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Iraq: The Authoritarian Drift Of The Bremer Machine

By Christopher Ayad

The Coalition Authority wants to concentrate all powers. It is becoming the object of every complaint.

Libération (Paris) 
Translated by Mark K. Jensen: http://www.liberation.fr/page.php?Article=156820
November 11, 2003

The work-yard of Iraqi reconstruction is a little like the story of the restrooms of the Republican palace. The Americans quickly stopped them up by using lots of toilet paper too thick for the Iraqi pipes. Instead of repairing them or adapting to them, the preferred installing brand-new ones, in the parking lot. Everything is shiny, the paper is soft, they're air-conditioned. Not one Iraqi goes inside... except with a bucket and broom.

GLEANING

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the true seat of power in Iraq, works more or less the same way. This body, run by Paul Bremer, the American head civil administrator, wants "to manage everything, direct everything right down to the smallest details, alone, without trusting Iraqis and without any on-the-ground contact," explains one European diplomat. "It's no surprise they run into problems. Then they come to see us without deigning to ask for advice, but hoping they'll glean some ideas, some formulas." Even if no one
speaks frankly, disarray is visible in the rare encounters one has with officials.

The most striking sign of general discouragement: most of the civilians working for the CPA do not renew their contract beyond the three months for which they were hired. "I don't want to end my days here," Jamie, a young British civil servant, blurts out. "It's not worth it. Two more weeks and I'll be seeing my pals again, Inch'Allah."

The CPA inhabits the former Republican palace, an immense complex stretching for several kilometers along the banks of the Tigris, in the center of Baghdad. Bremer's offices are situated in the heart of the "green zone." Everywhere else, it's the "red zone," to be avoided. The green zone resembles those wagons circles to avoid the redskins' attacks. Those who work there have taken to wearing pioneer dress: imitation combat uniforms, with the shirtsleeves rolled up. "This is where the new Iraq is being built," proudly proclaims James Smith, one of the many spokespersons of the Authority, whose sudden feeling of the need to communicate is probably a measure of his superiors' nervousness.

The CPA is a strange place that has no connection with Iraqi reality but where everything that happens in the country is decided. Once you're in the "green zone," you leave Iraq: muscular joggers are gasping in the shade of trees or go take a dip in the pool. The whole complex is so big that some people get lost. In front of the Ibn Sina Hospital, where American military doctors are in charge, a woman soldier on duty doesn't know where Bremer's offices are. "Paul who?" The name of the head of the CPA, who is supposed to represent
George Bush, means nothing to her.

"SEND US AN E-MAIL."

His offices are in the back, in an immense palace beneath four enormous busts of Saddam Hussein, the last ones in Baghdad, bedecked with strange crested helmets. Once inside the entrance, you know where you are: no smoking allowed. A thousand men and women work at the CPA. That's not many, given the size of the job. They scarcely go into the streets of the city: they have too much work, there's not enough security. These corridors shelter a small city: there's a supermarket, a shop for "oriental" souvenirs. A gigantic
drawing-room, decorated with frescoes showing Scud missiles and the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, has been turned into a chapel: an altar of considerable size stands next to a tiny little prayer rug for Muslims. The chaplain's assistant offers visitors the possibility of being photographed with one of Saddam's hats and one of Uday's swords. Despite the desire to feature the 19 nationalities working for the CPA, it remains above all an American administration, with characteristic tics and foibles. Every oral request is answered with a "send us an e-mail" that's right up there on a par with Arab bureaucracies.

However much officials insist on the fact that it's a Pole, Marik Belka, who organized the Madrid donors' conference, 70% of the CPA's employees are Americans, 20% British, and 7% Australians. Thus, the top advisor to the Justice Ministry is a retired American colonel, assisted by some big names that he has trouble following: an Australian professor, a Spanish judge, a British constitutionalist. "The Americans have only one way of working," one of these confides: "their way." Taking the Iraqi file from secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld and giving it to national security advisor Condoleezza Rice has something to do with this sort of criticism of the Pentagon's stifling desire to control, and its inadaptedness.

BRUSHING ASIDE

Charles Heathley, spokesperson for the CPA, brushes aside the failures and the fumbling. "It took ten years to rebuild Germany after the war. Here, we're way ahead. There's already a police force on the street, a new currency." Despite the big speeches about transferring power to Iraqis, Iraq remains under strict control. The top advisors manage the ministries directly, which means all documents have to be translated into English, slowing down the decision-making process. Not to mention the muffled behind-the-scenes struggle between the CPA and the Iraqi Provisional Governing Council (though this was appointed by Bremer), who vie with one another to control the ministries as well as the power to "legislate." "If the Council hasn't succeeded in figuring out where it stands, it's not our fault," one of Bremer's close aides complains. "It shouldn't spend its time drowning itself in details." The relations between Bremer and the Council resemble more and
more the relations between the Elysée [the residence of the French president] and Matignon [the residence of the French prime minister] during a period of cohabitation [when the offices are held by members of different parties]. Except that this duel is being conducted over a barrel of gunpowder.

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Translated by Mark K. Jensen: E-mail: jensenmk@plu.edu