peace and respect between nations”.[xxxviii]

 VI. Conclusion

                 Clearly, there has been a dearth of effective international efforts to control mercenary activities throughout the world. Whether it is in the form of traditional mercenaries, or the more ambiguous corporate security and military industry, at present, the international community is ill- equipped to effectively control and/or curtail mercenary activity. Mercenaries and Private Military Companies are subject to the laws of their home state but more often than not, these laws are highly unsatisfactory and unsuccessful in controlling mercenary activities. It is clear that governments that have been threatened by insurgent groups, such as in Angola and Sierra Leone, and for governments that seek professional military expertise, such as the Vinnell Corporation's involvement in training the Saudi Arabian National Guard, PMCs have very quickly become popular sources of quick and effective defence. What is more, for Western states that have been reducing their defence expenditures and their aid budgets, PMCs are an easy source of intervention without having to "undergo the political risk associated with sending national armed forces into security situations which are little understood or supported domestically".[xxxix] Regardless of whether states condone or condemn them, Private Military Companies pose a vexing challenge for the international system.


Although NAMUN DOES NOT accept pre-written resolutions, delegates should nevertheless consider the issues that will be addressed in the assembly. Some general ideas might include:

1) How should traditional mercenaries be controlled? Is the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries the best method? How can the UN work to gain the successful ratification of this document?

2) Are the Private Military Companies mercenaries?

3) Should PMC personnel be classified as all other mercenaries under international law and thus subject to no protection in combat according to the Additional Protocol I, Article 47 (1) (1977) of the Geneva Conventions on War (1949)?

4) What is the best method of dealing with Private Military Companies (PMCs)?

5) Is new international legislation required that recognizes PMCs as separate entities, that, when lawfully employed, are legitimate actors in a conflict?

6) Should PMCs continue to operate in their present state? Should they be controlled in some way? For example, should they be licensed and controlled by an international governing body? Or, should they be outlawed altogether?


                On a final note, there are many areas where delegates can start to research the issues that are discussed in this paper. I would recommend that they visit the website of the United Nations for salient points on traditional mercenaries as well as reference to the voting habits of states regarding mercenaries. Also, the websites of some PMCs are very helpful. Of greatest merit is Sandline International's website which has a great deal of information on Sandline and the industry in general. For a work that stands in opposition to Private Military Companies I would recommend Guy Arnold's Mercenaries: Scourge of the Third World. James R. Davis' Fortune's Warriors provides an insider’s perspective to the industry. Davis' book is also readily available in most commercial book stores, and is thus, very easily obtainable. I would also recommend David Shearer's article "Outsourcing War" from the journal Foreign Policy, as well as Shearer's book Private Armies and Military Intervention.





[i] Enrique Bernales- Ballesteros, "UN Document A/50/390: A report on the question of the   use of mercenaries", The United Nations, 29 August 1995.


[ii] Guy Arnold, Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World, (New York, 1998), pp. 43- 47
[iii] James R. Davis, Fortune's Warriors, (Toronto, 2000) p. 147.
[iv] Arnold, Mercenaries p. 150.
[v] ibid.
[vi] Davis, Fortune's Warriors, p. 157.
[vii] Francois Misser and Anver Versi “Soldiers of Fortune” African Business London: December 1997, p.11.
[viii] Davis, Fortune's Warriors p. 103.
[ix] Wayne Madsen, “Mercenaries in Kosovo” The Progressive. Vol. 63 Issue 8, August 1999, p. 30.
[x] Arnold, Mercenaries, p. 115.
[xi] Davis, Fortune's Warriors, p. 132
[xii] ibid, pp. 141-143.
[xiii] Arnold, Mercenaries, p. 117.
[xiv] David Isenberg, “Combat for Sale: The new, post- Cold War Mercenaries” USA Today, 18 Mar 2000. p.3.


[xv] ibid.
[xvi] “A far- off country” The Economist 16 May 1998, p. 48.
[xvii] ibid.
[xviii]Madsen, "Kosovo", Progressive, p. 30
[xix] Davis, Fortune's Soldiers, p. 157.
[xx] Ibid., p. 149.
[xxi] “UN Press Release HR/CN/764” The United Nations 14 March 1997, p. 1


[xxii] Arnold, Mercenaries, pp. 85- 105.
[xxiii] "Article 47, Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Protocol I, 12 August, 1949" Office of the High Commisioner for Human Rights.


[xxiv] “Press Release 3533” The United Nations, p. 3
[xxv] Arnold, Mercenaries, p. 117.
[xxvi] ibid.
[xxvii] Davis, Fortune's Warriors, pp. 162- 163.
[xxviii] Ibid., pp. 156- 163.
[xxix] Ibid, p. 65
[xxx] ibid, p. 107.
[xxxi] Arnold, Mercenaries, p. 122.
[xxxii] “Private Military Companies- Independent or Regulated?”, Sandline International, 28 March 1998


[xxxiii] US News & World Report, 20/01/1997, as cited in Arnold, Mercenaries, p. 119
[xxxiv] David Shearer, "Outsourcing War", Foreign Policy, (Fall 1998) p. 73. Shearer recommends that this task could fall to the International Committee of the Red Cross.
[xxxv] “Press Release 3533” The United Nations, p. 3.
[xxxvi] Davis, Fortune’s Warriors, pp. 113-114.
[xxxvii] Talif Deen, Janes' Defence Weekly, 13/11/1996 as cited in Arnold, Mercenaries, p. 117.
[xxxviii] Arnold, Mercenaries, p. 117.
[xxxix] Kevin A. O'Brien, "PMCs, Myths and Mercenaries: The Debate on Private Military Companies", RUSI Journal, (Feb. 2000), p. 59.





Appendix A: Chronology


1946- DynCorp is formed

1949- Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War

1960- 1965- Congo Crisis sees the appearance of the first modern mercenaries

1963- WatchGuard is formed in Britain by former SAS officer Colonel Sir David Stirling

1972- Organization of African Unity drafts its Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries

1976- Angolan government establishes the International Commission of Inquiry into Mercenaries

1976- In Angola, thirteen Americans and Brits who had been hired by the rebel group the FNLA under Holden Roberto, are tried and convicted of murder and  mercenarism as defined by the OAU.

1977- Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions is passed. Included is Article 47 which pertains to the rights of mercenaries in combat situations.

1988- MPRI is formed

1989- The UN General Assembly passes the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries

1989- Executive Outcomes is incorporated

1992- EO is contracted by Gulf- Chevron and Petrangoil to guard oilfields near Soyo, Angola

1993- EO secures a contract to restructure and train the Angolan army

1995- EO signs a contract to train the army of Sierra Leone

1996- MPRI receives a $400 million State department contract to train and equip the Bosnian Croat- Muslim Federation Army

1998- Sandline International is investigated for breaching a UN arms embargo against Sierra Leone. Claims to have acted with the understanding of the British Foreign Office. In Britain this becomes known as the “Arms to Africa” affair.

1998- Government of South Africa passes the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act

1999- In January, Executive Outcomes is officially disbanded





"A far off country", The Economist, London: 16 May 1998.


Arnold, Guy. Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.


Bernales- Ballesteros, Enrique, "UN Document A/50/390: A report on the question of the use of mercenaries", The United Nations, New York: 29 August 1995.



"Can Anyone Curb Africa's Dogs of War?" The Economist, London: 16 Jan 1999.



"Crystal Clear?" The Economist, London: 15 June 2000, p. 61.


Francis, David J. "Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing national security or international exploitation" Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, Issue 2, London: April                          1999, pp. 319- 338.


Isenberg, David. "Combat for Sale: The new, post- Cold War mercenaries" USA TODAY, New York: March 2000, pp. 12- 16.


Madsen, Wayne, "Mercenaries in Kosovo" The Progressive, Vol. 63, Issue 8, Madison:                     August 1999 pp. 29- 31.


Misser, Francois and Anver Versi, "Soldier of Fortune", African Business, Issue 227, London: December 1997, pp. 8- 14.


O'Brien, Kevin A. "PMCs, myths and mercenaries: The debate on Private Military Companies", RUSI Journal, London: Feb 2000, pp. 59- 64.


"Private Military Companies- Independent or Regulated", Sandline International, 28 March 1998


Shearer, David. Private Armies and Military Intervention Oxford: The Oxford University Press, 1998.


Shearer, David. "Outsourcing War", Foreign Policy, Fall 1998, pp. 68- 82.


Sheppard, Simon. "Soldiers for Hire", Contemporary Review, Cheam: August 1999, pp. 66- 69.



Spicer, Tim. “Why We Can Help Where Governments Fear to Tred”, Sandline International, 24 May, 1998.


"UN Press Release HR/CN/764: Report on Mercenaries to Human Rights Commission", The United Nations, New York: 14 March 1997.



"UN Press Release GA/SHC/3533: Third Committee Members see increase in racism, discuss also use of mercenaries", The United Nations New York: 21 October 1999               



"UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/54/151" The United Nations, New York: 29 Feb. 2000.


                *please note that Adobe Acrobat is required to access this resolution. This software can be downloaded for free at


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