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1. Introduction

Weak national control of the international transfer of "conventional" arms and security equipment contributes to the persistence of gross human rights violations. Of all the states with inadequate laws and administrative procedures to manage the export, transit and import of such arms - of which there are very many - none are more conspicuous than those states running the world's largest industrialised economies - the Group of Eight.

Amnesty International is opposed to the transfer of military, security, and police equipment, technology and expertise that can reasonably be assumed will contribute to human rights violations in the receiving country, and has consistently appealed to the G8 governments to abide by this principle which they have long recognised but never fully implemented.

As this study shows, the governments of the G8 authorize unparalleled levels of arms and related assistance to the world's armed forces and law enforcement agencies, but often to those who persistently commit gross human rights violations - equipping them, emboldening them and rewarding them.

At least two thirds of all global arms transfers in the years 1997-2001 came from five members of the G8.(1) The top supplier of weapons to the world was the United States, accounting for 28 per cent of global arms transfers. Second in line was Russia, with seventeen per cent. Third was France at 10 per cent, followed by Britain at 7 per cent and then Germany with 5 per cent.

For 25 years, US law has stipulated that weapons should be kept out of the hands of governments that will use them to abuse human rights. Yet US commercial arms sales have frequently had the opposite effect. US arms sales directed to developing countries have quadrupled from 2000 to 2001, many of them with forces that persistently abuse human rights. In addition, US military aid is currently furnished to more than 30 countries identified by the US itself as having a "poor" human rights record, or worse.

Almost ten years ago, the USA, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United Kingdom (UK) signed up, with other participating states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to the Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers. These Principles commit participating states to "avoid transfers which would be likely to be used for the violation or suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms." However, an examination of the practices of these seven powerful states falls tragically short of their agreed benchmark.

More recently, France, Germany, Italy and the UK, as Member States of the European Union (EU), committed themselves to the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (adopted 8 June 1998 by the EU Council). Canada, the USA and many other states have declared their general support for the principles of the EU Code. Although it leaves the final decision on exports to be made by national governments, the Code does stipulate that arms should not be exported to countries where there is a clear risk they might be used for internal repression or where serious violations of human rights have occurred. However, evidence so far suggests that this promise is not being fully kept. A binding international arms trade treaty grounded in principles of international law, especially human rights and humanitarian law, rather than an ad hoc voluntary Code would provide potential victims around the world with much greater protection, but only the G8 leaders could decide on that course.

There are almost no legal or regulatory requirements amongst the G8 states for the inclusion of international human rights or humanitarian law content in the various military, security, and police force training services that they provide to states in all world regions. Even where human rights criteria are referred to in laws governing arms export and foreign military and security aid, they are often loosely interpreted. In particular, inadequate attention is given during export decision-making by governments to the long lifecycle of most types of arms and security equipment and technology - and hence to the prolonged risk of abuse.

Instead, it is short term profit making and political advantage that guide the bulk of the international arms trade. Currently, the G8 governments allow companies to engage in secretive, loosely-regulated, international trade in weapons, technologies, and training. Using the excuse of "commercial confidentiality", the provision of meaningful and timely information to legislators, media and the general public about arms export decisions is lacking, thus undermining parliamentary scrutiny and public accountability of the trade. In addition, companies in the G8 countries have been allowed to establish foreign production facilities, sometimes under licensing arrangements with foreign companies where the licences and their impact are not subject to effective human rights conditionality or oversight. This practice allows G8 companies to evade domestic arms control restrictions by establishing production in foreign countries which have weaker arms export controls.

Some companies in the G8 countries have been involved in the supply of security equipment and devices whose prime practical purpose is for torture or ill-treatment. In many more cases, companies supply devices designed for security and crime control purposes but which in reality can easily lend themselves to torture and ill-treatment. For example, US, Russian, French and German companies are amongst the two hundred and thirty companies in 35 countries making, distributing or brokering the supply of electro-shock weapons. G8 governments do not have in place effective laws and regulations to prevent the export of such equipment to foreign security forces that are known to abuse legitimate devices to inflict torture.

The European Commission, following concerns expressed in the European Parliament, recently proposed a Trade Regulation for adoption by the European Council.(2) This will, if enacted un-amended, ban the import, export and brokering by companies and individuals within all 15 EU member states of items that the Commission has categorized as "torture equipment" including electro-shock stun belts, leg irons, thumb-cuffs and shackles. The proposed Trade Regulation will also require that all EU member states introduce controls on the export of items such as stun batons, stun guns and riot control agents such as tear gas. Amnesty International welcomes the introduction of this Trade Regulation and calls on other governments around the world to introduce similar prohibitions and controls to protect human rights.

In July 2000, six of Europe's largest exporters of arms - France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK - signed up to the Framework Agreement Concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and Operation of the European Defence Industry. This agreement is designed to loosen controls on arms exporting companies within Europe but could undermine arms export controls since it does not provide for adequate transparency or monitoring of exports to non-participating countries.

Who Armed Iraq?
In the shadow of the massive US-led military build-up against Iraq in late 2002 and early 2003, evidence emerged that all the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, as well as several East European states, had supplied arms and related materials to the Iraqi government.

Before the 1991 Gulf War, at least 20 countries were accused of involvement in building up the technological basis for different Iraqi weapons programs, in particular the chemical weapons program.(3) In December 2002, the Iraqi government submitted a 12,000-page dossier to the UN naming companies from Britain, France, Russia, the USA and China as suppliers of weapons technology to Iraq. However, by the time of writing, no conclusive evidence had come to light showing that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction.

Seventeen British companies named as having supplied Iraq with nuclear, biological, chemical, rocket and conventional weapons technology are to be investigated and could face prosecution. The dossier claims that 24 US firms sold Iraq weapons including nuclear and rocket technology and that some "50 subsidiaries of foreign enterprises conducted their arms business with Iraq from the US". Germany was shown to be Iraq's biggest arms-trading partner with 80 companies selling weapons technology. Although most of the trade ended in 1991 at the outbreak of the Gulf War, Russia, China and reportedly Portugal traded arms with Iraq after 1991 in breach of UN resolutions.(4)

In August 1991, UN arms inspectors - UNSCOM - compiled a list of companies which had supplied technology to the Iraqi chemical and biological weapons program. The list was not made public, but governments can obtain information on the involvement of companies from their own country upon special request to the UN.(5) The German, US, UK, French, Russian, and Chinese governments should release the list of companies which supplied technology to the Iraqi chemical, biological and other weapons programs.

German companies have been subjected to criminal investigations on suspicion of violation of the arms embargo against Iraq. The UK and the USA have been accused of supporting the Iraqi chemical and biological weapons program through the sale of chemicals and technology.

"British firms sold thousands of kilos of the basic ingredients of nerve and mustard gas to Iraq and Iran last year, the Department of Trade confirmed yesterday... the Department's figures show that 2,000 kilograms of methyl phosphonyl difluoride has been exported to Iraq. This is the basic ingredient of the nerve gas Sarin... British firms also sold 38,000 kilograms of dimethyl methylphosphonate and other Sarin ingredients to Iraq." Andrew Beitch, the Guardian, 6 April 1984.

Four years after this article was published, in March 1988, an estimated 5,000 people were deliberately killed and thousands wounded as a result of chemical weapon attacks by Iraqi forces on the town of Halabja in Northern Iraq. Most of the victims were civilians, many of them children and women.

Conventional arms supplied by many states to the Iraqi armed forces, such as artillery, tanks, military vehicles, fighter planes and helicopters, have reportedly been used to commit grave human rights violations.

For example, in April 1999, violent clashes were reported between protesters and security forces when the latter attempted to prevent Shi'a Muslims from taking part in Friday prayers at the al-Hikma Mosque in Saddam City in Baghdad. These clashes reportedly left scores of protesters dead. An eyewitness told Amnesty International that ''when people were prevented from prayers they started shouting slogans against the authorities. Some protesters were armed and started shooting at the security forces but the latter were using tanks against the population and many people, including children, were killed."(6)

In 1994 Iraqi military and special forces continued to launch deliberate and indiscriminate armed attacks on civilian targets, including the settlements of al-Jibayesh, al-'Uwaili and al-Saigal in the predominantly Shi'a Muslim southern marsh region of the country. Scores of families were displaced after their homes were destroyed or after fleeing to escape artillery shelling.(7) In February 1992, President Saddam Hussein had said that Shi'a Muslims who participated in the March 1991 uprising should be machine-gunned for treason.(8)

In addition to supplies from countries named above, spare parts for Iraq's military were smuggled from Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics, despite a UN arms embargo. Although such transfers would have been illicit under international law, in many cases the arms sales appear to have been either authorized by government agencies or undertaken by state-owned arms export agencies.(9)

The ease with which companies, dealers and brokers - often with the collusion of government officials - have violated UN arms embargoes, highlights the need for a worldwide arms trade treaty with legally enforceable national export controls.

Increasingly global markets, transport links and communication networks provide opportunities for arms traffickers to circumvent national arms and security equipment controls. Since the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, United Nations investigations into the violation of UN Security Council arms embargoes have shown, often in graphic detail, how international networks of arms brokers and traffickers have fuelled human rights crises. Only extra-territorial and transparent control by powerful states over arms brokering and trafficking has any chance of properly regulating the arms trade and stopping the kind of "third country" deals that result in transfers of arms contributing to gross human rights abuses. The USA has an extra-territorial law on arms brokering which, although imperfectly applied and undermined in covert gun running operations by US government agencies, does appear to deter arms trafficking by US nationals abroad. But Canada, France, Germany, Italy and the UK do not even have such laws.(10)

Arms brokering should be prohibited unless brokers pass strict eligibility criteria before being declared a 'fit and proper' person to carry out brokering activities. The US already has such a register but none of the other G8 countries has one. Moreover, by simply being on such a register, a broker should not be authorized to conduct any particular arms deals they want without first applying for an individual licence whose issuance is subject to strict human rights and other criteria. Such a system would assist enforcement agencies to target their efforts in a more informed way and provide for effective accountability.

Illicit firearms trafficking first appeared on the G7 agenda during the 1994 Economic Summit in Halifax when leaders highlighted the economic and social costs of crime. At the June 1997 G8 Summit in Denver, illicit small arms and light weapons trafficking had become a stated priority. The issue was discussed again at the May 1998 G8 Summit in Birmingham where it was agreed to develop an "international instrument" to combat firearms trafficking.

Although scant attention was given to the control of other conventional arms by the G8, the focus on small arms and light weapons did help the development of the UN Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, which it signed in 2002. This Protocol was attached to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. However, it has limited applicability to the supply of state armed forces and law enforcement agencies.(11)

In July 2001, the US and Russian governments allied with those of China and some in the Non Aligned Movement to significantly weaken the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Specifically, they objected to the inclusion of any explicit clauses to uphold international human rights and humanitarian legal responsibilities in relation to arms export control.(12) Nevertheless, governments did agree in the UN Programme to "assess applications for export authorisations according to strict national regulations and procedures that cover all small arms and light weapons and are consistent with the existing responsibilities of States under relevant international law, taking into account in particular the risk of diversion of these weapons into the illegal trade" (13) But will the governments of the G8 give effect to this promise?

Before 2001, the G8 had little engagement with peace and human rights issues, but at the June 2001 Summit in Italy the G8 leaders began to address conflict prevention as a policy concern especially for Africa. (14) This Plan was elaborated further at the 2002 G8 Summit in Calgary, but the Summit adopted little in the way of concrete steps and clear principles to make a serious improvement to human rights protection. In the run-up to the Calgary summit, Amnesty International made demands in three areas where courageous and decisive action by the G8 leaders could have an enormous impact:

· controlling the international arms trade;
· controlling the trade in 'conflict diamonds' and other minerals resources from armed conflict areas which fund the supply of arms and contribute to human rights abuses;
· supporting efforts to make police across the world more accountable and trained to respect human rights

Amnesty International and others highlighted the failure of governments from seven of the G8 states - the USA, the Russian Federation, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Canada - to regulate arms transfers that contribute to grave human rights abuses in developing countries, particularly in Africa.

In response, the G8 proposed to "support efforts by African countries and the United Nations to better regulate the activities of arms brokers and traffickers and to eliminate the flow of illicit weapons to and within Africa." These efforts are to include (i) "developing and adopting common guidelines to prevent the illegal supply of arms to Africa"; (ii) "providing assistance in regional trans-border co-operation to this end", and (iii) "supporting African efforts to eliminate and remove antipersonnel mines."

The 2002 G8 Summit's Action Plan for Africa failed to recognise the responsibility of the G8 governments themselves for the sale and transfer of arms to African countries, including by dealers, brokers and transport agents who are nationals and residents of the G8 countries. The Action Plan rather included a call for African nations to regulate illicit arms sales.(15) The G8 proposed international guidelines and border co-operation for dealing with the massive suffering and destruction caused by the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in Africa. But these measures are clearly not enough. In response to direct threats to their own states, the G8 Summit agreed a "global partnership to prevent terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction". This included a set of tough principles, a host of practical measures, and a $20 billion budget to stem nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons. Yet no similar partnership was offered to Africa to curb small arms and associated military items.

During 2001-03, the G8 governments have participated in the OSCE and "Wassenaar Arrangement", where Japan was also represented, to develop "best practice guidelines" for the export and control of small arms and light weapons. These guidelines include references to the need to avoid arms transfers that will be used for human rights violations, but are not binding on the participating states.(16)

What is needed is a genuine commitment and action from each of the G8 governments to enact powerful new arms control laws consistent with international human rights standards and humanitarian law that will bring an end to their complicity in this shameful catalogue of failures.

2. United States of America

2.1 Arms Sales and Export Controls

The United States is the world's leading arms exporter, with arms sales agreements for new (non-surplus) weapons in 2001 totaling more than $12 billion and actual deliveries valued at nearly $10 billion.(17) The US has two separate systems for selling arms abroad, a government-to-government sales program (Foreign Military Sales, FMS) and licensed commercial sales. Some of these sales are subsidized by a special financing program known as Foreign Military Financing.(18) Data released by the US in June 2002 indicate that whereas sales negotiated through the Pentagon declined from 2000 to 2001, commercial sales reversed a two-year downward trend and nearly doubled from 2000 to 2001. Significantly, US commercial sales directed to developing countries quadrupled in that same time period (from 2000 to 2001).(19)

Despite a weak world economy, trends may well show an increase in total US arms sales when the data are collected for 2002. The budget allocation to finance foreign military sales rose from $3.57 billion in FY 2001 to $4.11 billion for FY 2003.(20) A supplemental request for fiscal year 2002 defense appropriations (debated alongside the fiscal year 2003 budget) included another $372.5 million in counterterrorism-related FMF for a wide range of countries including Oman, Nepal, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.(21) U.S. military aid has also been on the rise to Colombia, the Philippines, Georgia, and Indonesia, which have redefined their long-standing insurgencies as "counter-terrorism" activities.(22) Philippines received 30,000 M-16 rifles (plus ammunition) from stocks of US excess equipment.(23)

Israel
The U.S. government has continued to sell sophisticated weaponry to Israel—including 52 F-16 fighter jets and six Apache attack helicopters in 2001- despite the fact that these weapons facilitate the disproportionate use of force and lead to violations of human rights.(24) On 9 April 2003, eyewitnesses reported that Israeli Apache attack helicopters and F16 Jets flew over Gaza city. The helicopters then fired a missile at a Palestinian car; after the first missile apparently failed to explode a second missile was fired at the same car killing two people. According to a local eyewitness, "After the attack dozens of residents from the area went outside to investigate and see if they could help in some way, when the helicopters came back and fired two additional missiles at the crowd." This second attack killed five Palestinians, including two children; 13 year-old Ahmad Hamsa Al-Ashraf and 16 year-old Sami Hasan Qassem, both from the Zeitouna neighborhood. According to Gazan doctors, the bodies of all five were riddled with shrapnel from the missiles. 47 other Palestinians were wounded in the attack, five of whom were admitted to intensive care.(25)

In 2002, Amnesty International called on all governments to suspend all transfers of the military equipment being used by the Israeli Defence Forces to commit human rights violations.(26) This includes components and weapons such as combat aircraft, helicopters, tanks, small arms, light weapons, and ammunition including air-to-surface rockets. The suspension should remain in force until the Israeli authorities demonstrate that the equipment will not be used to commit human rights violations in Israel and the Occupied Territories.

Earlier this year, the Bush Administration requested approval of $4.41 billion to finance foreign military sales, as part of the fiscal year 2004 budget.(27) The requested funding includes a $60 million increase in military aid to Israel, $15 million to Yemen in conjunction with the Global War Against Terrorism, $10 million to Nepal to fight counter-insurgency; and $110 million to Colombia to support counter-terrorism efforts and to protect the Cano Limon oil pipeline partly owned by Occidental Petroleum.(28) A supplemental appropriations bill to cover the cost of the Iraq war includes an additional $1 billion in financing for military equipment, together with another $1.06 billion to be split among 18 other small country allies, including Jordan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Colombia.

In theory, for 25 years US law has sought to keep weapons out of the hands of governments that will use them to abuse human rights. In 1978 Congress established a principled prohibition against the transfer of weapons to governments that engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. In 1996 it established tight new regulations on arms brokering,(29) and unauthorized retransfer of weapons to another country are likewise prohibited by law.(30) The US currently observes more than 20 arms embargoes and in 1999, Congress passed the International Arms Sales Code of Conduct Act requiring the administration to pursue a multilateral agreement on uniform, strict export standards. This bill also includes provisions that require the State Department to include in its annual report on human rights the extent to which states meet the Code's criteria.(31) Although many of these measures contain important loopholes that have impeded implementation or otherwise limited effectiveness, they do provide a legal framework to constrain arms transfers that put human rights at risk.

Over the past year, however, there have been several disturbing efforts to weaken or waive several of the provisions that constrain the sale of arms to countries that have a poor record of human rights. In March 2002 the Administration introduced an emergency supplemental defense authorization bill that sought to lift human rights restrictions in place for Colombia and Indonesia, despite continuing human rights abuses perpetrated by those wielding arms supplied by the state. Through so-called "counter-terrorism" funding, the US Administration sought to extend Indonesia's eligibility for military and police training, and it sought direct support for Colombia's operations against armed rebels.(32)

Colombia
The Colombian armed forces have been a relatively large recipient of US military rifles and machine guns despite the high probability that these arms are persistently used to facilitate human rights violations. During 2001 more than 4,000 Colombian civilians were killed for political motives. Paramilitary groups acting with the active or tacit support of the Colombian armed forces carried out the bulk of such killings.(33) In April 2001 paramilitaries massacred approximately 40 peasant farmers along the river Naya that runs between the Departments of Valle del Cauca and Cauca. The paramilitaries apparently entered the area immediately after detachments with the Third Brigade of the Colombian Army, Brigada III, left the area, pointing to a strong coordination between paramilitaries and the Colombian security forces.(34) The paramilitaries were able to carry out the massacre despite the heavy militarization of the area and the fact that the authorities had been repeatedly alerted to an imminent paramilitary attack.(35)

US military assistance has included aid to the Colombian Marine Infantry. In February 2000, paramilitaries massacred local inhabitants in the municipality of El Salado, Department of Bolívar, over the course of several days whilst military units attached to the Colombian Navy's Primera Brigada de Infantería de la Marina (First Marine Infantry Unit) not only failed to prevent the massacre but also reportedly set up a roadblock to prevent humanitarian organizations from getting through to the village. According to information received by Amnesty International, 200 paramilitary gunmen raided the village of El Salado, killing 36 people, including a six-year-old child. Many victims were tied to a table in the village sports field and subjected to torture, including rape, before they were stabbed or shot dead.(36)

During this last year, restrictions imposed on the supply of weapons to Pakistan after its 1998 testing of nuclear bombs were waived,(37) and security assistance to Pakistan has skyrocketed from $3.5 million in fiscal year 2001 to a current authorization of some 1.3 billion.(38) Human rights advocates are also concerned about a review of defense trade policy being undertaken by the Bush Administration. Publicly available information suggests that the administration is considering policy changes that would relax controls on defense exports to key allies and potentially limit Congressional oversight of the arms trade. Because the strength of these allies' export controls varies widely, such changes may open new avenues for the diversion of U.S. technology and weapons.(39)

Uzbekistan
In 2003 Uzbekistan received a 258 per cent increase in funds available to purchase military equipment from US suppliers. The US is providing $25 million for military assistance and $18 million for "border security assistance" for Uzbekistan, now described as "one of our foremost partners in the fight against terrorism".(40) The $25 million, from the Foreign Military Financing program, is for "lethal and non-lethal" equipment including communication equipment, airfield upgrades and training, as well as uniforms, equipment and counter-insurgency training for Uzbek Special Forces. It also covers helicopters and aircraft, some leased from Ukraine, for border patrols. In return, the US can maintain military bases in Uzbekistan.

The US has also offered another $1 million in policing assistance, to set up an anti-narcotics unit to stem the flow of heroin and other drugs from Afghanistan, a trade that it says is helping to finance terrorist activity.

Yet at the same time, the US government has noted the "unsatisfactory" state of human rights in Uzbekistan, accusing the Uzbek government of using concerns about terrorist activity to "crack down broadly" on political opposition groups and human rights activists. "There are regular reports of human rights violations on the part of law enforcement bodies," it says. Amnesty International also noted the "unabated" reports of ill-treatment and torture by Uzbek law enforcement officials of alleged supporters of banned Islamist opposition parties and movements.(41)

Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Kenya and Ethiopia also saw important increases in their US military spending allowances. Restrictions on military assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan were waived.(42) Budget requests for the next fiscal year (2004) include substantial increases for Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan. They also include an additional $60 million for Israel, despite the US State Department's recent assertion that helicopters, fighter aircraft, anti-tank missiles, and flechettes have been used to commit human rights abuses.(43)

Cluster bombs used in Iraq
Although the US and UK authorities said that they would do everything possible to protect the Iraqi people, hundreds of civilians were reportedly killed in Iraq. Some were victims of cluster bombs; some died in attacks in disputed circumstances.

The scenes at al-Hilla's hospital on 1 April 2003 showed that something terrible had happened. The bodies of the men, women and children brought to the hospital were punctured with shards of shrapnel from cluster bombs. Injured survivors told reporters how the explosives fell "like grapes" from the sky, and how bomblets bounced through the windows and doors of their homes before exploding. A doctor at al-Hilla's hospital said that almost all the patients appeared to be victims of cluster bombs.

Some of the cluster bombs reportedly dropped from the air by US forces on a civilian area of al-Hilla appeared to be of the type BLU97 A. Each canister contains 202 small bomblets the size of a soft drink can. These cluster bombs scatter and spray over a large area about the size of two football fields. At least 5 per cent of the bomblets do not explode on impact, turning them into de facto anti-personnel mines as they continue to pose a threat to people, including civilians, who come into contact with them. This is the same air-dropped weapon that caused severe humanitarian problems in Afghanistan and Kosovo.

Dark green-grey ball-shaped BLU61 bomblets were also filmed and reported seen around al-Hilla, Najaf and Baghdad. In addition, the US forces fired M77 multiple rocket launched salvos, each with 644 cluster submunitions that spread over a 100 to 200 metre area.

Following a report by the US-based Violence Policy Center exposing past sales of long-range .50 caliber sniper rifles to Osama Bin Laden, the US State Department has recently decided to suspend the commercial export of these high-powered rifles that can pierce armoured vehicles and bring down aircraft. The State Department had already approved the export of 75 such weapons this year, though only 16 had already been delivered before the decision to suspend further sales.(44)

Afghanistan
By July 2002, the US had militarily defeated the Taleban and Al-Qaeda forces and observed a United Nations embargo on arms to Afghanistan agreed in December 2000, except for the new Government of Afghanistan and the International Security Assistance Force.

It should be recalled that, according to its officials, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) gave over US$2 billion in light weapons to Mujahideen groups in Afghanistan fighting the Soviet invasion between 1979 and 1989. Much of this was channelled via the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). This US aid continued openly until 1991, despite the fact that thousands of Afghan civilians were deliberately and arbitrarily killed by Mujahideen fighters, who were also responsible for widespread beatings, abductions and rapes. Other outside powers, including Iran and China, also supplied the Mujahideen groups with munitions, and they captured arms from the former Soviet Union. By late 2001, the weapons markets in the Taleban-held towns and villages on the Afghan border with Pakistan and Iran, were still reportedly doing a heavy trade in arms, including US and other missiles, and Kalashnikovs, made under licence in China and Egypt.

It came to light in 2002 that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former Afghan prime minister (1992-1995) whose faction received considerable US assistance, has now been placed on a US list of terrorists associated with Al-Qaeda.

2.2 Exports of Security Equipment

In a few cases, US companies have been involved in the marketing of devices that easily lend themselves to use in torture or ill-treatment - such as electro shock stun guns, belts, leg-irons and thumbcuffs. In many more cases, US companies produce devices designed for security and crime control purposes but which in reality can easily lend themselves to torture. In some cases US companies have provided this equipment to foreign security forces that are known to abuse legitimate devices to inflict torture. Amnesty International has compiled lists of more than 80 US companies involved in the manufacture, marketing and export of the type of weapons and other equipment that can be used to torture over the past decade.

In Russia, for example, sixteen-year-old Andrei Osenchugov was reportedly beaten, whipped and subjected to electric shocks over a three-day period in July 2002 in order to force him to confess to a robbery that he says he did not commit. From 1999-2001, the Commerce Department approved licenses for more than $4 million dollars of discharge type arms (for example stun guns and shock batons) to Russia. Between 2000-2001, the Department of Congress approved US export licenses for more than $15 million in restraint equipment, $30 million in discharge type arms and $185 million in all crime control exports.

Recent changes to the laws and the administrative rules that govern the export of such equipment are intended to limit its possible use for torture and ill-treatment. Current policy now restricts export of crime control items on a broad range of human rights concerns(45), and an interim rule issued by the Department of Commerce in September 2000 significantly improved the regulation of crime control items that could be used in torture by requiring export license and disaggregated reporting of electric shock and restraint items. In the last session of Congress (2002), the House International Relations Committee passed the Lantos-Hyde Amendment. The amendment, initiated by Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA) and Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL), limits the export of crime control equipment when the foreign government has repeatedly engaged in acts of torture. It also restricts the exports of equipment that Amnesty International considers to be inherently cruel, inhuman or degrading such as thumbscrews, weighted gloves, and electro-shock stun belts. (46)

2.3 Military and Police Training

The US government trains more than 100,000 foreign police and soldiers from more than 150 countries each year in US military and policing doctrine as well as war-fighting skills.(47) Throughout the decade of the 1990s, the record of one US military training institution, in particular, attracted public scrutiny in the US - the US Army's School of the Americas (SOA) offered training and education to Latin American soldiers, some of whom went on to commit human rights violations, and in 1996 training manuals advocating torture, extortion, kidnapping and execution were brought to light. No one has ever been accountable for these manuals or for the behaviour of SOA graduates, but in 2001 the school was renamed "the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation" (WHINSEC) and its curriculum was changed to include coursework in human rights and humanitarian law.

SOA-WHINSEC is well known, but in fact it is only one small part of a vast and complex network of US programs for training foreign military and police forces. Some of this education and training is conducted inside the US, funded either by the foreign government itself or with US loans and grants. In addition to the WHINSEC, there are approximately 275 military schools and installations in the US, offering over 4100 courses. Tens of thousands of students train in these programs, but far more receive some US training in their own nations through a variety of programs, including military exercises. Funding requests for International Military Education and Training (IMET), one of several US foreign military training programs, have risen to $91.7 million for budget year 2004, an increase of nearly 60 per cent since 2001.(48)

The US has imposed various restrictions on eligibility for military training, but these are not always rigorously observed. For example, because of Congressional concerns about Guatemala's continuing human rights performance, Guatemala is eligible only for non-lethal training supplied through a program known as Expanded-IMET. However, the current US Foreign Military Training Report indicates that 95 Guatemalan Army troops received light infantry training, which is generally supplied by US Special Forces.(49)

2.3.1 Private Military Services
In recent years the US government has frequently hired or authorized private military consultants to train foreign police forces and military troops. According to a detailed scholarly study, US companies trained militaries in more than 24 countries during the 1990s. This list includes Angola, Bolivia, Bosnia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Hungary, Kosovo, Peru, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Taiwan and Uganda (Sudanese forces).(50)

In many cases the US Defense, Justice or State Departments hire private corporations to implement training projects that the government has designed. For example, the US State Department has been using Military Professional Resources International (MPRI) and Logicon to train countries involved in its Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). Similarly, many training missions related to the US-funded war on the illegal drugs trade are being contracted privately.(51)

This stepped up "outsourcing" by the US government for training is attributable most principally to the overall growth in military and police training taken on by the United States in the past decade; US forces are unable to meet all of the training missions that various parts of the US government support around the world. On the supply-side, post-cold war reductions in the size of the US military forces led to a glut of experienced military personnel looking for work. Long-established professional military companies expanded operations in the 1990s and new firms sprang up to meet this business demand. The principal companies providing training to foreign forces are MPRI, Vinnell Corporation, Carlyle Group, BDM, Defense Forecasters International, DynCorp, Science Applications International Corporation, Texas Instruments and Booz-Allen & Hamilton.

In addition to working for the US government to carry out training programs, private companies may also contract directly with foreign governments to train military, security, or police forces in programs run independent of the US government. To do so, firms must first apply and be granted an export license by the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls.(52) Companies ranging from Boeing to MPRI apply for training contracts - Boeing for training on weapons systems it manufactures, and MPRI for training in tactics and operations.

Sometimes persistence is rewarded. According to the New York Times, the State Department twice refused to grant MPRI authorization to work with the government of Equatorial Guinea because of its poor human rights record. After two years of lobbying, though, the company was finally given permission to help build a coast guard to protect the oil-rich coastal waters being explored by Exxon Mobil. The State Department balked, however, at MPRI's request to help Guinea build its police and military forces.(53)

In 1975 Vinnell Corporation became the first private American company to receive permission from the State Department to run an independent training program for a foreign security force—in this case the Saudi Arabian National Guard.(54) Vinnell's most recent contract is for 1998-2003, and the firm currently has around 1400 civilian employees in Saudi Arabia.(55) Several other foreign militaries and police forces have hired private US companies for training. According to a news report in early 2000, DynCorp Inc. and MPRI were then completing contracts for logistical support and training of Colombian police and counterinsurgency forces, while at least six US firms had set up shop in Latin America, in anticipation of lucrative new contracts related to the United States' $1.6 billion military aid program for Colombia.(56)

The level of public transparency and accountability is significantly higher for US government programs that employ private contractors, such as the Africa Crisis Response Initiative, than it is for private commercial transactions between foreign entities and private US firms, such as the Colombian contracts. Information on private transactions is scarce. There is no requirement that the State Department publish an annual listing of precisely whom it has licensed (and therefore authorized) to provide private military or security training, for what purpose, where and with which security unit. Nor does Congress know who is training whom, since the State Department is only required to notify lawmakers of contracts valued at $50 million or more - a threshold so high that very few, if any, training operations are likely to surpass it.

In April 2003 the US Department of State awarded the multi-million dollar contract for policing Iraq to DynCorp, a private company with a dubious policing record. DynCorp was seeking to recruit active or recently retired policemen and prison guards and "experienced judicial experts". DynCorp personnel contracted to the United Nations police service in Bosnia were accused of buying and selling prostitutes, including a girl as young as twelve years old. Several DynCorp employees were also accused of videotaping the rape of one of the women. When Dyncorp employee Kathy Bolkovac spoke out publicly about the sex ring she was dismissed by the company for drawing attention to their abuses, but won her case against the company in a British employment tribunal in November.(57)

Military training is now a multimillion dollar global business, and most companies involved in the business have Internet web sites relating their corporate histories and advertising their services, including perhaps some information on their past or even current deployments. If so, this source might be about the only public information available, as commercial training contracts are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, the law that forces the government to review and release documents to the public. Military companies can and have blocked public access to information on commercially negotiated contracts by arguing that even the most basic information is proprietary.

In terms of official oversight of private training contracts, the only remote possibility is that an official from the local US embassy's security assistance office will make a field visit to inquire into how a training program is being carried out. Oversight varies from embassy to embassy, depending on the prominence of the issue. However, the fact that quite a few defense attaches have past relationships with the retired military personnel who now work for private military companies, likely further undermines serious oversight.

There are no legal or regulatory requirements for the inclusion of any international human rights or humanitarian law content in military, security, or police force training contracted privately. In addition, the "Leahy Law" requirement that trainees be vetted for prior human rights abuses does not apply to training purchased with the buyer's own money (but it does apply to US taxpayer-funded programs employing private firms, such as ACRI).

Taken together, these realities lead many to fear that training by private US security companies might contribute to human rights violations by providing sophisticated military training to abusive personnel, by not including any human rights or humanitarian law emphasis in the training, or perhaps even by imparting tactics and doctrine that are not standard for US forces.

Private Military Training in Croatia
Military Professional Resources International (MPRI) received a two-year contract with Croatia in September 1994 (later extended for two more years) for the "Democracy Transition Assistance Program" (DTAP). This privately contracted program between MPRI and the Croatian government was supposed to ensure that the Croatian military could meet the necessary human rights and democracy standards for admission into NATO's "Partnership for Peace" program. DTAP was to focus on classroom teaching of issues such as the difference between military and civil systems of law and proper military conduct toward civilians during and after conflict. No classes on tactics or on the use of weaponry were to be taught.

In 1995 the Croatian military launched two surprisingly successful military operations, called "Flash" and "Storm." In these operations, the army exhibited new communications techniques and movements that did not resemble its usual Warsaw Pact military tactics.(58) In addition, Croatian troops committed a number of serious human rights abuses.(59)

In May 1996 Amnesty International sent a letter to the head of MPRI and to the Secretary of State, raising several questions about the human rights situation in Croatia (and Bosnia, where MPRI was also training forces), and inquiring about MPRI's human rights training.

"The fact that MPRI's initial training was followed by human rights violations [in Croatia], raises serious questions about the effectiveness of the human rights component of the training offered by MPRI." The letter asked specifically about the firm's system of vetting trainees, the content of the training (in particular inquiring whether the training raised the issue of gender, given widespread use of rape in the war), and how the impact and effectiveness of the training were monitored.(60)
Amnesty International USA staff subsequently met with Ed Soyster, the International Vice President of MPRI, who said that there was no specific human rights training included in the training provided to the Croatian forces. He also made the point, that as a private organization, MPRI was not accountable to Amnesty International or to anyone else for the content of their training programs.

The following year Amnesty USA filed a series of requests for information about the human rights components of the MPRI's Croatia contracts with the US State Department's Office of the Special Representative for Military Stabilization in the Balkans. The group received no useful information.(61)

2.4 Specific Recommendations

The government of the USA should actively promote the development of an international "Arms Trade Treaty" with provisions for arms export control based upon respect for international law, especially international human rights and humanitarian law. The US government should also takes steps to strengthen efforts to address the trade in small arms, light weapons and security equipment, and to prevent the use of indiscriminate weapons [for details on these measures, see the final recommendations at the end of this report]

In addition, the US government should:

· Suspend US arms sales, transfers and military aid to countries whose armed forces are likely to use them to commit human rights abuses, such as Israel, Colombia and Uzbekistan, until the danger of misuse has been proven to be very low.

3. Russian Federation

3.1 Introduction

Despite the break up of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation remains one of the world's top three producers of military, security and police (MSP) equipment and is still the world's second most important supplier of light weapons and ammunition after the United States.(62) The military industrial complex in Russia encompasses over 2,500 state defence contractors of which about 1,100 enterprises are licensed for the production of weapons and war materiel.(63)

Increasingly private companies are engaged in the MSP industry supplying such products as personal protection equipment or surveillance systems, or offering a full range of security services such as VIP protection or training of security forces. Often they have links into, or ex-staff from, the Russian security services, police or army.(64)

3.2 Arms Production

Russian companies make a wide range of weaponry and internal security technologies for purposes such as riot control, surveillance and prisoner restraint and control. These range from batons, shields and chemical incapacitants to shotguns firing a diverse range of incapacitating ammunition.(65) Russia has also imported security equipment and training from many countries including Israel, Germany, Canada, USA and Australia.(66) The Israeli company Elite Alpha Firearms Training Ltd claims to have trained Russian special forces.(67). Russia has engaged in significant programmes of research in "advanced non-lethal" weapons for disabling protestors using radio frequency, laser, kinetic, acoustic and biochemical systems (68) and in recent years some of this research has been in co-operation with a variety of agencies in the United States(69) and Germany.(70) Russian forces have also used "less lethal" weapons - most notoriously in the breaking of the Moscow theatre siege in October 2002, when they used a calmative agent based on the chemical fentanyl. Approximately 204 hostages died from the effects of the gas.(71) It has also been reported that Russian forces have used an ultrasound device during the conflict in Chechnya.(72)

Russia has manufactured electroshock batons since at least the early 1990s and has an institute dedicated solely to the testing of them.(73) The March Joint Stock Co, Moscow produces the Scorpion, Malvina and Arnold electroshock batons ranging from 70-100,000 volts, also 45,000 volt stun guns and a 45,000 volt electroshock briefcase.(74). Advanced pulsed electro-shock stun batons were imported from America in the mid nineties.(75) Small arms and light weapons continue to be manufactured largely in state owned factories.

3.3 Arms Export Control

Russia epitomizes the problems of controlling the use of arms and security equipment to prevent human rights violations. It is a major producer, a major exporter and a major victim of illicit proliferation of light weapons. Russia already has one of the most bureaucratically efficient systems of marking and tracking small arms. Its centralized systems mean that all trade is either officially sanctioned or it is illicit. The major flaw is that there is virtually no reference to controlling exports in terms of respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, and no national legal criteria or oversight mechanisms to achieve this goal.

Nevertheless, the Russian Federation agreed in 1991 to the OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers which do include respect for human rights, and more recently the Russian government supported the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons. On December 1, 2000, Russia set up the Committee on Military-Technical Co-operation of the Russian Federation to develop a more effective export control mechanism for military supplies. The Russian Government has also agreed to submit to the OSCE appropriate data on small arms and light weapon transfers in accordance with the agreed nomenclature. These are important shifts in policy that need to be recognized but, as is shown by the other G8 states, it is not sufficient to have a policy recognizing human rights - the main challenge is to abide by that policy.

In recent years, Russia has still ranked in the top three weapons exporters, despite the poor state of some of its production facilities. The majority of Russia's military exports are carried out by the state controlled marketing organization, Rosoboronexport, which has agents in 36 countries.(76) Exports in 2002 set a new post-Soviet record of $4.7 billion.(77) In 2002 Rosoboronexport exported 85 per cent of Russia's weapons. Five Russian companies also exported directly to overseas customers.

Despite efforts by Rosoboronexport to control all exports from Russia, the number of private companies able to export independently is set to increase. Because of the severe financial situation in Russia, its armed forces cannot afford to replace aging equipment and the only way many companies can survive is to export. This is leading to direct competition between the state exporter and private companies. It is extremely difficult to obtain official information about Russia's arms exports, and the Russian committee on military-technical cooperation with foreign countries has even developed a list of information relating to exports that will be banned from publication.(78)

Russia's main export markets are China and India. Other important markets are Vietnam, Algeria, Yemen, Kuwait, Greece, Burma, Malaysia and Sudan - mostly countries with long-standing and acute human rights problems.

3.4 Small Arms

Russian small arms and light weapons have proliferated to many of the world's conflict zones. The USA remains an important market for sporting and hunting versions of military weapons as well as ammunition.

The Kalashnikov assault rifle (AK47 - a term which covers the vast range of some 160 variants) is the world's most widely distributed single weapon model and has a huge impact on human rights especially within Africa and the Middle East. Copies of the AK47 are produced in at least 19 countries (including China, Bulgaria, Finland, Yugoslavia, Iraq and Romania), but it is no longer made in Russia. Its legendary reliability has led to estimates of the number of AK47s in circulation to be as high as 100 million(79), and it is held in the inventories of more than 80 countries, with the Russian Federation itself possessing ten different versions.(80) The price of these rifles varies enormously. The official Russian export price is $100 but models can be worth from $200-1000 on the illicit market, yet in areas of high availability such as South Africa, it can be as low as $15.(81)

The fact that so many countries are producing copies means that it is and will always be extremely difficult to determine exact provenance of manufacture of any weapon used in human rights violations, unless and until Russia shares its gun serial numbers with the international community. Estimates on available stockpiles of Russian small arms and light weapons are also difficult. The Swiss Small Arms Survey for example calculates that Mozambique alone has six million or more AK47s, roughly half the number thought to be in the whole of the Russian federation, and Afghanistan is thought to have at least 10 million in circulation.(82) What is more certain is that in the difficult economic climate which now prevails in Russia and its former client states, these stockpiles leak and become substitute currencies for army personnel, many of whom have not been paid for many months.

Examples of recent Russian small arms, light weapons and ammunition exports include automatic grenade launchers made by KBP to Afghanistan, Iraq, Chad and Angola(83); ammunition from LVE Plant to Afghanistan, Cambodia, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea.(84) Over the last 3 years Russia has exported over 9,000 modern, NATO calibre AK-101 and AK-102 assault rifles to Indonesia, with further exports ongoing.(85)

3.5 Larger weapons

Increasingly Russia is signing military-technical cooperation agreements as a first step towards increasing exports. Currently Russia has such agreements with a number of countries including Algeria, Syria, Yemen, UAE, Kuwait, Sudan, Egypt, Jordan and Libya. (86)

In early 2003 Russian officials visited Pyongyang to discuss military upgrades for tanks, and supplies of night vision equipment and ammunition.(87) It has recently delivered military equipment and training to Myanmar under a deal worth $130 million.(88) In 2002 Russia signed an agreement worth some $150 million to supply Ethiopia with a range of military equipment including combat helicopters, armoured personnel carriers and ammunition for infantry weapons.(89) It has also recently supplied helicopters to Nigeria.(90) Russia is increasing its exports and cooperation with Indonesia, exports include armoured personnel carriers, combat helicopters and military training.(91) All of these are countries where Amnesty International has documented human rights violations by armed forces

Russia uses arms exports to directly fund the re-equipping of its armed forces which otherwise it could not afford to do. The promotion of Russian MSP equipment has increased hugely in recent years. There are MSP fairs held regularly not only in Moscow but new fairs such as Ural Expo Arms, OTTV Omsk and Moscow Aerospace. International arms fairs used to see one stall of Russian weaponry marketed by the state export organization. In recent years Russian companies have exhibited at numerous international arms fairs including Malaysia, Colombia, Turkey, France, Greece, Pakistan, South Africa and United Arab Emirates. As well as weaponry, financial services for defence enterprises have also been offered at the fairs, for example by Interprombank at DSA in Malaysia and MAKS in Russia.(92)

3.6 Foreign Licenced Production

As well as exporting directly, Russia is increasingly embracing licensed production abroad as a way of earning badly needed revenue. Where foreign licenced production is established in states with weak arms export controls, the chances of such arms falling into the hands of human rights abusers is greatly increased. In Soviet times the production of Russian small arms and other weaponry took place in most Warsaw Pact countries but was often unregulated. Recently Russia has been trying to claw back some of this intellectual property and potential earnings by threatening lawsuits against unlicensed manufacture of its designs.

For example the Bulgarian Arsenal Plant was pressured to purchase a licensed production agreement for the Kalashnikov assault rifle.(93) Bulgaria has been the source of such Kalashnikovs by international arms traffickers supplying governments and rebel groups who commit human rights violations. It has also been reported that Bazalt, the Russian company that developed the RPG-7 rocket launcher, has pressed Pakistan Ordnance Factories as well as Bulgarian and Greek manufacturers to enter into agreements in relation to unlicensed copies.(94) At a recent arms fair in Abu Dhabi it was reported that Rosoboronexport was actively seeking out unauthorised copies of Russian military hardware.(95)

Russia is also actively offering new licensed production agreements as a method of ensuring arms exports, for example to India,(96) Vietnam,(97) China(98) and Syria.(99) At the recent Defendory arms exhibition in Greece (October 2002) Russia entered into negotiations with Greece on the possible licensed production of a new compact assault rifle, and the Bazalt company held discussions with Israeli representatives to discuss joint cooperation.(100)

3.7 Arms for Natural Resources

A worrying development in Russian MSP exports is the link between resource extraction companies (oil and gas) and the supply of weapons. Participation in oil and gas projects in Algeria by a number of companies, including Gazprom, has been linked to arms deliveries.(101) Recently it has been reported that Promgaz (an affiliate of Gazprom) has signed a cooperation agreement to interact in foreign markets to boost the export potential of Russia's defence industry.(102) Russian resource extraction companies, for example the joint Belarussian-Russian company Slavneft, are also heavily involved in exploiting Sudan's oil reserves.(103) Russia has actively exported arms to states in zones prone to violent conflict, particularly in African countries rich in natural resources.

Sudan
For example, following a trade delegation that visited Sudan in April 1995, the government in Khartoum reported that the Russian government was ready to support Sudan in technical and training fields and to reactivate previous military agreements.(104) It was reported in 1997 that Russia had supplied 9 T-55 tanks and 6 Mi-24B "Hind" attack helicopters to Sudan via Belarus.(105) Russia further supplied 60 BTR-80A armoured personnel carriers manufactured by the Arzamas Machinery Plant, which were delivered in 2000 to the Sudanese government forces.

On 21 February 2002, a Sudan government helicopter gunship killed 24 civilians in Bieh, injured many others and disrupted a World Food Programme (WFP) food distribution operation. The attack occurred despite a flight clearance agreement given by the Sudanese government to WFP operations in Bieh that day, under the framework of Operation Lifeline Sudan, the umbrella organization providing relief to civilians in Southern Sudan. The government announced an investigation into the incidents but no results of any investigation were ever announced.(106)


Angola
Weapons supplied by Russia to Angola range from Su-24 fighter bombers handed over in January 2001(107), Mi-23 fighters, repairs to other fighters, T-72 tanks, grenade launchers supplied by the Instrument Design Bureau KBP Tula(108), attack helicopters supplied in 2000.(109)

The civil war in Angola continued throughout 2001; hundreds of unarmed civilians were deliberately killed by government forces and by forces of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. The armed conflict and insecurity were responsible for the number of internally displaced people increasing by 300,000 during the year to an estimated total of four million and for a precarious humanitarian situation.(110)

A visit to Luanda by Igor Sergevey, Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, led to the parties reaching agreement on the maintenance and modernization of the Angolan army's weapons. It is also reported that Russia and Angola are proposing to establish in Angola centres for serving of weapons of Soviet manufacture in other African states.(111) This could have a profound effect as Africa is awash with old, broken down Russian equipment such as APCs and artillery pieces.

Russia has also supplied arms to Eritrea and Ethiopia at a time of high tension and military clashes.(112) Russia supplied significant amounts of weaponry to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan (in 2001 estimated at £30-40 million) and is expected to be the largest provider of MSP equipment to the new regime.(113) The largest markets by far for Russian MSP exports are China which over the last few years is stated to be worth up to US$9 billion,(114) and India.(115)

Russia has recently signed a number of major contracts with India and is in line to modernize and re-equip Indian paramilitary forces with equipment including Mi-17 helicopters and AK small arms.(116) This includes weaponry for border security forces that operate in Kashmir as well as Assam. Recently new contracts have been signed with Iran(117) and with Indonesia to supply helicopters which may have a role in the Papua and Aceh conflicts.(118) The Indonesian navy this year plans to buy two Mi-171 and eight Mi-2 helicopters from Russia. Human rights activists claim the new helicopters may be used in operations to crack down on separatist rebels in Papua and Aceh.(119)

3.8 Foreign-based Brokers, Dealers and Agents

Russian companies increasingly use agents and dealers abroad to promote their weaponry. One example is the South African based company Suburban Guns which advertises on its website that it is a dealer for Izhmash, Baikal and Makarov weapons, and has also offered Igla and Strela man-portable shoulder launched air-to-air missiles. It also stated in company product information that it was a distributor for NII Stali, although whether this included electroshock weapons is not known.(120)

Besides the "official" trade in weapons, there are a large number of arms traffickers and brokers willing to supply arms to warring factions across Africa. One example is the network operated by Victor Bout who, through his UAE based Air Cess Company, is reported to have delivered arms clandestinely to Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Congo and to have been paid in "conflict diamonds" mined illegally. Much of the weaponry traded originated in Russia, Central Asia and other Eastern European countries. Another example is the Zimbabwean company, Avient, with management links to the UK, which was reported to have hired Russian aircraft and air crew to support the government of Laurent Kabila in the Congo with "air drops", and also admitted to repairing and maintaining Russian MIG fighters for the Kabila regime.(121)

A major source of weapons for the arms brokers is from stockpiles left over from the Soviet era, or from current army stockpiles that may be poorly maintained and guarded. A number of instances have been reported where serving military units have supplied equipment to dealers. A Russian military unit reportedly supplied ten anti-aircraft missile launchers to a dealer who then sent them to Chechen armed oppositionists. The launchers were the same kind used to shoot down four military helicopters in 2002.(122) Such illicit weapons can impact greatly on domestic crime issues (Russia has seen an increase in the use of small arms in crime), as well as ending up in the hands of criminals abroad, for example the recent cases of military pistols ending up in Japan.(123)

3.9 Impact on Violations within Russia

Chechnya
The ongoing conflict in Chechnya has seen repeated human rights violations by Russian MSP forces in their efforts to contain rebel forces. Reports of torture in "filtration camps", disappearances, extrajudicial executions and the indiscriminate targeting of the civilian population have consistently been reported.(124) Of particular concern is the practice of "zachistki" or sweep operations, when villages or sectors of towns are cordoned and searched, in many cases leading to destruction of property, looting and the disappearance of young males.(125) Also reported is the use of "fuel air" weapons (more powerful than any conventional explosives) in civilian areas causing huge casualties(126) and the use of cluster bombs, which because of their high failure rate become de-facto landmines after the conflict has ended.(127)

Tragically much of the weaponry used by the rebels in Chechnya was provided by, or seized from, official Russian stocks.(128)For example in May 1992 the Russian Minister of defence ordered the handover to the Chechen General Dzhokhar Dudayev of half of the military armaments belonging to Russian Federation forces in Chechnya. Estimates of the Russian small arms left in Chechnya when Russian troops pulled out in 1992 range between 41,000 and 57,000 pieces. The Russian Defence Ministry reported 18,832 AK 74s 9,307 AKM's, 533 Dragunov sniper rifles, 138 grenade launchers, 678 tank machine guns, 319 large calibre machine guns and 10,581 pistols left behind. Rebels were also thought to have acquired 200,000 hand grenades and over 13 million rounds of ammunition.(129). It is worrying that Russia has decided to end the mandate of the OSCE assistance group in Chechnya as this could reduce scrutiny of human rights abuses in Chechnya and gives a false impression of normalisation.(130)

3.10 Specific Recommendations

The government of the Russian Federation should actively promote the development of an international "Arms Trade Treaty" with provisions for arms export control based upon respect for international law, especially international human rights and humanitarian law. The Russian government should also takes steps to strengthen efforts to address the trade in small arms, light weapons and security equipment, and to prevent the use of indiscriminate weapons [for details on these measures, see the final recommendations at the end of this report]

In addition, the Russian government should:

· Establish a system of export control based upon rigorous case by case consideration of whether any proposed arms or security equipment or technology export would be likely to result in such exports being used for serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law;

4. France

4.1 Introduction

France is one of the world's largest producers of military equipment and is ranked in the top five largest arms exporters. However, the French government is generally not transparent about its arms exports.

Since coming to power in 1995, President Jacques Chirac has instigated wide-ranging reforms of French defence policy. The defence reform programme, first announced in February 1996, was implemented through the 1997-2002 Military Planning Act, which ended conscription and reorganised both active and reserve forces. As a result of these reforms the defence industry has been forced to undergo huge changes, including privatisations and job cuts.(131) It has also meant that exports have been accounting for an increased proportion of business for French producers as orders from the French armed forces decrease.(132)

4.2 Production and Exports

In 1997-2001 France accounted for 10 per cent of global arms transfers, ranking as the third largest exporter(133). French military exports were 2.7 billion euros in 2000 and 3.1 billion in 2001. Figures are not available yet for the year 2002(134). Arms fairs to promote French military and security technology are organised and attended with government support, such as the Eurosatory arms fair in Paris in June 2002, Milipol Qatar 2002 and the Asian Aerospace 2000 show at which French fighter aircraft were displayed.(135)

4.3 Arms Control

Arms possession, production and trade are still governed by the Decree-law of 18 April 1939, though an inter-ministerial working group has recently been appointed to take into account recent changes in the field of public security, national defence policy and armaments. Features of the French national arms export control law include the following:

· Many types of security and police equipment and technologies are not mentioned in French trade legislation and hence their export is generally not controlled. There are exceptions for those items classified as 'arms' in which case both manufacture and export are regulated.

4.4 Small Arms and Light Weapons

Successive French governments have provided military and other security equipment and training to most Francophone countries in Africa, often regardless of their human rights record..(144) Among the recipients of weapons such as small calibre machine-guns, automatic rifles, light guns and shoulder-fired rockets in 1999 were Burkina Faso, identified by the UN as a conduit for arms to Liberia and to armed opposition forces in Sierra Leone.

Cameroon
The French authorities have also allowed the export in 1999 of small calibre machine-guns, automatic rifles, light weapons and shoulder-fired rockets in to Cameroon. There the security forces were reported to have unlawfully executed hundreds of people since 1998. In 1999, extrajudicial executions of criminal suspects in North, Far-North and Adamawa Provinces of Cameroon continued during operations to combat armed robbery by a joint unit of the army and gendarmerie (the paramilitary police), known as the brigade anti-gang. From March 1998, when the "brigade" was deployed, some 700 people were reported as extra-judicially executed. Killings were reported to have continued throughout 1999. The practice of abandoning unburied bodies decreased and it became more difficult to establish the numbers killed.(145)


Egypt
Despite persistent reports of human rights abuses involving the use of force by Egyptian security forces in the late 1990s(146), including excessive use of force and torture in police stations, shotgun cartridges were transferred from France to Egypt during 2000.(147) In a student demonstration at Alexandria University on 9 April 2002, a 19-year-old student, Muhammad Ali al-Sayid al-Saqqa, was killed and several others were seriously injured by buckshot. The demonstration began peacefully but events escalated as security forces prevented students from leaving the confines of the university campus to join others outside for a protest march.

A statement issued by the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior said that the security forces fired buckshot in an attempt to calm down the situation. Amnesty International fears that Muhammad 'Ali al-Sayid al-Saqqa died after being shot by buckshot fired by a member of the security forces in circumstances where the safeguards required under the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials were not adhered to.(148)


Senegal
Ammunition not categorised, as 'war material' still needs a special French export licence for 'explosive commodities'.(149) Many police forces worldwide use non-military grade ammunition in weapons such as shotguns. During 2000 France transferred both 'small arms ammunition' and 'shotgun cartridges' to Senegal.(150)

In January 2001, student Balla Gaye was shot dead in clashes between demonstrators and the police near the University of Dakar. President Wade immediately ordered an investigation which concluded in November that the police might have been responsible for this death. A policeman was subsequently charged and detained but has not yet been tried.(151)

Throughout the 1990s Amnesty International had reported regular human rights violations by the Senegalese security forces in the context of the armed conflict in Casamance, including arbitrary arrests and long-term detentions without trial, extrajudicial executions, "disappearances", torture and ill-treatment. In 1999, for example, Amnesty International reported that many civilians in Casamance, arrested by the security forces, were reportedly tortured or ill-treated while held incommunicado for up to 10 days before being presented before an examining judge. A number of them were allegedly burned with petrol-filled plastic bottles set alight. None of these allegations were investigated. In May 1998, security forces fired live ammunition to break up a student demonstration in Saint-Louis, Senegal's second city. Nine students and one policeman were hurt in these clashes.(152)

In April 1998 Djoumondong Bassène, Louis Bassène, Babao Manga and Lamine Tendeng were detained in Djiromaïte. They were reportedly asked to dig their own graves and then shot. Adrien Sambou ''disappeared'' after being arrested by soldiers in Kabrousse in July. In November soldiers broke into Djifangor Banjal, a neighbourhood near Ziguinchor, and killed some 30 civilians in a door-to-door search for MFDC (an armed opposition group) rebels.(153)

Côte d'Ivoire
Firearms' cartridges and parts were transferred to Côte d'Ivoire from France during 2000.(154) In 2002 Amnesty International reported several instances of extrajudicial execution in the country. On 7 October gendarmes in Abidjan shot three civilians from Burkina Faso. An eyewitness reported that « at about 7pm, gendarmes asked these three people to show them their identity cards and then took their money. They then asked them to lie down on the ground on their stomachs. One of the gendarmes took out his gun, the men from Burkina-Faso begged for forgiveness, the two other policemen tried to dissuade their colleague from shooting them but were not successful. Two of the men died instantly and the third died the next day."(155)

4.5 Larger Arms Exports

Zimbabwe
In 1998 it was reported that France's ACMAT military trucks had been selected by Zimbabwe for front-line use, with 23 already in use by the Zimbabwean armed forces.(156) Reporting on the continuing human rights violations in Zimbabwe by state-sponsored "militia" as well as state security forces, Amnesty International has noted repeated examples of soldiers arriving in trucks to commit such abuses. On 28 June 2000, for example, three days after the parliamentary elections, soldiers beat Edwin Mushoriwa, the opposition MDC party parliamentary representative for the Harare constituency of Dzivarasekwa, as well as other MDC supporters. Around 200 MDC supporters were holding a victory rally when the soldiers arrived in a military truck and beat them with rifle butts. Many MDC supporters were hospitalised.(157)

In the court hearings reviewing the election in the Mutoko South constituency of Mashonaland East Province, Matthew Rukwata Dovi, a parliamentary candidate for the MDC, testified that ''militia'' members abducted him on 20 April 2000 and held him for three weeks. He said that he was often handcuffed, and repeatedly assaulted, and on one occasion he and three other MDC party members were forcibly exhibited as ''MDC turncoats'' upon a stage at a ZANU-PF rally. Amnesty International reported that government trucks donated or provided by foreign states were used to transport the abducted victims.(158)

In July 2001, civilians in Budiriro reported that army soldiers and police were beating residents up, apparently in reprisal for their observance of a two-day stay away organized by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. Tim Rhumba, who lived in Budiriro, was quoted in a daily newspaper describing how armed soldiers arrived in five trucks outside his home as they searched for someone identified as an MDC official. He said the soldiers ordered him and other occupants in the home to lie down on the floor, and then began to assault them.(159) Given the recent escalation of violent political repression by government armed forces in Zimbabwe, as well as abuses committed by Zimbabwean soldiers in the DRC, it should have been foreseen that military trucks transferred from France would be used to facilitate human rights violations.

Côte d'Ivoire
In September 2000, there were 13 Véhicule de l'Avant Blindé (VAB) amphibious armoured personnel carrier in service in Côte d'Ivoire. The VAB was developed by Giat, the French state arms manufacturer, to meet the French Army's requirements. However, by the year 2000, one thousand of these vehicles had been exported and they were in service in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. While the French Army's version is normally fitted with a 7.62mm or 12.7mm machine gun, the export versions have a wider range of weapons including a turret-mounted 20mm cannon.(160)

In October 2002 dozens of civilians were massacred at Daloa, after the recapture of the town by government forces. The men in fatigues who carried out the killings arrived in military vehicles and 'tanks'.(161)

Indonesia
In April 1996, Indonesian security forces with armoured personnel carriers (APCs) violently suppressed a protest in Ujung Pandang using excessive force; at least three students were killed. Three months later, the US government explicitly included APCs in its arms export ban on Indonesia citing human rights violations as the reason for the ban. Amnesty International opposed the provision of such armoured vehicles to Indonesia because of the potential to use the mounted guns for political killings, to facilitate arbitrary arrests and torture, as well as to command and control such operations. Yet in that same month, July 1996, Indonesia ordered 18 VBL (Véhicule Blinde Leger) amphibious scout cars from Panhard, a French company, for delivery the following year to its armed forces. (162)

During 2000, Giat's VAB armoured personnel carriers were also in service with the Indonesian security forces.(163) Armoured vehicles were used by the security forces in Aceh to counter armed rebels during which serious human rights violations were committed by both sides. Hundreds of people were extra-judicially executed and thousands of villagers have fled their homes and sought refuge in local mosques and schools.(164)

Republic of the Congo
France is heavily dependent on Africa for its oil. French companies control significant oil fields in the Republic of the Congo. French oil interests have apparently been linked with the supply of arms, and this has sometimes had devastating consequences for the human rights of the local population. For example, in 1998, France delivered 71 military transport vehicles to the government of the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville). Many civilians were killed and injured during the armed conflict and some 800,000 people were displaced.

It could have been foreseen from the recent history of the violent conflict in the Congo that soldiers there would misuse the vehicles to facilitate human rights violations. Some 25,000 militias were estimated to be involved in the fighting. The former president of the French oil company Elf, which has significant interests in the Congo, admitted that his company delivered arms to both main sides in the conflict.(165)

4.6 Security Equipment

Tear gas to Kenya
When Kenyan paramilitary police stormed All Saints Anglican Cathedral in Nairobi on 7 July 1997, first they threw tear gas canisters, and then they moved in wielding truncheons. Several dozen peaceful pro-reform advocates sheltering inside were left bleeding and badly hurt; many more, including an elderly opposition member of parliament, were injured.(166) Amnesty International researchers retrieved some of the tear gas canisters and plastic bullets used against peaceful protesters in Kenya and traced them back to British companies. Following pressure from Amnesty International, the UK government declared that it had rejected £1.5 million of licence applications for riot control equipment - including batons and tear gas - to Kenyan police because of human rights concerns.

But human rights abuses by the Kenyan security forces continued. When tear gas was misused again in June 1999 against a crowd of 2,000 peaceful protesters, Amnesty International again put a name to the company manufacturing the tear gas - and this time it was a French company, Nobel Sécurité. So after the UK government rejected licences for export of tear gas, it seems that the Kenyan authorities instead turned to a French company to supply the equipment necessary for such brutal acts of "crowd control".

This case illustrates the need for stringent, internationally consistent arms control. However, a French decree of 20 November 1991 contains a list of all the war material and other associated equipment that is subject to a special export procedure, and tear gas grenades are not considered war material and therefore are not subject to any specific procedure.

Nor does French arms export law contain any specific reference to the control of leg irons, thumb cuffs, electronic batons, stun guns, stun belts and shock shields, all equipment which can be used for torture. In 1998-2000, the French companies Le Protecteur SA, AKAH (Albrecht Kind France), Equipol, Eclats Antivols SA and R-Plus were offering to supply electro-shock stun weapons, Rivolier SA and Le Protecteur SA were offering leg irons, and Le Protecteur SA was offering thumbcuffs.(167)

In its third report to the French parliament (2001), the Ministry of Defence admitted that Article 2 of the EU Code of Conduct mandates all EU member states to exercise control over the exports of non-military goods susceptible of being used for repression purposes or other human rights abuses. However, the goods involved do not fit into the French category of military goods or into the category of military-civilian dual use goods, and are therefore considered to be civilian goods to be regulated at the European level. A recently proposed European Commission Trade Regulation will, if enacted unamended, ban the import, export and brokering by companies and individuals of items that the Commission has categorised as "torture equipment" including electro-shock stun belts, leg irons, thumb-cuffs and shackles. It will also require member states to introduce controls on exports of stun batons, stun guns and riot control agents such as tear gas.

The French authorities have created a working group to assess the legal consequences of such a future European controlling mechanism for policing and security equipment. Amnesty International calls on France to introduce export controls on police and security equipment such as riot control batons and shields, tear gas and other chemical irritants, stun guns and shock shields.

4.7 Licensing of Foreign Production

Turkey
Giat Industries manufactures a one-person power-operated turret armed with a 25mm cannon and 7.62mm machine gun for the Romanian/Turkish RN-94 armoured personnel carrier, developed as a private venture by the Nurol Machinery and Industry Company of Turkey and the Romarm Company of Romania to meet the requirements of the Turkish Land Forces (TLF). TLF Command has so far purchased five RN-94s for extensive trials.(168) Giat's turret is being manufactured under licence by Nurol in Turkey for installation on locally built FNSS Defence Systems Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFV).(169)

In June 1995 the US State Department published a report saying that there was 'highly credible' evidence that Turkey was using armoured personnel carriers, among other equipment, in instances of human rights violations.(170) Amnesty International has documented the use of armoured personnel carriers to perpetrate human rights abuses in Turkey. Safak Akbulut is believed to have been abducted by Gendarmerie officers on 24 November 1999, the day she was released from prison. While in prison she was reportedly pressured to turn state's witness. The Minister of Justice reportedly gave a statement after Safak Akbulut's "disappearance", openly acknowledging that Safak Akbulut had not been released from prison, as the court had ordered, but that she had been taken in a military vehicle to the military service branch.(171)

4.8 Brokering arms supplies

Brokers of arms deals based in France must obtain government approval for their general operations but they do not need to obtain prior approval on a case-by-case basis if the arms transfer and brokerage activity is outside France.

"Angolagate" first came to light when French judicial officials found that Brenco International, a company owned by billionaire businessman Pierre Falcone, was involved in arms transfers to the Angola government and had made payments to a number of his French associates(172). Pierre Falcone was a consultant to the French government agency SOFREMI, which exports military equipment under the auspices of the French Interior Ministry. He had also developed good contacts in the Eastern European arms business through Russian émigré businessman Arcadi Gaydamak who was based in Israel. In November 1993, Pierre Falcone and Arcadi Gaydamak had allegedly helped arrange the sale of small arms to Angola worth US$47 million. In 1994, they reportedly arranged a second deal for US$563 million-worth of weapons, including tanks and helicopters. The Angolan government paid for the weapons with oil.(173)

The civil war in Angola has taken the lives of hundreds of unarmed civilians each year at the hands of both government forces and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Human rights abuses reported included torture, mutilation, abductions and killings. In 2001 alone, the armed conflict and insecurity were responsible for 300,000 people being forced to flee their homes, bringing the number of internally displaced people to four million.(174)

A new draft law proposed by the French Senate provides for the creation of a regime whereby a broker would have to apply for a licence before each "intermediary operation", as well as a system for reporting each brokerage operation under the threat of penal sanctions if these provisions are violated. However, there is no provision for full control of extra-territorial brokering by French nationals and residents, which means that brokers could merely leave the country to be able to continue their business. The draft law has still not been adopted.(175).

4.8.1 Trade supporting illicit arms trafficking
France, along with China, is one of the two largest markets for Liberian timber. Yet the Liberian timber industry has strong links with the arms trade to Liberia - an explicit finding of the United Nations (UN) Panel of Experts established by the UN Security Council to monitor compliance with UN sanctions imposed on Liberia in 2001.

The Panel's reports have shown that the government of Liberia is continuing to procure arms, despite the UN ban on arms transfers. The Panel has stressed concerns that revenue from the timber trade - a major source of government income - is being used to purchase military assistance and that timber companies have facilitated transfers of weapons. These weapons are being used to pursue internal armed conflict between government forces and the armed opposition Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD).

Both sides continue to commit grave human rights abuses against civilians as fighting has intensified and spread during 2003. Liberian government forces and armed militia fighting with them are responsible for killings, torture, including rape, and forcible recruitment of children under-18. LURD forces have committed similar abuses, although to a lesser extent.(176)

4.9 French military aid

During the cold war, one of the biggest fields of French cooperation was in Africa, the countries engaged in these cooperation were called "Les pays du Champ". France still has bilateral defence accords with countries such Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Cote d'Ivoire (suspended since General Robert Guei entered in power), Rwanda, Togo and Zaire.(177) The number of French military personnel in operation in African countries is difficult to establish.(178) In 2000 François Lamy a French deputy, noted that just 39 defence accords were published out of a total of 90.(179)

4.9.1 Training
The Nationals Schools with Regional Vocations (NSRV):
There are 15 training centres, in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, Ivory Cost, Mali, Senegal and Togo for more than 840 trainees coming from 20 countries in 2001 (690 in 2000). In these centres there are French instructors.(180)

French military schools:
In 2000, 1473 places were offered to foreign military officers. Some of the training involves maintenance of order but full details are not available. The available information does not mention human rights or humanitarian law, nor if inquiries are made about students' backgrounds or the risk of their involvement in human rights violations.(181)

4.9.2 Military "Co-operation"
Although the reporting structures within the French cooperation policy have recently been reformed,(182) there is still a great lack of transparency. The French Parliament does not receive a complete report about French military cooperation programmes abroad. An official of the MDCD told Amnesty International that his agency was always prepared to answer to questions raised by the French Parliament, but he refused to talk about French military cooperation programmes in central Africa, as 'this was confidential information that could not be shared with the general public'.(183)

4.9.3 Private Military Services
A new law in France was passed on 14 April 2003 aimed at preventing French mercenary activity abroad. Any individual recruited for the specific aim of fighting in an armed conflict in exchange for personal advantage or compensation, without being a citizen of a state involved in the armed conflict, a member of the armed forces of this state or an envoy of a state other than those involved in the armed conflict, will be subject to fines and imprisonment - 5 years and 75,000 euros for an individual, 7 years and 100,000 for a recruiter and organiser of mercenary operations. (184)

A new company, "Défense Conseil International" (DCI), 49.9 per cent owned by the French government and 50.1 per cent by private investors, now provides military and security training, advice, maintenance and technical assistance. There appears to be no parliamentary control of its activities. It has the expertise of around 700 French Army or retired army personnel, and works closely with the General Arms Delegation in the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Foreign Relations. In a conference run by these two organisations with the Institute of International and Strategy Relations, the president of DCI, Yves Michaud, reacted strongly against an Amnesty International (France) speech about the need for transparency and respect of human rights.(185).

4.10 Specific recommendations

The government of France should actively promote the development of an international "Arms Trade Treaty" with provisions for arms export control based upon respect for international law, especially international human rights and humanitarian law. The French government should also takes steps to strengthen efforts to address the trade in small arms, light weapons and security equipment, and to prevent the use of indiscriminate weapons [for details on these measures, see the final recommendations at the end of this report]

In addition, the government of France should:

· Adopt a law on arms brokering including extra-territorial applicability for French nationals, and for permanent residents and registered companies in France.

· Establish an effective system of parliamentary scrutiny of arms export decisions, for instance via a regular reporting to a parliamentary committee and office.

· Publish comprehensive and timely information about all exports from France of military, security and police equipment and technology in order to allow effective parliamentary and public scrutiny to ensure they do not contribute to, or facilitate, such human rights violations.

· Prohibit the production and trade of equipment whose inherent effects result in torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and prevent the export of all other security and police equipment in cases where there is a reasonable assumption that it will be used for cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.

· Support the adoption of the European Council Regulation concerning the trade in certain equipment and products which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (COM 2002 - 770).

· Ensure that all French military assistance abroad, whether carried out by state agents or by private companies, will include practical training in human rights law and international humanitarian law. The terms of agreement for French military and security assistance, whether financial or practical, should be made public and conditional on establishing human rights safeguards in the recipient country.

5.1 Introduction

The United Kingdom is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, a member of the Group of Eight and one of the top five arms exporting nations in the world(186). Arms and security equipment produced in the UK ranges from crowd control technologies such as water cannon, plastic baton rounds and tear gas, to small arms, small arms ammunition, major weapons systems such as aircraft, helicopters and warships, and electronics, computer software and other dual-use items.

5.2 Arms Export Controls

Companies or individuals wishing to export items on the UK's Military List or Dual-Use control list must apply for an export licence from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). UK government policy states that:

'An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by the need to comply with the UK's international obligations and commitments, by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression or international aggression, by the risks to regional stability or by other considerations as described in [the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria]'(187)

The consolidated criteria for approving arms exports modify the eight criteria that were announced in 1998 when the UK agreed to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. They were announced on 26 October 2000 and consist of eight criteria against which export licence applications must be judged, including the respect for human rights in the country of final destination, the existence of conflict or tensions, the preservation of regional stability and the risk that the equipment will be diverted or re-exported to undesirable end-users(188). The consolidated criteria form the basis of 'guidance' issued by the government to inform those involved in the licensing process, and as such do not have legal force.

The legal basis for the regulation of UK export controls is the Export Control and Non-Proliferation Act 2002 which became law on 24 July 2002. The Export Control Act, which is expected to enter into force in the second half of 2003, is the result of a comprehensive overhaul of the UK export control regime following the 'arms to Iraq' scandal in the late 1980s and early 1990s investigated and reported on by Sir Richard Scott.(189)

As a result of the findings of the Scott Report and sustained pressure from civil society, the Labour government announced in its 2001 general election manifesto that it would 'legislate to modernise the regulation of arms exports, with a licensing system to control the activities of arms brokers and traffickers wherever they are located'.(190) This process, though flawed, is nearly complete. The new Export Control Act sets out in primary legislation the extent of the government's powers to impose export controls, but the actual controls to be imposed under secondary legislation are still the subject of a three month consultation period which finished on 30 April 2003. Shortcomings in the proposed regulations are discussed below (see Holes in the controls), but the bottom line is that according to government policy, UK-supplied arms and security equipment (be it through direct export, brokered transfer, overseas licensed production or other means) should not end up in the hands of those who will use it to commit human rights abuses.

In 2001 the UK granted export licences for goods on the military or dual-use equipment lists to 181 countries around the world.(191) The licences include those granted to "non-sensitive" countries such as members of the EU, OECD and most NATO countries, those granted to "sensitive" destinations which might give cause for concern on human rights grounds depending on the nature of the equipment and the end-user, and those granted to countries under embargo.(192)

5.3 Impact of the 'war on terrorism'

UK government policy states that it "will not issue an export licence if there is a clearly identifiable risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression.' The government policy states that: 'Internal repression includes extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrest, torture, suppression or major violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.'(193)

However, in 2001, many states neighbouring Afghanistan that persistently commit human rights violations were benefiting from a UK government open licence that, according to one detailed study, "appears to authorise the export of almost anything on the military list, including unlimited quantities of small arms and light weapons, light and heavy artillery, armoured vehicles including main battle tanks, combat aircraft and helicopters, and rocket systems and missiles with a range of less than 300km".(194) The countries included Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, which provided bases and other help in the US-UK led military campaign against Taleban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, as well as Turkmenistan. Amnesty International has documented serious human rights violations in these countries for many years.

Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan's appalling human rights record has deteriorated even further following an armed attack on Preside