April 17, 2015 "ICH"
- "Politico"
- The Islamic State’s lightning offensive through Iraq and Syria last year has
dominated the headlines, but the jihadist group that has won the most territory
in the Arab world over the past six months is Al Qaeda. On balance, the Islamic
State has lost territory during this period—though it still controls more
overall than Al Qaeda—most prominently, Tikrit and the southern half of the
Salah al-Din province.
What we are likely to see now is a titanic war of ideology and
tactics between two vicious, radical groups that together probably command more
prestige among Arab peoples than the weak, often delegitimized governments they
have outsmarted and outfought. Perhaps the ultimate irony is that, in an era
when the threat of terrorist violence is arguably worse than it was on the eve
of 9/11, it is Al Qaeda—a decade ago, the scourge of Sunni governments—that may
come to be seen as the more acceptable of the two by these same governments.
Here is a snapshot of the two groups’ current territorial
holdings, though these are changing all the time. In the past year, all of the
Islamic State’s geographic gains have been minor, such as the town of Baghdadi
in Iraq’s Anbar province and the Yarmouk refugee camp near Damascus, and they
have also been contested, with control of these areas fluctuating between the
Islamic State (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL)
and its enemies. In contrast, Al Qaeda’s affiliated organizations have made
striking gains, in particular in Syria and Yemen.
Why have these gains fallen somewhat under the media radar? In
part because the Islamic State’s media capabilities dwarf those of Al Qaeda,
which for years has employed a strategy that emphasizes a quiet presence and
deliberate movement and has only occasionally tried to hold and govern
territory. Frequently, its affiliates’ connections to the Al Qaeda network have
gone unannounced, and the group has even worked to hide these ties. This
strategy was effective against Western states as well as regional governments
that Al Qaeda sought to topple, as Al Qaeda placed itself during the Arab Spring
uprisings in a position where it could gain influence and destabilize recognized
governments in multiple theaters, eventually allowing itself to erect its own
governments from its enemies’ ashes.
When ISIL loudly burst onto the scene with its superior skills
at public communication, it managed to change many of Al Qaeda’s strategic
strengths into weaknesses. Essentially, ISIL transformed Al Qaeda’s deceptions
and clandestine actions from an asset for fighting the West into a liability
when it came to competing with the Islamic State for affiliated organizations
and recruits. Because Al Qaeda was quiet in comparison to the Islamic State, it
seemed not only to Westerners but even to some jihadist movement insiders that
the Islamic State was quickly becoming the only game in town.
Al Qaeda’s recent gains show, however, that the competition
between these two groups is far from over. The Islamic State's challenge to Al
Qaeda’s holdings and supremacy over the jihadist movement will certainly cause
Al Qaeda to adapt. The question is whether Al Qaeda will replicate ISIL by
becoming louder and more overt—a rival would-be caliphate, in effect—or if its
adaptation will be more unconventional, a kind of fundamentalist jiujitsu that
waits for the Islamic State to overreach and be destroyed thanks to its baleful
prominence in the fight against the West.
Either way, Al Qaeda is on the move, and we need to do a
better job of understanding the latest iteration of this threat. Al Qaeda’s
Syria affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, was at the forefront of a rebel military
offensive that captured the city of Idlib, the capital of Syria’s northwest
province of the same name, on March 28. Idlib’s fall represents one of the most
significant rebel territorial gains against Bashar Assad’s government in two
years. Consistent with Al Qaeda’s more quiet strategy, Nusra attempted to
assuage its allies’ fears that it would seek to dominate Idlib, as the group’s
emir Abu Muhammad al-Jolani stated that the city would be ruled by sharia
(Islamic law) but also called for “unity among the groups that won Idlib" and
said that they should set up an Islamic court to settle disputes.
Following the fall of Idlib, Nusra led the capture on April 1
of Syria’s Nasib border crossing with Jordan, a crucial route used to move
commercial goods from Damascus to the Gulf. Nusra and allied rebel factions also
have experienced success in Syria’s southwestern province of Dara’a, about 70
miles south of Damascus, including capturing key towns like Nawa (population
60,000), Sheikh Miskin (population 24,000) and Bosra al-Sham. In addition to its
territorial gains, Nusra destroyed the Hazzm rebel movement, which received U.S.
support, over the course of a single weekend.
Meanwhile, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the jihadist
group’s Yemeni affiliate, has capitalized on the ongoing civil conflict in Yemen
between Iranian-backed Houthi Shias, Sunni tribes and forces loyal to
president-in-exile Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. AQAP recently managed to gain control
over Yemen’s fifth-largest city, al-Mukalla, in the Hadramawt coastal region. As
part of the offensive, AQAP militants freed some 300 prisoners on April 2, while
also seizing a presidential palace and al-Mukalla’s security headquarters and
raiding the central bank.
About two weeks earlier, AQAP also overran the southern city
of al-Houta, the capital of Lahj province. The militants were able to seize the
main security barracks, the governor’s office and the intelligence headquarters
where Al Qaeda detainees were held. Though AQAP withdrew from the city the same
evening, the fact that it overran al-Houta demonstrates the group’s
capabilities. Indeed, AQAP has employed these hit-and-run tactics in other
areas. It temporarily seized an army base in the town of Bayhan on February 15,
capturing several soldiers and heavy weaponry before leaving the area.
This method of overrunning territory in Yemen without trying
to hold it is designed to destabilize the areas, creating multiple chaotic
environments that AQAP’s opponents will be unable to defend and thus allowing
AQAP to ultimately erect governing structures after its opponents are exhausted.
Additionally, AQAP has secured a base of public support in these areas from
which it can recruit and receive backing, particularly given the Houthis’
penchant to make local enemies through their heavy-handedness. All of this
prompted U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter to say of AQAP that it can be seen
“making direct gains on the ground there as they try to take territory, seize
territory in these battle lines.”
Al Qaeda’s gains have surprised many analysts. After all, the
group’s strategy is based around having an unassuming presence and conducting
some of its expansion through non-Al Qaeda brands. For example, Jabhat al-Nusra
had long been affiliated with Al Qaeda prior to its public pledge of allegiance
to Al Qaeda’s emir, Ayman al-Zawahri, in April 2013. Rather than making a noisy
entrance into Syria, Al Qaeda first quietly entrenched itself with Syrian rebel
groups. This has put Nusra in a very strong position, as it is now thoroughly
enmeshed in the broader Syrian opposition, making rebel groups willing to work
with it despite Nusra’s connection to Al Qaeda, and also making Nusra difficult
for Western powers to attack so long as they still want to support the Syrian
opposition against Assad.
Al Qaeda has disguised its presence in other areas, too. Many
analysts did not recognize Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi in Tunisia or the Caucasus
Emirate as affiliates of Al Qaeda until these groups publicly described
themselves as parts of Al Qaeda in recent months. Similarly, the Tunisian
government has presented evidence about Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia that, if
accurate, means the group has been functioning as an unacknowledged Al Qaeda
affiliate for some time.
The jihadist commentator Abdallah bin Muhammad recently wrote
an article defending this approach. He quoted Osama bin Laden’s view that
declaring an Islamic state was “political suicide,” since the West would muster
its military resources to crush that state. He described Al Qaeda’s approach of
cooperating with other Islamist groups, and even covertly participating in
political processes, as “political guerrilla warfare.” (Bin Muhammad singled out
Libya as a place where this covert political participation was occurring.)
Though Al Qaeda has controlled territory in the past
(including northern Mali in 2012-13, parts of southern Yemen in 2011-12, and
most of southern Somalia until al-Shabab was pushed back in 2011-12), it has
never been so bold as to declare a caliphate. Indeed, the group has even shied
away from declaring emirates. This is because Al Qaeda has never assessed itself
to be in a position to hold significant territory for extended periods. Al Qaeda
has instead focused on quietly building an organizational structure across
multiple countries, destabilizing those countries and preparing to erect its
governing structures amidst the chaos that it planned to unleash.
Al Qaeda’s strategy is effective in what we might call a
two-player game (Al Qaeda vs. non-Muslim powers). But with ISIL’s emergence, Al
Qaeda now faces a challenge from its own side that understands its ploys—a
noisier adversary intent on turning the group’s tendency to stay below the radar
into a weapon against it. Al Qaeda’s approach is more poorly suited to such a
competitor because the Islamic State’s emergence was not accounted for when Al
Qaeda forged its strategy for North Africa and the Levant. This makes it
possible for ISIL to throw a monkey wrench into the plans Al Qaeda had prepared
over the course of years.
***
The Islamic State’s approach to global jihadism
has been largely the opposite of Al Qaeda’s: ISIL is a
boisterous organization that constantly seeks the media spotlight and touts its
victories (real or imagined) at every opportunity. It is adept at
communications, particularly its use of social media, and emerged at a time when
the U.S. and other Western states were war-weary after 14 years of fighting in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
These dynamics allowed the Islamic State to gain a great deal
of attention during its rise. ISIL was so hungry to foster the perception that
it had momentum that the group even convinced prominent outlets like CNN and The
Associated Press that it had taken control of the northern Libyan city of Derna
when it was, in fact, only one of a number of armed players there. The Islamic
State's subsequent military push into the Libyan city of Sirte appeared
calculated to further create the impression of momentum and impress the
Nigeria-based jihadist group Boko Haram, which agreed to pledge allegiance to
the Islamic State and thus join its network. Essentially, much of the Islamic
State's strategy for expansion into Africa had been a long con designed to
falsely inflate the group’s significance on the continent. In the case of Boko
Haram, a major jihadist group was persuaded by this con game.
Also, the Islamic State immediately claimed responsibility for
the notorious Bardo museum attack in Tunis, which killed 24 people—mainly
foreign tourists—on March 18. However, Tunisian authorities believe the attack’s
primary architect was not the Islamic State but, rather, Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi,
which is aligned with Al Qaeda. If ISIL exaggerated its role in the attack, its
immediate claim represents the Islamic State again outflanking Al Qaeda because
it understands the group’s methods. The Islamic State knew from past experience
that Al Qaeda generally doesn’t claim credit for attacks while its operatives
are still at large, particularly when they are trained operatives who are
intended to survive. ISIL thus may have realized that it could issue a claim of
responsibility before Al Qaeda was prepared to do so.
Further, the Islamic State recognized that it has the media
operations of Al Qaeda—a group that has been pursuing an often covert
strategy—outgunned. Given the way media cycles work—and ISIL is very attuned to
the media cycle—its false or exaggerated claim of responsibility would dominate
the news before anybody could disprove it, at a time when Bardo remained a top
headline. Al Qaeda’s greater role wouldn’t become known until the attack was no
longer a hot news item, and, given its disadvantage in media operations, Al
Qaeda would have trouble swinging the perception of momentum back to it.
The Islamic State’s louder strategy has allowed it to snatch
up a couple of important Al Qaeda affiliates, Boko Haram and Egypt’s Ansar Bayt
al-Maqdis. ISIL's strategy for convincing Al Qaeda affiliates to align with it
has a number of components. One is to tout its own successes, sometimes
embellishing them while providing enough granular information to make the
Islamic State's exaggerations seem believable, while never admitting failure.
The group’s loud claims of success have often been echoed by the news media even
when they proved to be inaccurate, as was the case for ISIL's claims to have
conquered Derna.
The Islamic State has also employed an “out with the old, in
with the new” narrative about its competition with Al Qaeda. In several issues
of the group’s English-language magazine, Dabiq, the ISIL refers to its ability
to do three crucial things: gain territory, maintain momentum and consolidate
its gains. The group often juxtaposes its criticisms of Al Qaeda with references
to its slogan, baqiya wa tatamaddad, or remaining and expanding.
Part of the Islamic State's criticism of Al Qaeda centers on
the latter’s inability to create a caliphate over its decades-long existence. In
the first issue of Dabiq, titled “The Return of Khilafah,” the Islamic State
presented a chart (right) illustrating the five phases necessary to achieve the
caliphate. It explained that while the Islamic State had reached the fifth and
final stage, that of establishing the caliphate, Al Qaeda had “become frozen” in
the very first phase, that of hijra (emigration). In the same issue, the Islamic
State highlighted a high-level defection from Jabhat al-Nusra to the Islamic
State. In later issues of Dabiq, the Islamic State would continue to trumpet its
ability to inspire defections from Al Qaeda, both from individuals and entire
groups. In return for the loyalty of its new supporters, the Islamic State
“guarantees … constant victory and consolidation” despite being surrounded by
enemies.
The Islamic State has made several references to Al Qaeda’s
strategy in Yemen, criticizing the organization’s unwillingness to emphasize
sectarian attacks against the Houthis and stating that it would resolve Al
Qaeda’s “mistakes in creed and methodology” with its expansion into the country.
Similar to the group’s loud expansion into other theaters, ISIL’s March 20
suicide bombings targeting Houthi mosques in Sanaa, which killed 137 people,
were designed to show off its presence.
The Islamic State's model has been highly disruptive for Al
Qaeda, as it has poached two major affiliates and threatens to either capture
still others or at least inspire defections from their ranks. But ISIL's model
is also a flawed one. Not only does its declaration of a caliphate make the
group’s legitimacy hinge on the caliphate’s continued viability, but the Islamic
State has done nothing but make enemies since its advance into Iraq. Further,
the group’s emphasis on consolidation and momentum means that a failure to
maintain the momentum that it trumpets jeopardizes ISIL. Indeed, despite the
group's boisterous advance into Africa, the recent military setbacks it has
experienced in Iraq at the hands of the coalition aligned against it pose a
significant challenge.
The most obvious way for Al Qaeda to respond to the Islamic
State's rise is to become more overt than it has been. In an effort to show that
it hasn’t become obsolete, Al Qaeda could ask its affiliates to more explicitly
adopt the Al Qaeda brand and could conduct the kind of shows of force that have
made the Islamic State so prominent.
But Al Qaeda could move in an unexpected direction that, as in
the past, exploits its adversaries’ willingness to view it as a spent force.
Rather than becoming more overt, Al Qaeda could instead further de-emphasize its
brand, pushing affiliates that lack a known Al Qaeda affiliation to the fore and
getting others to shed the Al Qaeda label in order to rekindle a robust
relationship with Sunni states like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait.
And then it can wait for Islamic State to destroy itself by
drawing all the fire. ISIL has moved what political theorists call the Overton
window—a range of ideas the public will embrace—with respect to what is
“acceptable” behavior for Islamist groups, thus making Al Qaeda appear to be a
lesser evil to some Sunni states (as well as to some Western commentators). In
addition, the region’s growing Sunni-Shia competition might further open the
door to Al Qaeda’s rehabilitation—and thus to state sponsorship as it operates
under new names.
Such a strategy would be risky for Al Qaeda, as creating a
front organization for its Iraqi affiliate helped produce the Islamic State’s
ultimate break from the mother organization. But at the same time, this strategy
would be based on the same premises trumpeted by top U.S. officials such as Vice
President Joe Biden: that the coalition’s recent string of successes has
significantly weakened ISIL. In other words, Al Qaeda may assess that the
challenge posed by ISIL will recede sooner rather than later. If the Islamic
State loses the city of Mosul, many jihadists may begin to question whether it
had ever succeeded in establishing a caliphate in the first place. Despite the
risks, such a gambit by Al Qaeda could pay off. After all, this move would bank
on its adversaries failing to understand Al Qaeda’s subtle and complex
strategy—and many analysts charged with understanding the group have displayed
an overarching eagerness to declare its incapacity.
So whose strategy is more likely to succeed? The competition
between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State will be fierce, and many unexpected
developments could occur. They could be vying for supremacy over the global
jihadist movement for years. However, Al Qaeda is better positioned for the long
term, while it’s not clear that the Islamic State is prepared for a metaphorical
rainy day. Al Qaeda has survived an onslaught by the world’s sole superpower
that has lasted a decade and a half, and it isn’t clear that the Islamic State
poses the mortal challenge that some commentators believe. However, the Islamic
State's rise poses a challenge to Al Qaeda that, if correctly exploited, could
severely weaken the organization that Osama bin Laden unleashed.
This is why it is so essential that we understand what the
shape of the Al Qaeda network is, instead of analyzing the group based on what
we would like it to be. The United States has a great deal of opportunity to
exploit the cleavages between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, but if we fail to
understand the two organizations’ strengths, weaknesses and strategic and
tactical postures, the jihadist movement may emerge from this period of
competition stronger than before.
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