| Ayatollah's
killing: Winners and losers
By Pepe Escobar
09/01/03: (Asia Times) PARIS - Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim,
ripped to pieces by the Volkswagen car bomb in front of the sacred
Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf which killed 125 and left more than 230
wounded after last Friday's prayers, was the quintessential martyr
of the current Iraqi jihad. All that was left of him was a charred
fragment of muscle which was sent to Baghdad for DNA
identification. A prominent cleric of a Shi'ite culture deeply
imbued with the concept of martyrdom, fate in the end dictated
that al-Hakim would tragically fall to a jihad conducted by Sunni
Muslims against a foreign invader just because he was kind of a
pacifist: although he wanted the end of the American occupation,
he was against armed resistance under the current circumstances.
No Shi'ite would dream of carrying out such blasphemous violence
on the doorstep of the Imam Ali Shrine, the third most sacred site
for Shi'ites after Mecca and Medina. Grand Ayatollah al-Hakim was
the victim of an assassination - as was the UN's special
representative Sergio Vieira de Mello. The hundreds of dead and
wounded in the horrific Najaf massacre were just - to borrow
Pentagon terminology - "collateral damage". Al-Hakim may
have become another high-profile victim - like Vieira de Mello -
of what Iraqis are now calling "the Saddam network",
which has already sabotaged oil pipelines and bombed the Jordanian
embassy and the UN compound in Baghdad.
But what if this was the work of somebody else? European
intelligence sources in Brussels tell Asia Times Online that
ordinary Iraqis are becoming increasingly convinced the bombings
are part of a sinister American conspiracy to plunge the country
into total chaos and so force the UN to take responsibility for
mopping-up operations, thus saving American face. Others blame
Israel's Mossad, which infiltrated Iraq even before the invasion.
Israel - with a history of political assassinations - would be the
big loser in the event of an Islamic government coming to power in
Iraq. Al-Hakim, a key political player, wanted a moderate, Shi'ite-led,
Islamic regime for the country.
A few days before his death, he was still telling a Spanish
newspaper he hoped the American-appointed governing council would
become representative, "but for the moment nothing very real
has come out of it". He believed the Constitutional Assembly
which will write the future Iraqi constitution should be
democratically elected, "otherwise the constitution would be
rejected". And he stressed that "the occupying troops
are neither qualified nor capable of resolving our problems, which
are very serious and could provoke a social explosion. In which
case, they would be responsible." He was a moderate, and he
had a broad constituency, but he was a post-Saddam
leader-in-the-making who did not please either the Americans, the
secular "Saddam network" or Wahhabi jihadis.
The resistance against the US occupation has been carried out by
myriad groups, which call themselves names like Iraqi Resistance
Brigade, Army of Mohammed, Muslim Fighters of the Victorious
Sects, General Command of the Iraqi Armed Resistance and
Liberation Forces, and Islamic Armed Group of al-Qaeda (Fallujah
branch). They have upgraded from attacking and ambushing American
soldiers to organizing complex operations like the UN and Imam Ali
Shrine bombings. The Americans at first thought they were fighting
a hard core of 600 former Republican Guards and Saddam fedayeen
with up to 11,000 "reserves". But now the hard core is
estimated at at least 7,000, all responding to local command and
self-sufficient in terms of funds, weapons and military know-how.
It's wrong to view the resistance as "remnants of Saddam's
regime", as the Pentagon insists on doing. The Saddam
remnants - former soldiers and Ba'athists - are joined by any
number of Iraqis angered by the occupation, and of course by
Saudi, Syrian, Egyptian, Yemeni and northern African jihadis, many
of them Arab-Afghans trained in the Afghan jihad. In this
particular sense, we are finally able to see something of the
missing link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda that the White
House and the Pentagon were so desperate to announce in the run up
to the war. But Saddam Hussein seems to have been clever enough to
prepare the conditions for the linkage to emerge only after the
war, as a time bomb designed to blow up in the Pentagon's face.
It's the deadliest of combinations, says a European intelligence
official monitoring global terror: "The former Republican
Guards, Ba'ath Party officials and members of security services
know the terrain, know everybody and have loads of cash. And the
jihadis not only focus on the special incentive of fighting the
American infidels on sacred Arab soil: they have the necessary
military knowhow." In the case of the Najaf bombing, there's
the added bonus of a meeting of minds. Saddam's secular regime and
its sycophants persecuted the Shi'ites, and the jihadis are
essentially Wahhabis or crypto-Wahhabis, for whom the Shi'ites are
as perverse an enemy as the Jews and the Christians.
Did Saddam plan all this? Of course he did - at least a great deal
of it. He knew he would lose the war, but he had enough time to
conceive a three-pronged form of resistance: nationalist,
Ba'athist and Islamist. European intelligence knows that months
before the US invasion Saddam had already distributed reserves of
troops, weapons and cash around Iraq. He himself recruited the key
guerrilla chiefs, whose ages range from 18 to 35. He conceived
them as operating independently, but with himself as
commander-in-chief. The Saddam view of the resistance is not
necessarily shared by most of the resistance groups, which
consider the Ba'athists a bunch of losers. These groups - all of
them tribal - are essentially nationalist: they are defending
Iraqi pride and Iraqi land. But in Saddam's scenario they are also
useful as added firepower and a nuisance factor against the
invaders.
After Baghdad fell without a fight on April 9, scores of Ba'ath
Party cadres took refuge in Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Libya,
Morocco and Mauritania. The Ba'ath Party has operated cells in
these countries since 1968. The idea - brilliant in itself - was
to have these cadres rally the Arab masses in these countries to
join a jihad against the superpower which dared to occupy sacred
Arab land. The masses may not be responding yet - but certainly
professional jihadis already have. With the Najaf bombing, the
"Saddam network" has scored another big hit: it has
managed in one stroke to simultaneously divide the Shi'ites (62
percent of the Iraqi population) and hurl hundreds of thousands of
them into the streets chanting anti-US slogans. Ayatollah
al-Hakim's brother is a member of the American-imposed interim
governing council, which has absolutely no power and is considered
a sham by the majority of Iraqis. Al-Hakim's Supreme Council for
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) has been vilified by other
Shi'ite factions because it is - at least for the moment - against
armed resistance. And many Shi'ites also remember very well that
SCIRI backed Iran in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war.
As Asia Times Online has reported, holy Najaf is at the dead
center of what happens next in Iraq. Immediately after the fall of
Baghdad, first the imam at Ali's Shrine, Dr Haider Alkelydar, and
then Shi'ite cleric Abdul Majid al-Khoei, who returned from exile
in London, were assassinated. As chaos takes over, Shi'ites are
increasingly in favor of armed resistance against the Americans.
But the top de facto religious authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,
does not want to get drawn into any political wrestling match: he
is still adopting a "wait and see" attitude. The one
character who has everything to gain from al-Hakim's murder is
young Moqtada al-Sadr, extremely respected because he is the son
of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr. Moqtada al-Sadr favors
armed struggle - right now - and that's exactly why he would be a
useful ally to both the "Saddam network" and the jihadis.
Their objective is total confrontation with the Americans - with
no space for appeasers like the UN's Vieira de Mello or SCIRI's
al-Hakim.
European diplomats are very cynical about the possibility of the
neo-conservatives controlling the Bush administration swallowing
their pride and turning to the UN for help. Even the UN is facing
a no-win situation, and the diplomats in New York and Geneva know
it. In the unlikely event blue helmets were deployed in Iraq, it's
practically certain they would be regarded by most of the
population as the tail end of the US occupying serpent. Especially
if Washington insists on not relinquishing one inch of control of
the whole, disastrous operation. So this is the gift of
Washington's neo-conservatives to the world: instead of a
democratic Iraq, a putrid state infected by a guerrilla virus and
on the verge of a devastating civil and ethnic war.
Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Ltd.
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