Darker Horizons Ahead: Rethinking the War on ‘IS’
By Ramzy Baroud
As much of the Middle East sinks deeper into
division between competing political camps, the so-called ‘Islamic
State’ (‘IS’) continues its unhindered march towards a twisted
version of a Muslim caliphate. Many thousands have lost their lives,
some in the most torturous ways, so that ‘IS’ may realize its
nightmarish dream.
Of course, violence meted out by ‘IS’ is hardly an
anomaly, considering that the group was spawned in a predominantly
violent environment. It is difficult to imagine, for example, that,
if the Syrian regime and its opposition had sought a political
solution from the early days of the uprising, ‘IS’ would have found
a stable foothold for itself in Syria.
It was during the emergence of violence by the
Syrian regime that ‘IS’, a dark force that neither believes in
democracy, civil rights nor co-existence, appeared. The same
scenario was repeated in Iraq and a host of other countries. In
an article in the Independent newspaper, Patrick
Cockburn highlighted seven countries where the influence of ‘IS’ is
great or growing: Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia
and north-east Nigeria.
The group’s “successes have been possible because
it is opposed by feeble, corrupt or non-existent governments and
armies,” he wrote.
However, very little emphasis has been placed on
the root cause of the problem and its resulting violence. Western
governments and media are not the only party guilty of discussing
the brutality of ‘IS’ outside proper political or socio-economic
contexts; Arab governments and media are particularly invested in
misconstruing the narrative. Arab countries’ official media often
misinterpret each crisis in the region in so convenient a way in
order to justify their own foreign policy or military adventures.
Yemen, which has undergone several stages of
political crises – government corruption and violence, a popular
uprising followed by a political stalemate, a civil war and finally
a regional war – is a case in point. ‘IS’ bombs targeting mostly
houses of worship, are now another staple in Yemen’s bloody
conflict.
‘IS’ thrives on conflicts and calamities that are
rooted in poor, fragmented Arab societies, where youth are
disenchanted with their governments and where they have little or no
hope for the future due to corruption and the protracted violence.
Such embitterment is a perfect recruiting ground for ‘IS’, which
enjoys multiple
revenue streams and a self-sufficient economy.
Of course, more violence is seldom the solution,
as the ‘Arab Spring’ amply demonstrated. In fact, the ferocity and
ruthlessness of the many conflicts currently under way in the region
have achieved little, aside from setting the stage for extreme
polarization in political, ideological and sectarian discourses.
While sectarianism in the region dates back many
years, its current expressions are mostly political, with
unambiguous agendas and goals. Initially, sectarianism distracted
from the genuine push for reforms and meaningful political changes
as sought by various Arab collectives. At a later stage, it served
as a space for regional rivalries between Shia-majority Iran, and
Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia.
Regardless of its ideological or religious claims,
it is evident that the violent vision of ‘IS’, if allowed to endure,
would constantly translate into greater death tolls from all sides –
Sunni, Shia, Christians, and other minority groups.
With
Turkey entering the fray now by bombing ‘IS’ targets in Syria,
the landscape of the war is stretching beyond its usual confines and
methods, into whole new territories.
After resisting pressure to join the US-led
coalition against ‘IS’, Turkey has now also agreed to allow the
coalition access to its Incirlik Airbase. Meanwhile, Turkish F-16
continued to pound ‘IS’ targets, while Turkish security reportedly
rounded up hundreds of suspected militants, not only of ‘IS’
supporters, but also Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and other
radical groups.
The local dimension in Turkey’s newly started war
on ‘IS’ should be of particular interest. While ‘IS’ is a common
denominator among various Middle East countries, each country seems
to have a local component that serves as a native host for ‘IS’, as
was the case in Libya following the NATO-led war, and of course,
Syria, Iraq, Somalia, and elsewhere.
The Egyptian case is also telling. The chaos that
preceded the ‘IS’ entry into Sinai was mostly related to internal
Egyptian affairs. The Sinai Peninsula is poor and neglected by the
Egyptian Government. For decades, it has been a testament to
corruption and unfair distribution of wealth. The Bedouin tribes in
Sinai, which were once at the forefront of the fight to liberate the
Peninsula from Israel, grew rebellious over time. The desert became
rife with drug and human trafficking. The celebrations in Sinai,
following the Egyptian revolt in Jan 2011, were short-lived and were
quickly replaced by an armed revolt, when hope turned into anger.
Until recently, the Sinai violence was largely a
local affair. Mauritanian journalist,
Sidiahmed Tfeil, argues that
Egypt’s militant factions, such as ‘Ansar Beit al-Maqdis’, resisted
calls to join al-Qaeda ranks. But their need for alliances and
support finally pushed them into the arms of ‘IS’, which now
considers the war in Sinai – led by the ‘Sinai Province’ – another
extension of its regional fight.
Tfeil lists countries where ‘IS’ is moving in full
force, flushing out al-Qaeda influence and competing with local
actors there. They include Yemen and Libya, but also Algeria, Mali,
Somalia and others.
Aside from Algeria, the same malaise of internal
conflict, external meddling and intervention seems to unite the
rest, which have either become – or teeter at the edge of being –
failed states.
In other words, the success of ‘IS’ has worked in
tandem with the failures of regional governments to offer roadmaps
out of security chaos, economic crises and chronic corruption. With
access to massive funds, ‘IS’ is able to latch on to local militant
groups which were formed as a result of real grievances, buying
leverage and loyalty, as they have done in Libya, Syria and Sinai.
Another weapon in the ‘IS’ arsenal that also
proved effective is the fact that the Middle East is split between
the Saudi and Iranian camps, and that there is not one single united
fight aimed at eliminating or, at least, slowing down the progress
of ‘IS’ armies. While ‘IS’ military camps are reportedly targeted in
Syria, other regional conflicts, especially in Yemen, are
facilitating the expansion of ‘IS’.
The war on ‘IS’ and other extremist groups cannot
possibly be won if the region remains divided, where corrupt,
violent regimes remain the only alternative to radicalization and
extremism.
It is the lack of political prospects, and the
smothering of any attempt at freedom and fair economic opportunity,
that lead to extremist violence in the first place. As long as this
reality remains intact, ‘IS’ will tragically find new recruits,
latch on to local militant groups, and continue to expand into new
borders – and even darker horizons.
– Dr. Ramzy Baroud has been writing about the
Middle East for over 20 years. He is an internationally-syndicated
columnist, a media consultant, an author of several books and the
founder of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is My Father Was
a Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story (Pluto Press, London). His
website is: www.ramzybaroud.net
.