Iran Won Upfront Sanctions Relief, But With Potential Snags
By Gareth Porter
April 04, 2015 "ICH"
- "MEE"
- The framework agreement reached on Thursday night clearly gives the P5+1 a
combination of constraints on Iran’s nuclear programme that should reassure all
but the most bellicose opponents of diplomacy. It also provides the basis for at
least a minimum of sanctions relief in the early phase of its implementation
that Iran required, but some of the conditions on that relief are likely create
new issue between Iran and the Western powers over the process. The agreement’s
dependence on decisions by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the
penchant of Israeli intelligence for discovering new evidence of illicit Iranian
activities will encourage moves to delay or obstruct relief of sanctions.
US and European officials had been telling reporters that they
would phase out their sanctions on oil and banking in return for Iranian actions
to modify its programme only gradually over several years, and made it clear
that the purpose of this strategy was to maintain “leverage” on Iran.
Iran, however, was demanding that those sanctions be lifted
immediately upon delivering on their commitments under agreement. And a source
close to Iranian negotiators told Middle East Eye that Iran was confident it
could deliver on all of the actions related to its enrichment programme and Arak
within a matter of months.
The same diplomatic conflict was being fought over UN Security
Council sanctions: Iran wanted them to end as soon as they have fulfilled its
commitments; the US and its allies were insisting that those sanctions could
only be suspended gradually on a schedule that would extend through most or all
of the initial ten-year period. And the P5+1 was also demanding that, in order
to get those sanctions lifted, Iran would have to fully satisfy the IAEA that it
had cooperated completely in regard to the “possible military dimensions” (PMD)
of its programme, and wait for the IAEA to give Iran a clean bill of health that
its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes only.
Figuring out how those pivotal issues were finally resolved
requires sifting through evidence that is not entirely clearcut. The two sides
apparently agreed that they would not release any official text of the
agreement. The joint statement by EU foreign policy chief Frederica Mogherini
and Iranian foreign minister Zarif, which is the closest thing to an official
statement, was very brief and general and failed to clarify the provisions on
sanctions removal. And the only available text of their statement, a transcript
of the English language translation of Zarif’s Farsi language version of the
statement, which was published in
the Washington Post, unfortunately fails to complete the one sentence on how the
issue of sanctions removal was removed, because it was partially inaudible.
The fact that no official text was released has meant that
press coverage of the content of the agreement has relied primarily on the much
more detailed summary of the agreement by the US State Department and on remarks
by Secretary of State John Kerry. The US interpretation of the agreement,
however, is ambiguous on some aspects of the sanctions removal issue, raising
serious questions about what was precisely agreed on.
On US and European unilateral sanctions on oil and banking,
which are of greatest short-term importance to the Iranian economy, the
documents says those sanctions “will be suspended after the IAEA has verified
that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps.” That wording appears
to suggest that the sanctions would be suspended immediately upon the
verification of the last step taken by Iran.
The US text thus seems to indicate that the Iranians won their
demand that the Western powers give up their scheme for a “gradual” or “phased”
withdrawal of sanctions. But the Iranians had wanted some of the sanctions
removed each time they completed the implementation of a commitment, and instead
the payoff comes only after the final step taken.
The US document also makes it clear that the “architecture of
sanctions” regarding US unilateral sanctions – meaning the legal and
bureaucratic systems underlying the sanctions – “will be retained for much of
the duration of the deal and allow for snap back of sanctions in the event of
significant non-performance.” The Iranians have complained that suspending
sanctions while leaving the threat of future sanctions in place has an
intimidating effect on banks and businesses regarding resumption of relations
with Iranian entities. But they didn’t have much leverage over that question.
The UN sanctions issue was resolved in a distinctly different
way. According to the US text, all the UN Security Council resolutions on Iran,
which impose various sanctions on Iran, “will be lifted with the completion by
Iran of nuclear-related actions addressing all key issues (enrichment, Fordow,
Arak, PMD and transparency).”
The implication of the US summary is that Iran would get some
sanctions relief from the UN Security Council each time it has completed the
implementation of one of its key “irreversible” commitments, as Iran had been
demanding - not only at the end of all of its performance on all of the
commitments. The inclusion of the PMD (“possible military dimensions”) of the
Iranian nuclear programme as an issue on which Iran would have to satisfy the
IAEA introduces a potential obstacle to early sanctions relief, because IAEA
Director General Yukiya Amano has said it could take several years to complete
its assessment of the issue. But at least a delay by the IAEA would not prevent
Iran from obtaining relief upon completing the other actions it would take.
Further confusing the interpretation of the agreement,
Secretary of State John Kerry referred to the United States and its
“international partners” providing sanctions relief “in phases” - a statement
that appears inconsistent with the State Department text. In a tweet on
Thursday, Zarif cited the Iran/P5+1 joint statement as saying the US would
“cease all application of ALL nuclear-related secondary economic and financial
sanctions”, and asked rhetorically, “Is this gradual?”
Judging from the US interpretative statements, Iran could get
the bulk of the sanctions relief in the initial period of implementation – much
of it within the first year or so. But that prospect would depend on the good
will of the Obama administration and the IAEA. The Obama administration may well
be inclined to facilitate the provision of early sanctions relief. But the
political dynamics swirling around US and IAEA policies toward Iran suggest that
the processes of IAEA assessment and delivery of sanctions may not go as
smoothly as Iran would hope.
Looking even further ahead, Iran is certainly concerned about
how a future US administration could and would implement the agreement. Iran was
insisting that the UN Security Council resolution repealing previous resolutions
with a new one reflecting the comprehensive agreement be passed before the
change in administration in Washington in 2017, according to the source in
contact with the negotiators. It remains unclear whether the P5+1 agreed to that
demand.
One thing the US text makes clear is that the issue of Iranian
research and development on advanced centrifuges research & development (R&D)
remains unresolved. The US statement says that for the first ten years of the
agreement, enrichment R&D will have to be consistent with maintaining breakout
timeline of at least one year - obviously based on further understandings that
have not been revealed or are yet to be negotiated. And beyond that period, the
Iranian R&D plan will be “pursuant to the JCPOA”, meaning the final Joint
Comprehensive Programme of Action” is still to be negotiated.
- Gareth Porter is
an independent investigative journalist and winner of the 2012 Gellhorn Prize
for journalism. He is the author of the newly published Manufactured Crisis: The
Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare.
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