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Stratfor Report: Military Doctrine, Guerrilla Warfare
and Counter-Insurgency
Summary
The current situation in Iraq requires revisiting the basic concepts
behind counter-insurgency. Iraq now is an arena in which
counter-insurgency doctrine is being implemented. Historically,
counter-insurgency operations by large external powers have not had
positive conclusions. Vietnam and Afghanistan are the obvious outcomes,
although there have been cases where small-scale insurgencies have been
contained. The actual scale of the Iraqi insurgency is not yet clear.
What is clear is that it is a problem in counter-insurgency, which is
itself a doctrine with problems.
Analysis
The current situation in Iraq, Chechnya and Afghanistan demonstrates the
central problem of modern warfare. Contemporary warfare was forged
during World War II when the three dominant elements of the modern
battlefield reached maturity: the aircraft carrier-submarine combination
in naval warfare, the fighter and bomber combination in aerial warfare
and the armored fighting vehicle-self-propelled artillery combination on
land. Tied together with electromagnetic communications and sensors,
this complex of systems has continued to dominate modern military
thinking.
It was not the weapons systems themselves that defined warfare. Rather
it was the deeper concept -- the idea that technology was decisive in
war. The armed forces of all major combatants in the 20th century were
organized to optimize the use of massed technology. The neatly
structured echelons in each sphere of warfare were designed not only to
manage and maintain the equipment, but also to facilitate their orderly
deployment on the battlefield. Even the emergence of nuclear weapons did
not change the basic structure of warfare. It remained technically
focused with the military organization being built around the needs of
the technology.
The modern armored division, carrier battle group and fighter or bomber
wing represent the optimized organization built around a technology
designed to assault industrialized armies and societies. They remain the
basic structure of modern warfare and they carry out that function well.
However, as the United States discovered in Vietnam and the Soviet Union
discovered in Afghanistan, this force structure is not particularly
effective against guerrilla forces.
The essential problem is that the basic unit of guerrilla warfare is the
individual and the squad. They are frequently unarmed -- having hidden
their weapons -- and when armed, they carry man-portable weapons, such
as rifles, rocket-propelled grenades or mortars. When unarmed, they
cannot be easily distinguished from the surrounding population. And they
arm themselves at a time and place of their choosing -- selected to
minimize the probability of detection and interception.
Guerrilla war, particularly in its early stages, is extremely resistant
to conventional military force because the massed systems that dominate
mainstream operations cannot engage the guerrilla force. Indeed, even if
collateral damage were not an issue -- and it almost always is -- the
mass annihilation or deportation of a population does not, in itself,
guarantee the elimination of the guerilla force. So long as a single
survivor knows the location of the weapons caches, the guerrilla
movement can readily revive itself.
Therefore, in modern military thinking, a second, parallel military
structure has emerged: counter-insurgency forces. Operating under
various names, counter-insurgency troops try to overcome the lack of
surgical precision of conventional forces. They carry out a number of
functions:
1. Engage guerrilla forces on a symmetrical level, while having access
to technologically superior force as needed.
2. Collect intelligence on guerrilla concentrations for use by larger
formations.
3. Recruit and train indigenous forces to engage guerrilla forces.
4. Organize operations designed to drive a wedge between the guerrillas
and population.
The basic units carrying out these counter-insurgency missions have two
components. First, there are Special Forces -- highly trained and
motivated light infantry -- intended to carry out the primary missions.
Second, there are more conventional forces, either directly attached to
the primary group or available on request, designed to multiply the
force when it becomes engaged.
During the first stages of U.S. involvement in Vietnam,
counter-insurgency units -- designated Special Forces or Green Berets --
carried out these operations. There were two fundamental and unavoidable
weaknesses built into the strategy.
There number of trained counter-insurgency troops available was
insufficient. The measure to be used for sufficiency is not the number
of guerrillas operating. Rather, the question is the size of the
population -- regardless of political inclination -- that must be sorted
through and managed to get through to the guerrillas. This means there
is a massive imbalance between the guerrilla force and the
counter-insurgency force that is intensified by the need for security.
Guerrillas operate in a target-rich environment. The need to provide
static security against attacks on critical targets generates an even
greater requirement for forces, although not necessarily of
counter-insurgency forces.
The huge commitment of forces needed to begin the suppression of a
guerrilla force cannot be managed by an external power. Unless the
target country is extremely small both in terms of population and
geography, the logistical costs of force projection for a purely
external force is prohibitive. That means that a successful force must
recruit and utilize an indigenous force that serves two purposes. First,
they serve as the backbone of the main infantry force, both defending
key targets and serving as follow-on forces in major engagements.
Secondly, since the counter-insurgency force normally needs intense
cultural and political guidance to separate guerrillas from the
population, these forces provide essential support -- from interpreters
to intelligence -- for the counter-insurgency team.
This leads directly to the second problem. The guerrillas can easily
penetrate an indigenous force, particularly if that force is being
established after the guerrilla operation has commenced. Recruiting a
police and military force after the guerrillas are established
guarantees that guerrilla agents will be well represented among the
ranks. Since it is impossible to distinguish between political views
using technical means of intelligence, there is no effective way to
screen these out -- particularly if the first round of recruitment and
organization is being carried out by the external power.
This means that from the beginning of operations, the guerrillas have a
built-in advantage. Having penetrated the indigenous military force, the
guerrillas will have a great deal of information on the tactical and
operational level. At that point, the very sparseness of the guerrilla
movement starts to work to its advantage. Hidden in terrain or
population, armed with information on operations, guerrillas can either
decline combat and disperse, or seize the element of surprise.
The reverse always has been the intention for counter-insurgency forces,
the idea being that they would mirror the guerrillas' capability. This
sometimes happened on a tactical level. However, the ability of foreign
forces to penetrate guerrilla movements on the operational level was
severely limited for obvious reasons. It was tough for an American to
masquerade as a Vietnamese. It could potentially be done, but not on a
decisive scale. That means that penetration on the operational level --
knowing plans and implementation -- depended on indigenous allies whose
reliability was often questionable. Therefore, the ability of the
counter-insurgency forces to mimic the guerrillas was constrained. In
neither Vietnam nor Afghanistan was the operational intelligence of the
counter-insurgency forces equal to that of the guerrillas.
The normal counter to this was to use imprecise intelligence and
compensate for it with large-scale operations. So, one counter for not
having precise knowledge of the location of guerrillas was to use large,
mobile formations to move in and occupy a region, in an attempt to
identify, engage and destroy guerrilla formations. This had two
consequences. First, it meant a violation of the rules of the economy of
forces as battalions were used to search for squads. In this case,
massive superiority in forces did not necessarily translate to strategic
success. The guerrillas, disaggregated in the smallest practicable unit,
could not be strategically crushed.
Second, the nature of the operation created inevitable political
problems. Operations of this sort were not dominated by specialized
counter-insurgency units, which were at least trained in discriminatory
warfare -- trying to distinguish guerrillas from neutral or friendly
population. By the nature of the operation, regular troops were used to
seize an area and search for the guerrillas. Since the area was
frequently populated and since the attacking troops had little ability
to discriminate, it resulted frequently in the mishandling of civilian
populations, hostility against the attackers and sympathy for the
guerrillas. Then, counter-insurgency troops, already handicapped in
their own way, were bought in to pacify the region. The result was
unsatisfactory, to say the least.
This points to the essential problem of guerrilla war. At its lowest
level -- before it evolves into a stage where it has complex logistical
requirements supplied from secure areas in and out of the country --
guerrilla war is political rather than military in nature. The paradox
of guerrilla war is that it is easier to defeat militarily once the
guerrilla force has matured into a more advanced, and therefore more
vulnerable, entity. However, by the time it has evolved, the likelihood
is that the political situation has deteriorated sufficiently that even
heavy attrition will be overcome through massive recruitment within the
disaffected population.
The loss of the political war makes a war of attrition extremely
difficult. As both the Soviets and Americans discovered, the ability of
the outside force to absorb casualties is inferior to that of the
indigenous force -- if the indigenous force is politically motivated.
Since the process of suppressing early stage guerrilla movements almost
guarantees the generation of massive political hostility, the later war
-- which should be favorable to the counter-insurgency forces -- turns
out to be impossible to win. Even extreme attrition ratios are overcome
by recruitment.
The dilemma facing the United States in Iraq is to surgically remove the
guerrilla force from the population without generating a political
backlash that will fuel a long-term insurgency regardless of levels of
attrition. This is much easier to say than to do. The heart of the
matter is intelligence -- to deny the guerrillas intelligence about U.S.
operations while gathering massive intelligence about the guerrillas.
The only way to win the war is to reverse, at the earliest possible
phase, the intelligence equation. The guerrillas must be confused and
blinded; the Americans must maintain transparency of the guerrillas.
That is clearly what the U.S. now is attempting to do. It is limiting
its search and seize operations while massively increasing its
intelligence capabilities. This is happening both in terms of human
intelligence and technical means of intelligence. It is unclear whether
this will work. Human intelligence is political in nature and requires
extreme expertise with the culture without dependency on indigenous
elements that might be unreliable. It is very difficult for someone from
Kansas, however gifted in the craft of intelligence, to make sense of a
tactical situation -- and at this point, the guerrillas present only a
tactical face.
It is nevertheless the key to any hope for success. It also is an
operation that will take an extended period of time. The U.S. hope
obviously is that by curtailing its own large-scale operations and
moving into an intense intelligence phase, the guerrilla operations will
alienate the population. It is possible but difficult. It also will take
time. But it is clear that the United States is in the process of
rewriting parts of the counter-insurgency book and, therefore, is
beginning to write a new -- and as yet uncertain -- chapter in military
history.
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