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Halabja: How Bush Sr.
Continued to Support Saddam After the 1988 Gassing of
Thousands And Bush Jr. Used it As a Pretext For War 15 Years
Later
After the Halabja gassing President Bush I and Sen. Bob
Dole fought sanctions against Iraq even though the gassing
killed thousands and was reportedly carried out in part by
U.S.-made helicopters. From 1989 to 1990 the gassing was
mentioned about once a month in major press outlets, yet in
the three weeks leading up to the 2003 invasion, the press
mentioned it 150 times. In 15 years the gassing went from an
untold story to a pretext for invasion.
TRANSCRIPT
AMY GOODMAN: Well, you can stay with us as we move
on to our next subject, which is the issue of weapons of mass
destruction. And now, hearing both general Colin Powell
yesterday on “this week with George Stephanopoulos” on
ABC, and Condoleezza Rice, both on CNN. And in this example,
this clip from Fox news, as they tried to distance themselves
from the issue of weapons of mass destruction being found now
in Iraq. They’re going back in time. This is Condoleezza
rice.
[TAPE]
CONDOLEEZA RICE: The president took a very bold and
decisive action. Everybody knows that the world is much better
off with Saddam Hussein gone. Nobody wants to argue that we
would have been better off to leave him in place. Given that
this brutal dictator is gone, this man who used weapons of
mass destruction in really one of the great crimes against
humanity in this century.
AMY GOODMAN:So there we have it. Condoleezza Rice
talking about the example of Halubjah.
Now, let’s talk about Halubjah, March of 1988. And what
exactly happened there. We’re joined out phone, in addition
to Ray Mcgovern, by another C.I.A. analyst for a number of
years, Steven Pelletiere, as well as John Stauber. He’s the
co-author of Weapons of Mass Deception. We’re going
back in time now, we’re going back 15 years. John Stauber,
you to a very interesting chronology in your book of what
happened after the people of Halubjah were gassed. Can you
describe the incident and then tell us in terms of what U.S.
bush administration, the first bush, said.
JOHN STAUBER: Well, Amy, let me first start by
saying that even I have been absolutely stunned by the
statements of Colin Powell and Condoleezza rice, especially
the secretary of state who went to Halubjah recently and said
the U.S. should have acted sooner there because of what
occurred there, which is the gassing of thousands of men,
women, and men. And here is the ultimate hypocrisy. I think
this has become the primary justification now for the war. But
the event occurred in 1988. The chemicals were supplied by the
Reagan administration. And after the gassing of civilians in
Halubjah, there was a bipartisan effort to try to pass the
1988 prevention of genocide act. That act was killed by Colin
Powell, who was Ronald Reagan’s secretary of—or was Ronald
Reagan’s national security advisor, and he led the effort to
kill the prevention of genocide act introduced after Halubjah.
I mean, chemical Ali, who we’re hearing so much about, was
essentially our ally during that time. And if history were
truthfully told, we would probably be referring to Colin
Powell as chemical Colin. Now, what happened after Halubjah,
of course, just a couple years later, Saddam Hussein
apparently thought he was so well loved by what was then the
bush administration succeeding the Reagan administration that,
of course, he invaded Kuwait, took over those oil fields, and
soon learned that the bush administration would not allow
that. In order to galvanize U.S. support for a war against our
former ally, Saddam Hussein, the bush administration working
with a front group funded by the Kuwaiti royal family called
citizens for a free Kuwait staged a stunt in October of 1990,
a hearing before the congressional human rights caucus, at
which they were investigating Iraqi atrocities. Well, there
were plenty of Iraqi atrocities, such as the most stunning
atrocity, the gassing at Halabjah. But rather than refer to
events in which the U.S. Reagan administration was complicit,
they concocted a phony atrocity, and that, of course, was the
“Nayirah Testimony” where this tearful young girl said she
saw Iraqi soldiers rip babies out of incubators and leave them
to die in occupied Kuwait. That was probably the turning
point. That testimony, which was repeated over and over on the
news was probably the turning point in the U.S. Senate voting
to support the first gulf war. Of course, it came out a year
later, although I think most Americans still do not know this,
that that testimony was completely false, that anonymous young
girl was actually a member of the Kuwaiti royal family. Her
family, the Kuwaiti ambassador to the U.S., was in the room. A
Llyod Fitz-Pegado Vice President of the Hill & Knowlton,
which received over $10 million from Kuwaitis, to set up the
front group, coached that young girl in her false testimony.
And it’s very interesting, as we wrote, I wrote “weapons
of mass deception” to go back and look at how the first gulf
war, there was almost no mention of Halabjah because, of
course, there was no desire on the part of the bush
administration to draw attention to a genocidal event in which
they had been complicit. Instead, in order to demonize Saddam
Hussein, the former bush ally, they repeated over and over the
baby killing charge, the phony charge. Now flash ahead to the
current situation and what we see is that the true story that
this was a staged and phony event is not in the news.
What’s in the news today and has become sort of the
primary argument for a wider war was a good thing is Halabjah.
And the real crank up for publicizing Halabjah began in
September of 2002, just as the current bush administration was
doing its so-called product launch for the war in Iraq. Now,
we’ve gone back and actually analyzed very carefully the
number of reportings both in the Halabjah with the search
program.
And I won’t spit out the statistics stinks, they’re in
our book, but they ignored Halabjah in which the U.S. was
complicit, provided the weapons of mass destruction, and then
Colin Powell led the lobby campaign to kill the prevention of
genocide act. More recently, I think they’ve got the
American public duped and confused into thinking that Halabjah
was some sort of recent event because they are now repeating
the Halabjah story over and over, and it’s been echoed over
and over in the news since September 2002. But bottom line
here, if chemical Ali goes on trial, I think probably chemical
Colin should be on trial with him.
AMY GOODMAN: Well It t sounds like they would not be
the only ones on trial in a just world, if Halabjah is the
example being used for the killing of innocent civilians. When
we come back, I’d like you to actually give the numbers of
the times Halabjah was raised right after it happened through
the gulf war, and then how often it has been raised now. But
what about that trip in 1990 that senator Alfonse D’Amato
took—rather, senator Robert Dole took? Alfonse D’Amato was
raising this issue early on. But senator Robert Dole went with
four other senators to meet with Saddam Hussein in northern
Iraq, and they fought to prevent sanctions from being applied
to Saddam Hussein. This was after Halubjah. It was senator
Robert dole, then senator-Alan Simpson of Wyoming, senator
Frank Murkowski of Alaska, and senator Howard Metzenbaum of
Ohio. Stay with us.
[MUSIC BREAK]
AMY GOODMAN: You’re listening to Democracy Now!,
the war and peace report. I’m Amy Goodman. As we talk about
Halabjah. We’re talking about Halabjah because that is being
used more and more-being raised- as the reason the U.S.
invaded Iraq. No, not in 1988 when the Kurds were gassed in
Halabjah, not in 1989, not in 1990 or 1991 when the U.S.
bombed Iraq. But being used now in 2003. Secretary of state
Colin Powell went to Iraq in the last few weeks, and he
visited the site of the mass graves in a museum dedicated to
the 5,000 people who lost their lives in the 1988 chemical
attack. A reminder, he said, of why the United States went to
war to oust Saddam Hussein’s regime. John Stauber is the
author of Weapons of Mass Deception: the uses of propaganda
in Bush’s war on Iraq.”
We’re also joined by Steven Pelletiere, who is a former
C.I.A. analyst who was in charge of Iraq years ago at the time
of the Halabjah gassing, as well as Ray McGovern’ remaining
on the line with us, a longtime C.I.A. analyst for more than a
quarter of a century under the director of central
intelligence George Bush and also when George Bush was Vice
President was one of his daily briefers. But, I just wanted to
get those numbers John of how often in that Nexis Lexis search
how often Halabjah was raised after the actual gassing, the
Persian gulf war, and now.
JOHN STAUBER: During the buildup to “Operation
Desert Storm”, and I’m just reading right out of our work
here in “Weapons of Mass Deception,” the first Bush
administration avoided mentioning the Halabja incident
didn’t mention it, reporters seldom mentioned it either. The
search of the Lexis Nexis news database shows that Halabjah
was mentioned in 188 news stories in the U.S. in 1988, the
year it occurred. It was rarely mentioned, however, in
subsequent years. 20 stories in 1989, and only 29 in 1990, the
year that Saddam invaded Kuwait. Between the invasion of
Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and the end of operation desert storm
on February 27, 1991, Halabjah received only 39 mentions. And
during the entire following decade, it barely averaged 16
mentions per year. During the presidential election year of
2000, Halabjah got 10 mentions. The story didn’t really
begin to circulate again in the U.S. media until September
2002 when the George W. Bush administration began its public
push for war with Iraq. After that, mentions began to increase
sharply. The Halabjah incident was mentioned 57 times in the
month of February 2003 alone.
In March, the month the war began, it was mentioned 145
times. By then, nearly 15 years had passed, memories had
faded, and it was safe to talk about Saddam’s gassing of
Iraqi citizens. Only a few of the journalists who wrote about
Halabjah in 2002 and this year bothered to mention that Saddam
committed his worst atrocities while the president’s father
was showering him with financial aid. So there you have it.
Now Halabjah is probably one of the few foreign words
pronounceable by most people in the U.S., but I suspect if a
survey were done, they would tell you that, indeed, this must
have been a recent occurrence, not something that took place
15 years ago with the complicity and collusion and cover-up by
Colin Powell and the Reagan administration.
AMY GOODMAN: Let’s bring Steven Pelletiere into
this conversation. You were working at the C.I.A. at the time
of the Halabjah gassing, is that right?
STEPHEN PELLETIERE: That’s right.
AMY GOODMAN: And can you tell us what you understood
at the time happened there? You’ve raised some very serious
questions.
STEPHEN PELLETIERE: Yeah, I can tell you, and it’s
not just that I was working at the agency at the time. It’s
that after I left the agency to become senior professor at the
war college, I was passed by the army to specifically
investigate Halabjah. With all due respect to your guest,
Stauber, in my opinion, he’s got it wrong. We know the
circumstances under which the alleged attack took place. It
was a battle. The Iranians had infiltrated the town and were
attempting to take it over so they could use it as a staging
ground to perpetuate—to perpetrate an invasion into Iraq.
The Iraqi commander ordered the use of chemical weapons in
order to drive the Iranians out of the town. Those chemicals
were delivered by mortar shells. Chemical Ali had nothing to
do with this operation. That was a decision of the Iraqi
commander on the spot, and he took that decision because it
was essential to regain the town. Now, the Kurds that were
killed, and it’s an unfortunate expression, collateral
damage. The Iraqis were not aiming at the Kurds, they were
aiming at the Iranians. And there was a report done by the
D.I.A. at the time, which also investigated it, in which the
D.I.A. determined because of the condition of the bodies that
the Kurds had been killed by Iranian gas, not by Iraqi gas.
And they determined this because the extremities were blue,
and that indicated a cyanide-based gas, and the Iraqis
didn’t have it.
Finally, the journalists who appeared on the spot and
investigated it and took those awful pictures which everyone
has seen, never counted more than a few score of bodies, and
the original stories, and you can go back and look at the
Christian Science Monitor and other reports of what went on by
reporters in the town, all uniformly saying a couple of
hundred people killed, now that’s been swollen to the point
where we’re now claiming between 3,000 and 5,000.
Now, the problem here is that there seems to be an attempt
by and it’s unfortunate, because it seems to be coming
mostly from the peace community—to characterize Halabjah as
an instance of Washington’s duplicity because they supported
Iraq, and therefore, didn’t mention the atrocity when it
occurred. But then later on, when they went to war with Iraq,
they dug it up. The implication is that, in fact, it was an
atrocity all along. It’s quite true that the administration
has attempted to exploit Halabjah to bring, to take the United
States to war, and that’s dreadful. That’s a lie. Because,
in fact, the circumstances surrounding Halabjah had been
completely distorted.
AMY GOODMAN: I’m looking at a series of pieces
that Henry Weinstein of the Los Angeles Times did way
back in 1991 about the vehicles that were used to, among other
things, perhaps deliver that gas attack. And it says in 1982,
the Reagan administration excused Iraq from the list of
international terrorists that had been a barrier to virtually
all trade with Baghdad. The next year, the U.S. began
providing agricultural credits to allow Iraq to buy American
rice and grain. In 1984, former diplomatic relations were
restored for the first time in 17 years. Let’s remember,
when they were restored, they were restored when Reagan-Bush
envoy Donald Rumsfeld went to Saddam Hussein in Iraq, shook
his hand, and even when they knew at the time that he had been
using chemical weapons, in a U.N. report, as well as a state
department report, they normalized relations. In 1985, that
was my insert, going back to Henry Weinstein’s piece, in
1985, U.S. companies were invited to the first Iraq-sponsored
business exhibition in Baghdad. Trade between U.S. firms in
Iraq began as soon as Baghdad escaped the terrorist list.
First on Hussein’s shopping list was helicopters. He bought
60 Hughes helicopters and trainers with little notice.
However, a second order of 10 twin-engine Bell “Huey”
helicopters like those used to carry combat troops in Vietnam,
prompted congressional opposition in August 1983. Congressman
Berman complained in a letter to Secretary of State George P.
Shultz that it had been a “serious mistake to take Iraq off
the terrorism list” and warned that “American helicopters
will fuel the Iran-Iraq conflict.” Nonetheless, the sale was
approved. Hussein was still buying helicopters in 1984 when
Berman again urged Schulz to intervene. This time Iraq sought
45 Bell 214ST helicopters that originally were designed for
military purposes. U.S. officials said Iraq proposed using
some of them to fury V.I.P.’s and equip others for
crop-dusting. It then went on to say that the procedural
changes in Washington came after the helicopter sales were
completed. In 1988, Kurdish civilians were attacked with
poisonous gas that were Iraqi helicopters and planes. U.S.
intelligence sources say they believe that the American-built
helicopters were among those dropping the deadly bombs. While
officials in the U.S. were debating the wisdom of helicopter
sales to Iraq, Hussein was undertaking a massive global
weapons oppositions program of far greater consequence. Your
comment on that, Steven Pelletiere.
STEPHEN PELLETIERE: My comment on that is this—put
it into context. What was the American position when the
Iran-Iraq war broke out? We obviously were against Khomeini
and obviously against Iran. First of all, we’d just gone
through the hostage ordeal. But beyond that, what was the aim
of Khomeini? The aim of Khomeini was to exploit the Iranian
revolution to Iraq and into the Saudi peninsula and into
Kuwait. He was appealing,to Shias and the Shias are extensive
all through Iraq, Kuwait, into Saudi Arabia, to rise up and
revolt against their governments. At that time, those
governments were supplying us with oil. It was not in our
interest to see Khomeini take over Saudi Arabia. We sent
Steven Solarz, then out to Iraq --
AMY GOODMAN: Then Congressman of New York –
STEPHEN PELLETIERE: To Baghdad in 1983, and Solarz
met with Saddam Hussein, and Saddam Hussein agreed that he
would discontinue all of his activities with various
terrorists organizations.
AMY GOODMAN: I wanted to bring John Stauber back
into this conversation, because I know what Steven Pelletiere
is putting forward is quite controversial. John?
JOHN STAUBER: It is controversial. I do want to
respond to it. You know, Steven wrote an op Ed in the “New
York Times” on January 31 where I think most people first
became aware of this argument titled “the war crime or an
act of war”. And that precipitated a letter from Kenneth
Roth, the executive director of Human Rights Watch, who took
sharp disagreement to what Steven has said and how he’s
portrayed Halabjah and I’ll just quote briefly --
STEPHEN PELLETIERE: But also, Kenneth Roth before
the war advocated our going to war with Iraq.
AMY GOODMAN: Let -
STEPHEN PELLETIERE: And Human Rights Watch now has a
team out there looking for mass graves, and as far as I’m
aware, they haven’t found them. That is mass graves
specifically associated with these alleged attacks on the
Kurds.
AMY GOODMAN: Let John Stauber finish his point.
JOHN STAUBER: Thank you, Amy. I think it would be
very useful to probably further examine this having Steven on
with someone from Human Rights Watch. But the Human Rights
Watch position is this—Human Rights Watch, researchers and
I’m quoting from their letter interviewed survivors from
Halabjah and reviewed 18 tons of Iraqi state documents to
establish beyond doubt that the attack was carried out by
Iraq. Iraqi forces used mustard and nerve gas, as well as mass
executions to kill some 100,000 Kurds in the genocidal 1988
campaign.
STEPHEN PELLETIERE: I can speak to each one of those
claims
AMY GOODMAN: Well, we’re going to continue this
discussion, because we’ve come to the end of this program,
but we will do it very soon. I want to thank you all for being
with us.
STEPHEN PELLETIERE: Oh, my God, Amy, you’re
cutting me off?
AMY GOODMAN: I am because the show is ending.
We’ll have you back. I want to thank you for being with us,
Steven Pelletiere, John Stauber, and Ray Mcgovern. Please go
to our web site for more information at democracynow.org. This
is clearly an issue that needs further investigation. You can
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